THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS

SCENARIO FOLDER

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HOW TO SET-UP THE GAME

Choose Scenario and Sides to be Played.

You can choose any of the three scenarios, or you may begin the Campaign Game at the beginning of the Spring or Dresden Scenarios. The Spring Scenario alone is best for introductory purposes.

One Player will control the French Army (including its German, Italian and Polish units), and the other Player will control the Allied Armies of Silesia, Bohemia, and the North (with Prussian, Russian, Austrian and Swedish units and leaders).

Organization Displays.

Each Player has one Organization Display. If Playing the Spring Scenario, the bottom portion of each display may be folded under and out of the way. Each Display has a track for each Leader, giving the initial unit strengths for the combat units in his Track (his Organic Units are those which bear his Corps designation in white). Place the combat units in the space on the Track in which their number is shown for the scenario in play (*see "How to Use" on the Allied Organization Display*).

Scenario Information.

The number of APs each Army begins the scenario with, the First Player, and the number of Game-Turns in each, is listed below.

Army	Scen S Spring	Scen D Dresden	Scen L Leipzig
French	21	45	39
Silesian	11	45	52
Bohemian	•	21	39
North	•	16†	16
1st Player	French	Allies	Allies
Length (turns)	23*	21	18

nr. of APs at Start

*may be less due to Armistice. † amount on entry, 25-6 Aug. (cent/opns arrives at this time).

Victory Conditions.

The winner of the game is determined by the following four criteria:

1. If, at the end of the scenario, one side X's morale is worse than its "at start" level, and side Y's morale is better than side X's, side Y is the winner.

2. Morale Victory (see the rules). This type of victory can occur at any time during play, and automatically ends the game.

3. Armistice (Spring only). When playing the scenario (not the Campaign Game), if the Armistice occurs by the end of May 27-28, the French Player wins. If it occurs later than June 2-3, the Allied Player wins.

4. Any outcome other than those specified above is a draw.

HOW TO USE THE SET-UP TABLES

Leaders listed on pages 5, 7 and 9 begin the game on the game map. Other units are brought on to the game map on the turn next to which they are listed on the turn Record/Reinforcement Track and are termed "Reinforcements."

Leaders in parenthesis following a Commander's name are considered subordinate to that Commander and must be set up at start as part of that Commander's force, in the same stack if possible. Each stack must be set up in the town hex specified, or as near as possible, on road if available (the other hex occupied by their stack may be any adjacent hex). In some instances the name shown in the set-up will be the successor or predecessor to the Leader shown on the counter, indicated by a prefix to the name (eg. "ex-"), corresponding to the name printed on the Organization Display, in parenthesis after the leader's name.

The specification of two towns indicates the force is marching from the first-named to the second, and the Leader markers must be set-up in column mode, facing in the specified direction, anywhere along the shortest path (in terms of MPs) between the two towns. Reinforcements specified to be entering "from" a certain town must begin their entry in the road hex labelled "to" the specified town.

Besieging units show the name of the fort being besieged—these units set-up adjacent to the fort listed. As long as at least one hex adjacent to the fort is occupied by enemy forces, the fort is 'besieged.'

Supply Source, Center of Opns:

At the beginning of a scenario, you can choose any Supply Source (only one per army, maximum at all times) but this choice must be specified before play commences. The Center of Opns may be set-up anywhere.

Mode:

Units may be in any mode when set-up, except those shown to be marching between two points (see above).

Multi-hex forces:

If there is more than one stack of counters in a single force, at least one hex of every force must be within one hex of (i.e. adjacent to) the listed hex.

Command Spans: If a Command Span is exceeded in a set-up, as printed, the owning Player must create Maj. Gen. and/or separate forces to accommodate the excess immediately. Note that an extra Maj. Gen. would be necessary for the Allied Reinf. of 2-3 Sept., and some shifting of units from Stedingk's Track would be necessary in the Dresden setup (for example).

(Units): Individual divisions and brigades are drawn attention to if they have been switched away from the corps designated on their counter, and are listed on the same line as the leader to whom they are attached. If individual units have been removed from their designated corps, the corps leader has the symbol "(–)" after his name.

CAMPAIGN GAME ONLY

ARMISTICE REINFORCEMENTS AND REPLACEMENTS

Received in one lump only after commencement of Armistice, and appear in Friendly-occupied territory.

Nationality	Units	Leaders (with units)
Russian	Bohemian Cent/Opns	Barclay de Tolly
	24 Wuitsch	Kapzewitsch
	Pahlen II	Osten-Sacken
	Denissiew	Wasiltschikow
	Karpow II	Langeron
	21 Laptew	(Olsufiew, Scherbatow)
		St. Priest
		Pahlen
Prussian		Tauentzien
French	27 Rozniezky	Girard
	Res. Art.	Mortier
	29 Lecoq	Murat
	20G Curial	LHeritier
	29c Beaumont	St. Cyr
	6 Vial	Poniatowski
	22c Hammerstein	Kellerman
	25c Norman	Arrighi
	3YG Delaborde	"Dresden"
	4YG Roguet	"Leipzig"
	3GC Walther	"Torgau"
	23 Teste	
	21c Corbineau	

ARMISTICE REPLACEMENTS

Prussian: 9i, 2c
*Ldw: 69i, 7c

Russian: 26i, 13c
Gde: 5i
Art: 3a

French: 38i, 24c
Gde: 2i

Austrian: 1a

*There is no functional difference between Prussian and Landwehr. [Historical interest.]

SITUATION: 27 May 1813

What if there had been no armistice, and the campaign had continued after the battle of Bautzen? The following material is presented in the form of a speculation, not as a formal scenario intended to be played.

No Armistice Option (Campaign Game Only)

If both sides agree, the French Player can refuse to Accept the Armistice, in which case the game is played through to a morale victory, or until June 8-9; the Allied Player wins automatically if no morale victory occurs by the end of that turn (Austria is considered to intervene). In this case, the game does not continue in the Autumn.

Reinforcements and Replacements

Reinforcements and Replacements shown below arrive only when playing this option. (This is their historical arrival time, but since it was too late for them to actually intervene historically, in games with Armistice they are considered "Armistice replacements and reinforcements.") The reinforcements arrive on May 29-30 at any possible Supply Source; the replacements on May 27-28.

Sacken (8i), Langeron (Scherbatow, 8i). Replacements (9i, 1c, 3G Ru; 5i Pr).

Strengths at Start; Main Army: Russians 35, Prussians 22. Buelow 8 (Tauenzien 20). Woronzow 10. (Russian break-down on 4-5 June: Guards 6, Res Cav 5, Grenadiers 6, Barclay 8, Wittgenstein 12, Miloradovitch 8, Sacken 8). French 125 (the French had suffered 43,000 combat casualties and 90,000 were on the sick lists). Positions can be derived from Petre, pages 144-148. [Source: Wm. Vane, *Narrative*]

FULL NAMES OF SOME GENERALS

Gdk Graf Maximilian von Merveldt 1761-1815
FZM Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld 1775-1822
FZM Graf Ignaz Gyulai 1763-1831.
Gdk Graf Johan von Klenau 1757-1819. Of Janowitz.
Gdk Erbprinz Friedrich JL von Hessen Homburg 1769-1829
FML Prinz Moritz von Liechtenstein 1767-1819
FML Graf Ferdinand von Bubna und Litic 1768-1825
FML Graf Johann von Nostitz-Rieneck 1761-1840
Gdk Graf Emanuel von Mensdorff-Pouilly 1777-1852
Graf Mikhail Semyenovich Vorontsov 1782-1856
Prince Aliksei Ivanovich Gorchakov 1769-1817
Tsarevitch Konstantin Pavlovich 1779-1831
General Leitenant Fyodor Karlovich Korf 1774-1826
Nicholas Jean de Dieu Soult, Duke of Dalmatia 1769-1851
Friedrich Wilhelm, Count Buelow of Dennewitz 1755-1816
Hans David Ludwig, Count Yorck of Wartenberg 1759-1830
Auguste de Marmont, Duke of Ragusa 1774-1852
Nicholas Charles Oudinot, Duke of Reggio 1767-1847
Karl Philipp von Schwarzenberg 1771-1820
M.B. Barclay de Tolly 1761-1818
L.L. Bennigsen 1745-1826
D.S. Dokhturov 1756-1816
A.P. Ermolov 1772-1861
M.A. Miloradovich 1771-1825
F.V. von der Osten-Sacken 1752-1837
N.N. Raevsky 1771-1829
A.P. Ostermann-Tolstoy 1752-1819
D.V. Vasil'chikov 1778-1859
P.C. Wittgenstein 1768-1842
V.N. Latour-Maubourg 1768-1830

Spelling of Russian names is presented in the German transliteration from the original cyrillic characters. As a guide to pronunciation, the more common appearances of some of the Russian names are listed below: Dokhturov (Dochturow), Ermolov (Yermalow), Gorchakov (Gortschkow), Miloradovich (Miloradowitch), Raevsky (Rajewski), Vasil'chikov (Wasiltschikow), Vorontsov (Woronzow), Alsufief (Olsufiew), Scherbatov (Scherbatow), Kaptsevitch (Kapzewitsch).


THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS
Magdeburg
Egeln
Aschersleben
Rosslau
Bernberg
Koethen
Wittenberg
Wettin
Zorbig
Landsberg
Halle
Torgau
Lindenau
Wachau
Weimar
Altenburg
Dresden
Orlamuende
Chemnitz
Saalfeld
HARZ MTS.
THUERINGER WALD
GEBIRGE

SCENARIO S: SPRING

From Napoleon's arrival with the main army through commencement of the Armistice, April–June 1813.

ALLIED SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	Location
Bluecher	Altenburg
Wittgenstein (St. Priest)	Lindenau
Winzingerode (Eugen, Treubetzkof)	Wachau
Kleist (–)	Halle
Maj Gen M (*August 12*)	Wettin
Yorck	Zorbig
Miloradovich (Markow, Korff)	Chemnitz
ex-Berg	Landsberg
Woronzof (*Borstell 5*)	nr. Madgeburg
Maj Gen K (*Harpe*)	Wittenberg
Buelow	Rosslau-Koethen
ex-Tormassov (ex-Kennevitzin, ex-Lawrof, Galitzin V)	Dresden
Maj Gen Besieging (*Rosen*)	Glogau

FRENCH SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	Location
Eugene (Macdonald, Lauriston *(Chastel 3L)* Latour) *(Roguet 10G)*	Aschersleben
Reynier (–)	Egeln
Victor (–)	Bernberg
Ney	Weimar
Maj Gen H *(Marchand 39)*	Saalfeld-Orlamuende
Maj Gen E (*Sahr 25, Gabl 26c*)	Torgau
Maj Gen Garrisons: *(Lapoype)*	Wittenberg
(Laplane)	Glogau
(Lanusse)	Magdeburg

*"nr." means adjacent to the citadel hex





SCENARIO S: SPRING

From Napoleon's arrival with the main army through commencement of the Armistice, April–June 1813.

