

# STUDY FOLDER

## Bonaparte in Italy

### SCENARIOS

#### How to Set-Up the Game.

Choose the scenario to be played. One Player assumes command of the French Army, and the other Player assumes the command of the Austrian Armies, each represented by the various combat units and Leaders. The cardboard pieces should be punched out of the unit counter sheets. The variously colored units represent forces of the various nationalities. The French Player always controls all French units (only); his opponent always controls all Austrian and Piedmontese (Italian) units.

#### Organization Displays.

Each Player has a group of three Organization Displays, divided as follows:

- (1) For Scenarios I through III (April-June 1796)
- (2) For Scenarios IV through VII (July 1796-February 1797)
- (3) For Scenarios VIII (May-June 1800)

Each Display has a Track for the Leaders required in its Scenarios, giving the necessary set-up positions and initial unit strengths. All of this information is listed under the column for that scenario. On the top line next to a Leader's Track is his initial set-up hex. Beneath this are listed the combat units in his Track (his Organic Units), their Strength, and type (i = infantry, c = cavalry). Place the combat and support units in the space on the Track corresponding to their listed strength. Place the Leaders and Center of Operations on the map(s) in the locations given. Also place an Incremental Strength (Attrition) marker in the 0 space of each Leader's Track. Blank Tracks may be used for additional Major Generals, as required. Leaders who do not have a Track listed for them do not appear in the Scenario.

#### THE SCENARIOS

There are eight Scenarios in *Bonaparte*, each representing a separate campaign and named after the most decisive battle in each. There is also a massive Campaign Game, which covers the whole period from April 1796 to February 1797. Each Scenario provides the Players with the following information:

- (A) Game Length (and dates)
- (B) Maps in Play
- (C) Accumulated APs, by nationality.
- (D) Which Player is the First Player (I.E. who moves first)
- (E) The status of Capital Cities (when appropriate)
- (F) Any bridges destroyed at the start of play
- (G) Any Special Rules required for play
- (H) Victory Conditions (how Players win the game)

Unless otherwise specified, all armies begin the game active and at Army Condition Level 0. Before play begins one Player should roll the die to determine the weather for the first turn. Vienna Morale is at 0 at the start of all Scenarios.

#### SCENARIO I -- Montenotte

**Game Length:** 10 April through 23 April, 1796 (7 turns)

**Maps in Play:** W and C

**Accumulated APs:** FRENCH = 4, AUSTRIAN = 10, PIED-MONTESE = 4.

**First Player:** Austrian.

**Capital Cities:** All controlled by Austrians, none looted.

**Destroyed Bridges:** None

**Special Rules:** The Austrian Army Condition marker begins the game at the first notch of the +1 box.

#### Victory Conditions:

**FRENCH PLAYER:** Force a Piedmontese *Armistice* (not a treaty) by the end of the game.

**AUSTRIAN PLAYER:** Prevent a French Victory.

#### SCENARIO II -- Lodi

**Game Length:** 6 May through 13 May, 1796 (4 turns)

**Maps in Play:** W and C

**Accumulated APs:** FRENCH = 8, AUSTRIAN = 12

**Capital Cities:** Genoa has been captured and looted by the French. No uprising is possible.

**Destroyed Bridges:** 0530

**Special Rules:** The First Player is French, and the game begins with a French Forced March Phase before Game-Turn 1.

#### Victory Conditions:

**AUSTRIAN PLAYER:** withdraw at least 20 Strength Points off the East edge of Map C.

**FRENCH PLAYER:** Prevent an Austrian victory.

#### SCENARIO III -- Borghetto

**Game Length:** 24 May through 1 June, 1796 (5 turns).

**Maps in Play:** C and E.

**Accumulated APs:** FRENCH = 8, AUSTRIAN = 5.

**First Player:** French

**Capital Cities:** Genoa and Milan have been captured and looted by the French. An uprising in Milan (only) is still possible.

**Destroyed Bridges:** None.

**Special Rules:** None.

#### Victory Conditions:

**FRENCH PLAYER:** Control (or have under siege) the citadels of Milan and Mantua at the end of the game.

**AUSTRIAN PLAYER:** Prevent a French Victory.

#### SCENARIO IV -- Castiglione

**Game Length:** 29 July through 8 August (6 turns).

**Maps in Play:** E.

**Accumulated APs:** FRENCH = 4, AUSTRIAN = 20.

**First Player:** Austrian.

**Capital Cities:** Milan, Genoa, Leghorn, and Bologna have been captured and looted by the French. No uprisings are possible in these cities.

**Destroyed Bridges:** None.

**Special Rules:** None.

#### Victory Conditions:

**AUSTRIAN PLAYER:** Control Mantua (Hex E2729) and have it in Dispatch Distance at the end of the game.

**FRENCH PLAYER:** prevent an Austrian victory.

## SCENARIO V -- Bassano

**Game Length:** 1 September through 15 September, 1796 (8 turns).

**Maps in Play:** E

**Accumulated APs:** FRENCH = 6, AUSTRIAN = 12.

**First Player:** Austrian.

**Capital Cities:** Same as Scenario IV

**Destroyed Bridges:** None

**Special Rules:** None.

**Victory Conditions:**

Same as Scenario IV.

## SCENARIO VI -- Arcola

**Game Length:** 31 October through 23 November, 1796 (12 turns).

**Maps in Play:** E

**Accumulated APs:** FRENCH = 7, AUSTRIAN = 17.

**First Player:** Austrian.

**Capital Cities:** Same as Scenario IV.

**Destroyed Bridges:** None.

**Special Rules:** None.

**Victory Conditions:**

Same as Scenario IV.

## SCENARIO VII -- Rivoli

**Game Length:** 7 January through 28 January, 1797 (11 turns).

**Maps in Play:** E

**Accumulated APs:** FRENCH = 8, AUSTRIAN = 21.

**First Player:** Austrian.

**Capital Cities:** All except Mantua have been captured and looted by the French. No uprisings are possible in these cities.

**Destroyed Bridges:** None.

**Special Rules:** The French Army is inactive at the start of the game.

**Victory Conditions:**

Same as Scenario IV.

## SCENARIO VIII -- Marengo

### **Background:**

After the successful conclusion to the Italian Campaign in 1797 Bonaparte returned to Paris, eventually embarking on an ill-fated expedition to Egypt (June 1798 - October 1799). In his absence most of the French gains in Italy were lost, and by the spring of 1800 a revitalized Austrian Army under Marshal Melas lay poised for the capture of Genoa and a subsequent invasion of France. Napoleon - who had by now returned to France and been appointed First Consul - responded with an ambitious attempt to lead his Reserve Army across the Alps and "fall like a thunderbolt" on the surprised Austrians.

**Game Length:** 26 May through 16 June (11 Turns).

**Maps in Play:** W and C.

**Accumulated APs:** FRENCH: 3, AUSTRIAN: 8.

**First Player:** French.

**Destroyed Bridges:** None.

The following are Special Rules used only in the Marengo Scenario.

### **Pitched Battle**

"This battle is completely lost, but it is only two o'clock and there is time to win another."

*General Desaix's reply to Napoleon concerning his opinion of the present course of the Battle of Marengo, 14 June 1800.*

By using the following procedure Players may vary the *type* of battle being fought between opposing forces. In a *Pursuit Battle* the Phasing Player makes a single attack on the defending force (This is the only type of battle permitted in the other Scenarios of the game). In a *Pitched Battle*, after the Phasing Player attacks the defending force the non-Phasing Player may Counterattack, and combat between the two forces may continue for a number of attacks and counter attacks, until one side finally retreats and the other pursues. At the beginning of the Combat Routine both Players must secretly choose which type of battle each Friendly Force involved in a combat situation will fight. These choices may be written down, or (if the Players are honest and trust one another) simply stated before each battle is resolved. Once made, a Players choice may not be altered.

### **Pursuit Battle**

Every Battle is a "Pursuit Battle" unless at least one of the Players has chosen "Pitched Battle" for that situation at the beginning of the Combat Routine. A Pursuit Battle is resolved "normally" - that is, according to the standard rules of combat, and exactly like all battles are resolved in the 1796-97 Scenarios.

### **Resolving Pitched Battles**

Pitched Battle allows a force to convert retreat results into Strength Point losses, thus compelling the Defending Force to Counterattack. This option may only be used by forces that chose Pitched Battle at the beginning of the Combat Routine. In any combat situation, Pitched Battle will continue only so long as the retreating side chooses (and is able) to remain in place. As with a Pursuit Battle, the initial attack by the Phasing Player will produce a combat result of two numbers. If the *retreating* force chose Pursuit Battle at the beginning of the Combat Routine then no Pitched Battle occurs; If however, the retreating force chose Pitched Battle, then no retreat occurs and the combat result indicates the number of Strength Points lost by each force. After these losses have been applied the non-Phasing Player immediately counterattacks with all (surviving) units which defended against the original attack. This attack must be made against at least one hex occupied by units which made the original attack. The odds for this counter attack are calculated in the usual manner, and are modified by affecting terrain and/or any Combat Bonus of the counterattacking Leader. The results of this and all subsequent attacks and counter attacks between the two forces may be applied as if it were either a Pitched Battle or a Pursuit Battle, *at the retreating Player's option*. If the retreating Player chooses to continue the Pitched Battle (by not retreating) then the Phasing Player must repeat his original attack (on *all* defending hexes), possibly causing the non-Phasing Player to counterattack again. This alternating sequence of attacks and counterattacks continues until one force retreats (and has its losses for that particular combat determined by pursuit).

### **Restrictions on the Type of Battle Chosen.**

Pitched Battle may not be chosen by a force of less than 10 Strength Points (10,000 Men). Infantry and Cavalry Maj.Gens. may never choose Pitched Battle (i.e. they must retreat if such a result is indicated for them on the Combat Results Table). Of course such Leaders could participate in a Pitched Battle if they were under a Friendly Commander's force. The number of attacks (or counterattacks) a force may make may not voluntarily exceed the Initiative Rating of the Force Leader (for forces containing more than one Leader, use only the Initiative of the force Commander). For example, General Lannes, with an Initiative of 3, could make no more than three attacks (or counterattacks) in any given Pitched Battle. If such a limit is reached and the Force is still required to attack or counterattack, it may continue to do so, but must retreat as soon as any Combat

Result is obtained calling for the force to do so (that is, once the limit is reached the force may no longer convert retreat results to Strength Point losses and thus remain in place). Additionally, the French Player may not choose Pitched Battle before the start of Game-Turn 9.

**Note:** Although forces engaged in Pitched Battle may attack and be attacked more than once per Phase, they may do so against only one opposing force.

#### **Reduction of Initiative After Pitched Battle**

For each "completed sequence" of attack and counterattack carried out during a Pitched Battle reduce the (unmodified) Initiative Rating by "one" when determining pursuit. A completed sequence is composed of one attack and one counterattack at the end of which neither side has retreated (i.e. Pitched Battle still continues).

#### **Genoa**

Hex C0552 is considered to be a citadel (cf) for this Scenario only. It has a stacking limit of 15 Strength Points and will surrender at the end of any Friendly Player-Turn in which the number of besieged Strength Points is 9 or less. All other citadel rules apply normally.

#### **Vienna Morale**

Players should use the 1800 Vienna Morale Chart for this Scenario. Except as noted below, the conditions for changes in Vienna Morale are judged in the same manner as for the 1796-97 Scenarios.

**BATTLE:** Loss or Victory in a Pursuit Battle is judged in the same manner as for all battles in the earlier Scenarios. In a Pitched Battle, the losing side is the one that retreats; the winning side is the one that does not, regardless of Strength Points lost (in order to qualify as a Pitched Battle *both* Players must have chosen that option for that combat situation).

**CAPITAL CITIES:** In addition to being captured, Turin and Milan may be *isolated* at the end of any Game-Turn in which the Austrian Player cannot trace a line of continuous Primary Road Hexes unblocked by enemy units or Zones of Control between the city and the east edge of Map C (the Citadel of Genoa has access to the sea and thus may not be isolated).

#### **Reinforcements**

Reinforcements are additional units that enter the map during the play of the Scenario. They enter the game map during the

Movement Phase of the Game-Turn listed for them on the Reinforcement Chart. Reinforcements arrive in the hex or hexes listed and pay the normal terrain cost for the entry hex (they may use the road bonus). Reinforcements may arrive stacked so long as the stacking rules are not violated. The first stack of reinforcement units brought onto a single hex in a Phase expends one Movement Point to enter the entry hex, the second stack expends two, and so on (these costs would be halved for units entering primary road hexes). Reinforcements automatically enter during the Movement Phase listed without expending any APs or rolling for Initiative. They do not suffer any attrition during this Phase and may not use Extended March. All reinforcements must enter the map as scheduled. They may enter into a hex containing an Enemy Zone of Control but not an Enemy-occupied hex. If their listed entry hex is blocked, the units enter from the nearest available hex instead. While off-map, reinforcements may not be reorganized and must enter divided into the forces indicated on the Reinforcement Chart.

**Capital Cities:** Milan and Turin begin the game under Austrian control and may be captured and looted by the French. Genoa begins the game under French control and had already been looted. No uprisings are possible in this Scenario.

#### **Victory Conditions:**

**FRENCH PLAYER:** Have Vienna Morale reach  $-4$  (or lower) at the end of any Game-Turn (this automatically ends the game).

**AUSTRIAN PLAYER:** Have a Vienna Morale of  $0$  (or higher) at the end of the game.

**Note:** If neither Player fulfills his victory conditions the game is a draw.

**SUPPLY SOURCES:** Possible French Supply Sources are hexes: W2401, W0103, C1001, and C2301.

#### **A NOTE ON SUPPLY SOURCES AND THE CENTER OF OPERATIONS**

At the start of each Scenario Players may choose which of the hexes (as listed on the Communications Table) they will use as a Supply Source for their Army. In Scenario I and the Campaign Game the French Player may not use hex W0146 until a Peace Treaty with Piedmont is signed. Milan may be used as a Supply Source for the Austrian Army provided it is not looted and a line of connected primary road hexes free of Enemy units or their Zones of Control exists from the city in question to hex E4401 or hex E5914. At the beginning of each Scenario Players may place their Center of Operations anywhere on the map, as desired.

The Following is an aid to tracing Line of Communications distances to Supply Sources which are "Off-Map" in Scenarios when not all three maps are actually in play.

#### **FRENCH PLAYER:**

##### **Map C to Supply Sources.**

70 Primary road hexes from hex C0133 (to W0146).

50 Primary road hexes from hex C0151 (to W0354).

##### **Map E to Supply Sources.**

115 Primary road hexes from E0127 (to W0146).

125 Primary road hexes from E0111 (to W0146).

#### **AUSTRIAN PLAYER:**

##### **Map C to Supply Sources.**

60 Primary road hexes from C3915 or C3921 (to E4401).

75 Primary road hexes from C3942 (to E 4401).

# CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS

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## CAMPAIGNS OF 1796 AND 1797 IN ITALY.

