Across Five Aprils
Exclusive Rules

TABLE OF CONTENTS

11.0 Introduction to the Exclusive Rules
   11.1 Victory Determination

12.0 BULL RUN Exclusive Rules
   12.1 Bull Run and Catharpin Run
   12.2 The Unfinished RR Line
   12.3 Combat Phase Markers
   12.4 Victory Conditions

13.0 PEA RIDGE Exclusive Rules
   13.1 Indians
   13.2 Union Movement Restriction
   13.3 Victory Conditions
   13.4 Options

14.0 SHILOH Exclusive Rules
   14.1 Union Phase Markers
   14.2 Surprise Attacks

   14.3 The Lexington and Tyler
   14.4 Union Reinforcements
   14.5 Victory Conditions
   14.6 Options

15.0 GETTYSBURG Exclusive Rules
   15.1 Big Round Top
   15.2 Fortifications
   15.3 Union Movement Restrictions
   15.4 Special Confederate Movement Rules
   15.5 The Unfinished RR Line
   15.6 Victory Conditions

16.0 BENTONVILLE Exclusive Rules
   16.1 Union Phase Markers
   16.2 Union Reinforcements
   16.3 Victory Conditions
11.0 Introduction to the Exclusive Rules

Rules Sections 12.0 through 16.0 are collectively referred to as the Exclusive Rules. While all five of the games in Across Five Aprils share the same set of Basic Rules, the Exclusive Rules are necessary to account for the many unique aspects of the various battles. The Exclusive Rules for each battle are unique to it, and are never used in any of the other games.

11.1 VICTORY DETERMINATION

Each of the five games has its own criteria by which the winner and his level of victory are judged; these are fully explained in each game's Exclusive Rules. However, there are some features of Victory Determination that are common to all five games.

Objective Hex Control

There are a number of Objective Hexes printed on each of the game maps in Across Five Aprils, and the winner is usually determined by the number of Objective Hexes controlled by each player. A player controls an Objective Hex if:

- he has a unit occupying the hex, or
- he has a unit that is projecting a ZOC into an unoccupied Objective Hex. If Union and Confederate units are both projecting ZOC's into an unoccupied Objective Hex, then neither side controls it, or
- he was the last to have a unit move through it, and neither of the two previous criteria apply.

Control of an Objective Hex can change any number of times in a single Game Turn. Each game's Exclusive Rules indicate which side controls the Objective Hexes at the beginning of play.

Exception: In GETTYSBURG, each side has its own Objective Hexes, and the conditions for gaining control of them are somewhat different than those listed here.

Example: At the start of play in PEAS RIGGE, all three Objective Hexes are controlled by the Union player. Early in game turn #3, a Confederate unit moves into hex 3605 (Elkhorn Tavern), thus taking control of the Objective Hex even though a Union unit is projecting a ZOC into it from hex 3706. However, during the Confederate Combat Phase of game turn #3, the Confederate unit is forced to retreat from Elkhorn Tavern into hex 3505. Since the hex is unoccupied and in the ZOC of both a Union and a Confederate unit, it is controlled by neither. Later still during turn #3, the Union unit moves onto the Tavern, restoring it to the Union player's control.

The control status of Objective Hexes is recorded using the Objective Hex Control markers, which have the Union flag printed on one side, and the Confederate battle flag on the other. When a player gains control of an Objective Hex, place or flip the Control Marker so that his side's flag is showing face-up. The Objective Hex Control Marker is removed from an Objective Hex that neither side controls, but it is replaced as soon as one side or the other gains control.

Victory Points

The relative losses suffered by the two sides in a game can also be a factor in deciding who wins. In those games where this method of determining victory is used, Victory Points (VP's) are awarded to the players according to the following criteria:

- each 2-Step enemy unit eliminated = 3 VP;
- each 1-Step enemy unit eliminated = 2 VP;
- each 2-Step enemy unit reduced by 1 Step = 1 VP.

12.0 Bull Run Exclusive Rules

12.1 BULL RUN AND CATHARPIN RUN

- Units can move or attack across Bull Run and Catharpin Run (Creeks) only at Bridges and Fords. Therefore, units that are in the ZOC of enemy units on the opposite side of Bull Run do not have to attack them (and, indeed, cannot attack them) during the friendly Combat Phase.

Exception: Bombarding artillery units can attack across Bull Run normally.

- Confederate units cannot cross Bull Run or Catharpin Run. A Confederate unit which is forced to retreat across a hexside of either creek is eliminated instead.

Design Note: These rules reflect the fact that in this first battle of the Civil War, commanders on both sides tended to overestimate the value of Bull Run as a military obstacle (the creek could, in fact, be forded at most points along its length). Union General Ambrose E. Burnside made exactly the same mistake when confronted with Antietam Creek at the battle of the same name approximately a year later. Confederate units cannot cross Bull Run because the Confederate commander, P.T. Beauregard, had designated the creek as his main line of defense, and had relatively
little idea of where Union troops were on the other side. In fact, well into the battle, he expected to be attacked in the center of his line (off-map to the southeast).

12.2 THE UNFINISHED RAILROAD LINE
The unfinished Independent Line of the Manassas Gap Railroad functions like a normal Railroad Line for all game purposes. Note, however, that there is no Bridge or Ford where the unfinished RR crosses Bull Run (hexes 2806-2906).

12.3 COMBAT PHASE MARKERS
Neither the Union nor the Confederate Combat Phase Markers are placed into the Phase Marker Cup Segment of Game Turn #1. Both are placed in the cup during the Phase Marker Cup Segment of Game Turn #2 and all following turns.

12.4 VICTORY CONDITIONS
The object of the game is to gain control of the three Objective Hexes printed on the map. All three are Confederate-controlled at the beginning of the game.

| Stone Bridge  | 3912 |
| Robinson House | 3413 |
| Henry House   | 3315 |

Game Turn #9 Victory Determination
At the end of Game Turn #9, determine if either player has won the game, and, if so, the extent of his victory. If neither player has won, then play proceeds to Game Turn #10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Victory</th>
<th>Confederate Decisive</th>
<th>Union Substantial</th>
<th>Union Decisive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective Hexes</td>
<td>Controlled 3</td>
<td>Union controls 2</td>
<td>Union controls 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Game Turn #10 Victory Determination
At the end of Game Turn #10, determine which player has won the game, and, the extent of his victory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Victory</th>
<th>Confederate Decisive*</th>
<th>Draw</th>
<th>Union Marginal</th>
<th>Union Substantial</th>
<th>Union Decisive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective Hexes</td>
<td>Controlled 3</td>
<td>Draw</td>
<td>Union controls 1</td>
<td>Union controls 2</td>
<td>Union controls 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Historical Result

Civil War, "They fought very well when they had an opportunity to take shelter behind trees and logs, but could not easily be brought to face artillery, and a single shell thrown at them was generally sufficient to demoralize them and put them to flight."

The following special rules apply to the Indian unit:
- It may never voluntarily move or retreat adjacent to a Union artillery unit. If forced to retreat adjacent to a Union artillery unit, the Indian unit is eliminated instead.
- It is immediately eliminated when attacked by artillery. If attacked while alone in a hex, the Indian unit is eliminated without determining odds or rolling dice, and the Union suffers no loss. If the Indians are stacked with another Confederate unit, eliminate the unit before determining the Initial Combat Odds Ratio for the combat.
- It must conduct an Automatic Retreat if it is adjacent to a Union artillery unit during the Confederate Combat Phase. If the Indian unit cannot conduct an Automatic Retreat, it is eliminated instead.