ALLIED SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	Location
Bluecher	Altenburg
Wittgenstein (St. Priest)	Lindenau
Winzingerode (Eugen, Treubetzkof)	Wachau
Kleist (–)	Halle
Maj Gen M *(August 12)*	Wettin
Yorck	Zorbig
Miloradovich (Markow, Korff)	Chemnitz
ex-Berg	Landsberg
Woronzof *(Borstell 5)*	nr. Madgeburg
Maj Gen K *(Harpe)*	Wittenberg
Buelow	Rosslau-Koethen
ex-Tormassov (ex-Kennevitzin, ex-Lawrof, Galitzin V)	Dresden
Maj Gen Besieging *(Rosen)*	Glogau

FRENCH SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	Location
Eugene (Macdonald, Lauriston *(Chastel 3L)* Latour) *(Roguet 10G)*	Aschersleben
Reynier (–)	Egeln
Victor (–)	Bernberg
Ney	Weimar
Maj Gen H *(Marchand 39)*	Saalfeld-Orlamuende
Maj Gen E *(Sahr 25, Gabl 26c)*	Torgau
Maj Gen Garrisons: *(Lapoype)*	Wittenberg
(Laplane)	Glogau
(Lanusse)	Magdeburg

*"nr." means adjacent to the citadel hex




THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS
Charlottenburg
Magdeburg
Baruth
Dennewitz
Wittenberg
DESSAU
ANHALT
Dahme
Kalau
HARZ MTS
Torgau
THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS
Leipzig
Stolpen
Dresden
Glasshuette
Koenigstein
Bergieshubel
THUERINGER WALD
SCHWARZE
SEBASTIENBERG
GEBIRGE
ERZ

SCENARIO D: DRESDEN

From the lapse of the armistice until the beginning of French Administrative Decline, Aug.-Sept.

ALLIED SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	Location
Bluecher (Osten-Sacken, Wasiltschikow, Tschaplitz)	Breslau
Yorck	Schweidnitz
Langeron (Olsufjew, Scherbatow, Kapzewitsch, Korff)	Striegau
St Priest (Borosdin)	Breslau
Barclay (Eugen, Gortshakow, Pahlen)	Muenchengratz
Wittgenstein (Konstantin,Yermalow,Galitzin, Rajewski) *(Alvens. Gde)*	Muenchengratz
Kleist	Muenchengratz
Buelow	Charlottenburg
Winzingerode (Woronzof, Tauentzien)	Charlottenburg
Maj Gen Besieging *(Senden)*	Glogau
Maj Gen Z	Gabel
Maj Gen A	Freihrit

FRENCH SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	Location
Napoleon (Drouot, Mortier, Nansouty)	Bautzen-Hochkirch
Kellerman	Lobau
Latour	Goerlitz
Poniatowski	Ostritz-Zittau
Victor	Rothenburg
Marmont	Bunzlau
Macdonald (Lauriston)	Lowenberg-Goldberg
Ney (Sebastiani)	Liegnitz
Vandamme	Weissig-Stolpen
St. Cyr	Koenigstein
L'Heritier	Glasshuette-Bergieshubel
Reynier (Bertrand)	Kalau
Arrighi	Dahme
Oudinot	Baruth
Girard *(Lanusse)*	Magdeburg
Maj Gen F *(Dombrowski 27)*	Wittenberg-Dennewitz
Maj Gen Garrisons: *(Laplane)*	Glogau
(Durosnel)	Dresden
(Lauer)	Torgau
(Margaron)	Leipzig
(Lapoype)	Wittenberg

SCENARIO D: DRESDEN

From the lapse of the armistice until the beginning of French Administrative Decline, Aug.–Sept.

ALLIED SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	**Location**
Bluecher (Osten-Sacken, Wasiltschikow, Tschaplitz)	Breslau
Yorck	Schweidnitz
Langeron (Olsufjew, Scherbatow, Kapzewitsch, Korff)	Striegau
St Priest (Borosdin)	Breslau
Barclay (Eugen, Gortshakow, Pahlen)	Muenchengratz
Wittgenstein (Konstantin, Yermalow, Galitzin, Rajewski) *(Alvens. Gde)*	Muenchengratz
Kleist	Muenchengratz
Buelow	Charlottenburg
Winzingerode (Woronzof, Tauentzien)	Charlottenburg
Maj Gen Besieging *(Senden)*	Glogau
Maj Gen Z	Gabel
Maj Gen A	Freihrit

FRENCH SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	**Location**
Napoleon (Drouot, Mortier, Nansouty)	Bautzen-Hochkirch
Kellerman	Lobau
Latour	Goerlitz
Poniatowski	Ostritz-Zittau
Victor	Rothenburg
Marmont	Bunzlau
Macdonald (Lauriston)	Lowenberg-Goldberg
Ney (Sebastiani)	Liegnitz
Vandamme	Weissig-Stolpen
St. Cyr	Koenigstein
L'Heritier	Glasshuette-Bergieshubel
Reynier (Bertrand)	Kalau
Arrighi	Dahme
Oudinot	Baruth
Girard *(Lanusse)*	Magdeburg
Maj Gen F *(Dombrowski 27)*	Wittenberg-Dennewitz
Maj Gen Garrisons: *(Laplane)*	Glogau
(Durosnel)	Dresden
(Lauer)	Torgau
(Margaron)	Leipzig
(Lapoype)	Wittenberg




THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS
Magdeburg
Barby
Rosslau
Acken
Dessau
DESSAU
ANHALT
Wartenburg
Kemberg
Jessnitz
HARZ MTS.
THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS
Torgau
Elsterwerda
Leipzig
Seerhausen
Grossenhain
Weimar
Altenberg
Nossen
Meissen
Neustadt Weissig
Dresden
Pirna
Freiberg
Koenigstein
Dippoldiswalde
Berggieshubel
Saalfeld
Zinnwalde
Marienberg
Annaberg
Teplitz
GEBIRGE
Leitmeritz
THUERINGER WALD
Hof
ERZ

SCENARIO L: LEIPZIG

The final French collapse, from the abandonment of the right bank of the Elbe, Sept.-Oct.

ALLIED SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	Location
Bennigsen (Dochturow, Tolstoi) *(Stroganow AvGde)*	Leitmeritz
Osten-Sacken (*Tschaplitz Div.*, Wasiltschikow)	Grossenhain
Barclay de Tolly (Pahlen)	Teplitz
Buelow	adj. to Wartenburg
Tauenzien	Jessnitz
Bluecher (Yorck, Langeron, St Priest, Korff, Olsufjew, Borosdin, Kapzewitsch)	Elsterwerda-Torgau
Scherbatow	adj. to Neustadt
Maj Gen C *(Philipp 3)*	Hof
Maj Gen B (*A. Liechtenstein 2*)	Annaberg
Maj Gen A *(Bubna 2Lt)*	adj. to Neustadt
Colloredo	Zinnwalde
Klenau	Marienberg
Meerveldt	Teplitz
Bernadotte (Stedingk, Winzingerode, Woronzow)	Barby and Rosslau
[Bridges]	Acken, Wartenburg

FRENCH SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	Location
Napoleon (Lauriston, ex-Soult (*Albert 10*), Mortier, ex-Bessieres)	Dresden
Oudinot (*Raglowich 29*)	Weissig
Macdonald (Sebastiani) *(Marchand 39)*	Dresden-Grossenhain
Souham (-)	Berggieshubel
ex-Vandamme	Dippoldiswalde
St Cyr (-)	Koenigstein
Maj Gen F *(Creutzer 42)*	Pirna
Maj Gen H *(Claparede 43)*	Freiberg
Murat (Victor)	Nossen
Poniatowski (Kellerman)	
Ney (Bertrand, Reynier, Arrighi) *(Guilleminot 14)*	Kemberg
Marmont	Meissen-Seerhausen
Latour	Grossenhain-Meissen
L'Heritier	Meissen
Maj Gen Z *(Lefebv 2G, Br 1L)*	Altenberg
Girard *(Lorge 5L)*	Dessau
Augereau	Saalfeld
Maj Gen J *(Lefol)*	Weimar
Maj Gen Garrison: *(Lemoine)*	Magdeburg
[others same as Scen. D]	





SCENARIO L: LEIPZIG

The final French collapse, from the abandonment of the right bank of the Elbe, Sept.–Oct.

ALLIED SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	**Location**
Bennigsen (Dochturow, Tolstoi) *(Stroganow AvGde)*	Leitmeritz
Osten-Sacken (*Tschaplitz Div.*, Wasiltschikow)	Grossenhain
Barclay de Tolly (Pahlen)	Teplitz
Buelow	adj. to Wartenburg
Tauenzien	Jessnitz
Bluecher (Yorck, Langeron, St Priest, Korff, Olsufjew, Borosdin, Kapzewitsch)	Elsterwerda-Torgau
Scherbatow	adj. to Neustadt
Maj Gen C *(Philipp 3)*	Hof
Maj Gen B (*A. Liechtenstein 2*)	Annaberg
Maj Gen A *(Bubna 2Lt)*	adj. to Neustadt
Colloredo	Zinnwalde
Klenau	Marienberg
Meerveldt	Teplitz
Bernadotte (Stedingk, Winzingerode, Woronzow)	Barby and Rosslau
[Bridges]	Acken, Wartenburg

FRENCH SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) *(Units)*	**Location**
Napoleon (Lauriston, ex-Soult (*Albert 10*), Mortier, ex-Bessieres) Oudinot (*Raglowich 29*)	Dresden
Macdonald (Sebastiani) *(Marchand 39)*	Weissig
Souham (–)	Dresden-Grossenhain
ex-Vandamme	Berggieshubel
St Cyr (–)	Dippoldiswalde
Maj Gen F *(Creutzer 42)*	Koenigstein
Maj Gen H *(Claparede 43)*	Pirna
Murat (Victor)	Freiberg
Poniatowski (Kellerman)	Nossen
Ney (Bertrand, Reynier, Arrighi) *(Guilleminot 14)*	Kemberg
Marmont	Meissen-Seerhausen
Latour	Grossenhain-Meissen
L'Heritier	Meissen
Maj Gen Z *(Lefebv 2G, Br 1L)*	Altenberg
Girard *(Lorge 5L)*	Dessau
Augereau	Saalfeld
Maj Gen J *(Lefol)*	Weimar
Maj Gen Garrison: *(Lemoine)*	Magdeburg
[others same as Scen. D]	



PLAYERS NOTES

Now that you've read the rules, punched out the counters and set up a scenario, you are ready to play "STRUGGLE OF NATIONS". Well, sort of! The nature of the beast is such that a player unfamiliar with the system could be overwhelmed by the number of decisions necessary to complete a turn. What follows, hopefully, will provide some basic ideas and techniques to facilitate play.

First, we cannot emphasize too strongly that a basic historical knowledge of the 1813 Campaign will greatly clarify your objectives and choices as a player. It is recommended that the player closely study, not just read, the historical notes in the Scenario Folder. The player who is familiar with the historical campaign will have an advantage over one who is not.