### NAPOLEON AND BEAULIEU.

**POLITICAL SITUATION.**—In 1792, Italy was divided into the kingdom of Sardinia with its provinces of Savoy, Nice, Piedmont and Sardinia; the republics of Genoa and Venice; the duchies of Parma, Modena and Tuscany; the Austrian province of Milan; the Papal states; and the kingdom of Naples.

In 1796, Austria, Sardinia and Naples were at war with France. The dukes of Parma and Modena were under the influence of Austria. Because of the violence of the French Revolution, the rulers of the other states, although not actively hostile to France, were not friendly. In all these states there was a middle class of active French sympathizers.

**TOPOGRAPHIC SITUATION.**—The Maritime Alps and the Apennine mountain ranges separate the narrow strip of territory along the Mediterranean, called the *Riviera*, from the basin of the Po River. The two ranges are separated by a saddle on the road from Savona to Cairo whose elevation is only 1,600 feet. All roads and trails crossing the Apennines from Savona, Voltri and Genoa reach an elevation of 2,500 feet. The Maritime Alps increase in elevation from Savona westward and at Col de Tenda the road crossing the mountains reaches an elevation of 6,000 feet.

The *Riviera* about Nice belonged to the kingdom of Sardinia; east of this it belonged to Genoa.

South of the mountains, all the important towns are on the coast and are connected by the road from Nice to Genoa, 125 miles. This road was in bad condition and the French depended largely upon water transportation exposed to capture by the British fleet. This road was later improved by Napoleon and became the famous *Corniche* road. All the coast towns had small garrisons.

North of the mountains, the Sardinians had the fortified towns of Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Dego, Acqui, Alessandria, Tortona and Novi. The shortest road connecting these towns follows the east branch of the Bormida River and near Cairo passes within nine miles of Savona. The principal roads connecting the coast with the Po valley were those connecting Nice and Coni; Oneglia and Albenga with Ceva; Finale and Cairo; Savona and Cairo; Savona and Sassello; Voltri and Novi; Genoa and Novi.

**MILITARY SITUATION.**—The war of the French with the first coalition began in 1792. In that year, French troops invaded the Sardinian provinces of Savoy and Nice and these provinces were declared annexed to France. The invading force in Savoy became the *Army of the Alps* and that in Nice became the *Army of Italy*.

In June 1793, the Army of Italy attacked the Sardinian army intrenched in the foothills of the Alps between Nice and Tenda and was repulsed. It then retired to the Var and from August to December was engaged in the siege of the insurgent fortified town of Toulon which had opened its harbor to the British fleet. It was here that Napoleon first joined the Army of Italy, as a captain of artillery. It was by following a plan suggested by Napoleon

that the town was finally taken; as reward he was promoted to general of brigade in the artillery.

In 1794, the French drove the Sardinians beyond the Col de Tenda and occupied the territory of the republic of Genoa as far east as Savona. This year Napoleon served in the army as chief of artillery and became thoroughly familiar with the mountain passes as far east as Genoa. He also suggested some of the plans to which the success of the French was due.

In April 1795, Napoleon was relieved and placed on waiting orders. In June, the French were driven out of Savona by the Austrians but in November they retook the town and drove the Austrians back over the mountains.

In September, Napoleon was assigned to that bureau of the War Department which dealt with the operations of the field armies; he submitted various memoirs on proposed operations of the Army of Italy and drew up instructions for the army commander. In October, he won the gratitude of the government by dispersing a Paris mob which threatened the national convention.

In March 1796, when Gen. Scherer—the fifth commander of the Army of Italy since its organization—requested to be relieved, Napoleon was appointed to succeed him.

**FRENCH ARMY.**—When Napoleon took command of the Army of Italy there were in his territorial department, which extended from Savona in Italy to the mouth of the Rhone River in France, about 60,000 men present for duty and nearly 25,000 sick in the hospitals.

On April 6, he reported his disposable field troops as 45,000 men. This agrees with his returns which show about 43,000 men present in the field army and 2,000 en route to join it.

Gen. Laharpe's infantry division of three brigades formed the outpost line covering Savona. One brigade was on the Genoa road at Voltri with an outpost at Pegli. It was sent to this point by the government commissioner with the army who wished to intimidate the Genoese and enable the French to purchase supplies in Genoa. One brigade was guarding the mountain passes on the roads from Savona to Sassello and neighboring points; this brigade had a strong outpost at Monte Legino and another at Veraggio. One brigade was in the mountains on the road between Savona and Cairo.

Gen. Meynier's infantry division of two brigades was in reserve in the vicinity of Savona.

Gen. Augereau's infantry division of three brigades was at Finale and Loano with strong outposts in the mountains. One brigade was guarding each road and one in reserve.

Gen. Serurier's infantry division of two brigades was at Ormea and Gressio in the Tanaro valley.

These ten brigades had an average strength of 3,600 men or a total of about 36,000 men.

The divisions of Laharpe and Meynier—18,000 men—formed an advance guard under the command of Gen. Massena stationed at Savona.

There were two divisions whose combined strength was but 7,000 men, guarding the Col de Tenda and the passes near the sources of the Var River where the mountains were still covered with snow.

The cavalry of the army—4,500 men—under Gen. Stengel was on its way from southern France where it had spent the winter. It had not all joined.

Napoleon took command at Nice, the department headquarters, March 26, and remained there five days ordering up supplies and troops. On April 5, he was at Albenga where he remained five days more inspecting the troops in the vicinity and organizing his transportation. While here, he learned that the Austrians were advancing through Bochetta Pass and on Sassello and Dego. He

made no change in the disposition of his troops, but cautioned his division commanders to be ready to move at a moment's notice, with a full supply of ammunition.

**ALLIED ARMY.**—The allied army opposed to Napoleon was composed of 32,000 Austrians and 17,000 Sardinians. Gen. Beaulieu, who had just arrived from the Rhine, was in command, though he really exercised command only over the left wing composed of the Austrian corps of Generals Argenteau and Sebottendorf—each 14,000 men. The right wing, composed of 17,000 Sardinians and 4,000 Austrians, was under the Austrian general, Colli, who had been attached to the Sardinian army since 1793.

Argenteau's corps had spent the winter near Alessandria, Acqui and Tortona; Sebottendorf's corps at Pavia and other points in the province of Milan. Argenteau had five brigades of infantry; Sebottendorf, three brigades of infantry and two of cavalry; each infantry brigade numbered about 3,000 men.

Colli's troops extended from Coni to Dego. The greater part of his force was on his right at Coni and Mondovi guarding the direct road from Nice to Turin; two battalions only were at Dego. Provera's Austrian brigade was near Millesimo.

There was also a strong Sardinian force guarding the mountain passes between Piedmont and Savoy, from Lake Geneva to Coni. It was threatened by the Army of the Alps under Kellerman senior.

In a letter to the Directory, April 6, Napoleon estimates the Austrian army as 34,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, and the Sardinian army as 45,000. This latter estimate includes the force in front of Kellerman, which Napoleon thought he might be compelled to meet should he advance on Turin.

In numerical strength the two armies actually opposed to each other were approximately equal. The French army had the advantage of position, unless the allies concentrated near Cairo. The French army also had the advantage of a single commander who was familiar with the country and had been for two years studying his problem. The allies had two almost independent commanders, the senior of whom was unfamiliar with the topography of the country and had had no time to make a thorough study of past operations in this territory.

**PLANS.**—The aim of the French government had for some time been to destroy the alliance between Sardinia and Austria. As France was unwilling to restore to Sardinia the provinces of Nice and Savoy, this could only be effected by a decisive victory over the Sardinian troops. Napoleon's predecessor—Gen. Scherer—had been repeatedly directed to attack the Sardinian left flank near Ceva, but in his opinion the condition of the army did not warrant such a movement. It was difficult to subsist the Army of Italy because of its position and the wretched condition of the French system of administration and supply. The army had not been paid and its supply of clothing, arms, ammunition and equipment were very defective. Napoleon had been able to partially remedy some of these defects, but he knew that his only ultimate hope lay in crossing the mountains and living on the enemy's territory. He thoroughly understood the policy of his government and that while Austria was the real enemy to be defeated it was very desirable to detach Sardinia from the alliance.

Beaulieu was directed by his government to confer with Colli and decide on an aggressive campaign.

At a conference between the allied commanders, Colli advocated a concentration at Cairo; but no definite plan was agreed upon. Without informing Colli, Beaulieu later decided to attack the French force at Voltri, by moving two mixed brigades—7,500 men—in two columns from Novi; one via Bochetta Pass and the other via Campofredda.

At the same time, Argenteau was to move from Acqui on Savona

with 8,000 men.

Beaulieu would thus cut off Napoleon's supplies from Genoa and might compel him to evacuate Savona. He assumed that Napoleon would, like most of his predecessors, remain on the defensive as his army could hardly be in a condition to take the field.

**CAMPAIGN.**—As early as April 5, Massena learned of the approach of the Austrians on the roads to Genoa, Voltri, Sassello and Dego. As Napoleon gave him no orders, he strengthened the brigade at Voltri and the post on Monte Legino.

**April 10.**—On the afternoon of April 10, Beaulieu attacked the French force at Voltri. As the French were expecting him, they made a good defense and with little loss retired that night towards Savona.

Argenteau was expected to attack Monte Legino and the French posts, if any, on the Sassello road, but as his troops were not in position he deferred the attack to the following day.

**April 11.**—Beaulieu remained at Voltri, April 11, awaiting a report from Argenteau. Argenteau advanced with a force of 3,500 to 4,000 men on the Montenotte road to Monte Legino, sent a brigade on the Sassello road and posted two battalions near Montenotte to protect his communications. He made three unsuccessful assaults on the French force advantageously placed on *Monte Legino*. This force was originally 1,100 men but was reinforced to 1,500 during the day. That night, Argenteau bivouacked near Montenotte in front of the French works and sent to Dego for two guns as he had no artillery. The Austrian brigade at Sassello was not engaged.

Napoleon was at Savona this day and learned from his aide—Marmont—the particulars of the attack at Voltri, and that the French troops had retreated. He also learned from the chief of brigade—Rampon—that the Austrians had made several assaults on Monte Legino and, although repulsed, they still remained in his front. He at once sent Rampon a reinforcement of 700 men and four guns and directed him to hold on until he could be further reinforced.

That night he issued the following orders:—Laharpe with two of his brigades to move on Monte Legino and attack Argenteau in the morning; Massena with Laharpe's third brigade to move along the crest of the mountains to Montenotte and get in Argenteau's rear; Meynier to move with his two brigades to Carcare; Augereau to leave one brigade at Bardinetto to report to Serurier, and with the other two to move on Carcare. Meynier and Augereau were to prevent Colli from sending any troops eastwards; Serurier was directed to keep Colli busy at Ceva without compromising his own troops.

**April 12.**—Beaulieu, becoming uneasy, started a brigade for Sassello to secure contact with Argenteau. The latter was attacked on the morning of the 12th near *Montenotte* by Laharpe, defeated, and pursued towards Acqui. The battalions he had posted to cover his line of retreat were defeated by Massena who struck them in succession and they retreated towards Dego. Massena then marched to Cairo.

Napoleon spent the day at Altare on the Savona-Carcare road but established his headquarters at Cairo that night.

**April 13.**—Beaulieu, informed of Argenteau's defeat, withdrew from Voltri in order to reach Acqui and cover his line of retreat.

Augereau, with Meynier's division and part of his own, attacked Gen. Provera who was on the ridge east of *Millesimo* with 4,000 men. Provera was defeated and while his main body retreated towards Ceva, Provera himself with about 1,000 men took refuge in the ruined castle of Cossaria, perched on a high hill. Napoleon was with Augereau and directed several unsuccessful assaults on this work. Towards evening he returned to Cairo leaving Auger-

eau to invest the castle.

Massena reconnoitered Deگو and Laharpe joined him at Cairo during the day.

**April 14.**—Augereau called on Provera to surrender, which the latter was compelled to do early in the morning of the 14th, as his men were without food, water or ammunition.

Meynier now reported to Massena at Cairo with one brigade. With Laharpe's division and Meynier's brigade Massena attacked and captured *Deگو*. The Austrians who escaped fled to Acqui. Meynier's brigade was left to hold Deگو and Laharpe was ordered to cooperate with Augereau on the 15th.

Knowing that Beaulieu could not assume the offensive with his two Austrian corps, Napoleon decided to capture Ceva if possible.

**April 15.**—Argenteau's brigade at Sassello had not been engaged but also retired to Acqui. The brigade sent by Beaulieu to Sassello reached there after Argenteau's command had been defeated and the French had gone to Cairo. This brigade moved through Montenotte to Deگو and reached there early on the morning of the 15th.

The troops of Meynier's brigade were out of hand on the morning of the 15th being engaged in looting the town. The Austrians without much difficulty retook the town and the French fled to Cairo.

Napoleon at once recalled Laharpe, and in the afternoon of the same day the divisions of Laharpe and Meynier, under the supervision of Massena, recaptured the town. The Austrians fled to Acqui.

Napoleon now became uneasy about Savona in which he had left a small garrison, and ordered Laharpe to march to Sassello the following day to ascertain if any Austrians were marching on Savona.

Massena took temporary command of Meynier's division as the latter was ill.

**April 16.**—Laharpe went to Sassello while Massena remained near Deگو. Augereau attacked Colli at *Montezemolo* and was repulsed. That night Colli fearing that Serurier, who was advancing, would attack him in rear, retired to the Corsaglia River leaving a garrison in the citadel of Ceva.

**April 17.**—Laharpe returned to Deگو and reported that there were no Austrians in the mountains. Massena was then sent to San Benedetto on the Belbo to guard that flank, while Augereau and Serurier deployed in front of Colli's position on the Corsaglia.

**April 18.**—Serurier and Augereau made an unsuccessful attack on Colli on the Corsaglia River.

**April 19.**—Leaving a battalion at Deگو, Laharpe moved to San Benedetto while Massena moved into the attacking line in front of Colli. Augereau moved down the river to cross and attack Colli in flank.

Without waiting another attack, Colli fell back to Mondovi.

**April 20.**—After a desperate battle, Colli was defeated by Massena and Serurier at *Mondovi*. Augereau remained behind the Corsaglia and Laharpe at San Benedetto.