13.2 UNION MOVEMENT RESTRICTION
The Union 24th Missouri Regiment (which sets up in hex 3205) cannot move on Game Turn #1.

13.3 VICTORY CONDITIONS
The object of the game is to gain control of the three Objective Hexes printed on the map. All are Union-controlled at the beginning of the game.

| Elkhorn Tavern | 3605 |
| Union HQ       | 4009 |
| Leetown        | 4117 |
First Day Victory Determination

At the end of Game Turn #9, determine if either player has won a Decisive Victory. The Confederate player wins a Decisive Victory if he controls any two Objective Hexes, and the Union player wins a Decisive Victory if he controls all three. If neither player has achieved a Decisive Victory, play proceeds to Game Turn #10 and continues into the second day.

Second Day Victory Determination

At the end of Game Turn #15, determine which player has won the game, and the extent of his victory. Any combinations other than those listed below result in a draw.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Victory</th>
<th>Objective Hexes Controlled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Decisive</td>
<td>Confederate controls 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Substantial</td>
<td>Confederate controls 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Marginal</td>
<td>Confederate controls 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Substantial*</td>
<td>Union controls 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Historical Result

13.4 OPTIONS

Switch Confederate Entry Hexes

The two Confederate Divisions switch entry areas; Price enters at “A” and McCulloch enters at “B.”

Confederate Unified Command

All Confederate units enter at “A” or “B,” according to the Confederate player’s choice. However, only one division may enter on the Game Turn #1; the other enters on Game Turn #2. Furthermore, if both divisions arrive at Entry Hex B, the Confederate player needs to control one more Objective Hex to achieve each level of victory on Turn #15, and the Union needs to control only two Objective Hexes in order to achieve a substantial victory.

Example: If the Confederate player controls two Objective Hexes at the end of Game Turn #15, he achieves only a Marginal Victory, not a Substantial Victory. Likewise, if he controls only one Objective Hex he cannot win at all (though he can prevent the Union player from winning by contesting control of one of the other two Objective hexes).

14.0 Shiloh Exclusive Rules

14.1 UNION PHASE MARKERS

Union Combat Phase Marker

The Union Combat Phase Marker is not placed in the Phase Marker Cup until the Phase Marker Cup Segment of the Game Turn following that in which a Confederate unit first enters any Union ZOC, or until the Phase Marker Cup Segment of Game Turn #6 (whichever comes first).

Union Movement Phase Markers

The Movement Phase Markers for the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions of the Union Army of the Tennessee are not placed in the Phase Marker Cup until the Phase Marker Cup Segment of Game Turn #6 unless a Confederate unit enters a Union ZOC on or before Game Turn #4.

If a Confederate unit(s) enters the ZOC of a Union unit on or before Game Turn #4, that (Union) Division’s Movement Phase Marker is put into the Phase Marker Cup in the Phase Marker Cup Segment of the next Game Turn. Furthermore, the Movement Phase Markers of all other Divisions of the Union Army of the Tennessee are placed into the cup in the Phase Marker Cup Segment of the turn after the next turn.

Example: During Game Turn #3, Confederate units enter the ZOC’s of units belonging to the 5th and 6th Divisions (the first time they’ve entered any Union ZOC during the game). The 5th and 6th Divisions’ Movement Phase Markers go into the cup on Game Turn #4; the 1st, 2nd and 4th Divisions’ Movement Phase Markers will go into the cup on Game Turn #5.

14.2 SURPRISE ATTACKS

Design Note: During the Battle of Shiloh, both sides achieved surprise. On the first day, the Confederates caught the Union Army of the Tennessee unprepared, routing many units before they could get organized. On the second day the Union troops achieved surprise because they attacked early and in strength, while the Confederates had falsely assumed that the Yankees were too badly battered from the previous day’s fighting to do any attacking.
The effect of a Surprise Attack is portrayed in the game by automatic Combat Odds Column shifts gained by the attacking player. These shifts are applied after shifts due to defensive terrain have been applied. Surprise Attack shifts apply only to attacks; a player who has a Surprise Attack bonus gains no benefit from it when he is defending in combat.

Confederate Surprise Attack

- All Confederate attacks made during the first Game Turn in which Union units are attacked have their Final Combat Odds Ratio (see 6.2, Step #4) shifted two columns to the right.
- All Confederate attacks made after the first Game Turn in which Union units are attacked but before Game Turn #7 have their Final Combat Initial Odds Ratio shifted one column to the right. (i.e., the Confederate surprise advantage ends on Turn #6).

Union Surprise Attack

- All Union attacks made during the first four Game Turns of the second day of the battle have their Final Combat Odds Ratio (see 6.2, Step #4) shifted one column to the right.

14.3 THE LEXINGTON AND TYLER

Gunboat Activation and Movement

The Lexington and Tyler are Activated by their own Movement Phase Marker which is placed in the Phase Marker Cup with all the rest. They can only move into hexes that are all or part Tennessee River, and cannot enter any riverfront hex (i.e., a hex containing both land and Tennessee-River terrain) on the west bank of the Tennessee River. Each Tennessee River hex entered costs one Movement Point.

Gunboats and ZOCs

The Lexington and Tyler exert no ZOC’s, and are totally unaffected by Confederate ZOC’s (i.e., their movement is unrestricted and they do not have to attack adjacent Confederate units).

Gunboats and Combat

- Gunboats function like artillery (7.0) units, and can therefore conduct both Bombardment and Combined Attacks. They trace Line of Sight and suffer the effects of Range Attenuation exactly like normal artillery units. Gunboats never suffer any combat Result when attacking.
- Gunboats cannot be the lead unit in a Combined Attack, and can never Advance.
- Gunboats can be attacked only by bombarding Confederate artillery units, and an attack against a gunboat remains a Bombardment Attack even if the attacking artillery units and the gunboat(s) are in adjacent hexes (thus, artillery units attacking gunboats never suffer any combat results).
- Gunboats can be attacked separately even when stacked together. There is no requirement that both gunboats in a stack must be attacked.

Note: Infantry and cavalry units cannot attack gunboats.

14.4 UNION REINFORCEMENTS

Pittsburg Landing

Union Reinforcements that enter at Entry Hex C (Pittsburg Landing) must pay 1 Movement Point to “dismount” in the hex.

Blocked Entry

Union reinforcements can enter the map only in their designated entry hex. If the entry hex is occupied by a Confederate unit, they cannot enter in the nearest unblocked hex. Instead, they are held out of play until the entry hex is free of enemy units.

Note: This is an exception to the Blocked Entry rule in section 8.0 of the Basic Rules.

14.5 VICTORY CONDITIONS

The object of the game is to gain control of the five Objective Hexes printed on the map. All five are Union-controlled at the beginning of the game.