Perhaps the most striking physical component is the small hexagon mapboard. This affects play in two ways. First, it makes "STRUGGLE OF NATIONS" a very close game played close up to the mapboard often causing the player to lose his perspective. Second, for the veteran gamer, the small hexes magnify the scale of the map; distances are much greater than is apparent. A player should always know the march distance between supporting forces and the march distance to the enemy. (You will get used to the scale).

"STRUGGLE OF NATIONS" revolves around supply sources, the center of Operations and Administrative Points.

An army can never have too many Administrative Points, as they must be used both to issue Movement Commands and alleviate attrition. It is recommended that both the Allied and French players commit at least two Administrative Points to support their armies, thus taking attrition in the "actual" accumulated AP column on the AQT. This support, however, will greatly curtail accumulation of APs on the Admin Point Pool Table, depending on the distance between the Center of Operations and the source of supply.

The only problem is that as APs are spent to create necessary movement commands, the army's accumulated APs are spent, raising attrition on the AQT. Administrative Points should, therefore, be husbanded and not frivolously spent on unnecessary movement commands. You will note the devilishly clever Sequence of Play requiring all Movement Commands be issued prior to the movement forces based on the leaders' Initiatives. There is no second chance. If you do not spend the Admin Point to issue the command and if the leader does not roll his Initiative, thou shalt not move!

Thus, APs should be spent on movement commands when you wish to initiate combat, block an enemy advance, or retreat out of danger. APs will also, unfortunately, often have to be spent to issue a movement command to an isolated force with a low leader Initiative rating. If you are the French Player it is often advantageous to issue two APs to allow the Guard to conduct an extended march, thus using them as a mobile "fire brigade", immune from attrition, moving from one trouble spot to another, throwing their weight into an attack or blocking a potentially dangerous enemy advance. In all other cases, APs should not be spent to create Movement Commands to merely reposition a force from point A to point B.

One of the secrets to good play is to move your forces on your leaders' Initiative, in anticipation of your opponent's plans, to meet all contingencies, without running hither and yon plugging holes and wasting APs on Movement Commands.

Of course, before you receive a movement command, before you can support the army and before you can accumulate APs; you must have an active Center of Operations. Given the most favorable situation the Center of Operations should always be within 20 road hexes of the source of supply and it should never be inactivated.

Given the situation, on offense the LOC and Dispatch Distance stretches only so far. The player will, therefore, find it necessary to surge forward in fits and starts stretching the Dispatch Distance to the maximum, then suffering a self imposed stand down while the center of OPs displaces forward. This is particularly applicable to the French in the Spring Scenario and a bit less so to the Allies in the Dresden Scenario. The primary problem is for the army commander to determine the axis of his advance and, when necessary, to advance the Center of Opns. to support the offensive in as few moves as possible.

In retreat you can never go wrong by placing your Center of Operations too far to the rear. A player should always be careful not to place the Center of Operations too close to the front as it could expose his Line of Communications to be cut or directly expose the center of Opns to being deactivated by an enemy force.

The player should always concentrate on maintaining an active Center of Operations. You cannot afford to move your army on the "0" AP column of the AQT. Your source of supply should be regarded with one simple principal; never, never, under any circumstance allow your LOC to be cut. Maintaining your supply line will not guarantee that you will win, but failure to do so will guarantee you will lose. An even more cardinal sin, if possible, is to allow the enemy to occupy the source of supply. This is tantamount to disaster. To place your army on the "0" column, for attrition on the AQT, with only a 1/3d chance of changing the supply source could destroy your army without a battle.

Because of the nature of the game, maintaining LOC and source of supply is a much greater problem for the French than the Allies. In the Spring Scenario, due to the lack of cavalry and the necessity of the offensive, the French LOC is constantly exposed to marauding allied cavalry. The French player must, therefore, take care to allow sufficient forces to protect his LOC.

The Dresden and Leipzig scenarios present a slightly different problem, since the cavalry differential has been redressed. The French Player must keep a much closer tab on his LOC as it is often extended to the maximum. The LOC is more often in danger of being cut closer to the front line corps than by raiding parties in the rear. The results, while localized could be profound. As the combined Allied armies are more powerful, a forced retreat while out of supply, to avoid attack could cost as many strength points in attrition as a major battle. The French starting at a numerical disadvantage cannot afford the loss.

In the Dresden Scenario, that city is the only source of supply able to support sustained offensive operations east of the Elbe. For that reason, the French player must be particularly sensitive to any advance on Dresden. By the Leipzig Scenario the French supply source is again on the west edge of the map and again the French are faced with marauding cavalry threatening the source of supply. Due to the low counter density it is necessary to be constantly prepared to block small Allied raiding parties from gaining unopposed access to the French Communications.

Supply for the Allies is a much simpler affair. In the Spring Scenario the biggest problem is where to locate your source and still be within a reasonable distance of your Center of Operations. As the Allied Army is outnumbered by approximately 3-1 and will be retreating on its supply source, I suggest the northern edge of the Eastern section, Silesia, be used.

This will enable the Allied Player to place his Center of Operations so as to be within Dispatch Distance of both the Berlin and Dresden fronts; available to issue the necessary Movement Commands to combat French advances on both fronts.

The Dresden and Leipzig scenarios present a far different situation. The Allied Player has three separate armies with three separate sources of supply. This makes the Allied armies much less sensitive to a French maneuver to the rear, as the French army rushes one or two of the Allied armies the best play is to retreat with those armies which are pressed and advance on the French rear with the army or armies which are not being moved on.

To sum up, Struggle of Nations revolves around Administrative Points which are a function of the relationship of the Center of Operations to the source of supply. In concert with the logistics, the player must move his corps in sympathetic harmony with each others' strengths and weaknesses. Unlike most wargames, battles in Struggle of Nations are not periods at sentence end; but merely notes, albeit sharp and sustained, in a continuing melody.

After logistics both Players, but especially the Allied Player, must pay close attention to their TO&E, the Organization Display. Due to the poor Initiative Ratings of his leaders and small numbers of SPs in many Corps, the Allied Player should subordinate them to leaders with a higher Initiative such as Barclay, Langeron and Osten-Sacken. This serves two purposes; first it allows for a concentration of a combined arms force and second it gives the army a greater mobility. The drawback is, of course, that a large force is liable to a consequently larger march attrition rate. This however the Allies can afford.

The French Army due to the better Initiative of its officers will be able to maintain a greater dispersal, and leave itself much less liable to march attrition.

The French Old and Young Guard should always be kept concentrated as when combined the total is immune from attrition and can with the issuance of the necessary movement commands extend its march with impunity. Napoleon should, as much as possible, not be encumbered with individual units on his command track, such as the reserve artillery with which he starts. Thus freed he will be able to quickly transfer to the threatened fronts at the speed of Light Cavalry and once there be able to command the maximum number of individual forces necessary.

As the French initiative is greater and the overall AP situation is much less favorable, it is recommended that the French Player keep his forces dispersed until threatened with an Allied advance.

Both players should continue to have their leaders with Bonus Points command large forces as the bonus favorably affects attrition as well as battle. Both should also be cognizant of their leader's Subordination Rating vis a vis their Command Span. Timely reorganization can often eliminate inefficient leaders by reassigning their units to other corps commanders (i.e. Augereau), freeing those leaders for the protection of the LOC and the concentration of

scattered garrisons.

Finally the creation of cavalry and infantry major generals should always be actively considered during each reorganization phase, the first for raiders and the second to protect the LOC and other fixed strategic points.

At this point a special word should be said for cavalry, the Player's most versitile SPs. For the French the Old and Young Guard cavalry as stated previously should be kept together to preclude attrition. These are strictly battle cavalry. When defending always screen your main army with a cavalry force, when attacking you should combine the cavalry with your main force to obtain a cavalry majority to favorably influence the enemy leader's Initiative, add to your artillery's effectiveness and increase your force's pursuit ability following a victory or decrease the enemy's pursuit ability following a defeat.

In addition, due to its mobility a cavalry force can prevent a second enemy force from reinforcing the main battle by either defensively screening the force or, more aggressively attacking it, creating a double battle. As it is highly ineffective cavalry should not be heavily committed to battles in woods or mountains. Cavalry can also be used in small corps or division forces as raiders to disrupt the enemy's rear and to blow bridges in retreat. Both Players should endeavor to keep at least 2000 cavalry with each major force as 1000 cavalry are often not enough to modify the enemy cavalry effects on Initiative and pursuit.

As for battle tactics a Player should never allow a force to be attacked in column or march mode. If you screen your main force with cavalry you will have the option of attempting to retreat the cavalry or reinforcing the screen with the main force.

The Player should never attack with a two package force unless each package is equal to or greater than the defending package. That, however, being the case, the attacker should attempt to form a hinge placing all possible retreat hexes in his Zone of Control to double the effect of pursuit. The attacker should always attempt to screen the main battle from possible reinforcement by enemy forces in the vicinity.

You cannot have too much cavalry in an attack, only too little. When a large battle is imminent the Player should attempt to concentrate all cavalry not otherwise engaged in screening or attacking other enemy forces.

If you must retreat it is best to do so line mode, especially if you are the attacker and your opponent gets the next move. You also must keep in mind, there is a good chance that your losing force will be disorganized, precluding any move under Initiative and thus the possibility of changing mode in an enemy ZOC.

If forced to attack in the mountains you should always attempt to form a two package attack force as only three infantry units per package may attack. An attacker should always endeavor to have a leader with a bonus point command the attacking force.

In defense, it may be advantageous to declare a pitched battle if your force outnumbers one package of a two package attack force by at least 2-1. The defense should always attempt to place his force to take maximum advantage of affecting terrain, keeping in mind that if you are cavalry poor it is better to defend in swamps or woods.

Finally remember that small forces with little or no cavalry can be overwhelmed and eliminated causing the leader of the force also to be eliminated.

When defending a fort, (Dresden or Leipzig) a force of 20,000 can hold out for many turns as the attacker may only attack one round per turn. The only efficient way to attack a fort is to cut its LOC and reduce it by attrition as well as battle casualties. Citadels especially those on the Elbe, present a special problem. They can be invested but not attacked, yet the forces inside may attack out to break the seize.

To draw the threads together, in the Spring Scenario the burden of the offense is on the French Player. While he indeed outnumbers the Allies approximately 3 to 1 he is cavalry poor making it difficult to bring the Allied army to battle. The most obvious and perhaps best route of advance is via Leipzig to Miessen and Dresden, clearing the west bank of the Elbe, recapturing Dresden to raise French Morale and open the Citadel of Torgau for passage over the central Elbe. A secondary advance can also be made on Berlin through Wittenberg. Although an obvious target due to its effect on morale, the Berlin front should not be strengthened to the detriment of the Dresden advance. This division of forces often only serves to delay the fall of Dresden without causing the fall of Berlin.

In this scenario the French Player can afford to trade Strength Points for time sacrificing them to march attrition. What cavalry is available should be concentrated in two or three corps to deal with the enemy and support the major forces in pitched battles.