**Armistice of Cherasco.**—After the battle of Mondovi, Napoleon moved rapidly to the Stura River to threaten an advance on Turin. On April 23, Colli requested an armistice. Napoleon consented, provided it was preliminary to peace and the fortresses of Coni, Ceva and Tortona were at once surrendered to him.

These conditions being accepted, there was no more fighting between the Sardinians and the French, and on April 28, the armistice was signed and the Sardinians deserted their allies. Besides the three fortresses mentioned the French were to occupy the country limited on the north by the Stura River to Cherasco, the Tanaro River to the Po, and the Po to Parma. They were to use the road via Coni, Ceva, Acqui and Tortona as their line of com-

munication through Sardinia under the protection of Sardinian troops.

Until the evacuation of Ceva, Napoleon was worried about his communications which ran through Savona. After the road through Ceva to Ormea was opened, Savona became of small value.

When the campaign closed, Laharpe was at San Benedetto, Augereau at Alba, Massena at Cherasco, Serurier at Fossano and the Col de Tenda brigades were marching on Coni.

It will be observed that on April 21, ten days after Beaulieu's attack on Acqui, Napoleon had solved the first part of his problem by defeating the Sardinians to such an extent that they were willing to desert their allies.

#### NAPOLEON'S COMMENTS.

1. A French army that occupies the crest of the Apennines covers the Riviera as far as Genoa; but since the army is only two to five leagues distant from the sea, its line can be penetrated in a single day. It would then find itself unable to rally to make its retreat. On account of its little depth, this field of operations is bad and even dangerous.

Had Beaulieu studied the topographic features, he would not have marched on Voltri to cover Genoa, but would have concentrated his army at Acqui and Cairo. From those places he could have advanced in three strong columns of 15,000 each; the left by Montenotte and Savona, the right over the mountains to Finale. The French would have been obliged to fall back from Genoa and Voltri to guard the points attacked. The Austrian general would have operated on ground wholly to his advantage, since he could in a single day cut the French army in two, force it back on the sea and ruin it.

2. After the battle of Montenotte, the Austrians were compelled to rally near Acqui; the Sardinians should at once have moved to Deگو to form their right wing. It was an error to assume that to protect Turin it was necessary for them to remain on the direct road to that place. If the two armies had assembled at Deگو, they would have thoroughly covered Turin since they would have been on the flank of the road leading to that capital. Had Beaulieu had a few days to rally his troops, it would have been still better to concentrate the armies at Ceva, since then they would have been near the French line of communications. With a strong allied army at Ceva, the French would not have dared to invade Milan. Combined, the two armies were stronger than the French; separated, they were lost.

3. When the French army united to attack Colli, Laharpe was left to watch Beaulieu who was rallying his army at Acqui. Apparently the natural position for this corps was Deگو, on the direct line to Savona. Napoleon preferred San Benedetto, farther from Acqui than Deگو. From San Benedetto, Laharpe could support the main French army, if necessary, and also take Beaulieu in flank and rear if he decided to advance. It must be observed that at this time the road through Ormea was open to the French and that the road through Savona was not their only line of communications.

4. At Mondovi the divisions of Massena and Serurier only made the attack. This was to leave Augereau on the same side of the Corsaglia River as Laharpe in order to support him should he be attacked by Beaulieu.

**CAMPAIGN CONTINUED.**—After the armistice with the Sardinians, Napoleon placed French garrisons in Coni, Ceva and Mondovi, and prepared to move against Beaulieu before the latter should recover from his defeat.

He reorganized his army and endeavored to bring it under discipline. As the troops were illy clad, without pay, and on half

rations when he took command, he had been rather lenient to infractions in discipline and at Dego and Mondovi suffered partial reverses because of desertions of men from their commands to loot. By requisitions on the conquered country, he now clothed, fed, and paid his army, as well as his defective system of supply would permit, and issued strict orders against looting. This evil was never entirely eradicated.

Gen. Meynier having been assigned to the command of the fortress of Tortona, Gen. Massena assumed permanent command of his division. A new advance guard was organized by forming three battalions of the grenadiers and attaching to them a brigade of four regiments of cavalry. This was commanded by Dallemagne, who had reported from the Col de Tenda division. Gen. Stengel having been killed at Mondovi, Gen. Kilmaine became chief of cavalry. With reinforcements received from Col de Tenda and the soldiers returning to their commands from the hospitals, etc., Napoleon now had a field army of 45,000 men, of whom 5,000 were assigned as garrisons of the Sardinian fortresses.

The Sardinians having withdrawn from the alliance, Gen. Beaulieu retired from Acqui, captured the fortified town of Valenza from his former allies, and crossed to the north bank of the Po. Napoleon had inserted a secret clause in the armistice of Cherasco giving the French the right to cross the Po at Valenza, which was probably communicated to Beaulieu.

Napoleon now decided to cross the Po at Piacenza by surprise. To this end, on May 1, he ordered his advance guard, his cavalry and Laharpe to Tortona via Acqui. Augereau and Massena were ordered to follow as soon as the roads were clear. Serurier was to move down the north bank of the Tanaro to a point opposite Valenza, to deceive Beaulieu.

On May 5, the advance guard was near Montebello, the cavalry, Laharpe, Augereau and Massena close behind.

On May 6, active operations began and on the 7th the advance guard, the cavalry, and Laharpe reached the vicinity of Piacenza where, by means of boats and a flying bridge, they crossed the river as rapidly as possible and drove away an Austrian cavalry patrol that was guarding the river bank.

The French at once intrenched themselves on the north bank, and when a force of 5,000 Austrians moved down from Pavia to attack them, they were enabled to defeat the Austrians and drive them in the direction of Pizzighittone. In these operations Gen. Laharpe was accidentally killed by his own men.

Augereau found a ferry above Piacenza that was not guarded and crossed at that point. Massena crossed at Piacenza after Laharpe, but was not on the north bank until the morning of the 9th.

That day the divisions of Massena and Augereau, preceded by the advance guard and cavalry, moved towards Lodi to intercept Beaulieu, who was retreating via Pavia and Lodi. Laharpe's division remained in position watching the Austrians at Pizzighittone.

On May 10, the French troops reached Lodi and found that Beaulieu had crossed the Adda to the east bank leaving a battalion in the town. This battalion crossed the river as soon as the French appeared. The wooden bridge, 250 yards long, had not been destroyed; but a rear guard—twelve battalions and fourteen guns—had been left by Beaulieu to defend it. Beaulieu himself had followed the Adda southwards to Cremona.

Napoleon at once established a number of guns on the west bank at Lodi and the greater part of the day was spent in a harmless artillery duel. Late in the afternoon Napoleon decided to storm the bridge, but first sent his cavalry to cross at a ford higher up.

The storming column, consisting of a battalion of light infantry followed by his grenadiers, formed behind the walls of the town and suddenly advanced out on the bridge. Their advance was

soon checked by the Austrian artillery; and, to carry the column forward, Generals Massena, Berthier, Dallemagne, and Chief of Brigade Lannes, placed themselves at the head of the column. When the column was checked a second time, the light infantry leaped into the shallow river and engaged the batteries and Austrian infantry. This enabled the grenadiers to cross the bridge and attack the Austrian rear guard. The Austrians retreated with a loss of about 500 men and a few guns.

The theatrical storming of the bridge at Lodi had a great moral effect both on the French and the Austrian soldiers.

The Austrian troops were pursued by the advance guard and Augereau as far as Crema and Cremona, while the cavalry went northward to ascertain whether any other Austrian troops were retreating to Brescia.

The advance guard and Laharpe's division were then posted along the Adda, and Serurier's division at Piacenza, which it had reached on the 10th. Augereau moved to Pavia and Massena to Milan.

Napoleon entered Milan with Massena on May 16, about a month after the battle of Montenotte. Here he started the siege of the citadel, then held by 2,000 Austrian troops left by Beaulieu, and organized a new government.

On May 20, he learned that peace was finally signed between Sardinia and France and he felt able to again advance, as his communications were secure and he could count on reinforcements from the Army of the Alps.

Augereau was directed to move to Milan, Massena to Lodi, and Serurier to Cremona; the three divisions then moved to Brescia. The cavalry and advance guard preceded the columns; Laharpe's division moved with Massena's central column. Gen. Despinoy, who had been on Napoleon's staff, was assigned to the command of Milan.

Beaulieu, who had retired to the fortress of Mantua, was thus obliged to withdraw his army from the vicinity of that fortress to defend the upper Mincio and protect his communication with the Tyrol in Austria.

From Brescia, Napoleon, with his advance guard, cavalry, Massena and Serurier moved on Valeggio, while Augereau moved on Peschiera. When Kilmaine, who temporarily commanded both the cavalry and advance guard, forced the Mincio on May 30, at Valeggio where it was fordable, Beaulieu retreated to Rivoli and then made his way to Roveredo in the Tyrol. A strong Austrian garrison was left in Mantua.

This closed the campaign of Napoleon and Beaulieu, which had lasted a little less than two months.

#### NAPOLEON'S COMMENTS.

1. To defend the passage of the Po, Beaulieu took a position near Valenza. This could fulfil his object only when opposing an army that was incapable of maneuvering. He should have placed himself astride the Po, near Stradella, where he should have constructed two bridges with strong bridgeheads. This would have prevented the French from moving down the south bank of the Po and compelled them to cross it above the bridges. The Austrian general would then have had the advantageous lines of the Po and Ticino as lines of defense.

2. It is said that Napoleon should have crossed the Po at Cremona instead of Piacenza; he would then have turned the Adda as well. This is wrong; his movement was already an audacious one. To have still further extended his army was to tempt the enemy to attack its parts in detail. Furthermore, at Piacenza, which is on the south bank, it was more probable that boats would be found for the crossing than at Cremona, which is on the north side.

3. It is said that Napoleon should have advanced at once after Lodi, for he would then have found Mantua unprepared for defense. Such a movement would have been hazardous. There were fortified places in rear, and governments to be established in the province abandoned by the Austrians. The French were as active and rapid in their movements as could be expected; more would have been impossible. In the six days the army rested in Lombardy, it doubled its effective power by increasing its artillery, remounting its cavalry, and rallying its stragglers.

4. Instead of attempting to defend the line of the Mincio, which is weak, Beaulieu should either have assembled his whole army in the district south of Mantua and drawn his supplies from the country south of the Po, or he should have assembled it about Gavardo or further north. This would have prevented the French army from crossing the Mincio.

If he felt too weak to do either, he should have assembled it on the plateau of Rivoli without entering Peschiera. The precedent he established in violating the neutrality of Venice by occupying this fortress compelled the Venetians to yield the fortresses of Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago to the French.

**FRENCH GENERALS OF DIVISION.**

**AUGEREAU, Pierre Francois.**—Born in Paris 1757. He enlisted in the Neapolitan cavalry and was a sword master in 1792 when he returned to France and entered the volunteers. He rose rapidly and in 1794 was a general of division. In 1804 he was made a marshal of France. He served in the Army of the Pyrenees, in the Army of Italy, 1796-7; commanded the Army of the Rhine-Moselle, 1798; the Army of Holland, 1800, and as commander of the VII. corps took part in the campaigns of Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau and Friedland. Served in Spain in 1809, and under Napoleon in 1812-13-14. He hastened to join the Bourbons in 1814 and his services were declined by Napoleon upon his return from Elba and by the Bourbons on the second restoration. He died in 1816. Under the Empire he was made Duke of Castiglione.

"Strong character, courage, firmness, energy, experience in warfare, liked by his men and is lucky."—Napoleon August 14, 1796.

**BERTHIER, Alexandre.**—Born in 1753 and entered the general staff in 1770. Served as chief of staff of several different armies of the revolution before becoming Chief of Staff of the Army of Italy. In 1799 he became minister of war and in 1800 the nominal commander of the Reserve Army. In 1804 he became a marshal of France. He accompanied Napoleon in all his campaigns as chief of staff until his abdication in 1814. He then supported the Bourbons and retired from France during the Hundred Days. He was killed somewhat mysteriously during that period. He was one of the French officers who served under Rochambeau in America. Under the Empire he was made Duke of Valengin, Prince of Wagram and Sovereign Prince of Neuchatel.

"Talent, energy, courage, character. Is ambitious."—Napoleon August 14, 1796.

**DALLEMAGNE, Claudius.**—Born in 1754. Entered army as volunteer in 1773. General of brigade 1793; general of division 1797; died 1810. Performed distinguished service at Lodi, Lonato, Castiglione, Lavis and Mantua. In 1798 invested the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein on the Rhine and forced its capitulation. Senator in 1806 and commandant of 25th military division in 1809.

**KILMAINE, Charles Edward.**—Born in Ireland 1751. Entered French service in 1774; adjutant in 1778; captain in 1778; lieut. col. in 1792; colonel in 1793; general of brigade in 1793; general of division in 1794. Died in Paris in 1799. Served in northern armies until 1795; served in Armies of Alps and Italy until 1798, then temporary commander of the Army of England.

"Especially good as commander of a detached body in any operation requiring discretion, ability and calmness."—Napoleon at St. Helena.

**LAHARPE, Amedee Emmanuel.**—Born in Switzerland 1754. Forced to leave his country an account of liberal views, entered French army and became chief of battalion of volunteers 1792; general of brigade for services at Toulon 1793; general of division 1795; was killed accidentally by his own troops at Fombio, Italy, in 1796. From 1793 to 1796 he served in the Army of Italy.

"An officer of distinguished bravery. A grenadier in heart and stature. Beloved by his troops whom he led with intelligence."—Napoleon at St. Helena.

**MASSENA, Andre.**—Born in Nice in 1758 and enlisted in the infantry in 1775. In 1789 he left the service, having reached the grade of non-commissioned officer. He entered the volunteers and was elected chief of battalion in 1792. In 1793 he became general of brigade and general of division, and in 1804 marshal of France. His service was with the Army of Italy from 1792 to 1797. In 1798 he commanded the French corps at Rome and in 1799 the Army of Switzerland. In 1800 and again in 1805-6 he commanded the Army of Italy. In the Friedland campaign he commanded the right wing of the army about Warsaw. He took part in the campaign of 1809 on the Danube and in 1810 was sent to Spain and Portugal where he remained until the summer of 1811. After his unsuccessful campaign in Spain, Napoleon refused to give him a field command. He took service under the Bourbons and took no part in the affairs

of the Hundred Days. He lost favor with the Bourbons because he was a member of the court-martial which refused to try Marshal Ney. He died in 1817. Under the Empire he was made Duke of Rivoli and Prince of Essling.

"Active, indefatigable; has boldness, military instinct and promptness in deciding."—Napoleon August 14, 1796.