Purdy/East-Corinth Crossroads 1012
Shiloh Church 1107
Cloud Field 1415
Pittsburg Landing 1921
Snake Creek Bridge 2711

First Day Victory Determination

At the end of Game Turn #10, determine if either player has won the game, and the extent of his victory. If neither player has won, play proceeds to Game Turn #11 and continues into the second day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Victory</th>
<th>Objective Hexes Controlled by The Confederate Player</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Decisive</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Substantial</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Victory, Play Continues</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Substantial</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Decisive</td>
<td>0 or 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second Day Victory Determination

At the end of Game Turn #17, determine which player has won the game, and the extent of his victory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Victory</th>
<th>Objective Hexes Controlled by The Confederate Player</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Decisive</td>
<td>4 or 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Substantial</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determined by Victory Points</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Substantial</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Decisive</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Determining Victory by the Victory Point Ratio

If, at the end of Game Turn #17, the Confederate player still controls two Objective Hexes, the winner and his level of victory are determined by the ratio of Confederate Victory Points to Union Victory Points (do not round off).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Victory</th>
<th>Ratio of Confederate VP's to Union VP's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Substantial</td>
<td>2-to-1 or higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Marginal</td>
<td>1½-to-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Marginal</td>
<td>1-to-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Substantial</td>
<td>less than 1-to-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14.6 OPTIONS

Cavalry Units
With the exception of the Confederate Reserve Corps' Cavalry brigade (commanded by Nathan Bedford Forrest), all of the cavalry units in the Shiloh game are included only when using this optional rule. Furthermore, all such cavalry units (excepting Forrest's cavalry unit) are prohibited from entering an enemy ZOC except as the result of Retreat.

Design Note: We chose to eliminate the cavalry units from the standard Shiloh game because historically they had very little impact upon the battle. In April of 1862 the combatants had yet to figure out how to employ cavalry profitably on a battlefield dominated by rifled infantry weapons. Since traditional mounted charges were almost suicidal, both Union and Confederate cavalry units at Shiloh were generally relegated to such secondary roles as scouting and rounding up stragglers. Later in the war, both sides made much better use of their cavalry units in battle, primarily by having them fight dismounted delaying or screening actions. We have included the cavalry units as an option so that you can see what effect they could have had if these tactics had already been developed.

Lew Wallace Presses On
The 3rd Division of the Army of the Tennessee (which normally arrives on Game Turn #10 at Entry Hex B) can instead arrive on Game Turn #6 or #7 at hex 1502. During the Phase Marker Cup Segments of Turns #6 and #7, the Union player rolls one die. If the result is a 1 or 2 the 3rd Division arrives that turn. If Wallace's Division does not arrive on Turn #6 or #7, it arrives normally on Turn #10 at Entry Hex B.

When playing with this option, Confederate units cannot enter hex 1502.

Design Note: Late in the morning of March 6th, General Lew Wallace's 3rd Division—then at Crumps Landing, four or five miles down-river from Pittsburg Landing—was ordered to march up and join Grant's army on its right flank. Having a less than perfect grasp of the road network, and expecting that Grant's right would be in the vicinity of Shiloh Church, Wallace set his units in motion on a route that would bring them to the battlefield on the Purdy Road. It was only after several hours that Wallace learned of his mistake from one of Grant's aides, and shifted his line of march, causing delays that prevented his troops from arriving on the battlefield until just before darkness fell. This option assumes that Grant's aide fails to contact Wallace, who therefore sticks to his original route.

15.0 GETTYSBURG EXCLUSIVE RULES

15.1 BIG ROUND TOP
Big Round Top (hex 3212) has Embankment hexside terrain along all six of its hexsides, although this is not readily visible on the map.

15.2 FORTIFICATIONS
Breastworks may be constructed during Night Game Turns by infantry units that occupy Hill (or Wooded-Hill) hexes and which do not move during that turn.

Note: Entrenchments cannot be constructed.

15.3 UNION MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS
Union Cavalry Movement Restriction
The Union 1/1st and 2/1st Cavalry Brigades, and Calef's Artillery (all of Buford's Cavalry Division) cannot move across Willoughby's Run until Game Turn #3. They can, however, Retreat across the Stream if no alternative route is available.

Union Reserve Artillery Movement Restriction
The 1st Regular Artillery and the 1st through 4th Volunteer Artillery units constitute the Union player's Artillery Reserve. When these units arrive as Reinforcements on Game Turns #14 and #15, they must move as rapidly as possible into hex 2010 or any adjacent hex. Once the units of the Artillery Reserve are deployed in or adjacent to hex 2010, they must remain there until they are Released. Unreleased Reserve Artillery units can participate in normal and bombardment combat without restriction.

All units of the Artillery Reserve are Released in the Phase Marker Cup Segment of any Game Turn in which the Confederate player either controls one or more Confederate Objective Hexes, OR has units adjacent to two or more Confederate Objective Hexes. A Reserve Artillery unit is also Released if it is attacked by Confederate units located in adjacent hexes (i.e., not solely by Bombarding Confederate artillery units). Once a Reserve Artillery unit has been Released, it can move without restriction for the rest of the game.

If the conditions for the release of the Artillery Reserve are already in effect when the Reserve Artillery units Arrive, they can immediately move without restriction.
15.4 SPECIAL CONFEDERATE MOVEMENT RULES
In GETTYSBURG, each of the three Confederate Corps has two Movement Phase Markers. Contrary to the normal Movement rules, some or all of the units in a Confederate Formation can move when each of the Phase Markers is drawn.

Staggered Movement of Confederate Corps
Each Confederate Corps is made up of three divisions plus several independent artillery units; e.g., Longstreet's I Corps consists of McLaw's, Pickett's and Hood's Divisions, and Alexander's and Eshleman's artillery units.

The first time that one of a Confederate Corps' Phase Markers is drawn during an Operations Segment, all of its component units can move, but all of the units of at least one of its divisions must move. When the Corps' second Phase Marker is drawn, movement is conducted by all of the Corps' units that didn't move when the first Phase Marker was pulled. No unit can move both times that a Corps' Movement Phase Marker is drawn.

Exception: See the Longstreet's Corps special rule below.

Movement is conducted by divisions. If any of a division's units move when a Corps' first Phase Marker is drawn, then all of the division's units are assumed to have moved (and none can move when the second Phase Marker is drawn). A Corps' independent artillery units can move when either of its Phase Markers is drawn; they don't all have to move on the same one. To keep track of which units in a Corps have moved, rotate the playing piece of each unit that has moved 90° after it has finished moving.

Longstreet's Corps
Beginning on Game Turn #14, all units of Longstreet's Corps can move when each of the Corps' Movement Phase Markers is drawn; effectively moving twice per turn. This special movement ends on the turn that any Union unit can trace a normal, four-hex Line of Sight to any unit of Longstreet's Corps; beginning on the following turn, all units of the Corps can move only once per turn. Thus, if a unit of Longstreet's Corps is within the Line of Sight of a Union unit on Game Turn #14, the Corps will move twice on that turn only, reverting to normal movement on Game Turn #15.

15.5 THE UNFINISHED RAILROAD LINE
The unfinished portion of the Hanover and Gettysburg Railroad functions like a normal Railroad Line for all game purposes. Note, however, that there is no Bridge or Ford where the unfinished RR crosses Willoughby Run.

15.6 VICTORY CONDITIONS
The object of the game is to inflict more damage on the enemy's units than he inflicts upon yours, and to control as many Objective Hexes as possible. Note that the Union and Confederate players have different Objective Hexes (Union in blue, Confederate in grey). You win by controlling your own Objective Hexes, but controlling your enemy's Objective Hexes is also important since it prevents him from gaining Victory Points.

Victory Points for Controlling Objective Hexes
A side gains control of an Objective Hex by being the last to have a unit occupy or move through the hex. Control of an Objective hex can change any number of times in a single Game Turn.

Note: In GETTYSBURG, an Objective Hex cannot be controlled merely by placing it in the ZOC of a friendly unit.

The number of Victory Points gained for the control of Objective Hexes varies between the Confederate and Union players, and from day to day of the battle. See the various Victory Conditions listed below for the specifics.