For the Allies, a retreat to the east bank of the Elbe is the only apparent answer. You should blow the bridge at Meissen and staunchly defend Dresden. The forces initially located on the west bank can be evacuated to the east bank of the Elbe via the Pontoon bridge carried by Wittgenstein. It is then merely an act of fighting a delaying action as the French are stretched to the limits of their supply.

In the Dresden scenario perhaps the most obvious line of advance for the French Player is towards Berlin, with the placement of the Center of Operations in Luckau. Be warned, however, previous play has revealed that due to the poor road net the Berlin front is a morass. Perhaps a better line may be Napoleon's original plan to trap the Bohemian Army north of the mountains by outflanking their advance on Dresden to the east. Dresden is the major French supply source and its loss would be disastrous. This flanking move would take a cast iron will and singleness of purpose for if Dresden were lost so would the game be.

For the Allies, best play appears to be to avoid pitched battles at all costs, retreat when pressed and advance when not pressed; preferably upon the French LOC. Any advance upon Dresden is guaranteed to cause a French reaction. The primary goal of the Allied Player is to avoid a decisive defeat and run the French army into exhaustion by constantly pressuring it to defend against thrusts from three sides. Cavalry raiding parties can cause the French a great deal of discomfort and help to diffuse his already inferior army.

The Leipzig Scenario is quite different as the initiative had definitely passed to the Allies. While the situation dictates an Allied victory a certain satisfaction can be gained hustling the French Player from the Leipzig position by indirectly advancing on his LOC. To this end the Silesian Army is the chief protagonist in unhinging the French from the west bank of the Elbe and cutting off the River Citadels. When the French Player reacts, which he inevitably must, the Bohemian Army then debouches from Austria into lower Saxony, threatening the French LOC, cutting off Dresden and, theoretically forcing a retreat.

For the French Player a victory would be maintaining the Elbe River line and holding Dresden preventing it from being isolated. To remain strictly on the defensive on the West bank of the Elbe appears less than satisfactory as you cannot prevent Bluecher from forcing a crossing. Perhaps a better strategy, giving the French some play, would be to screen the Bohemian Army with strong forces while keeping Napoleon and the main field army on the West bank of the Elbe, threatening the Silesian Army's LOC. Remember, the Elbe Citadels give the French Player unlimited access to both banks of the river, all other bridges should be blown and guarded.

As for the Campaign Game it is merely the connecting of the Spring and Dresden Scenarios with a variable armistice. Perhaps the most important aspect of the armistice is the accumulation of Admin Points. For these there is no substitute. It is therefore recommended that the Center of Opns. be moved to within 20 hexes of the source of supply. Any initial disadvantage suffered immediately following the Armistice due to the Center of Opns. being out of position will be more than compensated for by the surplus APs.

Last and perhaps least a word on the victory conditions. They are difficult and for the French Player, perhaps impossible to meet. More often than not something less than victory is achieved by one Player and something less than defeat by the other. The lack of a morale victory or defeat, however, will not conceal from the players who has won and lost the game. Only the most intransigent of players will fail to recognize a defeat.

Bob Coggins

SITUATION, 8th OCTOBER 1813
[For historical interest; **not** a "scenario".]

FRENCH POSITIONS

Commander (Leaders)	Location
Souham[1]	Torgau
Napoleon (Drouot, Mortier, Oudinot[1], Nansouty)	Meissen
Macdonald[1] (Sebastiani)	Meissen
Ney (Bertrand, Reynier[2], Arrighi)	Wurzen
Latour[3]	Pretsch
Marmont[1]	Taucha
Murat (Poniatowski[3], Kellerman, Lauriston, Victor, LHeritier[3])	Waldheim-Colditz-Borna
Maj Gen Z (Lefebvre 2Gc, Br 1L)	
Girard	Magdeburg
Augereau[1]	Jena
Maj Gen J (Lefol)[1]	
Maj Gen Garrisons (Margaron)[2]	Leipzig Torgau Wittenburg

Unless specified, use strength shown for Scenario "L".
Notes: [1] = reduce strength of each unit on leader's track by 1000 men from Scenario L Strength.
[2] = the same, but reduce by 2000.
[3] = *increase* strength of all leader's units by 1000.

ALLIED POSITIONS

Commander (Leaders)	Location
Bernadotte (Stedingk, Winzingerode, Buelow, Woronzow)	Dessau, Zorbig, Jessnitz
Bluecher (Langeron, St Priest, Korff, Olsufiew, Borosdin, Kapzewitsch)	Dueben
Yorck	Muehlbach
Osten-Sacken (Tschaplitz, Wasiltschikow)	Eilenberg
Tauenzien	Rosslau
Scherbatow	
(Bridges)	Rosslau, Acken, Wartenbg.

DISTANT ALLIED FORCES (Do not move until date shown)

Game-Turn	Commander (Leaders)	
8 Oct	Wittgenstein (Barclay de Tolly)	Zwickau
	Maj Gen (Thielemann, Mensdorf, Platov)	Gera
	Maj Gen B (A Liechtenstein) Yermakow[1]	Gera
10 Oct	Schwarzenberg (Meerveldt[1], Klenau[1], Gyulai, Hesse-Homburg[1], Konstantin)	Chemnitz
14 Oct	Bennigsen (Dochturow, Bubna 2 Lt, Stroganow AvGde)	Freiburg

Unless noted, use strength shown for Scenario "L."
Note: [1] = reduce strength of each unit on indicated leader's track by 1000 men from scenario L strength.

ALLIED ARMIES UNIT MANIFEST

Formation / Commander	Divisional Generals	Composition of Unit
AUSTRIAN ARMY		
	Bubna (2Lt)	Jaegers, Grenzer, Ldw and cav.
	M. Liechtenstein (1st Lt)	Jaegers, Grenzer and cavalry
1st CORPS	Andrasy-Greth (3rd)	Regular
General Colloredo	Schneler-Hardegg (1st c)	Grenzer and cavalry
	Wimpfen (2nd)	Regular
2nd CORPS	Lederer (1st c)	Reg., Grenzer and cavalry
General Gyulai (later Meerveldt)	A. Liechtenstein (2nd)	Regular
	Weissenwolf (3rd)	Regular
3rd CORPS	Crenneville (1st) (ex-3d Res.)	Grenzer and cavalry
General Gyulai	Murray (2nd)	Regular } ex-div. Weissenwolf (3/II)
	Prince Philipp (3rd)	Regular }
4th CORPS	Meszko-Mohr (3rd Lt)	Wallachian Grenzer and cav.
General Klenau	Hohenlohe Bartenstein (2nd)	Regular
	Mayer (3rd)	Regular
	Ehrengarde (1st c)	Cuirassiers
RESERVE CORPS	Chasteler-Weissenwolf (1st Res)	Grenadiers
Prince Hesse-Homburg	Bianchi (2nd Res)	Regular
	Civalart (3rd Res) (ex-1st/III)	Regular
	Nostitz	Cuirassiers
	Reisner	Artillery
		*Grenzer = "border" troops
PRUSSIAN ARMY		
1st CORPS (later 2nd)	Roeder-Pirch I (10th)	Regular and Ldw.
General Bluecher (later Kleist)	Kluex (9th)	Reg., Ldw and Ldw cav.
	Prince August (12th)	Reg., Ldw and Ldw cav.
	Zieten (11th)	Reg., Ldw and Ldw cav.
	Dolffs-Roeder	Cavalry
	Alvensleben (Gde)	
	Reserve	Artillery
2nd CORPS (later 1st)	Steinmetz/Losthin (1st)	Grenadier
Lt. General Yorck von Wartenburg	Karl/Warburg (2nd)	Reg. Ldw and cav.
	Horn/Weltzien (7th)	Reg., Ldw and cav.
	Huenerbein/Girsa (8th)	Reg., Ldw and Cav.
3rd CORPS	H. Homburg (3rd)	Reg., Ldw and cav.
Lt. General Buelow	Borstell (5th)	Reg., Ldw and cav.
	Krafft (6th)	Infantry and Ldw
	Oppenheimer	Cavalry
	Thuemen (4th)	Reg., Reserve and cav.

4th CORPS	Puttlitz	Ldw
Lt. General Tauentzien	Hirschfeld	Ldw
	Dobschuetz	Ldw
	Wobeser	Ldw

SWEDISH ARMY CORPS

Marshal Stedingk	Braendstroem (3rd)	
	Posse (4th)	
	Boije (6th)	
	Schutssenheim (1st)	
	Reuterskjoeld (2nd)	
	Cavalry	
	Artillery	

RUSSIAN ARMY

1st INFANTRY CORPS	Helffreich (14th)	Regular and Jaeger
Lt. General Berg (later Gortschakow)	Lukof-Mesenzow (5th)	Regular and Jaeger
	Kasakofski	Mixed
	Alexeief-Ilowaiski	Kossacks
2nd INFANTRY CORPS	St. Priest-Pueschnizki (4th)	Regular and Jaeger
Lt. General Eugen	Schachowskoi (3rd)	Regular and Jaeger
1st CAVALRY CORPS (later 4th)	Milesinow-Moller Sak. (1st Hus)	
Lt. General Korff (later Pahlen)	Lisanewitsch	Ulans
	Karpof	Kossacks
3rd GRENADIER CORPS	Zwilenief-Tschoglokow (1st Gren)	
Lt. General Kenevitzin (later Rajewski)	Sulima (2nd Gren)	
5th GUARD CORPS	Rosen (1st Gde)	
Lt. General Lawrof (later Yermolow)	Udom I (2nd Gde)	
2nd CUIRASSIER CORPS	Depreradowitsch (1st Cuir)	
Prince Galitzin V	Kretow (2nd Cuir)	
	Duka (3rd Cuir)	
	Tchalikof-Schewitsch (Lt)	
	Huene (Res)	Artillery
9th INFANTRY CORPS	Kornilow (15th)	Regular and Jaeger
Lt. General Olsufiew	Udom II (9th)	Regular and Jaeger
7th INFANTRY CORPS	Gortschakof II-Pilar (17th)	Regular and Jaeger
Lt. General St. Priest	Gurgalow (11th)	Regular and Jaeger
	Borosdin II (1st Drag)	
6th INFANTRY CORPS	Benardos (18th)	Regular and Jaeger
Lt. General Scherbatow	Talysin I (7th)	Regular and Jaeger
(AD HOC)	Engelhardt/Volkonski	
General Miloradovitch	Karpenko	Chasseurs
4th INFANTRY CORPS (later 10th)	Schapski-Turtschaninow (22nd)	Regular and Jaeger
Lt. General Markow (later Kapzewitsch)	Urussow (8th)	Regular and Jaeger
1st CAVALRY CORPS	Pahlen II (2nd Chas)	
Lt. General Korff	Denissiew	
	Karpow	Kossacks
	Thielman	Kossacks
	Mensdorf	Kossacks
	Platov	Kossacks
11th INFANTRY CORPS	Newjerowski (27th)	Regular and Jaeger
General Osten-Sacken	Lieven III (10th)	Regular and Jaeger
3rd CAVALRY CORPS	Lanskoi (2nd Hus)	Hussars
Prince Treubetzkof (later Wasiltschikow)	Pandschulidsef (3rd Drag)	
	Karpow II	Kossacks
14th INFANTRY CORPS	Laptew (21st)	
Lt. General Woronzow	Wuitsch (24th)	
	Harpe	
	ORourke (AdvGde)	
	Krassofsky	
ARMY CORPS	Chowanski (12th)	Jaegers
General Dochturow	Paskiewitsch (26th)	Regular and Jaeger
	Lindfors (13th)	Reserve Inf.
	Puschkin (c)	Chas and Ulan
	Markow-Stroganow (AdvGde)	Inf., cav. and Jaeger
	Reserve	Artillery
MILITIA CORPS	Muronzow	
General Ostermann Tolstoy	Tirow	
	Tschaplitz (c)	