**SERURIER, Jean Matthieu.**—Born 1742. Entered army 1760, major 1789, general of brigade 1793, general of division 1795, marshal 1804. Served in Hanover 1760, in Poland 1762, in Corsica 1768, in Army of Italy 1792-1799. Governor of Invalides and commandant of National Guard under Consulate and Empire but was not in the field. Did not serve under Louis XVIII., but served during the Hundred Days. Died 1819.

"Fights like a soldier, assumes no responsibility, firm, has a poor opinion of his men."—Napoleon August 14, 1796.

**STENGEL, Henri.**—Bavarian who entered French service in 1762; first lieutenant 1765; captain 1769; major 1788; general of brigade 1792; general of division 1794. Served in the northern armies until 1796. Killed at Mondovi 1796.

"Adroit, intelligent, alert; was a true general of outposts, collecting all military and topographic information without being directed; combined the qualities of youth with the experience of age."—Napoleon at St. Helena.

**AUSTRIAN ARMY COMMANDERS.**

**BEAULIEU, Jean Pierre de.**—Born in Belgium in 1725 and entered the army in 1743. Served as a company officer in the Seven Years' War, 1756-1763. In 1789 he became a brigade commander in the Austrian army, a division commander in 1790, and served with distinction against the French in Belgium from 1792 to 1795. He retired in 1796 and died in 1819.

**COLLI-MARCHEI, Baron Michele Angelo Alessandro.**—Born in Piedmont, Italy, 1738, and entered the Austrian service in 1756. He was a company officer until 1768, a field officer until 1787; attained the rank of division commander in 1793. He was in the Sardinian army 1793-1796, and later served in the Papal and Neapolitan armies. He died in 1808.

**AUSTRIAN ARMY—APRIL 1, 1796.**

Beaulieu—General in Command.

Wings	Brigades	Battalions	Squadrons	Stations
Argenteau	Liptay	4	—	Aqui
	Ruccavina	4	—	Cortemiglia
	Pittoni	7	—	Alexandria
	Sallich	5	2	Tortona
Sebottendorf	Kerpen	5	—	Pavia
	Schubirz	—	18	Pavia
	Nicoletti	6	—	Lodi
	Roselmini	4	—	Lodi

There were also 13 squadrons of Neapolitan troops serving with Sebottendorf.

Total, 35 battalions, 33 squadrons, 28,000 men.

**ARMY OF ITALY—APRIL 4, 1796.**

General in Chief, Bonaparte.

Aides de Camp, Murat, Junot, Marmont, Lemarrois, Louis Bonaparte.

Chief of Staff, Berthier, General of Division; Assistant Chief of Staff, Vignolle, Adjutant General; Chief of Artillery, Dujard, General of Division; Chief Commissaire, Chauvet.

	Generals of Division	Generals of Brigade	Strength
Massena	Laharpe	Pijon	11,075
		Menard Cervoni	
	Meynier	Dommartin	5,428
		Joubert	
	Augereau	Beyrand Victor	7,908
	Serurier	Banel	6,938
		Guieu Pelletier	
	Macquard	David Dallemagne	3,690
	Garnier	Davin Verne	3,136
		Bizanet Colomb	
	Stengel	Cavalry	2,542
	Kilmaine		2,000
	Total present in field army,		42,717
	Coast Divisions		21,639
	Total present,		64,356



Sick in hospitals.....24,427

The organization of the divisions of Augereau and Serurier was somewhat modified before the 11th, since Napoleon mentions Gens. Rusca, Fiorella and Miollis as brigade commanders in these divisions. The best authorities now agree that on the 10th of April Napoleon had in his four leading divisions between 40,000 and 41,000 men, of whom 35,000 were infantry, and of the remainder two-thirds cavalry and one-third artillery.

### NAPOLEON AND WURMSER.

**THE ITALIAN QUADRILATERAL.**—The fortresses of Verona and Legnago on the Adige River and those of Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio River form the Italian Quadrilateral. Legnago and Peschiera were small fortifications designed principally as bridgeheads and not requiring large garrisons. Verona was a large walled town lying on both sides of the Adige and had several detached forts. It was a bridgehead of great value as it covered several bridges, had a citadel, and was capable of strong defense. Mantua was a large walled town on the west bank of the Mincio but as a fortress it owed its value to its peculiar situation. The Mincio here forms a lake which almost encircles the town and leaves only a small part of the perimeter to be defended. The east bank of the Mincio was connected with the town by two long bridges and causeways. The one running due north from Mantua terminated in a permanent fort—the citadel of Mantua—which formed a strong bridgehead. The other was also covered by a permanent bridgehead. The southwestern face of the city was accessible by land but was covered by strong fortifications.

The Adige River between Verona and Legnago is a serious obstacle; being unfordable, very swift and over 400 feet wide. The Mincio although as wide as the Adige is fordable in the summer months and is not a serious obstacle.

The principal east and west roads through the Quadrilateral are the Verona-Peschiera and the Legnago-Mantua roads. On the former, Brescia is thirty and Peschiera seventeen miles west of Verona; Villanova is thirteen and Vicenza is thirty miles east of Verona. On the latter road Cremona is forty and Marcaria thirteen miles west of Mantua; Legnago is thirty and Padua seventy miles east of Mantua.

An Austrian army entering Italy from the north, passes the Alps by Brenner Pass and reaches Trent on the Adige River. An Austrian army entering Italy from the east, passes through the plain between the mountains and the Adriatic and reaches the Brenta River near Cittadella. If armies are moving into Italy by both lines simultaneously they may when they reach the Brenta be concentrated either at Trent or Cittadella and advance on the Quadrilateral by any of the various roads shown on the map.

From Trent to Bassano where the river emerges from the mountains is a distance of sixty miles. Cittadella is ten miles from Bassano, forty-five from Verona, and one hundred from Legnago via Padua.

**ROADS FROM TRENT TO THE QUADRILATERAL.**—From Trent the principal road is that along the east side of the Adige which follows the bank of the river to Verona—fifty-five miles. This road is most easily blocked at the gorge of the river just below Rivoli and sixteen miles from Verona; the French later constructed a fort at this gorge on the east side of the river. Roveredo is the principal town on this road, being the center of a network of roads. Between Roveredo and Trent the road and river run through the gorge of Calliano.

All the roads between the Adige and Lake Garda start from the Roveredo-Riva road and unite at the plateau of Rivoli. One follows the west bank of the river to a point above Rivoli where on account of the gorge it ascends the plateau—three or four hundred feet above the river—and runs to Castelnovo. The two others are inferior roads; one along the lake shore and the other in the

valley east of Monte Baldo. The latter passes through the defile of Corona.

West of Lake Garda the valley of the Chiese River may be reached by road either from Trent or from Roveredo. The roads unite at Storo. Along Lake Idro there is a single road following a narrow shelf at Rocca d'Anfo. Below Lake Idro one road runs to Brescia which is ninety miles from Trent; one follows the river, passing through Gavardo, with a branch running to Salo on Lake Garda. There was no road between Salo and Riva along the west shore of Lake Garda.

The road from Trent to Lake Idro passes the divide between the Sarca and the Chiese at an elevation of 2,700 feet and that from Riva to Lake Idro over a divide 2,500 feet in elevation. Lake Idro itself has an elevation of 1,600 feet. The mountain ranges inclosing the Adige, Lake Garda and the Chiese all have summits whose elevation exceeds 7,000 feet.

**LAKE GARDA.**—Lake Garda is the largest of the lakes of northern Italy being thirty-four miles long, and eleven miles wide at its broadest part. Sailing vessels on the lake formed the usual means of transport.

### FIRST CAMPAIGN.

**MILITARY SITUATION.**—After the retreat of Beaulieu, Gen. Sauret reported to Napoleon to replace Gen. Laharpe and was assigned to the command of the troops west of Lake Garda. Gen. Vaubois also reported with a division from the Army of the Alps.

To Massena was assigned the task of covering the besieging forces at Mantua. With Sauret's division of 4,000 men he was to guard the roads west of Lake Garda, and with his own division increased to 15,000 men he was to hold the space between Lake Garda and the Adige River as far south as Ronco. A French garrison was placed in Verona.

The rest of the troops were to drive the Austrians—10,000 men—who were encamped around Mantua across the Mincio into the fortress where they were to be watched by Serurier assisted by Kilmaine while Augereau guarded the Adige above and below Legnago. In order to reduce the citadel and fortress of Mantua, orders were sent to Coni, Nice and other points for siege artillery.

During the month of May, Napoleon had made terms with the Dukes of both Parma and Modena by which they agreed to make large contributions for the support of the army. As it would be some time before the Austrian army could again take the field, he determined to utilize this time in forcing the other powers of Italy to make peace.

On June 5, at Brescia, he signed an agreement with the representatives of the King of Naples. The following day he started via Milan for Tortona and from that point arranged matters with Genoa.

While at Tortona he directed Augereau to march with a part of his division on Bologna, and Vaubois to march with his division via Modena on Leghorn.

At Bologna, June 23, he came to an agreement with the representatives of the Pope, and on June 27 visited Vaubois at Leghorn to adjust matters in Tuscany. Having received information that a new Austrian army was being assembled in Trent to relieve Mantua, he now hastened back to his army and directed Augereau to recross the Po and return to his position on the Adige.

On June 30, the citadel of Milan surrendered to Gen. Despinoy and he was directed to leave a small garrison under Gen. Sahuguet and join the army with three demibrigades.

On July 6, Napoleon reported to his government that Gen. Wurmser, the new Austrian commander, was at Trent with an army of 49,000 regulars. He gave the strength of his own army as 44,000 men. In round numbers Massena had 15,000; Sauret,

4,500; Augereau, 5,000; Despinoy, 5,500; Kilmaine, 2,000; Serurier, 10,000. About 2,000 of Despinoy's division, not included above, were at Bergamo.

Sauret's troops were at Salo, Gavardo and Desenzano and a small detachment at Brescia. Massena had outposts at Torri, Corona and in the valley of the Adige, a strong reserve at Rivoli, a garrison in Verona, and a demibrigade along the river below the city. Despinoy had one demibrigade on the Adige between Massena and Augereau and another in Peschiera. Augereau occupied Legnago and guarded the river above and below. Kilmaine with the cavalry reserve was near Villafranca.

Napoleon at this time believed the roads west of Lake Garda impracticable for a large force and expected the Austrians to force the gap between the Adige and Lake Garda or attempt to cross that river below Verona.

During the month of July, Napoleon tried unsuccessfully to capture Mantua by surprise, employing boats to take his men across the lake which surrounded the fortress. On July 18, the siege guns having arrived, the first parallel was opened and the chief engineer promised to reduce the place in twenty days. The siege was however interrupted by Gen. Wurmser.

**CAMPAIGN.**—In the latter part of July, Gen. Wurmser moved out from Trent leaving garrisons in the Tyrol.

Wurmser's plan was to attack the French line in three columns. A column of four mixed brigades—18,000 men—under Gen. Quasdanovich, was to move down via Lake Idro to attack the French posts west of Lake Garda. A central column of seven brigades—24,000 men—commanded by himself, was to move down the Adige and on each side of Monte Baldo—15,000 west of the Adige River and 9,000 east of that river. A flying column of one brigade of infantry and one brigade of cavalry—5,000 men—under Gen. Meszaros, was to move via the Brenta valley and Vicenza to secure Verona and Legnago the minute they were evacuated by the French.

**July 29.**—Early in the morning of July 29, Wurmser's central column attacked Joubert's brigade of Massena's division at Corona; and, though reinforced, the French outpost line was, during the day, forced back to Rivoli. Sauret was attacked by one brigade at Salo and was compelled to retreat to Desenzano. A second Austrian brigade defeated the French force at Gavardo which fell back to Salo and took refuge in an old castle where it was invested. The other Austrian brigades moved on Brescia.

Napoleon was at Brescia in the morning and hastened to Peschiera. His first orders were for a counter-attack, but this was soon abandoned. Despinoy and Kilmaine were ordered to Castelnovo to support Massena. Augereau was ordered to retreat to Roverbella.

**July 30.**—On the west side of Lake Garda two Austrian brigades reached Brescia and one Austrian brigade reached the Chiese River at San Marco on the Lonato road. The fourth brigade remained at Salo. Wurmser's column was engaged all day in concentrating at Rivoli and attacking Massena. Meszaros took Verona and Legnago as soon as abandoned by the French. He took no active part in the campaign but protected Wurmser's communications.

Sauret was at Desenzano; Massena was obliged to fall back to Castelnovo; Augereau was on the road between Legnago and Mantua; Despinoy and Kilmaine at Castelnovo.

That night Napoleon definitely decided his plan of action, which was to make his communications safe, by first attacking the Austrians west of Lake Garda. Sauret and Despinoy were to recapture Salo, release the French, and march on Brescia; Massena was to abandon the east bank of the Mincio, leaving a small force to hold Peschiera and the bridge at Valeggio, and send one demi-

brigade to Augereau; with the remainder of his troops he was to retire to Desenzano; Serurier was to abandon the siege of Mantua and send his troops east of the Mincio to join Augereau; with those west of the Mincio, he was to fall back to Marcaria and hold the crossing; Augereau, reinforced by Kilmaine and by troops from Serurier and Massena, was to march for Brescia and recapture it.

**July 31.**—Two of the Austrian brigades west of the Mincio moved from Brescia to Montechiaro on the Chiese River; the one at San Marco on the Lonato road advanced to Lonato, where it attacked Despinoy, defeated him, was in turn defeated by Massena and returned to San Marco. The fourth remained at Salo.

Wurmser advanced from Castelnovo to the Mincio and gave orders for the investment of Peschiera. He made no attempt to cross the river or to advance on Mantua.

Sauret made a night march on Salo and relieved the troops that had taken refuge in the old castle. He could not march on Brescia, as Napoleon had ordered, since Despinoy had not accompanied him. He therefore returned to Desenzano. Despinoy was moving to support Sauret, when he was attacked by the Austrians near Lonato.

Massena withdrew to Desenzano and in the afternoon marched to Lonato to assist Despinoy.

Augereau and Kilmaine, under Napoleon, were at Roverbella. They covered Serurier while he was withdrawing his troops from the besieging lines, destroying his works, and dismounting his guns. Serurier with two brigades retired to Marcaria.

**August 1.**—Quasdanovich, hearing nothing from Wurmser and learning that his brigades had met defeat at Salo and Lonato, ordered his three advance brigades to fall back towards Gavardo. Wurmser, after leaving a besieging force at Peschiera and a strong force at Castelnovo to cover his communications, marched to Mantua.

Augereau and Kilmaine under Napoleon with a column of 12,000 men crossed the Mincio at Goito during the night of July 31-August 1, and moved on Brescia, driving the enemy's detachments from their front. Sauret and Despinoy joined them at the Chiese. The French reached Brescia in the evening of August 1, just as the Austrians were evacuating. In passing Castiglione, Augereau left a brigade at that place to cover his rear.