First Day Victory Determination
At the end of Game Turn #11, determine if either player has won a Decisive Victory according to the following criteria. If neither player has achieved a Decisive Victory, play proceeds to Game Turn #12 and continues into the second day.

Confederate 1st-Day Victory Conditions
Control one Confederate Objective Hex, and have at least a 1½-to-1 ratio of Victory Points over the Union Player. Each Confederate Objective Hex controlled is worth 6 Victory Points.

Union 1st-Day Victory Conditions
Have more Victory Points (for inflicting losses on CSA units) than the Confederate Player has overall.

Second Day Victory Determination
At the end of Game Turn #22, determine if either player has won a Decisive Victory according to the following criteria. If neither player has achieved a Decisive Victory, play proceeds to Game Turn #23 and continues into the third day.

Confederate 2nd-Day Victory Conditions
Control both Round Tops (2912 and 3212), or all three hexes of Culp's Hill, or all four hexes of Cemetery Hill, and have a 1½-to-1 ratio of Victory Points over the Union Player. Each Confederate Objective Hex controlled is worth 6 Victory Points.

Union 2nd-Day Victory Conditions
Control five Union Objective Hexes, and have a 2-to-1 ratio of Victory Points over the Confederate Player. Each Union Objective Hex controlled is worth 5 Victory Points.

Third Day Victory Determination
At the end of Game Turn #31, determine who has won the game and his level of victory. Note that both players must satisfy two criteria for each level of victory; if only one can be met, then that level of victory is not achieved. It is possible that the game will end in a Draw. Historically, the battle was a Union marginal victory, but the campaign was a Union substantial victory.

Confederate 3rd-Day Victory Conditions
Each Confederate Objective Hex controlled is worth 10 Victory Points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Victory</th>
<th>CSA Objective Hexes Controlled</th>
<th>CSA to USA VP Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Marginal</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>+11 but &lt; 1½-to-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Substantial</td>
<td>3-7</td>
<td>1½-to-1 or higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Decisive</td>
<td>8 or more</td>
<td>2-to-1 or higher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Union 3rd-Day Victory Conditions
Each Union Objective Hex controlled is worth 5 Victory Points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Victory</th>
<th>USA Objective Hexes Controlled</th>
<th>USA to USA VP Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Marginal*</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>+1 but &lt; 1 1/2-to-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Substantial</td>
<td>5 or more</td>
<td>1 1/2-to-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Decisive</td>
<td>5 or more</td>
<td>2-to-1 or higher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Historical Result

Example: The Union Reinforcement die-roll range printed in the Game Turn #3 box on the Game Turn Track is 1-3. If the result rolled for a particular unit is 1, 2 or 3, that unit Arrives as a reinforcement during the current turn.

The Union player rolls for his reinforcing units one at a time until he has either rolled for all of them, or has rolled successfully for three of them, whichever comes first. All units of the XIVth Corps must be rolled for before any rolls are made for XXth Corps units, and all infantry units of the XXth Corps must be rolled for before a roll is made for the XXth Corps' artillery unit.

16.3 VICTORY CONDITIONS
The object of the game is to gain control of the seven Objective Hexes printed on the map. All are Union-controlled at the beginning of the game.

Final Defense Line: 0110, 0210, 0310, 0410, 0411, and 0512
Harper's House: 0212

Determining Victory by Objective Hex Control
At the end of Game Turn #5, determine if the Confederate player wins through control of Objective Hexes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Victory</th>
<th>Objective Hexes Controlled By The Confederate Player</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Decisive</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Substantial</td>
<td>1 or 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determined by Victory Points</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Determining Victory by the Victory Point Ratio
If the Confederate player does not win by control of Objective Hexes, then Victory is determined by the ratio of Confederate Victory Points to Union Victory Points (do not round off).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Victory</th>
<th>Ratio of Confederate VP's to Union VP's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Substantial</td>
<td>2-to-1 or higher</td>
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<td>Draw</td>
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<td>Union Substantial</td>
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FIRST BULL RUN

The Battle of Bull Run was the first major battle of the Civil War, and, as such, was one of its most important. In the Summer of 1861 most people believed that the war would be brought to a swift conclusion in a single, decisive battle, and bridled at the delays involved in raising armies and giving them a bare minimum of training. From all sides came demands for immediate action, and the cry "On to Richmond!" resounded throughout the North. Ultimately, the popular pressure was so great that the Union had to take the offensive before its armies—or those of the Confederacy—were truly ready. A battle, "The Battle" to decide the war, was the goal of this offensive, but not its result.

General Irvin McDowell marched out of Washington, D.C. in July of 1861 with an army of 37,000 green, but eager, Union soldiers. Facing him at Manassas Junction, some 20 miles southwest of Washington, was General P. G. T. Beauregard with some 20,000 equally green Confederates. Having a numerical advantage of almost 2-to-1, McDowell hoped to destroy Beauregard's army before it could be reinforced by General Joseph E. Johnston's force of 13,000 men in the Shenandoah Valley, some 40 miles to the west. Once Beauregard was out of the way, McDowell would march in triumph into Richmond, the capitol of the Confederacy.

McDowell proceeded toward Manassas cautiously, having learned that the Confederates had drawn their defensive line behind a lazy little stream called Bull Run. As McDowell approached, General Johnston was ordered to rush his Army of the Shenandoah eastward and combine it with Beauregard's. Thus, McDowell was unknowingly running—and losing—a race against time as he methodically made his approach to Bull Run. On July 18th the Union army occupied Centreville, several miles to the north of Bull Run, and on the following day fought the first major skirmish of the campaign at Blackburn's Ford. On the 19th and 20th, however, the Union forces remained halted in order to bring up supplies and prepare for the decisive advance.

McDowell's delay allowed General Johnston to bring down a substantial part of his troops from the Shenandoah Valley by rail. The first of his units to reach Manassas was the brigade of General Thomas J. Jackson, which arrived at about 4:00 PM on July 19th. On Saturday the 20th more substantial numbers arrived, along with Johnston himself. Since Johnston outranked Beauregard, he was technically in command of their combined armies, but in fact command remained split between the two, a source of confu-
sion for both their troops and, later, historians. Meanwhile, Union reconnaissance had revealed that the crossings over Bull Run upstream from the Confederate left were unguarded, and General McDowell formulated an audacious plan to exploit this weakness.

At 2:30 AM on July 21st a column of 13,000 Union soldiers from the 2nd and 3rd Divisions began marching in a broad arc to the north and west that placed them beyond the Confederates' left flank. Turning southward again, they crossed Bull Run at Sudley Springs Ford and arrowed in behind the Confederate line. Meanwhile, the Union 1st Division moved forward to the Stone Bridge in order to mount a feint attack that was intended to pin the enemy's left flank units in place. At 5:00 AM the Union artillery near the bridge opened fire and the Battle of Bull Run began.

Discovering that Union troops on the Sudley Springs Road were bearing down on his unguarded northern flank, Confederate General Nathan "Shanks" Evans rushed his small brigade to meet the threat on a line running along a shallow ridgeline southwest of the Matthews House, and sent out a desperate call for reinforcements. However, the Confederate army was encamped around Manassas Junction, several miles to the south, and spread out all along Bull Run guarding its many fords. Therefore, the reinforcing units arrived on the battlefield piecemeal rather than in a mass, adding greatly to the disorganization on the Confederate side.