FRENCH ARMY UNIT MANIFEST

Formation Commander	Divisional Generals	Nationality of Unit
1st CORPS	Phillipon-Cassagne (1st)	French Cohorts and 3rd bns
General Vandamme (later Mouton)	Dumonceau (2nd)	French Cohorts and 3rd bns
	Teste-Dufour (23rd)	French Conscripts
	Corbineau-Gobrecht (21st c)	French and Anhalt
2nd CORPS	Dubreton (4th)	French Reg.
Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno	Dufour (5th)	French Reg.
	Vial (6th)	French Conscripts
	Bruno-Hammerstein (22nd c)	Westphalian
3rd CORPS	Souham-Brayer (8th)	French Regular
Marshal Ney, Prince of Moscow	Brenier-Delmas (9th)	French Regular and Cohorts
	Girard-Albert (10th)	French Regular and Cohorts
	Ricard (11th)	French Regular and Cohorts
	Laboissiere-Beurmann (23rd c)	French and Baden
	Marchand (39th)	Hessian and Baden
4th CORPS	Morand (12th)	French Reg.
General Bertrand	Peyri-Fontanelli (15th)	Italian
	Franquemont (38th)	Wuerttemberg
	Briche-Wolf (24th c)	Wuerttemberg and Westphalian
5th CORPS	Maison (16th)	French Cohorts
General Lauriston	Puthod (17th)	French Cohorts
	Lagrange (18th)	French Cohorts and Foreign
	Rochambeau (19th)	French Cohorts
	Dermoncourt (6th c)	French
6th CORPS	Compans (20th)	French Regular and Marines
Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa	Bonnet-Lagrange (21st)	Line, Marines and Spanish
	Friederichs (22nd)	French Reg.
	Normann (25th c)	Wuerttemberg
7th CORPS	Lecoq-Zeschau (24th)	Saxon
General Reynier	Thielmann-Sahr (25th)	Saxon
	Durutte (32nd)	French "Deserters and Cowards"
	de Gaebleus (26th c)	Saxon
8th CORPS	Kamieniecki (26th)	Polish
General Poniatowski	Roznietzky-Dombrowski (27th)	Polish
	Uminski (27th c)	Polish
9th CORPS (aka 15th)	Turreau (51st)	French Conscripts
Marshal Augereau	Semelle (52nd)	French Conscripts
10th CORPS (blockaded in Danzig)	Grandjean (7th)	French, Polish, German
General Rapp	Heudelet (30th)	French and Confederation
	Destrees (33rd)	Neapolitan
11th CORPS	Ledru dessarts-Philipon (31st)	French, Westphalian, Neapolitan
Marshal Macdonald	Gerard (35th)	French and Italian
	Charpentier (36th)	French
	Montbrun (28th c)	Wurzburg and Italian
12th CORPS	Pacthod-Gruyere (13th)	French
General Oudinot	Lorencez-Guilleminot (14th)	French
	Raglowich (29th)	Bavarian
	de Seissel (29th c)	Bavarian and Hessian
13th CORPS (Around Hamburg)	Loison (3rd)	French
Marshal Davout	Thiebault (40th)	French Conscripts and Polish
	Pietrowski (50th)	French Conscripts
	Frederic	Danish
	Wathiez (30th c)	French and Polish
14th CORPS	Mouton-Creutzer (42)	French Conscripts
General St. Cyr	Claparede (43rd)	French Conscripts
	Berthezene (44th)	French Conscripts
	Razout (45th)	French Conscripts
	Jacquet (16th c)	French
1st CAVALRY CORPS	Bruyere-Corbineau (1st Light)	French and Saxon
General Latour-Maubourg	Chastel (3rd Light)	French
	Bordessoule (1st Heavy)	French and Saxon
	Doumerc (3rd Heavy)	French
2nd CAVALRY CORPS	Roussel d'Hurbal (2nd Light)	French
General Sebastiani	Exelmans (4th Light)	French
	Wattier-St. Germain (2nd Heavy)	French
3rd CAVALRY CORPS	Lorge (5th Light)	French
General Arrighi	Fournier (6th Light)	French
	Defrance (4th Heavy)	French

4th CAVALRY CORPS	Sokolnitzki (7th Light)	Polish
General Kellerman	Sulkowski (8th Light)	Polish
5th CAVALRY CORPS	Klicky-Subervie (9th Light)	French
General Lheritier (then Pajol)	Collaert-Lheritier (5th Heavy)	French
	Lamotte-Milhaud (6th Heavy)	French
IMPERIAL GUARD:		
OLD	Roguet-Friant (1st Old Guard)	French and Italian
Marshal Drouot (acting, Soult)	Curial (2nd Old Guard)	French, Polish and German
I YOUNG	Dumoustier-Pacthod (1st Young)	French
Marshal Oudinot	Delaborde-Decouz (3rd)	French
II YOUNG	Barrois (2nd Young Guard)	French
Marshal Mortier	Roguet (4th Young Guard)	French
GUARD CAVALRY	Lefebvre-Ornano (1st c)	French and Berg
Marshal Bessieres (then Nansouty)	Walther-Lefebvre (2nd c. Young)	French
	Walther (3rd c.)	French

Note on Div Gens: where two names are shown, the second succeeded to command during the campaign.

FRENCH PRONUNCIATION:

These guides can only give a general impression, limited as they are to sounds in the English language. "g" is soft as if written "j"; "t" and "s" at the end of a name are silent; "-er" ending sounds like "a"; "-au" sounds as "o."

DESIGNER'S NOTES

If we assume, as the historians do, that great men lead humanity toward the attainment of certain goals—the grandeur of Russia or France, the balance of power in Europe, the dissemination of the ideas of the Revolution, general progress, or anything else—then it is impossible to explain the phenomena of history without the concepts of *chance* and *genius*.

If the aim of the European wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century had been the aggrandizement of Russia, that aim might have been accomplished without all the preceding wars, and without the invasion. If the aim was the aggrandizement of France, that might have been attained without either the Revolution or the Empire. If the aim was the dissemination of ideas, the printing press could have accomplished it far better than soldiers. If the aim was the progress of civilization, it is extremely easy to see that there are more expedient ways of propagating civilization than by destroying men and their wealth.

Why did it happen in this way instead of in some other way?

Because that is how it happened. "*Chance* created the situation; *genius* utilized it," says history.

But what is *chance*? What is *genius*?

The words *chance* and *genius* do not denote anything that actually exists, and therefore cannot be defined. These words merely indicate a certain degree of comprehension of phenomena. I do not know why a certain event occurs; I think that I cannot know it; so I do not try to know it and I talk about *chance*. I see a force producing effects beyond the scope of ordinary human agencies; I do not understand why this occurs and I talk of *genius*.

To a flock of sheep, the one the shepherd drives into a separate pen to feed every evening, and that becomes twice as fat as the others, must appear to be a genius. And the circumstance that every evening this particular sheep, instead of coming into the fold gets into a special enclosure where there are oats, and that it is precisely this sheep that is rolling in fat and is killed for mutton, doubtless strikes the rest of the flock as a remarkable conjunction of genius with a whole series of extraordinary chances.

But the sheep need only give up thinking that everything that is done to them is done solely for the attainment of their sheepish ends; they need only admit that what happens to them may also have purposes beyond their ken, and they will at once perceive a unity and coherence in what happens to the sheep that is fattened. Even if they do not know for what purpose it was fattened, they will at least know that what happened to the sheep did not happen accidentally, and will no longer need to resort to conceptions of *chance* or *genius*.

Only by renouncing the claim to knowledge of an ultimate aim immediately intelligible to us, and admitting the ultimate purpose to be beyond our comprehension, may we discern the logical consistency and expediency of the lives of historical personages; the cause of the effect they produce, which is incommensurate with ordinary human capacity, is then revealed to us, and the words *chance* and *genius* become superfluous.

We have only to admit that the purpose of the upheavals of European nations is unknown to us, that we know only the facts—the murders, first in France, then in Italy, in Africa, in Prussia, in Austria, in Spain, and in Russia—and that the movements from west to east and from east to west comprise the essence and end of these events, and not only shall we have no need to see exceptional qualities and *genius* in Napoleon and Alexander, but we shall find it impossible to regard them as anything but men like other men; and far from having to evoke *chance* to explain the minor events that made those men what they were, it will be clear that all those minor events were inevitable . . .

A man without convictions, customs, traditions, without name, and not even a Frenchman, emerges by the very strangest of chances it seems, from among all the turbulent parties of France and, without attaching himself to any of them, is borne forward to a prominent position . . . . During the wars in

Italy he is several times on the brink of disaster and each time is saved in some unexpected way. Owing to various diplomatic considerations, the Russian armies—the very armies that have the power to destroy his prestige—do not appear on the European scene while he is there . . . . In Africa a whole series of outrages are perpetrated against the virtually defenseless inhabitants. And the men who commit these crimes, especially their leader, assure themselves that this is admirable, this is glory, that it is like Ceasar and Alexander the Great and that it is fine.

This ideal of *glory* and *grandeur*, which consists not merely in considering nothing wrong that one does, but in priding oneself on every crime one commits, ascribing to it an inconceivable, supernatural significance—this ideal, destined to guide this man and his adherents, is given full play in Africa. Whatever he does succeeds . . . .

He alone, with the ideal of glory and grandeur he had developed in Italy and Egypt, with his insane self-deification, with his audacity in crime and his outright lies—he alone can justify what has to be done.

He is needed for the place that awaits him, and consequently, almost independently of his will, and despite his indecision, lack of plan, and all the blunders he makes, he is drawn into a conspiracy that aims at seizing power, and the conspiracy is crowned with success.

He is thrust into a meeting of the legislature. Alarmed, he tries to flee, feeling that he has been betrayed; he pretends to fall into a swoon, and utters senseless things that ought to have brought about his ruin. But the once proud and shrewd rulers of France, feeling that their part has been played, are even more befuddled than he, and fail to say what they ought to have said to retain their power and crush him.