**August 2.**—Quasdanovich was assembling three brigades at Gavardo; the fourth again took possession of Salo. Wurmser was at Mantua, completing the destruction of the French besieging works and moving their cannon into the fortress. He sent a reconnoitering force via Goito towards Brescia to ascertain the position of Quasdanovich.

Massena remained near Lonato and Sauret returned to that place; Despinoy remained at Brescia where his troops from Bergamo joined him. Augereau and Kilmaine moved back to Montechiaro on the Chiese.

That afternoon Napoleon learned that the French brigade at Castiglione had retreated before Wurmser's reconnoitering force without fighting. Assuming that Wurmser was behind this column he was for a time thoroughly discouraged and inclined to order a general retreat behind the Adda. He recovered from his depression, however, and decided not to retreat.

He therefore ordered Sauret's division to again make a night march from Lonato and retake Salo. Dallemagne, who commanded a brigade under Sauret, was to move on Gavardo and cooperate with Despinoy, who was to march to the same place from Brescia. Augereau and Kilmaine were to advance to Castiglione and hold Wurmser should he advance.

**August 3.**—Quasdanovich decided to leave a brigade at Gavardo

and advance with the others to find Wurmser. En route to Lonato he struck in succession Despinoy and Dallemagne and drove them back. His fourth brigade from Salo reached Lonato via Desenzano and its commander surprised one of Massena's brigades and captured part of it. Massena came to the rescue and the Austrian brigade was defeated and almost destroyed. Quasdanovich again withdrew towards Gavardo. Wurmser advanced with a strong force and joined his reconnoitering force at Castiglione, where he had an engagement with Augereau and Kilmaine.

On the morning of the 3d, Sauret's division returned to Salo, without passing through Desenzano and in turn invested a part of an Austrian fourth brigade. The operations of Despinoy, Dallemagne and Massena have been described. In a brilliant engagement at Castiglione, Augereau and Kilmaine defeated the force that Wurmser had brought to that place.

That night Napoleon directed Massena to reinforce Sauret's division and ordered the Austrian communications to be seriously threatened both from Salo and Brescia.

**August 4.**—Quasdanovich, having lost one of his brigades and being threatened from Salo and Brescia, was afraid to advance with his whole force but sent a mixed brigade of 2,000 men to find Wurmser. This force almost captured Napoleon when it appeared suddenly at Lonato; its commander, however, being informed that he was in the presence of the whole French army, surrendered his command. When he learned of this loss, Quasdanovich ordered his brigades to fall back to Lake Idro.

Wurmser concentrated his force this day to make a serious attack on Augereau.

That night Napoleon decided that his communications were no longer threatened and that he could attack Wurmser with impunity.

**August 5.**—The decisive battle of the campaign took place this day at Castiglione, where Wurmser had assembled about 20,000 men. Napoleon employed in his attack all of his available troops—30,000 men. The division at Salo was the only one absent. The two brigades of Serurier's division at Marcaria marched to the field and attacked the Austrians in flank and rear.

Wurmser fought a stubborn battle but was finally compelled to retreat across the Mincio.

**August 6.**—Massena, followed by Augereau, marched in haste to reinforce the French garrison of Peschiera—which was about to surrender—and to cross the Mincio in order to cut off Wurmser's retreat. Being warned in time, Wurmser decided that night to leave part of his troops as a garrison in Mantua and with the remainder withdraw to Rivoli and Verona.

**August 8 to 10.**—Napoleon ordered Sauret to advance via Lake Idro, Massena on Rivoli, and Augereau on Verona. By August 10, Sauret was at the junction of the roads north of Lake Idro, Massena at Rivoli and Corona, and Augereau at Verona. Each of the three columns of Wurmser's army retired over the roads on which it advanced. Meszaros stopped at Bassano.

At the close of this two weeks' campaign, Gen. Despinoy was sent to command a fortress in Sardinia and his troops given to Gen. Sauret. Gen. Sauret, who was injured during the campaign, was later replaced by Gen. Vaubois. Gen. Serurier, who was seriously ill, was replaced by Gen. Sahuguet. Gen. Serurier later took the command in Tuscany which had been held by Vaubois.

With the troops left by Wurmser, the Mantua garrison now numbered five brigades—15,000 men.

The French troops were much exhausted by this campaign, and it was not until August 24, that the Austrian garrison at Mantua was attacked and forced to cross to the west side of the Mincio.

As all the siege material and works had been destroyed either

by the French or the Austrians, Napoleon was compelled to resort to investment alone. This however was not sufficiently close to cut off all supplies from the south.

#### NAPOLEON'S COMMENTS.

1. The plan of Marshal Wurmser was defective; his three columns were separated from each other by two rivers, the Adige and the Mincio, by Lake Garda, and by several chains of mountains.

2. Wurmser should have done one of two things:

*First:*—He might have advanced with his whole force between Lake Garda and the Adige River and taken possession of the plateau of Rivoli. To this point he could have brought his artillery by the river road. Thus posted, with his right on Lake Garda, his left on the Adige, with a front of only three leagues, he would have been too powerful for the French army.

*Second:*—He might have debouched with his whole army by the Chiese on Brescia; the artillery could have taken this route.

3. In the execution of his plan, he made another mistake, for which he paid dearly; it was in losing two days by going to Mantua. He should have thrown two bridges over the Mincio out of cannon range of Peschiera and promptly crossed this river to join his right column at Lonato, Desenzano, or Salo, and thus rapidly repaired the defects of his plan.

To operate by lines separated from each other is a mistake which usually compels one to commit a second. The detached column has orders only for the first day; its operations for the second day depend on what happens to the main column. It therefore either loses time in awaiting further orders or it operates by chance.

It is then a principle that an army should always have its columns so united that an enemy cannot get in between them.

4. The division of Sauret should have had an advance guard at Rocca d'Anfo on Lake Idro to reconnoiter the country to the north; this would have prevented the surprise of Salo and Brescia. These places would then have had twelve hours warning and could have been prepared for defense.

5. Since there is west of Lake Garda but a single practicable road for artillery which passes through Rocca d'Anfo, an army must pass this defile to reach Salo. Would it not have been better to post Sauret at this point and occupy by redoubts, intrenchments, and two armed boats the roads and the lake? It would have taken the Austrian right column twenty-four hours to take this place, and Brescia, Salo, and army headquarters would have been warned of its approach. It must be admitted that this division was badly posted, since it did not occupy the position which it should have occupied to fulfil its purpose of covering the country to the west of Lake Garda.

6. At Brescia was a hospital and storehouse and only three companies in garrison; they were made prisoners of war. Had the citadel been put in condition to resist open assault, this would not have happened. It was afterwards done, but should have been done before.

#### FRENCH GENERALS OF DIVISION.

**DESPINOY, Hyacinthe Francois.**—Entered army as cadet 1780, second lieutenant 1784, chief of battalion 1793, general of brigade 1793, general of division 1800, died 1848. Served in the armies of the North and of the Pyrenees 1792–1795. Captured the citadel of Milan in 1796 and brevetted general of division. Governor of various fortified towns 1800–1814. In the army under the Bourbons until 1830.

"Without energy or audacity. Is not a natural soldier, is not loved by his men, does not lead them into action. Has high principles, a good mind, sound political views. A good commander in the interior."—Napoleon August 14, 1796.

**SAURET, Pierre Franconin.**—Born in 1742. Entered army as private in 1757, grenadier 1759, sergeant 1763, ensign 1779, captain 1792, chief of battalion,

chief of brigade and general of division 1793, died 1812.

"Good, very good soldier; not sufficient intellect for a general officer; not lucky.—Napoleon August 14, 1796.

### AUSTRIAN ARMY COMMANDER.

**WURMSER, Count Jean Pierre de.**—Born in Alsace in 1724 and entered the French army in 1745. After two years' service he moved to Vienna, entered the Austrian service, and served in the Seven Years' War. Attained the grade of division commander in 1779, and in 1787 that of corps commander. Served with distinction on the Rhine, 1793–1795. After 1797 he was made field marshal, but died the same year without further service.

#### ARMY OF ITALY—JULY 20, 1796.

Generals of Division	Generals of Brigade	Strength
Massena	Joubert	15,391 including 2 cavalry regiments
	Valette	
	Rampon	
	Victor	
	Pijon	
Augereau	Guillaume	5,368 including 1 cavalry regiment
	Beyrand	
	Robert	
Sauret	Guieu Rusca	4,462
Serurier	Pelletier	10,000 including 2 cavalry regiments
	Charton	
	Serviez	
	Dallemagne	
Despinoy Kilmaine	Bertin	5,500
		1,535
	Total,	42,256

The 12th demibrigade was en route to join Serurier and the 25th demibrigade was en route to join Despinoy from Milan; the latter was at Bergamo. These reserves would bring the strength of the army to 46,700.

### SECOND CAMPAIGN.

**MILITARY SITUATION.**—The withdrawal of 25,000 men under Gen. Wurmser to reinforce the Austrian army in Italy had weakened the Austrian armies along the Rhine River and allowed the French armies to cross that river.

The French Army of the Sambre and Meuse, under Gen. Jourdan, crossed the Rhine north of the Main, and the French Army of the Rhine under Gen. Moreau at Strasburg. About the 20th of August, Jourdan was near Nuremberg and Moreau near Ulm. From Ulm, Gen. Moreau was to move a force on Innsbruck and threaten Wurmser's communications through the Inn Valley. This, it was believed by the Directory, would cause Wurmser to retreat from the Tyrol and join Archduke Charles in Germany. The Directory advised Napoleon, under these circumstances, to advance to Trent and follow Wurmser over the Brenner Pass.

Napoleon had three brigades—10,000 men—under Vaubois west of Lake Garda; two of these brigades were north of Lake Idro and one at Salo. Massena had four brigades—13,000 men—between Lake Garda and the Adige with one brigade of cavalry. Augereau had three brigades—10,000 men—at Verona. Kilmaine was at Verona with a mixed brigade of 2,000 men. Sahuguet was besieging Mantua with a force of 8,000 men. Several thousand men were sick in the hospitals.

Wurmser's regular force was now reduced to 40,000 men. A new chief of staff was sent him from Vienna to suggest a plan of operations. The plan adopted was to divide his army into two equal corps—one under Wurmser to assemble at Bassano and defend the road eastward from Verona; the other under Gen. Davidovich to remain at Trent and defend the road leading into the Tyrol. Each could advance cautiously and if Napoleon attacked either, the other could relieve Mantua and operate on the French communications.

When the campaign opened, one division of Wurmser's corps was at Bassano, one in the valley of the Brenta near Primolano, and one just east of Trent.

Davidovich was compelled to detach two brigades to protect his communications against Moreau's army and had but 14,000 regulars with some militia. His main body—8,000 men—was near Roveredo with outposts at Ala and beyond Riva; the reserve was at Trent.

**NAPOLEON'S PLAN.**—Napoleon notified both the Directory and Gen. Moreau that he would advance on Trent about September 2, and reach there the 4th or 5th. He would then be able to decide on his next step.

His plan was to advance in three columns. Vaubois with his two brigades was to advance to the vicinity of Riva and there meet his Salo brigade, which was to be transported by water. Massena was to advance up the Adige valley and Augereau up the valleys north of Verona.

Kilmaine was directed to hold Verona with an infantry garrison of 1,000 men and cover it with a cavalry brigade.

Sahuguet was to hold the line about Mantua and send a cavalry outpost to Legnago.

As it was possible that Napoleon himself might move north from Trent he warned both Kilmaine and Sahuguet that the Austrians might appear in force either at Legnago or Verona. If the opposing force was too great, Kilmaine and Sahuguet were to fall back behind the Oglio, leaving a strong garrison in Peschiera.

**CAMPAIGN—September 2.**—Vaubois advanced to Riva and Massena drove the Austrian outposts out of Ala.

**September 3.**—Massena captured Roveredo and drove the Austrians beyond Calliano. Vaubois united his forces and moved up the west side of the Adige.

**September 4.**—Napoleon entered Trent with Massena and was there joined by Vaubois.

**September 5.**—Massena and Vaubois attacked Davidovich at Lavis and compelled him to retreat towards Botzen. Augereau arrived at Roveredo and was sent eastwards to Levico.

**September 6.**—Napoleon decided to leave Vaubois at Lavis, covering Trent, while he with Massena and Augereau moved against Wurmser.

**September 7.**—Augereau with two brigades attacked Primolano where there was an Austrian brigade of 2,000 men and succeeded in capturing the commanding officer and most of his force.

**September 8.**—Massena and Augereau reached the foothills north of Bassano, where Wurmser had left a brigade on each side of the river to cover his trains near Cittadella. A third brigade was in reserve near Bassano. Massena attacked west of the river and Augereau east of the river and together carried the Austrian lines and pursued the Austrian troops to their reserves who were also defeated.

The Austrians lost 35 guns, their bridge equipage and a large number of prisoners. Some of the fugitives retreated eastwards from Cittadella, but the main force to Montebello. Napoleon had now almost completely destroyed one of Wurmser's three divisions; one after considerable loss retreated to Montebello; the third was at Montebello when Bassano was attacked and was not engaged. Wurmser himself joined this division.

**September 9.**—Wurmser now decided to move on Legnago, cross the river and go to Mantua. He spent the day in reorganizing and resting his troops near Arcole, but sent a cavalry force to Legnago which was at once evacuated by the French garrison. Massena followed to Montebello; Augereau moved to Padua.

**September 10.**—Wurmser reached Legnago in the afternoon and crossed the river. Massena's advance guard crossed at Ronco that night. Augereau marched towards Legnago.

**September 11.**—Sahuguet was warned of Wurmser's movements and directed to destroy all the bridges over the Molinella

River between Sanguinetto and Mantua and guard the river; Kilmaine was to assist him. Massena was directed to march on Sanguinetto and Augereau was directed to take Legnago if possible. Wurmser left a strong rear guard in Legnago and started for Sanguinetto.

Napoleon's plans went astray this day. Sahuguet's men did not destroy all the bridges, and Massena's guide, instead of taking him on the direct road to Sanguinetto, took him via Angiari and Cerea. Massena therefore ran into Wurmser's main body with two brigades greatly weakened by stragglers and was defeated. Wurmser, guided by a native, passed over a bridge south of Sanguinetto and joined the Austrian garrison opposite Mantua. Sahuguet abandoned his investing line east of the Mincio and crossed the Mincio at Goito.

**September 12.**—A brigade of Massena's division and Augereau's division invested Legnago. Massena moved towards Mantua.