First to show up were Bee's and Bartow's Brigades, but even this force was too small to stem the Federal tide. As the Union pressed the attack with its superior numbers, the Confederates fell back across Young's Branch and up the slopes of Henry House Hill. If Henry House Hill was captured the Union forces on the other side of Bull Run would be able to cross the Stone Bridge, join in the attack, and roll up the remainder of the Confederate line from north to south. The battle had reached a crisis for the Confederates.

At this point the Confederate troops of Jackson's and Bonham's Brigades arrived and joined with the remnants of Evans' and Bee's units to make a stand along the crest of Henry House Hill. They soon found themselves hard-pressed as the Union troops launched attack after attack against the thin Confederate line. It was here that General Jackson won the nickname "Stonewall" because his troops steadfastly resisted the worst of the Union onslaught and formed the hard core of the Confederate defense. Over the next two hours the battle's tempo steadily increased as more and more troops from both sides joined in, and countless charges and countercharges surged up and down the hill.

All the while a steady stream of Confederate troops from the Army of the Shenandoah were detaining at Manassas Junction and marching straight into the battle. At around 4:00 PM the latest of these reinforcements, General Kirby Smith's Brigade, overlapped the right end of the Union line, attacking it in the flank and rear while the rest of the Confederates mounted a simultaneous frontal attack. The combined attack pushed the Union troops back and suddenly, with incredible speed, the Union line broke and began streaming off the field. The half-trained soldiers had seen enough of fighting and dying, and could not be stopped despite all of their officers' pleas, cajolery and threats. At first, the Union troops fell back in reasonably good order, but the retreat soon turned into an utter rout when a severe traffic jam developed on the road to Centreville. The thousands of civilians who had ridden out from Washington to watch the great battle joined in the rout, greatly intensifying the confusion and congestion on the roads.

**Consequences**

Although the Union army suffered a major defeat, a few "professional" regiments of the old Regular Army covered its retreat and the great majority of its men got away. The Confederates, although victorious, were disorganized almost as badly, and in no shape to effectively pursue their fleeing foe. Therefore, the Battle of Bull Run was an important victory for the Confederates, but was in no way decisive. The North was shocked by the Bull Run fiasco and responded by redoubling its war effort. General McDowell was removed from command, and replaced by General George B. McClellan, who began the inevitably long process of building a much larger and more proficient army. The people of the South were initially ecstatic at their victory and expected great things from it, but were soon disappointed as it became clear that the North was as determined as ever to continue the fight. Thus, the aftermath of the Battle of Bull Run revealed that the war would probably be much longer, and bloodier, than either side had expected.

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**PEA RIDGE**

Missouri was a strategic border state that was vital to both sides in the Civil War, and consequently witnessed more fighting than any other state except Virginia. The loyalties of its population were strongly divided, a fact demonstrated by the vicious treatment that Union and Confederate partisans in Missouri often met out to one another. However, despite the deep divisions within Missouri's body politic, the Union swiftly gained the upper hand in the state, largely through the vigorous—and ruthless—efforts of General Nathaniel Lyon (who died at the Battle of Wilson's Creek in August of 1861).

By the end of 1861 the Confederates had been driven totally out of the state, and a Union army of 11,000 men under General Samuel R. Curtis had pressed on across its southern border into Arkansas. Facing Curtis was General Earl Van Dorn and his Confederate army of 17,000 men; and a strange army it was. It consisted of the exiled Missouri State Guard (which was more irregular militia than military), "civilized" Indians from the Indian Territory (later Oklahoma) who sided with the Confederacy, and Confederate troops from Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and other western states. It was a hard-bitten, ragtag army led by a man who was nothing if not a bold, aggressive leader. Confronted by Curtis' invasion, Van Dorn decided to take the offensive.

In a situation rare during the Civil War, Van Dorn's advancing Confederate army outnumbered its opponent, and Curtis began to fall back towards the Missouri border. The Confederates force-marched for three days to catch up with the withdrawing Union forces, consuming all their
rations as they went. However, when they finally caught up, they found the Union troops well-entrenched behind a stream called Sugar Creek, about a mile south of an Arkansas hamlet called Leetown that was just below the Missouri border. Curtis, a West Point trained engineer, had constructed an excellent defensive position behind the creek, and by all rights the story should have ended there. But Earl Van Dorn was determined to fight, both because of his characteristic aggressiveness and his desperate need to capture supplies.

On the night of March 6, 1862, Van Dorn divided his troops into two columns and marched them in a huge arc around Curtis’ right flank and turned inward to attack the Union position from the rear. The left-hand column, under General Sterling Price (formerly the Governor of Missouri), marched around the eastern end of a rocky prominence named Pea Ridge and then southward along the Telegraph Road, the only decent thoroughfare in the entire area, and the main line of supply for Curtis’ army. The right-hand column, under General Ben McCulloch of Texas, turned off at the western end of Pea Ridge and marched towards Leetown and the Union’s right rear.

As dawn broke on March 7th, Curtis realized that the Confederates were no longer before him across Sugar Creek, and shortly scouts came in warning that Van Dorn’s army was rapidly approaching from the north. The Union army was cut off and outnumbered, leaving Curtis with the options of either retreating southward into enemy territory without a supply line, or “retreating” northward to confront the Confederates. He chose the second option. With his enemy thus forewarned, Van Dorn had lost the element of surprise, but still enjoyed a considerable positional advantage, so he pressed on.

The battle opened at 10:30 AM with Price’s Missourians falling on outposts of Colonel Eugene A. Carr’s 4th Division around Elkhorn Tavern. Almost simultaneously, McCulloch’s column assaulted troops of the Union 1st Division under Colonel Peter Osterhaus north of Leetown. The outnumbered Union troops were pushed back on both fronts. However, Union reinforcements were steadily marching up from the Sugar Creek line in the form of General Alexander Asboth’s 2nd Division and the 3rd Division of the ironically-named Colonel Jefferson Davis, both of which were initially sent to the left flank.

However, the Union left continued to fall back before McCulloch’s advance until they occupied the southern edge of a large field just to the north of Leetown. In the early afternoon, the Confederates charged across this open field in the face of Union fire coming from both their front and flank, and McCulloch and many of his men were cut
down in the deadly crossfire. Colonel McIntosh, the next in command, was killed within the hour, and his successor was captured after accidentally riding into the Union lines. The survivors of McCulloch’s command fell into confusion and many retreated from the field of battle. Those that remained fell back to the north and east to join up with Price at Elkhorn Tavern.

Van Dorn, over with the Missourians on the Telegraph Road, knew there was trouble when an ominous silence fell over the western side of the battlefield. On Price’s front the Confederates had captured Elkhorn Tavern and steadily pushed the Union forces back, but neither side was able to force a decision before darkness came. After some deliberation Van Dorn decided to fight on, and spent the night shoring up Price’s line with the remnants of McCulloch’s command as they struggled in. Curtis also had to consider the advisability of continuing the battle. At around midnight, he called a council of war in which three of his four principal lieutenants advised him to retreat, while the other remained silent. Curtis, however, was convinced that the Confederates has spent themselves, and decided that the Union army would stand its ground on the 8th, and even attack if a favorable opportunity came.

And come it did. The Confederates opened the second day of battle low on ammunition (they’d left their supply train back beyond Sugar Creek) and hungry, but they attacked anyway. The attack sputtered out almost immediately and Curtis had his opportunity. Starting on his left flank near Pea Ridge, Curtis’ forces began advancing relentlessly. Van Dorn knew the battle was over and began retreating to the north and east. By early afternoon on the 8th the Battle of Pea Ridge was over and the triumphant Union army held the field.