Chance, millions of *chances*, give him power, and all men, as if by agreement, collaborate to confirm that power. *Chance* forms the characters of the rulers of France, who submit to him; *chance* forms the character of Paul I of Russia, who recognizes his power; *chance* puts the Duc d'Enghien in his hands and unexpectedly impels him to assassinate him—thereby convincing the mob by the most cogent of means that he has the right since he has the might. *Chance* contrives that though he bends all his efforts toward an expedition against England (which unquestionably would have ruined him) he never executes his plan, but fortuitously falls upon Mack and the Austrians, who surrender without a battle. *Chance* and *genius* give him the victory at Austerlitz; and by *chance* all men, not only the French but all Europe, except England, which takes no part in the events about to occur—forget their former horror and detestation of his crimes, and now recognize his authority, the title he had bestowed upon himself; and his ideal of glory and grandeur, which seems splendid and reasonable to them all.

As if taking their own measure and preparing themselves for the coming movement, the forces of the west several times push toward the east: in 1805, 1806, 1807, and 1809, growing in size and strength. In 1811 the group of men that has formed in France unites into one enormous mass with the peoples of Central Europe. The increase in the size of the group further justifies the power of the man who stands at the head of the movement . . . . Everything is done to deprive him of what remains of his powers of reason and to prepare him for his formidable role. And when he is ready, the forces are ready too.

The invasion courses eastward and reaches its final goal—Moscow. The capital is taken; the Russian army suffers heavier losses than the opposing army suffered at any time during previous wars from Austerlitz to Wagram. But all at once, instead of *chance* and the *genius* that had so consistently led him by an unbroken series of successes to the predestined goal, a succession of counter *chances* occur—from the cold in his head at Borodino to the frosts, and the spark that set fire to Moscow—and instead of *genius*, stupidity and unprecedented baseness are displayed.

The invaders flee, turn back, flee again, and now the *chances* are not for Napoleon but consistently against him.

A countermovement is effected from east to west, bearing a remarkable resemblance to the earlier movement from west to east. There are the same preliminary attempts to move from east to west as there had been from west to east in 1805, 1807, 1809, before the great westward movement; there is the same coalescence into a group of mammoth proportions; the same adherence of the people of Central Europe to the movement; the same hesitation midway; and the same accelerated speed as the goal is approached.

Paris, the ultimate goal, is reached. The Napoleonic government and army are destroyed. Napoleon himself is no longer of any consequence; all his actions are patently mean and pitiful; but again an inexplicable chance occurs. The allies detest Napoleon, whom they regard as the cause of their misfortunes. Deprived of power and authority, his crimes and his cunning exposed, he should have appeared to them what he appeared ten years earlier and one year later—an outlawed brigand. But by some strange chance no one sees this. His role is not yet ended. The man who ten years before and one year later was considered an outlawed brigand is sent to an island two days' sail from France which is presented to him as his dominion, with guards and millions of monies paid to him for some reason.

The storm of nations begins to subside. The waves of the great sea recede, leaving a calm surface on which are formed eddies of diplomats who imagine that it is they who have produced this lull.

But the calm sea again swells. To the diplomats it seems that their dissensions are the cause of this fresh pressure of forces; they anticipate war between their sovereigns; the situation seems to them insoluble. But the wave they feel to be gathering does not come from the quarter they expect. It is the same wave as before, rising from the same point—Paris. The last backwash of the movement from the west occurs: a backwash that serves to solve the apparently insuperable diplomatic difficulties and put an end to the military movement of that period.

The man who has devastated France returns to France, alone, without any conspiracy, without soldiers. Any guard might arrest him; but, by a strange chance, not only does no one touch him, they all rapturously acclaim the man they had cursed the day before and will curse again within a month.

This man is still needed to justify the final collective act.

The act is performed. The role is played out. The actor is bidden to disrobe and wash off his paint and powder: he will not be wanted any more.

And some years pass during which this man, in the solitude of his island, plays for himself his pitiful comedy, ignominiously intriguing and lying, justifying his actions when justification is no longer needed, and showing to the world at large what it was that men had mistaken for strength so long as an unseen hand directed his actions.

The manager, having brought the drama to a close and stripped the actor, shows him to us. . . .

As the sun and each atom of ether is a sphere complete in itself, yet at the same time only a part of a whole too vast for man to comprehend, so each individual bears within himself his own purpose, yet bears it to serve a general purpose unfathomable to man.

A bee, settling on a flower, stings a child. And so the child is afraid of bees and declares that the purpose of the bee is to sting people. A poet delights in the bee sipping from the nectaries of the flower and says that the purpose of the bee is to imbibe the nectar of flowers. A beekeeper, seeing the bee collect pollen and carry it to the hive, says that the purpose of the bee is to gather honey. Another beekeeper, who has studied the life of the swarm more closely, says that the bee forages for pollen to feed the young bees and rear a queen, and that the purpose of the bee is to propagate the species. A botanist, observing that the bee flying with the pollen of a diclinous flower to a pistil of another flower fertilizes the latter, sees in this the purpose of the bee's existence. Another, observing the pollinating of plants, notices that the bee assists in this work, and may say that this is the purpose of the bee. But the ultimate purpose of the bee is not exhausted by the first, the second, or any of the processes the human mind can discern. The higher the human intellect rises in the revelation of these purposes, the more obvious it becomes that the ultimate purpose is beyond our comprehension.

Only the speculation on the relation of the life of the bee to other manifestations of life is accessible to man. And so it is with the purpose of historical characters, and nations.

—Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, Epilogue, Part One, Chapt. 2-4

On Economies

The Campaign of 1813 bridges the gap between two distinct epochs of European history. With the August declaration of Austria against Napoleon, the political alignment formalized at the Congress of Vienna, a committment to conservatism, stability and the *status quo* which held through the 1870s, was effectively forged. Before mid-1813, Napoleon never faced all his potential foes at once; he had fought them singly and in pairs at worst. Thenceforward, under concentric attack by three great armies financed by Britain, his resistance collapsed.

The British Empire was manifestly an economic one, and economic competition was both cause and means for her single continuation of the struggle against Napoleon. While the other powers came and went for a year or so at a time, Britain alone was continuously at war from 1802 to 1814, with no major force in the field until 1808.

British economic support allowed the defeated nations to return again and again to the offensive. Without the £2,000,000 given to Russia and Prussia and the £500,000 given Austria in June and July of 1813 the Armistice would probably have been followed by a peace treaty.

If Clausewitz is correct and war is the pursuit of politics by other means, and if politics is the process of control and distribution of wealth, then war, at least since the advent of capitalism in the Middle Ages, can be seen to spring from economic causes. The economies of Europe were straining under the so-called "Continental System," Napoleon's only weapon in the economic war, which structured trade in France's favor and excluded Britain. Tsar Alexander's evasion of the British embargo was a leading cause of the invasion of Russia, and it was for the sake of their sagging economies that the rest of Europe joined the fight in 1813.

Sadly, many nineteenth-century historians failed to trace things back to their causes, content with appearances and unconcerned that nationalistic fervor, in this case as always, was artificially created by the familiar propagandistic processes at the service of the state. Disastrously, the forces of nationalism once released continued to simmer, fueled by a glorification of the wars by Napoleonic historians on all sides, and ultimately overcame the shadow of the Congress of Vienna one summer a hundred years after its inception.

"How oft we sigh, when histories surmise,
that histories lie."

History has long had a reputation for being inexact, erroneous, misleading in its very nature, and subject to the conscious and unconscious whims and fantasies of historians. With this in mind, the study of Order of Battle material presents the naive hobbyist, particularly given the current rage for things quantifiable, with what seems to be a possible realm in which to seek a strange sort of certitude. It seems to deal with established facts of magnitude: such-and-such divsion, on such-and-such date, had exactly so many men.

Now aside from the failures of the data, often, to stand up to its own established criteria (eg., does it include officers, sick, and is it estimated? Was the tally really taken at the time specified? etc.) After a great deal of study it appears that the most misleading aspect of these lists is the concept of a "unit" as a fixed identity. Though the name or i.d. number of a division may remain constant between two tallies, the percentage of men lost, detached, and

replaced appears to be so great and so incessant that, much like an atom giving off and absorbing virtual particles, the constituent components of the unit at those two times are substantially unlike. In brief, the OB of such-and-such date is like a snapshot of an object in a state of flux, and it is altogether impossible to speak of the same unit existing at two different points of time.

The source material may speak of a given regiment belonging to a brigade; but at a lower level of research, inevitably this is only part of the story, as often half or more than half of the battalions of that regiment are scattered elsewhere over the face of Europe. And within the battalions, individual companies are constantly being detached, attached from other battalions, consolidated without end. And of course the composition of a given company does not remain fixed one day to the next, as it is subject to the same processes down to the level of the individual.

Thus the OBs in the sources reflect their compiler's appreciation of them as being in a solid state; fixed, definable, and immutable. In actuality, these OBs were tallies and nothing more; and the division of the mass of the army into units was the way of counting: it could never come out the same way twice; even if two tallies were conducted on consecutive days, a shifting between groups would be unavoidable.

"A universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can begin to see how the familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the original act of severance. The act is itself already remembered, even if unconsciously, as our first attempt to distinguish different things in a world where, in the first place, the boundaries can be drawn anywhere we please. At this stage the universe cannot be distinguished from how we act upon it, and the world may seem like shifting sand beneath our feet." (G. Spencer-Brown: "Laws of Form.")



The St. Thomas church, Leipzig, where Bach lived as cantor 'til 1750, was used as a military hospital for 1500 patients in October of 1813.

BACKGROUND: THE CIVILIZATION OF THE ELBE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

Under Frederick Augustus I, Elector of Saxony from 1694 to 1733, Dresden became "the Florence on the Elbe," leading all German cities in expenditure on art. The great *Gemaeldegalerie of Dresden* took form under his successor, while an opera house rose in Dresden in 1718.

The *University of Halle* was the first to accord freedom of teaching to its professors and to expand instruction in natural science, social studies, and law. Christian Gellert, who taught philosophy and ethics at the *University of Leipzig*, mourned the dead at Rossbach instead of celebrating Frederick's victory.

Germany in the Eighteenth Century was the least na-

tionalistic of European "states," and German literature is said to have suffered from this lack of national consciousness, though this century gave birth to Kant, Klopstock, Wieland, Lessing, Herder, Schiller, and Goethe.

The most famous composer of religious music in Germany was Georg Philipp Telemann, born in 1681 and died in 1767. In 1701, passing through Halle, he met the sixteen-year-old Handel, and loved him at first sight. He went on to Leipzig to study law, but relapsed into music as organist for the Neuekirche in 1704. A year later he accepted the post of *Kapellmeister* in Sorau; then to Eisenach, where he met Bach. In productivity he was unrivalled, composing sacred music for all the Sundays and feast days of thirty-nine years—Passions, cantatas, oratorios, anthems and motets; he added operas, comic operas, concertos, trios and serenades.

The valley of the Elbe is, with that of the Rhine and Danube, one of the main lines of definition of German culture. Some idea of the centrality of the area depicted on the map to that cultural life can be glimpsed in the following brief itinerary of one of its sons.

Johann Sebastian Bach was born on 21st March 1685, at Eisenach, in the duchy of Saxe-Weimar, and first performed in the orchestra and choir of the Convent of St. Michael at Lueneburg, 28 miles from Hamburg. In 1703 he became the organist at the Neuekirche in Arnstadt (near Erfurt), where he composed his first significant works.