**September 13.**—The Austrian commander of Legnago surrendered with 1,600 men and the French investing troops marched on Mantua. Augereau was obliged by sickness to give up his command.

**September 14 and 15.**—These days were spent by Napoleon in uniting his forces and attacking Wurmser at San Giorgio to compel him to evacuate the east bank of the Mincio. The fighting was very severe but at last Napoleon was successful.

The campaign ended September 15, two weeks from the day Napoleon started from Trent. After a few days' rest, Massena was sent to occupy Verona and take post at Bassano where he could communicate with Vaubois via the Brenta valley. The other divisions remained near Mantua.

Wurmser took with him into Mantua about 10,000 men which added to the garrison made a force of about 25,000 men. The fighting strength of this force was reduced by several thousand on the sick report. Wurmser encamped most of his men on the main land southwest of the fortification.

Napoleon assigned Kilmaine to the command of the investing forces which he organized into two divisions under Gens. Sahuguet and Dallemagne. The investment was not at first very close but after Wurmser attempted to seize Governolo near the mouth of the Mincio, Kilmaine reinforced by Augereau's division drove him into his intrenched camp west of the Mincio. The French lines of investment were then strengthened by field fortifications.

The French army suffered greatly in this campaign. All of the brigade commanders of Massena's division were killed, wounded or so exhausted by the operations as to be on the sick report.

The distance from Rivoli to Lavis is 60 miles; from Lavis to Cittadella 70 miles, and from Cittadella to Mantua 70 miles via Ronco. The divisions of Massena and Augereau must therefore have marched on an average about 15 miles a day from the 2d to the 13th inclusive, besides engaging the enemy almost daily.

On October 1, Napoleon reported to the Directory that he had 18,000 men on the sick report; 4,000 from wounds. He reported the strength of his divisions—Vaubois, 8,000; Massena, 5,500; Augereau, 5,400; Sahuguet, 4,500; Dallemagne, 4,500. The strength of the cavalry reserve is not mentioned.

#### NAPOLÉON'S COMMENTS.

1. At the beginning of September, when Wurmser moved towards Bassano, leaving Davidovich in the Tyrol, he should have directed Davidovich, in case he was attacked in force by the French, not to accept battle at Roveredo, but to retire on Bassano, in order to unite the army before giving battle. The Tyrolean militia could have guarded the Avisio valley. Otherwise he should have ordered Davidovich to retire on Calliano and the valley of the Avisio. Roveredo and the other positions occupied by him

are good positions, but they cannot compensate for lack of numbers if attacked by impetuous troops. In all affairs in gorges, columns once broken, interfere with each other and fall into the power of the enemy.

2. Wurmser having united his corps at Bassano, should have sent only a column, consisting of a division of infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and a bridge train, to relieve Mantua. This force should have crossed the Adige at Albaredo from which it is only a short march to Mantua. The garrison of Mantua thus reinforced could have maintained itself in the field for some time. He himself should have retired to the Piave. The French army would have been obliged to hold its left in the Tyrol, its center in front of the Piave, and at the same time reinforce its right in order to re-establish the blockade of Mantua. This would have been a heavy task for a small army.

3. After Bassano, Wurmser was compelled to march to the Adige with the remnant of his army. His bridge train and reserve parks having been captured, he should have been surrounded, stopped by the river and compelled to surrender. He owed his good fortune in reaching Mantua to the French chief of battalion who evacuated Legnago.

4. The Marshal made a mistake in leaving any garrison in Legnago. It was impossible for him to retreat to Legnago in the face of the entire French army; he was obliged to try to reach Mantua. It would have been easier for him to move to Milan than to return to Legnago. He reduced his own strength and sacrificed this garrison uselessly.

5. Wurmser was also wrong in risking a battle at San Giorgio; he should have retired to the country south of Mantua which is the real battlefield of the garrison of Mantua when strong enough to operate outside its walls.

He might also have crossed from this section to the country south of the Po. By making a detour, he might have reached Padua with his cavalry, artillery and staff before the French general became aware of his movement.

#### FRENCH GENERALS OF DIVISION.

**SAHUGUET, Jean Joseph.**—Born 1756. Entered French army as lieutenant and became captain 1784; lieutenant colonel of dragoons 1791, general of brigade 1792, general of division 1793, died 1803. Served in the Army of the Pyrenees, in the Army of Italy and as governor of conquered provinces after Wurmser's second campaign.

**VAUBOIS, Claude Henri.**—Born 1748. Captain of artillery at the outbreak of the revolution, general of brigade 1793, general of division 1795, retired as lieutenant general 1817, died 1839. In the Army of the Alps 1793 to 1795, in the Army of Italy in 1796, in 1798 was appointed by Napoleon commander of the island of Malta which he successfully defended for two years. Elected senator and made count in 1808. Took no part in Napoleon's government in 1815 and remained in chamber of peers until his death.

"Vaubois is a brave man. Has the proper qualifications for the commander of a besieged place but not for the commander of a division in a very active army or in a war so vigorously conducted as this."—Napoleon November 24, 1796.

#### AUSTRIAN ARMY—JULY 26, 1796.

Wurmser—General in Chief. Weyrother—Chief of Staff.						
Wing	Brigade	Bat.	Squad.	Inf.	Cav.	Total
Right— Quasdanovich	Reuss Spork Ott Ocskay	17	13	15,272	2,349	17,621
Right-Center— Melas	Kummer Bajalics Nicoletti Pittoni	19	4	13,676	727	14,403
Left-Center— Davidovich	Mitrofski Liptai Spiegel	11	10	8,274	1,618	9,892
Left— Mezaros	Hohenzollern Minkwitz	5	7	3,949	1,072	5,021
Total,				41,171	5,766	46,937

## NAPOLEON AND ALVINCZI.

### FIRST CAMPAIGN.

**MILITARY SITUATION.**—After the defeat of Wurmser in front of Mantua, Napoleon moved his headquarters to Milan where he remained until the middle of October.

While he was engaged in his second campaign with Wurmser, the French armies in Bavaria were defeated by Archduke Charles and both Jourdan and Moreau had retreated to the Rhine River.

Napoleon was now anxious for peace with Austria. His own army was exhausted and in no condition to invest Mantua and meet the new Austrian army which the emperor would be sure to send; his communications were harassed by Sardinian bandits who seemed to be supported by their government; both the Papal states and Naples were threatening war and an uprising in Venice was to be feared; all the other Italian states were restless and ready to desert him if he met with defeat. His requisitions had been very severe on Italy, robbing her not only of supplies and war material, but also of her most precious works of art.

On October 2, he wrote to the emperor of Austria, threatening to advance on Triest and destroy that harbor, unless peace was made. As this had no effect, on the 16th he wrote to Wurmser offering him free passage for his entire garrison if he would surrender the fortress of Mantua; this letter was not answered.

The Austrians, who had some reserve battalions on the frontier of Venice, at Tarvis and Gorz, used these and the battalions of Wurmser's army that had retired eastward, to form the nucleus of a new army. Knowing from the Venetians the weakness of Massena's division, these troops advanced to the Piave River.

On the 17th of October, Napoleon informed the Directory that the Austrians had 15,000 men on the Piave, 14,000 in the Tyrol and were sending troops from Austria to reinforce them; he urged that he be similarly reinforced.

About the middle of the month he started for Verona via Pavia, Modena and Bologna and reached his army October 23.

**NAPOLEON'S PLAN.**—Assuming that Davidovich's corps had been reduced by detachments sent to the main army on the Piave, which was daily growing in strength, Napoleon decided to have Vaubois attack Davidovich and drive him back into the mountains. Then Vaubois could either come with his whole force or send a large part of it down the Brenta valley to unite with Massena and Augereau.

Vaubois had 10,500 men at Lavis and Trent; Massena had 9,500 at Bassano and Cittadella; Augereau 8,500 at Verona, a reserve infantry brigade of 3,000 was at Villafranca and the reserve cavalry brigade of 1,600 men at Verona. Kilmaine with the divisions of Sahuguet and Dallemagne was at Mantua.

**THE AUSTRIAN PLAN.**—In the latter part of September, Gen. Alvinczi was assigned to the command of the relieving army which was strengthened as much as the resources of the empire would permit.

Having visited Davidovich in the Tyrol, he decided on the following plan. Davidovich was to recall the two brigades that had been protecting his communications in the previous campaign from possible attack by detachments from Moreau's army, and his army was to be strengthened by four brigades to 18,000 or 20,000 men. He was to assume the offensive and drive Vaubois out of Trent, thus giving the Austrians the northern end of the Brenta valley. Alvinczi was to personally command the army which was to be concentrated on the Piave River. This army was to have six brigades—28,000 to 30,000 men. He was to move from the Piave to Bassano and Cittadella and secure the southern end of the Brenta valley.

The two Austrian armies could then concentrate on either line of march, or both advance to unite at Verona.

The French and Austrian plans were similar; the Austrian forces outnumbered the French by one-half the strength of the French mobile force. To offset this advantage, the French were protected by the Adige River and its fortresses—Verona and Legnago—each of which had been placed in a good state of defense by Napoleon's chief engineer and chief of artillery.

**CAMPAIGN.—November 2.**—Vaubois made an unsuccessful attack on the advancing Austrian forces north of Lavis. Alvinczi's troops began to cross the Piave River.

**November 3.**—Davidovich advanced his left wing so as to cut Vaubois from the Brenta, and his right wing along the west side of the Adige. Alvinczi crossed the Piave River and advanced in two columns on Bassano and Cittadella.

**November 4.**—Davidovich, still advancing on both sides of the Adige, compelled Vaubois to retreat to Calliano. Alvinczi advanced on Bassano and Cittadella and Massena retreated to Vicenza where the reserve infantry brigade joined him. Augereau advanced from Verona to Montebello.

While authorizing Massena to retreat, Napoleon had not given up his plan of holding the line of the Brenta. He therefore reinforced Massena and pushed Augereau to the front.

**November 5.**—Davidovich took possession of Trent and arranged his columns for an advance on Calliano.

Alvinczi crossed the Brenta unopposed. Massena was at Vicenza; Augereau advanced to that point.

Gen. Joubert, whose brigade was at Legnago, was ordered to Rivoli with one demibrigade to cover the retreat of Vaubois.

**November 6.**—Vaubois was attacked on the afternoon of the 6th at Calliano and resisted the attack. The Austrian brigade west of the Adige, having only a small force in its front, reached the Riva-Roveredo road and threatened his communications.

Massena and Augereau, under Napoleon's supervision, attacked Alvinczi between Cittadella and Bassano on the Brenta. Both armies fought well. Napoleon was unable to force Alvinczi to recross the Brenta.

**November 7.**—Vaubois fought all day at Calliano. Being obliged to send troops to protect his communications, he was decisively defeated in the afternoon and retreated that night through Ala to Peri. Joubert's brigade moved up from Rivoli and held Corona.

Napoleon had intended to renew the battle on the Brenta this day, but the news from Vaubois made him hesitate and he finally started Massena for Verona to be followed by Augereau. In person he hastened to Rivoli and put Vaubois' troops in position at that place.

**November 8.**—Massena reached Verona in person on the afternoon of the 8th and as he was familiar with the country was placed temporarily in command of Vaubois' division, with orders to defend the line between Lake Garda and the Adige. Massena sent another demibrigade to Joubert at Corona and posted the remainder of Vaubois' division at Rivoli. Davidovich did not push his pursuit.

Massena's division retired to Verona and Augereau's to Montebello. Alvinczi reached Vicenza.

**November 9.**—Davidovich, having been informed that Massena had reinforced Vaubois, ceased his advance. Vaubois and Massena strengthened their positions at Corona and Rivoli with artillery and intrenchments.

Augereau's division returned to Verona where he was assigned the defense of the Adige from Verona to Legnago. Alvinczi advanced to Montebello.

**November 10.**—The Austrians did not move this day and the French simply strengthened their lines.

**November 11.**—Alvinczi advanced to Villanova from which place the French outpost retired. An Austrian reconnoitering force came within a mile of Verona but was driven back.

As everything was quiet in Vaubois' front, Napoleon decided to again attack Alvinczi. Massena in person was recalled from Rivoli and that night the division of Massena and part of that of Augereau moved out and encamped near the east gate of Verona.

**November 12.**—At break of day Napoleon moved from Verona and attacked the Austrian advance brigades at Caldiero—8,000 men—with the divisions of Massena and a part of that of Augereau. Although the resistance was obstinate, the Austrians being in intrenched villages, Napoleon was making progress when, in the afternoon, two additional Austrian brigades reached the field. The French were then defeated and driven with considerable loss back into Verona. The darkness probably prevented the Austrians from following up their success.

**November 13.**—There were no operations this day, though Davidovich was preparing to advance.

Napoleon was thoroughly discouraged and wrote a very despondent letter to the Directory. Vaubois' division had lost a third of its strength and some of its regiments had shown signs of demoralization. Massena and Augereau had twice unsuccessfully attacked the enemy and had suffered severe loss. The Austrians were now relatively much stronger than they had been at the opening of the campaign. Retreat to the Adda seemed the only thing left.

**November 14.**—Another day passed without any operations. Davidovich made preparations to attack Corona on the 15th. Alvinczi decided to throw a bridge across the Adige south of Caldiero and was making causeways through the marsh to the site of the bridge.

Napoleon's spirits rose and he began to despise an adversary who was so slow to take advantage of his opportunities. He knew that Vaubois could not hold out against Davidovich and yet he did not dare to move Massena and Augereau to Rivoli with Alvinczi at the gates of Verona. He therefore decided to strike the communications of Alvinczi about a day's march from Verona, and see if he could not make him retreat and give Napoleon time to destroy Davidovich.

At Villanova, thirteen miles east of Verona, the Verona-Vicenza highway is hemmed in between the foothills of the Alps on the north and the marshy triangle between the Adige and Alpon. Alvinczi left his trains just east of Villanova.

Napoleon knew that Alvinczi would feel sensitive about this point, and he therefore made up his mind to threaten it.

To secure a striking force, he directed Gen. Vaubois to send at once two of his seven demibrigades from Rivoli to Ronco and one to Verona, and on the 15th to concentrate his entire division at Rivoli, leaving only an outpost at Corona. Kilmaine was informed that he must keep Wurmser in Mantua, Alvinczi out of Verona, and send one of his seven demibrigades to Napoleon.

Sixteen miles below Verona on the west bank of the Adige River is the small village of Ronco, where the French had a ponton bridge which had been dismantled a few days before. Between the Adige and Alpon is marsh, below the water level of the two rivers. A dike along the east bank of the Adige and another along the west bank of the Alpon were the principal roadways in this section. There was a small area of high ground near the junction of the two rivers. At *Arcole* or *Arcola*, where the Alpon is about 60 feet wide, there was a narrow wooden bridge. Arcole is only three and a half miles from Villanova and due south of it.