Consequences

Pea Ridge was the largest Civil War battle fought west of the Mississippi River and was also one of the most decisive battles in the war. Its outcome ensured that the Confederates would never again seriously threaten the Union’s dominant military and political position in Missouri. There would be countless smaller battles, bushwhacks, and guerrilla fights, but Missouri would remain irrevocably in the Union.

Van Dorn’s disorganized army took a week to reassemble, and soon after received orders to cross the Mississippi and proceed on to Corinth. There Van Dorn was to join forces with General Albert Sidney Johnston, who was massing troops for an attack on General Ulysses S. Grant’s Union army at Pittsburg Landing (Shiloh) in Tennessee. Unfortunately for the Confederates, Van Dorn arrived one week after the Battle of Shiloh was fought.

Curtis’ victory at Pea Ridge should have made him famous and advanced his career, but it did neither. He was awarded command of the Department of Missouri but quickly fell out of favor with the Governor of that state and was removed by President Lincoln. He was sent to fight Indians—the usual employment for unsuccessful Union generals. It was a poor reward for Curtis’ victory, and a loss for the Union, since his conduct of the Battle of Pea Ridge demonstrated that he was a highly capable field commander.

SHILOH

In early 1862 the Confederates were reeling after the surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson (respectively on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers) forced them to abandon Nashville, the capitol of Tennessee, and fall back before the advance of General Ulysses S. Grant’s Army of the Tennessee and General Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Cumberland. Tennessee was all but lost to the Confederacy and the time had come to either write it off or attempt to retake it. The Confederate western theater commander, General Albert Sidney Johnston, chose to attack and used the railroads to assemble forces from all corners of his far-flung command at the junction town of Corinth in northeastern Mississippi.

For the moment, the armies of Generals Grant and Buell were widely separated. Buell was located near Nashville, while Grant was more than 50 miles away, encamped on the western bank of the Tennessee River at Pittsburgh Landing, and blissfully unaware of the forces massing against him only 20 miles away. The Confederates, hoping to defeat Grant before Buell could join with him, marched off to the attack on April 3rd, but things went badly from the start due to confusion, rain and mud. Instead of taking only one day to cover the distance to Pittsburgh Landing, it took the Confederates three. They were finally in position to attack on the morning of April 6th, and, amazingly, Grant was still unaware that 40,000 rebels were lurking in the woods nearby. But, for their part, the Confederates did not realize that Buell and one of his divisions were very close at hand and the others were a mere 20 miles away.

The battle of Shiloh began at about 5:00 AM on April 6th when the Confederates engaged an advance Union patrol, but their luck held and surprise was maintained. Pressing on, the Confederates hit the Federal troops in or just in front of their fortified camps. Although the Union forces fought bravely, by 8:00 AM they were forced to retreat, abandoning their camps to the rebels, who gleefully looted them. Unfortunately for the Confederates, General P. T. Beauregard had devised a plan of attack in which all four Confederate Corps deployed behind one another, and had to advance in linear formation through the densely wooded terrain. Not surprisingly, formation cohesion was swiftly lost and reinforcing units arrived late or in the wrong places. The resulting delays gave the Union forces time to rush up reinforcements and establish a new line along a sunken road that ran between the Peach Orchard and the Duncan Field.

When the Confederates encountered the new Union line, they attacked frontally instead of outflanking it, and an intense, close-quarters fight commenced in which the Federals repulsed attack after Confederate attack, delaying the enemy’s advance for several precious hours. In an angle of woods later called the Hornet’s Nest, the remnants of General Prentiss’ 6th Division resisted eleven Confederate assaults before being surrounded, attacked by over 60 massed artillery pieces, and forced to surrender. This success finally broke the Union line and the Confederates poured on toward Pittsburg Landing, but by that time their commander, General Johnston, was already dead, fatally wounded while leading a charge through the Peach Orchard.
Beauregard took command of the Confederate army, and as nightfall approached two Confederate brigades pressed onward to within several hundred yards of Pittsburgh Landing, but were stopped there by the massed fire of Grant's remaining artillery, the gunboats Lexington and Tyler, and the leading brigade of Buell's army. Thus, the Confederate plan of crushing Grant's army against the river failed by a hair's breadth, but close was not good enough, since, during the night, Grant received over 20,000 fresh troops as the full strength of Buell's army arrived.

At dawn on April 7th the Union army attacked, taking the Confederates, who had thought that the Yankees were too beaten-up to attack, rather by surprise. Through a series of unrelenting attacks, Grant's and Buell's troops pushed the enemy back all along the line, regaining the ground lost on the previous day. The Confederates fought tenaciously but were too tired, weak, and disorganized to halt the advance. Around noon Beauregard called for a retreat back to Corinth and the Confederates slipped away. The battle of Shiloh was over.

Consequences

The Battle of Shiloh was, at the time, the largest single battle ever fought on the North American continent. The intensity of the battle, and the huge casualty toll it produced, shocked the people of both the North and South, demolishing any remaining notions that the war would be short and relatively bloodless.

The Union had won the Battle of Shiloh, but, because he had been caught by surprise and his victory was in no way decisive, Grant came under severe attack in the North. Many people called for his immediate removal, but President Lincoln stood by Grant, saying "I can't spare this man-he fights." However, for the moment, command of Grant's army was taken over by General Henry W. Halleck, the Union's western theater commander. The North retained its hold on Tennessee.

The Confederates fell back to Corinth and held that important rail junction for seven weeks until the approach of Halleck's much-larger army (with Grant as second-in-command) forced them to retreat. Shiloh was a
major setback and disappointment for the Confederates. They had missed an excellent opportunity to crush a major Union army, lost troops that they could not afford to lose, and had once again lost the initiative in the western theater. With the almost solitary exception of the Battle of Chickamauga in September 1863, the Confederate forces in the West would know nothing but defeat for the remainder of the war.

GETTYSBURG

In June of 1863 the Union armies in the west were pressing forward on several fronts as General Rosecrans pushed General Braxton Bragg’s Confederates out of Chattanooga, and General Grant besieged Vicksburg, the last Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River. But, in the eastern theater, General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had seized the initiative after its brilliant victory at Chancellorsville and was invading the North. Lee hoped to draw the Union Army of the Potomac away from Richmond, feed his army on the green and unavaged fields of Pennsylvania, and, most importantly, fight a victorious battle on Northern soil in the hopes that this might convince the Union to accept Southern independence and end the war.

Lee’s army of 76,000 began crossing the Potomac into Maryland on June 15th, with General Joe Hooker's Union army following slowly to the southeast. Lincoln, unhappy with Hooker’s slow pace, and inability or unwillingness to attack the Confederates, accepted Hooker's resignation on June 28th and replaced him with the capable, if not brilliant, General George Gordon Meade.

Lee’s army fanned out across south-central Pennsylvania, threatening Harrisburg—the state capital—and spreading panic throughout the North, but causing no serious damage. J.E.B. Stuart was out of communication with Lee, off leading his three best cavalry brigades in yet another largely pointless ride around the Army of the Potomac. Thus deprived of his best means of reconnaissance, Lee only discovered Meade's approach rather belatedly, and rushed off orders for his scattered army to concentrate at Cashtown. On June 30th a Confederate infantry brigade that had been sent east from Caftown to probe the small town of Gettysburg—and to steal shoes from a factory there—encountered a small force of Union cavalry. A spirited skirmish resulted, and from this unexpected encounter grew the greatest battle ever fought on American soil.