Bach composed the earliest of his preserved cantatas as organist at Muehlhausen (1707 to 1708) at the age of twenty-two. The form of these early works is based on a colorful sequence of sections articulated into smaller subdivisions.

In June 1708, he moved to his new post as organist in the *Schlosskirche* in Weimar. When appointed concert-master of the orchestra at the court of Duke Wilhelm there in 1714, he was also allotted the task of composing and performing a new church cantata for the court service every four weeks. At this time he turned toward the "newer style of church cantata" which added the recitative and (da capo) aria to the sacred concerto, strophic aria and chorale movements of the older type.

When Bach found himself disappointed in his hopes for succession to the post of Court Director of Music at Weimar, he abandoned the composition of further cantatas in 1716 and moved to Koethen in the following year. Here, at a court attached to the Reformed Church, he was obliged above all to compose secular instrumental music and cantatas.

Bach was engaged for the post of cantor in the *Thomasschule* at Leipzig in 1723, and remained in that job until his death on 28th July 1750. He regarded it as his main duty to provide the music of the main churches, St. Nicholas and St. Thomas, with cantata compositions of his own. This set him the task during his first years there of composing new cantatas week after week (except in Advent and Lent) until there was a sufficient number available. A little over three of the five yearly cycles of cantatas have survived.

The first large-scale work that Bach wrote for his new center of activity in Leipzig was the *St. John Passion*. This was followed by the *St. Matthew Passion* a few years later, perhaps the greatest of his compositions. Toward the end of his life he compiled three monumental works, solely because he wished to create the best examples he could of works cast in certain forms. These were the *Mass in B Minor*, the *Art of Fugue*, and the *Musical Offering*.

[This background material was taken from: "Johann Sebastian Bach's Cantata Compositions," by Alfred Duerr, published in the *Telefunken* recordings of the Cantatas; "Bach's Passions," by Paul Steinitz (Scribners); and "The Age of Voltaire," by Will and Ariel Durant (Simon and Schuster).]

DISCOGRAPHY: Nicky Harnoncourt and the *Concentus Musicus Wien* have recorded the Passions, and have set themselves the arduous task of making the first complete recording of the entire Cantata *oeuvre* (about 125 hours of music). Numbers one through 114 are currently available; all recordings are performed on museum instruments and are available in America on the Telefunken label, in twenty-eight boxed sets.

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For further sources used, see the Study Folder to "Napoleon at Leipzig," published 1979 by Operational Studies Group.

Appendix

It was on December 4, 1812, that Napoleon left the wreck of the Grand Army, which six months ago he had led across the Niemen, to its fate in the snows of Russia. Handing the command of its pitiful remnant over to Murat, he hurried back to Paris as fast as post horses could carry him. On the 14th he was in Dresden. From there he wrote to the King of Prussia, calling on him to raise another 30,000 men, an order with which the King was most willing to comply, as it afforded cover under which to continue preparations for the national emergency which all Germans felt must arise sooner or later. On December 19 Napoleon arrived in Paris and wrote to Murat a letter, in which he made it appear that the King of Prussia had himself offered these reinforcements. No evidence of any such offer has, however, been found, and the motive which led to this distortion of fact remains obscure, unless Napoleon craftily intended to put fresh heart into his beaten and famishing soldiers by leading them to believe that the Prussians still had a good enough opinion of their invincibility to offer to back them up in spite of their retreat from Moscow.

On January 19, 1813, the Emperor wrote to Davoût, then in Hamburg, ordering him to seize Swedish Pomerania forthwith, if there were boots enough in store there to make it worth his while. The order was promptly carried out, but the boots had to be dearly paid for, as this violation of Swedish territory was not the least of the causes which subsequently compelled Bernadotte to throw in his lot with the Allies.

Meanwhile, the débris of Napoleon's beaten army was reaching the Prussian frontier, and a report of the Q.M.G. of Königsberg shows that on December 21 there were 255 French generals, 699 colonels, 4,412 captains and subalterns, and 26,590 men, exclusive of 6,000 sick in the hospital, quartered in that district alone.

As the stragglers arrived at the frontier they were ordered to report at the following places :—

I and VIII Corps at Thorn ; II and III at Marienburg ; IV and IX at Marienwerder ; V at Warsaw ; VI at Plock ; Artillery and Engineers at Danzig ; Dismounted Line Cavalry at Königsberg ; Guard Cavalry at Elbing.

The 30th Division (Heudelet) consisting of Bavarians, together with 8 Squadrons, had only recently reached Danzig, and were the only formed body of troops available for the field.

The X Corps, (Macdonald), to which the Prussian contingent under Yorck was attached, was still in the neighbourhood of Riga, and the VII Corps (Reynier) was with Schwarzenberg close to the Austrian frontier. The Russians had halted about Vilna, and on the Bug, only following up the French retreat with their Cossacks, who on December 21 crossed the Prussian frontier near Gumbinen and Insterburg. On December 30 the convention of Tauroggen was concluded, by which von Yorck separated himself from Macdonald and surrendered to the Russians. The exact truth of this surrender will probably never be ascertained, for many verbal messages passed between Yorck and the King in Berlin, of which under the circumstances no written record exists. The situation was far too delicate to entrust such secrets to paper.

Convention of Tauroggen

General von Wrangel, in his *Memoirs*, published in 1830, says that in August, 1812, he carried verbal instructions to von Grawert, authorizing him, in case of a general retreat, to separate from the French and withdraw on Graudenz, but von Grawert had just resigned his command on account of sickness, and the message was delivered to his successor, von Yorck, who, however, did not show himself at all inclined to act upon verbal instructions in a matter of such moment.

But already at an early stage of the proceedings a kind of tacit agreement had been arrived at to limit the fighting at the outposts "as far as was compatible with the honour of the Prussian arms," which was also a portion of the verbal instructions conveyed by von Wrangel, then a Major and confidential Staff Officer. The Russians kept Yorck well informed as to the progress of the retreat, and from time to time made efforts to induce him to desert the French cause. but to all these Yorck returned answer that he had been all his life a soldier, knew nothing of diplomacy, and must carry out his orders. At length, in December, the collapse of the French Army becoming more evident every day, Yorck transmitted a fresh proposal of the Russians to Berlin for the Royal instructions, and a Major von Seydlitz was sent to him again with verbal instructions, the precise import of which cannot be discovered, for the testimony of the eye-witnesses of the several interviews which now took place differs on several essential points. All that seems certain is that von Seydlitz's verbal message actually did authorize Yorck to act "according to circumstances," and these presently became so pressing, with the prospect of becoming immediately worse, that on the night of December 29 Yorck agreed to a meeting for the next day, at which the final terms of surrender were agreed upon with the Russians.

All doubts as to the military importance of Yorck's action are set at rest by Napoleon's own opinion. On January 19 he wrote to Jerome in the following words (*Corres.* 19,462) : "The immediate consequences of this act of treachery are that the King of Naples will have to withdraw behind the Vistula, and that my losses will be increased by all the sick left in the hospitals of Old Prussia." Clausewitz, who was present with Wittgenstein's Headquarters, confirmed this by his independent testimony to the effect that the Russian Army was so completely exhausted by its losses that had Yorck and Macdonald remained together, the pursuit must have come to a standstill on the Niemen, and all the resources of East Prussia would have been paralysed for months to come. As it was, East Prussia proved the nucleus of the Nation's revival, for the Cossacks pressing on the heels of the French gave the necessary screen behind which the first new formations could be organized, without news of them reaching the French Emperor.

The King leaves Berlin

The situation was indeed one that called for all the King of Prussia's perspicacity. At Berlin he was still within the clutches of his adversary, and might at any moment be taken prisoner. To avoid this risk he left Berlin on January 22, and betook himself to Breslau.

On his way he wrote to Napoleon, pointing out in diplomatic language that though he was most anxious to fulfil his treaty obligations, money was an indispensable condition of his compliance, and that if the French Government's payment for the supplies issued to French troops during the previous year was forthcoming (as provided for in their agreement) the process of rearmament would be greatly facilitated.

Meanwhile, the Estates of East Prussia met on their own initiative at Königsberg, being cut off from direct communication with their King, who officially, was still the Ally of Napoleon, by the Russian screen of Cossacks, and with great enthusiasm passed a resolution in favour of placing all the resources of the district at the disposal of Yorck, Bülow and Borstell, the principal military representatives on the spot, and they proceeded to call out the quotas of men due under the existing law from the several parishes. But though the townspeople were ready to welcome all signs of military activity, the peasants in the country shewed no corresponding zeal for the National Cause. The orders directing the recruits to join their headquarters were torn up, the civil authorities were openly defied, and ultimately dragoons had to be sent round the provinces to enforce obedience to the law.

Arrived at Breslau, Frederick William came more within the direct influence of the Russians, and on February 23 decided openly to throw in his lot with theirs ; but his celebrated proclamation denouncing the French Alliance, and calling on the whole Nation to rise against their oppressors, was only published on March 16, and the actual declaration of War did not reach Paris until the 27th of the same month.

Looking at the numbers actually brought into the field by the date of the first great battle of the War of Liberation, Lützen or Gross Gorschen, on May 2, viz. 95,000 Allies against 145,000 French, one is inclined to think that an even longer delay could only have been advantageous, for the great difficulties in raising fresh troops consisted in laying the foundations of a sound organization and system of administration, matters not easily attended to when once active contact with the enemy has been established. Once it is quite clear who is really responsible for clothing and equipment, who is authorized to sign requisitions and decree new formations, etc., fresh units are comparatively easily called into existence. But all such machinery was idle in the districts still held by the French or occupied by the Russians, who were still technically the enemy ; while the poverty of the country, its comparative roadlessness, and more particularly the alternations of frost and thaw, made the circulation of orders and instructions most tedious and unreliable.

Difficulties of Prussian Reorganization

To overcome, as far as possible, these difficulties the King decided on a bold step, i.e. decentralization. Accordingly he decreed on March 15 the sub-division of the Kingdom into four Military Governments, viz., (*a*) the district between the Elbe and Oder, General von L'Estocq ; (*b*) between the Oder and Vistula, Lieut. General von Tauentzien ; (*c*) between the Vistula and Russian frontier, Lieut.-General von Massenbach, and (*d*) the district of Silesia, Lieut.-General Graf. Götzen—within each of which divisions the civil authorities were made responsible for the supply of recruits, equipment, etc., while the military authorities undertook the organization of the men thus supplied, their training, and all matters of local defence. Each unit as it was formed and completed was at once drafted to the Field Army.

It will be clear that even a couple of weeks' delay would have been invaluable to allow this new machinery to work smoothly ; but at the last, events forced the hands of the King. Napoleon's demands for the supply of fresh troops, and his claim to place Prussian commands at the disposal of his Marshals for employment against the "common enemy" became too insistent, while on the other hand the continuous advance of the Cossacks, who drove the French out of Berlin on March 3 and 4, 1813, rendered further delay impossible.