After dark on the 16th, Napoleon, with the divisions of Massena and Augereau, Gen. Guieu's brigade of Vaubois' division and a brigade of cavalry, marched down to Ronco where orders had been given to rebuild the bridge. En route, one of Guieu's demibrigades

was left opposite Alvinczi's proposed crossing. An Austrian battalion, posted at Ronco, retreated to Arcole.

**November 15.**—As directed, Vaubois withdrew from Corona without being attacked and concentrated his remaining troops at Rivoli. Davidovich followed with four brigades and occupied Corona.

At daylight, Massena crossed the bridge, and with part of his division, started up the pike for Caldiero. The Austrians at once sent a force to meet him but in the course of the day Massena reached and held Porcil a small village a mile and a half from the Verona-Vicenza road.

Augereau followed Massena and moved on the dike to Arcole, where there was an Austrian brigade with two guns. For a mile, this dike was separated from the Austrians behind the opposite dike by the width of the river—30 yards. The flank fire of the Austrians threw Augereau's column in disorder and, although at one time he was in actual possession of the bridge, he could not hold it.

In the afternoon, Napoleon sent Guieu with his brigade to Albaredo to cross in boats to come up on the Austrians' left flank. The attacks on the bridge were continued by Augereau's column until late in the afternoon. As at Lodi, the generals of division and brigade, placed themselves at the head of the column to carry it forward, but all in vain; Napoleon himself led one attack. Towards evening Napoleon ordered both divisions to recross the ponton bridge leaving a strong guard on the east bank.

Guieu came up after dark and captured Arcole by surprise. He stayed there until midnight. Hearing nothing from Napoleon, he then retreated to Albaredo, crossed the river and returned to Ronco.

While the day's work had not been entirely successful, it did cause Alvinczi to send his trains from Villanova to Montebello; to give up all thought of crossing the Adige; and led him to engage in a battle on the dikes.

That night Napoleon ordered Vaubois to still further reduce his force and send 1,000 men into Verona to replace some he had ordered to Ronco.

**November 16.**—Davidovich spent this day in making preparations to attack Rivoli. Alvinczi sent two brigades down the dikes from Porcil and four brigades to Arcole. One of the latter took possession of Albaredo and protected that flank; one remained in Arcole; the other two crossed the Alpon and marched towards the French ponton bridge. Alvinczi hoped to prevent the French from again crossing the river.

Massena and Augereau crossed the river as on the preceding day, and met the Austrians on both dikes close to the bridge. The battle of the dikes was maintained all day long without the capture of the bridge at Arcole. In the afternoon, the French made an attempt to bridge the Alpon near its mouth but the Austrians on the opposite dike prevented its successful completion.

At night Napoleon again withdrew Massena and Augereau to the west bank, leaving a strong guard to cover the bridge.

**November 17.**—Davidovich attacked Vaubois, routed him and captured two of his three brigade commanders and a third of his command. Vaubois fled with the remnant of his command to Castelnovo. Davidovich stopped between Rivoli and Castelnovo to await orders from Alvinczi.

On the night of the 16th-17th, Napoleon sent a battalion of infantry and a regiment of cavalry to Legnago, to form with its garrison a column which was to move up the east side of the Adige to Arcole. Preparations were also made for the construction of a bridge near the mouth of the Alpon on the following day.

In crossing the river on the morning of November 17, Massena was in advance and was for a time cut off with a part of his division.

by the breaking of the ponton bridge. The French artillery however protected him from the attacks of the Austrians who were again marching for the bridge.

Severe fighting on the dikes again took place beginning near the bridge and with varying success. In the afternoon Augereau, however, crossed the Alpon near its mouth and formed a junction with the Legnago column. Massena then attacked along both dikes. Augereau was repulsed in an attack on Arcole and the day might have ended with the village in the possession of the Austrians, had not Napoleon sent a small squad of cavalry, in concealment around the Austrian left flank, where its bugles sounded calls, which made the Austrian commander believe a large cavalry force was on his flank. He therefore abandoned Arcole and retired through Gazzolo. Augereau and Massena pursued and attacked but were repulsed.

The French bivouacked on both sides the Alpon at Arcole.

**November 18.**—Davidovich did not move, as he had heard nothing from Alvinczi. Massena and Augereau moved up on opposite sides of the Alpon to Villanova, and caused the withdrawal of the last of Alvinczi's forces. They then marched to Verona, while the cavalry followed Alvinczi towards Montebello.

Napoleon, having heard that Vaubois' force was almost destroyed, ordered Massena to unite with the remnants of Vaubois' division at Villafranca.

**November 19.**—On the afternoon of this day, Davidovich learned of Alvinczi's retreat, and began himself to move northwards. Massena moved to Villafranca while Augereau remained at Verona.

**November 20.**—Massena organized his force at Villafranca. Alvinczi this day learned of the defeat of Vaubois and informed Davidovich that the main army would again move on Verona.

**November 21.**—Massena moved on Rivoli, and Augereau up the east bank of the Adige. Hearing that Massena was moving to attack him, and Augereau was marching for his communications, Davidovich hastened to retreat. Massena struck his rear guard at Rivoli and Augereau's advance guard struck him in flank at Peri.

**November 22.**—Davidovich sent word to Alvinczi that his troops were in no condition to continue the campaign, and he would retire to Roveredo. Alvinczi had by this time retaken his position at Caldiero and Arcole.

**November 23.**—Alvinczi received Davidovich's message and not caring to face Napoleon alone, promptly ordered a retreat to the Brenta River. Napoleon made no attempt to pursue, as his troops needed rest. Assuming that the relieving armies were near by, Wurmser made a sortie this day but was repulsed.

This ended the three weeks' campaign.

#### NAPOLÉON'S COMMENTS.

1. When Alvinczi began his campaign he decided to move in two columns. Nothing could have been more faulty than this plan. As soon as he was master of Bassano, he should have ordered Davidovich to join him and appear on the Adige with a united army. The defense of the Tyrol might have been left to the militia.

2. In occupying Caldiero, he should have established strong posts in the marshes opposite Ronco. In assuming that the marshes were impassable he allowed the French to construct a bridge at Ronco and place an army in his rear.

3. The columns of Alvinczi and Davidovich, although only ten or twelve leagues apart, were unable to communicate with each other. The country above Verona is very rough and has no practicable cross roads.

4. It is said that my bridge should have been made at Albaredo instead of Ronco. This is wrong. In Verona, Kilmaine had a force of only 1,500 men; the town might have been taken by assault.

After crossing the river Massena was at once sent up the Adige, to place himself in rear of Alvinczi. If the Austrian commander now advanced on Verona, Massena could pursue him. If the bridge had been constructed at Albaredo, this river and the marshes would have protected Alvinczi while attacking Verona. The passage at Ronco was audacious but not dangerous, while that at Albaredo would have been both rash and dangerous. It would have compromised the safety of Verona.

5. Why did Napoleon retreat behind the Adige on the nights of the first and second days? To remove the bridge and intercept Davidovich on the road to Mantua if necessary. If Davidovich reached Mantua first, all would have been lost, but if the French army reached there first, all would have been safe. United with Vaubois, the general in chief would have defeated Davidovich, driven him back to the Tyrol, and been back on the Adige before Alvinczi could have crossed.

6. It is said a bridge should have been thrown over the Alpon on the first, certainly on the second day. No, it was only on the third day that the Austrian army was sufficiently discouraged to warrant it. Even then the generals thought the movement of the army into the plain east of the Alpon was too hazardous. It must be remembered that the French army had been weakened by the battles of the Brenta and Caldiero and by the first and second days of Arcole.

#### AUSTRIAN ARMY COMMANDER.

**ALVINCZI, Baron Joseph.**—Born in Transylvania, 1735. Distinguished himself in the Seven Years' War and attained the rank of brigade commander. In 1789 he commanded a division in the war with the Turks. From 1792 to 1796 he served with distinction in the Netherlands and on the Rhine. In 1808 was made field marshal and died in 1810.

#### ARMY OF ITALY.—NOV. 12, 1796.

Generals of Division	Generals of Brigade	Strength
Massena	Menard	9,540 including 2 regiments of cavalry
	Rampon	
	Vial	
	Pijon Leclerc	
Augereau	Verdier	8,340 including 1 regiment of cavalry
	Bon	
	Lannes	
Vaubois	Guieu	10,500
	Fiorella	
	Gardanne	
Kilmaine Sahuguet	Chabot	8,830 including 1 regiment of cavalry
	Dallemagne	
	Sandos	
	Lebley Bertin	
Macquart	(infantry reserve)	2,750 including 1 regiment of cavalry
Dumas	(cavalry reserve)	1,600—6 regiments of cavalry
Total		41,560

#### SECOND CAMPAIGN.

**MILITARY SITUATION**—Immediately after the retreat of Alvinczi, Napoleon made Joubert brevet general of division and assigned him to the command of Vaubois' division, whose numerical strength was restored by reinforcements, with orders to hold the positions of Corona and Rivoli. Intrenchments and batteries were constructed at Corona, at Rivoli to command the road connecting plateau and river, and on the east bank of the Adige at the gorge of the river below Rivoli. Massena was posted at Verona with orders to support Joubert, and Augereau was charged with the defense of the Adige from Ronco southwards.

The nucleus of a new division was begun at Desenzano, by placing a brigade of infantry and some cavalry under the command of Gen. Rey, who had reported from the Army of the Vendé, with



reinforcements. He was to protect the country west of Lake Garda. He had a detachment at Lake Idro, some battalions at Salo, and a detachment at Brescia.

Kilmaine, having become incapacitated for field service, was assigned to the general command of the region between the Chiese and Ticino, and Serurier was recalled from Tuscany to take command of the besieging forces around Mantua. Kilmaine still retained the general command of the cavalry of the army. Vaubois was again sent to command the French troops in Tuscany.

Sahuguet being detached to command one of the fortresses in the rear, Gen. Dumas of the cavalry was temporarily assigned to command his division.

Napoleon employed the period between his first and second campaigns against Alvinczi in perfecting his organization.

In each of his principal divisions, the old and the inefficient officers were ordered to their homes and replaced by the young officers who had shown the greatest bravery and activity.

The field and horse artillery were reorganized and equipped.

Field works were constructed at exposed points and the permanent works were strengthened by more artillery.

A system of signals, by cannon located at intervals, was arranged so that warning could be rapidly sent from one division to another announcing the appearance of the enemy and whether or not assistance was desired. Courier posts were established for the rapid transmission of orders in all directions.

Napoleon spent most of his time between the campaigns at Milan, but was en route to Bologna when the campaign opened.

**AUSTRIAN PLAN.**—After his first campaign, Gen. Alvinczi concentrated the greater part of his army at Roveredo, leaving a force of 5,000 at Bassano under Gen. Bajalich and a force of 10,000 at Padua under Gen. Provera. His own force numbered about 28,000, excluding the required garrisons and small detachments guarding his communications.

He was urged to relieve Wurmser at once, notwithstanding the inclement weather, as the garrison of Mantua was reported to be almost out of rations and would soon be compelled to surrender.

His plan was to divide his Roveredo force into six brigades. One was to follow the shore of Lake Garda and join the others in front of Rivoli; two were to follow the mountain road through Corona; two were to follow the west bank of the Adige; and one the east bank. The latter was to throw a bridge across the river below Rivoli. The field artillery and the cavalry were to follow the river roads.

To disconcert the French, Provera was to move first and threaten Legnago. He was provided with a bridge train so that he could cross the Adige out of range of that place and relieve Mantua, whose garrison was, if necessary, to retreat across the Po and join the Papal forces.

Bajalich was to move second and threaten Verona and prevent its garrison from moving to either flank.

**FRENCH FORCES.**—Joubert's division of 10,300 men had its reserves at Rivoli and its outposts guarding all the lines of approach to Rivoli; one brigade was at Corona. Massena, with 9,000 men, was at Verona; Augereau with 9,000 was guarding the Adige with his troops widely scattered from Verona to Legnago; Rey with 4,000 men was at Desenzano and Salo. In addition to these forces there was a cavalry brigade in front of Augereau at Legnago, one in rear of Verona, and a third at Villafranca. A demibrigade of infantry, 2,000 men, under Gen. Victor, was also at Villafranca. The investing force at Mantua was about 10,000 men.

**THE CAMPAIGN.**—January 7.—Gen. Provera started from Padua and marched to Este.

Napoleon was in Milan.

January 8.—Provera marched towards Legnago and Bajalich left Bassano. Augereau was informed of Provera's movement and prepared to defend the Adige. Napoleon was on his way to Bologna.

January 9.—Provera attacked Augereau's advance posts about five miles east of Legnago and drove them back to the Adige. Bajalich was marching towards Verona. Napoleon probably reached Bologna on the night of the 9th.

January 10.—Provera waited for his brigade and wagon trains. Bajalich appeared in front of Verona and at Arcole, and sent some troops into the mountains north of Verona to get in touch with the main column. His outposts in front of Verona were attacked by Massena's cavalry and retired to Caldiero. Alvinczi started the three brigades which were to move along the lake and on the plateau, for Rivoli.

Napoleon was at Bologna, where he had assembled a brigade under Gen. Lannes to hold the town against the Papal troops who were advancing northward. Having heard from Augereau that the Austrians were in force in front of Legnago, he at once sent these troops, via Ferrara, to defend the Adige below Legnago.

January 11.—Provera ordered a reconnaissance of the river at Angiari where he decided to cross the Adige. Bajalich made no movement. Alvinczi's second and third brigades moved towards Corona while his first continued its march down the lake. His fourth brigade reached the Adige opposite Corona.

Napoleon was still at Bologna where he met the representatives of the Duke of Tuscany.

January 12.—Provera ordered a bridge to be thrown over the Adige at Angiari, but afterwards revoked the order. Bajalich attacked Massena's outpost close to Verona and captured it. He was in turn attacked by Massena and forced back to Caldiero. Alvinczi's second and third brigades reached Corona in the morning, but through a misunderstanding only one attacked. The small brigade of French troops, under the personal supervision of Joubert, stationed there, being well intrenched, was able to hold its own. The fourth of Alvinczi's brigades was now ordered to ascend the plateau and join the second and third.

Napoleon left Bologna on the night of the 11th and reached Roverbella on the morning of the 12th. From the reports received, he assumed that Provera's was the main attack. He therefore decided to concentrate on him, cross the Adige, and attack him.

Massena was ordered to hold himself in readiness to move on Legnago; Victor's reserve infantry demibrigade and the reserve cavalry brigade were ordered to the road between Legnago and Mantua; Rey was directed to leave a sufficient force at Salo to meet any force coming down the west side of Lake Garda and march to Valeggio with a demibrigade.