Day One of the Battle

On July 1st, the Battle of Gettysburg was a massive meeting engagement between two major armies, with the
vital question being which army would concentrate fastest. The battle opened around 8:00 AM when Confederate troops of General Henry Heth's division stumbled upon the Federal cavalry division of General John Buford several miles west of the town. The battle steadily grew in intensity as more Confederates of General A.P. Hill's Corps came down the Chambersburg Pike and engaged the hard-pressed cavalrymen on McPherson's Ridge. At mid-morning infantry of the Federal I Corps came to Buford's relief and wrecked two Confederate brigades, but General John Reynolds, one of the North's finest corps commanders, was killed at the head of his troops.

In the early afternoon, the Union I Corps line to the west of Gettysburg was threatened in the flank as General Richard Ewell's Corps approached from the north. The Confederates were temporarily halted north of Gettysburg by the troops of General Oliver Howard's XI Corps which had just arrived on the battlefield, but, after
a bloody fight, the unlucky "Dutchmen" fell back in confusion through Gettysburg. Since I Corps was almost encircled, it too retreated back through Gettysburg, rallying only when it reached Cemetery Ridge behind the town. Losses in killed and wounded had been heavier on the Confederate side, but, when taking prisoners into account, the Union had unquestionably gotten the worst of it. General Lee himself had arrived in time to watch the Union retreat and to plot how to take advantage of it.

The Union forces hastily formed a fishhook-shaped line drawn along Cemetery Ridge, anchored on the right by Culp's Hill and in the center by Cemetery Hill. Lee ordered the attack to continue "if practicable", but his subordinates did not attack, thus missing what many believe was their best chance for victory. Thus, at the end of the first day of the battle, the Confederates had won a sizable victory, but the Union army was still on the field and had reinforcements arriving hourly. His partial victory in the first day's fighting encouraged Lee to continue the battle in hopes of winning a major victory—a decision with disastrous consequences.

Day Two of the Battle

On the morning of July 2nd, the Union forces holding the "fishhook" faced-off against the Confederates holding Seminary Ridge to the west and Gettysburg itself to the north. Lee placed the main effort of his army to the south, ordering General James Longstreet's Corps to assault the Union left and take Little Round Top, a position from which the entire Union line would be outflanked. However, Longstreet was slow in getting his Corps in place and did not begin his attack until mid-afternoon. Before Longstreet was ready to attack, General Dan Sickles advanced his Union III Corps into the valley between the two armies—exceeding his orders—and took up position in a salient that ran through a peach orchard on the Emmitsburg Road and a rocky hillock called Devil's Den.

Longstreet's attack fell upon Sickles' Corps with full force, touching off several hours of incredibly vicious fighting. Eventually, Sickles' Corps, outflanked and overwhelmed, was forced to retreat back to Cemetery Ridge, but the Confederates failed to take Little Round Top. The hill had been left undefended until literally the last moment, when Colonel Strong Vincent's Brigade of the Union V Corps was rushed up to the crest. In some of the bravest fighting of the war, the Union troops—and in particular, the 20th Maine—fought off the Confederate assault and saved Meade's army from being outflanked.

To the north General Ewell was ordered to attack the Federal positions on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill, but he also acted too late. Ewell's troops took the lower slopes of Cemetery Hill, but were committed to the fight piecemeal and were forced to fall back at nightfall. Over on Culp's Hill the Confederates captured and held a line of breastworks near the eastern base of the hill, but could not over-run the entire position. Thus, at the end of the second day, the battle seemed to hang in the balance. The poorly-coordinated Confederate attacks had failed to win the battle, but yet another Union corps had been taken apart. However, unknown to General Lee, by that afternoon the Union army outnumbered the Confederate army and Federal reinforcements were still arriving.

Day Three of the Battle

During the night Lee decided to attack the center of the Union line on July 3rd. By any standard this was an extremely risky decision. The Union Army of the Potomac had finished its concentration on the battlefield, outnumbered the Confederates by almost 20,000 men, and held a naturally strong defensive line bristling with artillery.

At 1:00 PM on the 3rd, Lee opened the assault with an artillery bombardment the likes of which had never before been seen in North America. The ground trembled under Lee's massive barrage, touching off a counter-bombardment by the Union artillery deployed along the crest of Cemetery Ridge. After over an hour of intensive shelling the Union artillery fire slackened and then stopped in order to save ammunition for use against the Confederate infantry attack that could plainly be seen massing on Seminary Ridge. Lee, thinking the Union artillery had been silenced, launched his last remaining fresh troops against Cemetery Ridge.

Three Confederate divisions under the overall command of General George Pickett, some 12,000 men in all, charged across the valley. The Union artillery and infantry opened fire on the advancing Confederates and huge gaps appeared in the Confederate lines as the Union fire found its mark. The closer the Confederates came, the higher their casualties mounted. Fewer than 6,000 Confederates reached the crest of Cemetery Ridge, there to be overwhelmed by superior numbers as Union reserves converged from all sides. Pickett's charge, the high tide of the Confederacy, was repulsed and thousands of Confederate soldiers were killed, wounded, and captured. The shattered remnants of Pickett's command staggered back into the Confederate lines and Lee's army braced for the expected Union counterattack. It never came. Both armies stood their ground, glaring at one another across the blood-soaked valley—the battle of Gettysburg was over.

Consequences

July 4th 1863 was a decisive date in the history of the Civil War, since it was both the day on which Lee began his retreat from Gettysburg and the day on which the Confederate army besieged in Vicksburg surrendered. Lee's army had suffered crippling losses—over 28,000 casualties out of some 70,000 men engaged—that the South simply could not replace. When Lee's Army reached the Potomac River, it found itself with no way to cross, its bridge having been destroyed by Union cavalry. The Army of Northern Virginia entrenched and waited as another bridge was hastily constructed.

General Meade's Army had suffered over 23,000 casualties out of some 85,000 engaged. Meade followed Lee cautiously to the Potomac, but, to President Lincoln's great disgust, did not attack Lee when he was trapped with his back against the river. Eventually, Lee's army slipped across the river, denying the Union the full strategic benefit of its victory at Gettysburg. Ultimately the battle's most important strategic consequence was that Lincoln brought his most successful general—Grant, the hero of Vicksburg—east to take command of all the Union armies and to direct the Army of the Potomac personally.
The battle of Gettysburg is the most storied battle in American history. More books have been written about it than about all the other battles of the Civil War combined. Its fame derives from the fact that it represented the high tide of the Confederacy, the last point at which the South could hope to win the war by a dramatic offensive victory. Gettysburg also marked the end of a two-year period of humiliating defeats for Federal Army of the Potomac. After Gettysburg, the Union armies would do no more retreating, although their steady advance toward Richmond and final victory would be accomplished only at an immense cost in casualties.

**BENTONVILLE**

The battle of Bentonville is one of the least known and least studied battles of the war. It was the last battle fought between rival "western" armies—although it was fought in North Carolina—and the second-to-last battle of consequence in the war (the last being the Battle of Five Forks between Lee and Grant). General William T. Sherman's army had taken Atlanta in late 1864 and then driven southeastward to the sea, leaving a broad swath of scorched earth across the heart of Georgia. Now, in the Spring of 1865, Sherman was pushing north through the Carolinas on his way to join Grant for the final attack against Lee in Virginia.