Napoleon then went to Verona, where he arrived in time to witness Massena's counter attack.

January 13.—On the 13th, Provera concentrated his force near Legnago as if to attack and sent a party some miles down the river as if to secure a crossing. After dark he moved to Angiari above Legnago, sent a force across in boats to drive out the small garrison, and began the construction of a ponton bridge.

Bajalich remained at Caldiero and in the morning defeated a cavalry force sent on a reconnaissance by Napoleon. At Provera's request, in the afternoon he went to Arcole to threaten a crossing. Alvinczi's second, third and fourth brigades advanced through Corona and deployed along the Tasso occupying the villages of Caprino and Martino. The first brigade had only reached Lumini. The Austrian columns following the Adige valley were on the same general line as those on the plateau.

During the night of January 12-13, Joubert was informed by his outposts near Lumini that an Austrian force was advancing to

that point. Leaving his fires burning he retired from Corona in the early morning and withdrew his forces to the southern ridge northwest of Rivoli; only observation posts were left on the northern ridge. In retiring from Corona, a detached battalion was overlooked and was later captured by the Austrians.

Towards evening, Joubert decided that he was too weak to hold his position and gave orders to retire to Castelnovo after dark.

Before his troops had moved, however, he received word from Napoleon that he was coming in person to Rivoli and was sending Joubert reinforcements to enable him to hold his position.

Napoleon was at Verona that day and was uncertain from which point to expect the main attack. He knew that Joubert had been compelled to evacuate Corona and that a large force had appeared in front of Legnago. He had determined to send Massena and Rey to reinforce one of his flanks, but it was not until 3 P. M. that the reports clearly indicated that the main attack was from the north.

Napoleon was thoroughly familiar with the topography of the country and knew that at this season of the year the columns marching down on Rivoli, via the plateau, could be infantry only with a few mountain guns, that the field guns and cavalry could only reach Rivoli by the river roads. If he could, with Joubert's division, prevent the Austrians from securing the road between the river and the plateau until reinforcements could reach him, he felt that he could defeat Alvinczi's plan, since neither Bajalich nor Provera seemed strong enough to cross the Adige.

At 3 P. M. he sent orders to Gen. Victor to move from the Legnago-Mantua road via Villafranca to Rivoli. Victor fortunately however started on a more direct and shorter road.

At 5 P. M. he ordered Massena to leave 3,000 of his division at Verona and send three demibrigades—6,000 men—as soon as possible to reinforce Joubert. Orders were at the same time sent to Rey to march with a demibrigade from Valeggio to Castelnovo, where he would meet a staff officer to guide him, and if the Salo garrison was not threatened, he was to send a part of it to cross Lake Garda in boats.

Massena was probably 17 miles from the field; Rey and Victor were still further; time was necessary for the transmission of the orders and the preparation of the troops for the march. None could reach Rivoli until the following day.

That night Napoleon himself went to Rivoli and reached Joubert at 2 A. M.

**January 14.**—Provera crossed the river and started for Mantua. Augereau's troops, guarding the river between Verona and Angiari under Gen. Guieu, moved down and by their attacks delayed his movements. Augereau himself was at Legnago; he directed Lannes to move up to that place.

On the morning of January 14, Alvinczi had three brigades in front of Joubert and one at Lumini. His fifth brigade was on the river road with the cavalry and artillery, ready to ascend the plateau as soon as its path was cleared. The sixth brigade was still across the Adige, but could easily join the others by throwing a bridge across the river.

Alvinczi was not satisfied with the advantage he had gained and instead of ordering his first brigade from Lumini to Caprino, ordered it to march via Costermano and Affi to seize the ridge south of Rivoli. This would delay his attack until the afternoon. In the morning the three brigades in front of Joubert were to complete their deployment and occupy the ridge from Ceredele to San Marco.

When Napoleon reached Rivoli, it was moonlight and he was able to reconnoiter the position. He at once decided that to prevent the union of the Austrian columns, Joubert must hold the ridge at San Marco and extend his left along the ridge towards Trombalora. Even if driven from this advanced position he would gain time for the arrival of Massena and Victor.

At dawn, Joubert left 1,500 men to hold his second line and man the fortifications commanding the river road, and with about 8,500 moved out to the line selected by Napoleon. He conducted the right of his line in person. He had hardly reached San Marco before an Austrian brigade approached to occupy it. This brigade was attacked and after a severe engagement was driven back.

On the Trombalora ridge the French line was outflanked by the right brigade of the Austrian line and Joubert's left wing was defeated and retreated in a panic. The Austrians were rolling up the center when Massena appeared with his first demibrigade. Massena at once attacked the Austrian brigade in flank, drove it from the field and reestablished the French left.

Before the arrival of Massena, Alvinczi saw the French left retreating and sent his center and left brigades against Joubert at San Marco. This attack compelled Joubert to fall back to the southern ridge while Massena was restoring the left of his line on the northern ridge.

Arriving at the head of the road leading down into the Adige valley with Joubert, Napoleon saw that his fortified line in the valley was carried and the Austrians were advancing up the road in a dense column, whose head had reached the plateau.

A regiment of cavalry held in reserve charged the head of the Austrian column and was supported by Joubert with such infantry as he could rally. This attack, supported by artillery, was successful and the Austrians retreated to the valley to reform.

Then, turning to the Austrian brigades which had followed him from San Marco, Joubert held them in front while Massena, who had been joined by his second demibrigade, attacked them in flank. The Austrians were in turn surprised and a sudden charge of French cavalry caused them to break and retire to their morning position.

The first Austrian brigade had pursued its way unmolested and was now on the ridge south of Rivoli.

Leaving Joubert to face the Austrians north of him, Massena took one demibrigade to attack this brigade. In marching to the attack, he was joined by his third demibrigade, which he had sent via Garda to reconnoiter the road along the lake leading to Peschiera. Finding no Austrians at Garda, this brigade marched to Rivoli.

The commander of the Austrian brigade tried to retreat via Affi, running the gauntlet between Massena and Victor, who was approaching Affi from the south. Many of his command were captured and those who escaped ran into and were captured by Gen. Murat who had crossed the lake from Salo with its garrison and had landed at Torri.

The Austrian brigades which had recrossed the Tasso north of Rivoli were not pursued since night was falling and Napoleon had just learned that Provera had crossed the Adige at Angiari.

Napoleon now considered Alvinczi defeated and at once ordered two demibrigades of Massena's division and Victor's demibrigade to make a night march to Mantua to assist Serurier.

Of Massena's division, one demibrigade, and of Rey's division, Murat's battalions of the Salo garrison, remained with Joubert. A demibrigade of Rey's division was en route for the field from Valeggio and would be up there in morning.

**January 15.**—On the 15th, Provera continued his march for Mantua, but was delayed en route by the reserve cavalry brigade and Gen. Guieu.

He sent his advance guard to communicate with Wurmser, but the commander of this guard found the French investing force strongly intrenched and being himself repulsed was unable to communicate with Wurmser.

Augereau, reinforced by Lannes, moved up to Angiari to attack

the rear guard left by Provera to protect his bridge. This rear guard attempted to join the main body, but was cut off and captured. Augereau then burned the Austrian bridge and started for Mantua.

That night Napoleon was at Roverbella with two demibrigades of the command which had marched from Rivoli; the other demibrigade was en route from Castelnovo.

Joubert, on the morning of the 15th, had in his front only three Austrian brigades. He had been reinforced as above stated from the divisions of Massena and Rey, and was directed by Napoleon to take the offensive.

He first took the hill at San Marco shortly after daylight; then, pivoting on that hill, turned the Austrian right. He thus cut their line of retreat to Corona and compelled the Austrians to retreat over the mountains to the Adige. His victory was decisive and he captured several thousand prisoners. This closed the two days' battle of Rivoli.

**January 16.**—Provera appeared before Mantua in the morning, and was here attacked by Massena, Victor, Guieu and Serurier. Being cut off from Mantua with no hope of retreat, he surrendered his remaining force of 7,000 men at 11 A. M. This engagement was known as the battle of *Favorita*.

This ended the eight days' campaign. Alvinczi retreated to Roveredo and Bajalich to Bassano.

Alvinczi had sent a small raiding force down the west side of Lake Garda; this reached the vicinity of Brescia but was then compelled to retreat without doing any damage.

On February 2, Wurmser surrendered Mantua. General Wurmser with his staff, the general officers with their staffs, and an escort of 700 men were allowed to return to Austria. The remaining 15,000 became prisoners of war. A large part of the Austrian garrison died of fever during the siege.

#### NAPOLÉON'S COMMENTS.

1. Alvinczi had for the campaign of Rivoli about 50,000 men and 120 pieces of artillery. He moved one half of his army, with all his artillery, down the valley of the Adige. The column on the east bank was stopped by a hundred men in the fort controlling the gorge of the Adige below Rivoli. The column which followed the west bank of the Adige was on the narrow shelf between the bluffs and the river. Its only exit was the road which ascends the bluffs at the plateau of Rivoli near the chapel of San Marco. This road is commanded on the north side by the height of San Marco and on the south by the plateau of Rivoli. With 25,000 men, without artillery and cavalry, Alvinczi expected to drive back the French army from Corona to Rivoli and there unite with the columns which moved along the valley. He believed that he would have only the division of Joubert to overcome and therefore again separated his command, sending one column down between Lake Garda and the mountains. Such a plan would be correct if armies were like mountains, immovable. This was the mistake frequently made by the Austrians. In this case it was assumed that Massena would remain quietly at Verona. It assumed that Napoleon did not appreciate the value of the position at Rivoli.

2. What should Alvinczi have done? Marched his army so as to permit him to fight it every day, every hour. His whole force should have marched between Lake Garda and the Adige, united by communications and acting as a single mass. Similarly he should have united his cavalry, since cavalry can go wherever infantry can. He should have made his dispositions to attack Joubert only on the morning of the attack, when he had full information as to his troops and dispositions.

3. It is a principle of war to make no detachments on the eve of making an attack, since the condition of things may change by the retreat of the enemy, or the arrival of reinforcements which will

enable him to take up the offensive and render dangerous the premature dispositions that have been made.

4. One is often deceived in war as to the strength of the enemy; prisoners know only their corps, officers make uncertain reports.

5. This axiom will remedy everything. Let an army be every day, every night, every hour ready to oppose all the resistance it is capable of offering. To this end soldiers must always have their arms and ammunition; infantry should always have its artillery, cavalry, and its generals; the different divisions should be constantly disposed to support each other; in camps, at halts, on the march, the troops should always be in favorable positions, which have the qualities demanded by a field of battle, viz., flanks supported and all the arms in the position best suited for them. For this purpose, there must be advance guards and flankers, far enough off to allow the main corps to deploy.

6. A great captain should ask himself several times each day, what would I do if the enemy suddenly appeared on my front, on my right flank, on my left flank? If he finds himself embarrassed to answer these questions, as a rule he is badly placed and should correct his position. If Alvinczi had said, "What if I meet the French army before I reach Rivoli, when I have but half my infantry without cavalry or artillery?" he would have replied, "I shall be beaten by forces inferior to my own." Why was not he made more careful by Lodi, Castiglione, the Brenta and Arcole?

7. Alvinczi debouched in January. Mantua was held at bay. He operates with two columns; the first from the north commanded by himself; the other on the lower Adige, commanded by Provera. The success of Provera would be of no value, were Alvinczi defeated. This fault was aggravated by a central attack on Verona, which had no other end than that of weakening the main attacks. It is true the Austrian authorities ordered Wurmser, in case he was relieved by Provera, to cross the Po and retreat on Rome. Unless, however, he could count on the assistance of the king of Naples, this movement would have been of no value.

8. Having succeeded in throwing a bridge over the Adige, Provera should have ordered the force threatening Verona to join him; this would have greatly strengthened him. As it was, he not only left this force behind, but he also left a guard at his bridge which he should have taken up. The guard was captured. On arriving before Mantua in the morning, he should at once have forced an entrance. He did nothing that day; in the evening Napoleon with the troops from Rivoli began to arrive and on the following day he was obliged to capitulate. The Austrians did not appreciate the value of time.

9. Napoleon should have occupied the plateaus of Rivoli, Corona, San Marco and Rocca d'Anfo, by good fortifications in wood and masonry. In six weeks these four forts might have been constructed. Each with a garrison of 400 or 500 men and 15 guns would have protected these places from surprise. They would have been worth more to the army than a reinforcement of 15,000 men.

#### FRENCH GENERALS OF DIVISION.

**JOUBERT, Barthelemy Cathérine.**—Born 1769. Entered volunteers as sergeant 1791; general of brigade 1795; general of division 1797; 1798 commanded in succession the armies of Holland, Mayence and Italy. Resigned this last command but was reappointed in 1799 after the army had suffered many reverses and was killed in his battle at Nôvi, August 1799. Served in Army of Italy 1795-97.

"He was bold, vigilant, active. Had he lived he would have attained great military renown."—Napoleon at St. Helena.

**REY, Antoine Gabriel.**—Born 1768. Enlisted in army under Louis XVI, lieutenant 1791, general of brigade 1793, general of division 1795. Served with distinction in armies of the Rhine, of the West and of Italy. He did not approve of the *coup d'état* by means of which Napoleon made himself First Consul and was relieved from command. Restored in 1808 and served in Spain from 1808 to 1814. In 1815 was commander of Valenciennes which he defended after Waterloo. Retired from service 1820. Died 1836.

## AUSTRIAN ARMY—NOVEMBER 1796.

Alvinczi—General in Chief.

Corps	Brigades	Strength
Provera	Hohenzollern, Roselmini, Liptai Schubirz, Brabeck, Pittoni	28,699
Davidovich	Laudon, Ocskay, Spork, Vukassevich	18,427
	Total,	47,125

## ARMY OF ITALY—JANUARY 1, 1797.

Generals of Division	Generals of Brigade	Strength
Massena	Monnier Brune Leclerc	8,851 including 2 regiments of cavalry
Augereau	Guieu Point Verdier Walther	8,851 including 4 regiments of cavalry
Joubert (bvt.)	Vial Lebley Sandos	10,250 including 1 regiment of cavalry
Rey	Murat Vaux Baraguey-d'Hilliers	4,156 including 2 regiments of cavalry
Serurier Dumas Dallemagne	Davin Miollis Monteau Serviez Lasalcette	10,230 including 2 regiments of cavalry
Cavalry reserve	Dugua	658 2 regiments
Infantry reserve	Victor	1,800 including 1 regiment of cavalry
	Lannes	4,000
	Total,	48,610