The Confederate Army of Tennessee had been more or less destroyed in the disastrous battles of Franklin and Nashville in 1864, and, by March 1865, only a pitiful remnant consisting of some 20,000 men (little more than two divisions in the old days) remained to confront Sherman's mighty army of almost 100,000 battle-hardened veterans. Sherman's army, however, was not concentrated; part of it was on the coast in Wilmington, while the main body of about 60,000 men was divided into two columns as they marched into North Carolina. The Confederate commander, General Joseph E. Johnston—he of First Bull Run fame—saw that his only option was to defeat one of the Union columns before the other came to its aid. With that strategy in mind he retreated steadily before Sherman's advance and waited for an opening.

On March 19th his opportunity came and one of the best-prepared—and worst-executed—battles of the Civil War began. Johnston planned a surprise attack against the Union XIV Corps of General Slocum's column as it marched toward the town of Bentonville, North Carolina. Johnston deployed his army along a ridge line, covered by woods, so that the advancing Union column would march into a trap and could be attacked from three sides at once. The plan almost worked, as the Union Corps advanced into the trap as planned. However, the Confederate forces, led astray by by faulty maps and other troubles typical in the

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**BENTONVILLE Orders of Battle**

![Bentonville Orders of Battle Diagram](image-url)
days before radio communications, were not all present for the attack. In mid-afternoon the attack fell on the advancing Union column, 15,000 Confederates versus 15,000 Federals, with surprise on the Confederate side and reinforcements on the way for both.

The Union forces were forced back, some units even broke ranks, but in fairly short order they reformed. Even though surrounded on three sides and trapped against a swamp, the Union veterans held off the uncoordinated Confederate attack. Once the situation stabilized somewhat, the Union left fell back to the stream running in front of the Morris Farm, where reinforcements from XX Corps had established a fall-back position.

The Confederates assaulted the Union position three times before the battle ended at nightfall. Already outnumbered and with tens of thousands of additional Union soldiers converging on the battlefield, General Johnston fell back to the ridgeline from which he had mounted his initial attack. On the 20th he faced a Union army of over 60,000 men. Rather than attack and lose men to no purpose, Sherman simply waited for the Confederates to retreat, which they did on the morning of 21st. The Union juggernaut then resumed its relentless advance northward.

Consequences

The battle of Bentonville was a close-run affair for a few hours, but Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia surrendered less than three weeks later, and Johnston’s own army two weeks after that. Thus, even if Johnston had succeeded in smashing the XIV Corps, the “victory” would have been strategically pointless. The only thing the Battle of Bentonville accomplished, at the cost of some 1,400 casualties on the Union side, and probably twice that many for the Confederates, was to demonstrate that the southerners were willing to fight until the very end even though the hopelessness of their cause was clear to all.

DEDICATION

To my father, Samuel Lee Smith, and to my uncle, John Eugene Smith, who taught me to love American history.

THE ORIGINS OF ACROSS FIVE APRILS

This game system had its genesis way back in the early 1980’s. At that time, I was a staff game designer for SPI (Simulations Publications, Inc.) in New York City and was developing A Gleam of Bayonets, Rich Berg’s game on the Battle of Antietam. In order to test that game’s command control system, I went back to the old SPI Blue and Gray quad-game, Antietam. Using the smaller game I was able to test the command system over and over again because it played so quickly. Out of this experience grew the idea of creating my own Civil War “quad” game.

I grew up on SPI quad games, especially Blue and Gray and the Napoleonic series. I and a group of friends played them consistently and enjoyed them a great deal. They played very quickly, were easy to learn, and allowed you to play a wide variety of battles without having to go through the hassle of learning a whole new set of rules. Across Five Aprils is a game in that spirit.

THE GAME SYSTEM

Across Five Aprils is a simple game, but nonetheless has a number of novel features. The most important of these is the Phase Marker system, which portrays a fundamental truth about the nature of Civil War battles (and, indeed, about the battles of any era).

Battles are, by their very nature, highly confusing, chaotic affairs that make it difficult for even the most able of commanders to keep track of everything that’s going on, and to maintain effective control of their troops. March delays, misunderstood orders, and lost or delayed messengers all conspire to ruin a commander’s best-laid plans, making it particularly difficult to coordinate maneuvers and attacks involving multiple formations. Typically, the units engaged in a battle will spend the most of their time out of combat, either marching from one place to another or just sitting around awaiting orders. Thus, most battles are characterized by periods of fierce combat interspersed with long lulls during which relatively little fighting takes place.

Traditionally, wargames have ignored these facts and given players a highly unrealistic degree of control over their units. Maneuvers involving multiple formations are coordinated perfectly 100% of the time, attacks can be planned down to the last combat factor, and, in general, the tempo of combat is simply much too fast. Across Five Aprils avoids this pitfall by means of its semi-random sequence of movement and combat, which better simulates the fundamentally chaotic nature of battle. A fortunate side-effect is that Across Five Aprils plays very well as a solitaire game.

The other rules systems are fairly traditional, but some have important twists. The combat resolution system, for example, uses traditional odds columns, but both players roll a die, which creates 36 possible combinations. Add in the morale modifications and you have a combat system that generates a broad range of outcomes. Note, however, that regardless of the dice combination, the result is usually a step loss or two and a retreat. The results are attributional, not decisive, which reflects the actual results of Civil War combat—lots of casualties, but few decisive engagements.

THE BATTLES

In deciding which battles to include in Across Five Aprils, I looked for balanced situations that would make good, fun games without requiring lots of Exclusive Rules. For the sake of variety, I wanted to include both large and small battles, with the additional motive of offering play-
ers a broad range of playing times. BULL RUN and BEN-
TONVILLE were chosen because they were—respectively—
the Civil War's first and last "gameable" major battles
(The Battle of Five Forks occurred after BENTONVILLE, but
the Confederates had little chance of winning). GETTYS-
BURG and SHILOH were natural choices because they are
perhaps the two most famous battles of the entire war. PEA
RIDGE stands out as the most important battle fought west
of the Mississippi River. Ironically, I had designed the
Across Five Aprils system to simulate battles with commu-
nications and leadership breakdowns, such as occurred at
Antietam and Chancellorsville, yet we only included battles
that did not require such rules.

THE FUTURE

On the BULL RUN map you may have noticed that there
is a second Retreat Compass, and a number of Entry Hexes
that are not used in this, the first battle of Bull Run. These
have been included in anticipation of a future expansion of
the Across Five Aprils system. Assuming that Across Five
Aprils is successful, we will publish a second series of bat-
tle games that will include the Second Battle of Bull Run,
which will be played on the same map.

At present, the only battles that we know for certain
will be in the projected second installment of Across Five
Aprils are 2nd Bull Run and Antietam, the other three have
not yet been determined. However, we will include several
battles (such as Antietam) that had communications and/or
leadership failures in order to exploit fully the capabilities
of the Phase Marker system. Once you've played Across
Five Aprils, you can just imagine the possibilities; give
Stonewall Jackson a separate combat phase marker to
allow him to attack twice per turn, have certain movement
phase markers "activate" only on a die roll, and so forth.
The possibilities are many and they will be simple, realistic
and fun. Of course we'll also include some battles
which don't require such rules—as long as they make for a
good game.

If you've enjoyed Across Five Aprils and would like to
see a second series of games, drop us a letter and let us
know. Feel free to comment on the five games in this
series, and make suggestions as to those battles you would
like to see in the next series. Send your replies to the same
address given for rules questions on page #2 of the Basic
Rules Booklet.

IN CONCLUSION

We hope you enjoy Across Five Aprils. If you do, much
of the credit goes to Kevin Boylan, the game's developer,
and to the corps of playtesters who have spent so many
hours tweaking each game.

Until next time,
GAME CREDITS

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