Reading and re-reading the mass of documentary evidence accumulated by von Holleben, from whom the above figures and facts are principally taken, an unbiassed critic is absolutely forced to the conclusion that the King showed sounder judgment than all his advisers put together, although their list comprises such names as Scharnhorst, Bülow, Blücher, Hardenberg and Stein ; their ideas were premature, his were practical.

Scharnhorst's Plan for a Landwehr

On March 15 Scharnhorst submitted to the King a final project for the organization of a *Landwehr* and *Landsturm* throughout the whole kingdom, which was finally approved on the 17th of the same month. The project had indeed been under discussion for months, and the fundamental idea, together with the name, can be traced back to 1658 ; but the poverty of the country was so great, and the different degrees in which districts were or had been affected by the passage through them of French or Russian troops, prevalence of active hostilities, and so forth, had hitherto rendered any attempt to deal with the matter on a uniform basis, if not impossible, at any rate inopportune. Even as it was, such delays arose in its execution that no formed bodies of Landwehr actually took part in field operations until after the Armistice of June 4, though isolated detachments, temporarily called together without uniforms or even muskets, rendered good service in support of the field troops, both in sieges, and in the operations on the Lower Elbe before Napoleon's reappearance on the scene in the beginning of May. Permission was also given by the King of Prussia to form Volunteer Corps, and though these too were not employed until after the Armistice, a recapitulation of their names here will be in place. These volunteers found their own equipment, and were commanded by ex-regular officers.

They were "The Lützow Free Corps," whose formation, sanctioned on February 18, reached on March 21 a strength of 1,036 men, organized in 4 Companies, and 2 Squadrons, to which subsequently a Battery of 3 guns and 1 howitzer were added.

The foreign battalion, "von Reusz," and the volunteer rifles, "von Reiche," both formed of volunteers drawn from the rest of Germany, and nearly all deserters from the Westphalian or other contingents of the "Grand Army."

Major Hellwig's volunteers 2 Squadrons of partisan Cavalry; Major von Schill's Hussar detachment—commanded by a brother of the celebrated von Schill, killed

in a raid near Stralsund, 1809—comprised 2 Squadrons. Also a variety of smaller detachments, mostly composed of picked foresters, even of poachers amnestied.

The total of all these formations up to the date of the Armistice only reached the figure of 8,500 men, of whom 2,000 were mounted.

The most amazing point, however, seems to me to be this, in spite of all the efforts of the Tugendbund and other secret societies, to say nothing of the inspiring *Volkslieder* of Arndt, etc., the two weak battalions of Reusz and Reiche appear to have been quite adequate to absorb all the true patriots of the remaining 20 million Germans.

By the end of March there stood ready for the field:—

(*a*) 21 Battalions, 40 Squadrons, 12½ Batteries, 2 companies' engineers = 646 officers, 26,510 men, 100 guns—under Blücher.

(*b*) 27 Battalions, 24 Squadrons, 11½ Batteries, 4 Companies' engineers = 646 officers, 25,751 men, 106 guns—under Yorck and Bülow.

(*b*) 4 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 1½ Batteries = 61 officers, 2,761 men, 12 guns—under Borstell.

Other small detachments brought the numbers up to 57 Battalions, 70 Squadrons, 27½ Batteries, 7 Companies engineers, 8 park columns, and 1 column tradesmen—in all 1,145 officers, 58,865 men, 234 guns available for field service, but their sick list was very high. In addition there remained 30,077 garrison troops, and 33,640 in the depôts, giving a grand total of 122,582 men.

Compared with the states for August 1, 1811, these figures shew a net increase of 48,169 men, which, even allowing for losses in Russia and a high rate of sickness, seem very small for such an emergency, and appears insignificant compared with the re-creation of the French Army during the same period.

Considerable difficulty was also experienced in finding new officers for the Forces. The conditions of the entrance examinations had to be relaxed, and the two cadet schools were supressed, their pupils being posted direct to Regiments. Non-commissioned officers of good character and approved conduct in the field were also freely promoted. The cause of the difficulty, of course, lay in the Treasury policy of the past forty years, which had compelled the retention of officers on the active list long after they ought to have been pensioned. It was not that the Generals of the pre-Jena Army had been too old, but the captains and senior subalterns decidedly were so (the former averaged about the same as those who served under Moltke in the Franco-German War, and were younger than the average of French Generals ten years ago); they had lost all youth and activity, and collapsed wholesale under the stress of the retreat.

As regards muskets, there appear to have been sufficient for the Field Army, but the depôt and garrison troops had to drill with extemporized pikes, while some of the Landwehr, even after the Armistice, were led against the enemy their front ranks provided only with similar weapons. The supply of guns, too, was sufficient, though heavy and antiquated patterns had to be employed,[1] and both the draught horses and cavalry remounts appear to have been fair material, though time was wanted to train them in the systematic manner of former days, and, as Marwitz and others have since shewn us, this training was the real secret of excellence in the old Frederickian Cavalry.

English Subsidies

English subsidies were largely instrumental in rendering the equipment of these troops possible. Unfortunately, we also sent over a number of uniforms of English pattern (colour not stated), and, to quote Von Holleben, "The King had to submit to the daily annoyance of seeing his men clad in these tasteless garments."

The Russians

Meanwhile the Russian Field Army had been moving forward, leaving detachments behind to observe the fortresses of Thorn, Danzig and Küstrin—in all 36,000 men, 313 guns; and troops to keep order in Poland—21,800 men, 150 guns. Making these deductions, however, at the end of March, 1813, the troops available for the Field Army numbered 63,686 men and 436 guns, of whom 19,000 with 92 guns under Wittgenstein constituted an Advance Guard that was pressing close on the heels of the retiring French, while the remainder under Kutusow were drawing near to Kalisch on the borders of Silesia.

The Grand Army

It is time now to return to the operations of the wreck of the Grand Army, which, as we have seen above, had been compelled to evacuate in haste the banks of the Vistula on receipt of the news of Yorck's defection at Tauroggen. Murat's orders we have already given; these were the last he issued, as he was immediately afterwards recalled to Paris, and handed over his command to Prince Eugène, Viceroy of Italy. At this moment, January 19, the whole of the six Corps, nominally at the Prince's disposal gave him barely 12,000 fighting men, and these almost worn out by privation. He would have had practically no men for field operations, but for the arrival at Posen of some 10,000 provisional detachments of different nationalities; for the only other troops which had preserved their formation, viz., the Polish Division, Grand Jean, of Macdonald's Corps, and Heudelet's Division of the XI Corps had been thrown into Danzig, raising the garrison of that place to 30,000 men, of whom, however, barely two-thirds were fit for active service.

On the right wing the VII Corps (Reynier), two Saxon Divisions and the French Division (Durutte) had separated themselves from Schwarzenberg's command when the latter concluded an armistice with the Russians, and were marching through Silesia, suffering continually from the attacks of Cossacks and other local partisans. But Poniatowski's Poles, about 8,000 men, had been cut off in Warsaw, and another 12,000 had been left as garrisons in Modlin, Zamosc and Thorn. In rear of the centre there remained only the 31st Division (Lagrange) of the XI Corps, 10,000 strong, but dispersed to hold Berlin and garrison Magdeburg Spandau and the fortresses on the Oder—Glogau, Küstrin and Stettin, whilst the Division of Grenier, 18,000 men, was only due in Berlin on January 25.

Out of the 12,000 men thus immediately under Prince Eugène's hand he organized four weak Divisions—one Bavarian (General Rechberg), one Polish (General Girard), one French (General Gérard), and finally one of the Guard (General Roguet), grouping them around Posen, and drafting all supernumerary officers and non-commissioned officers in excess of their complements back to the depôt at Erfurt. The name "Division" was retained in order to deceive the enemy as to their actual weakness. Some 2,000 mounted men, partly surplus to the above detachments, partly rallied to him by force of circumstances, were also organized in two "Divisions." With this skeleton force the Prince endeavoured to impose on the Russians and hold the line of the Oder in obedience to the Emperor's orders, until reinforcements from France could reach him. He also summoned Bülow and all other Prussian detachments to his aid, but received evasive answers. Meanwhile the growing unrest in Berlin and its neighbourhood compelled him to keep back the new XI Corps, organized out of Grenier's 18,000 men, for the maintenance of order in his rear.

His situation soon became hopelessly untenable. Frost held all the rivers in its bonds, and Tettenborn's and Tschitschagow's Cossacks swept all round his flanks. At length on February 12 he began his retreat, reaching Frankfort on the Oder on February 18, where hearing that the Cossacks had already crossed the river further to the north, he continued his movement on Berlin. Meanwhile in the south Reynier's two Saxon Divisions deserted him, and Durutte's Division was surprised on the march and nearly cut to pieces.

Viceroy's return from Berlin

But even Berlin, (where he had rallied on the new XI Corps, to which Gouvion St. Cyr had been appointed in command,) could not, as we have seen, be held for long, and on March 5 the Viceroy's (Prince Eugène's) force withdrew to the Elbe, whilst the wreck of Reynier's troops gathered in Dresden. Napoleon wrote one of his characteristic letters to Eugène, censuring him severely, but more as an elder brother than as a Generalissimo, for his failure to hold the line of the Oder; but his reasoning, though unanswerable from the arm-chair-critical standpoint, like his letters to Jerome when in Spain, made no sufficient allowance for circumstances of weather and topography.

If the old school of strategists had gone altogether too far in the attention they paid to the configuration of the ground and other circumstances which exist only to be conquered by skill and determination, he now overshot the limit of the reasonable in ignoring the limits of human endurance and climatic vicissitudes. To him as Graf. Yorck von Wartenburg in his *Napoleon as a General* has well pointed out, a "Corps" remained always a "Corps," even if its numbers had shrunk to 5,000 men or less, while a river or a mountain range was a scratch on a map, unless he happened at the moment to be face to face with it himself. In this instance he had entirely overlooked the terrible frost which still held all the rivers of Eastern Prussia in its grip. Had the Oder been in its normal unfordable condition, undoubtedly the possession of its four fortresses, Stettin, Frankfort, Küstrin and Glogau, might have enabled Eugène to hold it, even with his reduced forces for some weeks longer than he actually did, as the Russian Army was still a long way off and Yorck and Bülow's forces were quite insignificant. But in the weather then prevailing the Oder could be crossed almost anywhere, as, in fact, it was, and with a population on the verge of insurgence behind him, the Viceroy certainly had not a moment to spare when he came to his decision to retreat.

On the question of the abandonment of Berlin, Napoleon's comments are again masterly from the *general* point of view, although, as above pointed out, no allowance is made for the actual position of affairs as seen by the average man on the spot.

Napoleon's Comments

"Nothing is less in accord with sound military practice than your decision to withdraw your Headquarters behind Berlin (viz., to Schöneberg, a preliminary step to complete withdrawal). It should have been evident to you that this step must attract the enemy. If, on the contrary, you had taken up a position in front of Berlin (i.e. east) communicating by convoys with Spandau, and thence with Magdeburg, and had brought up a Division of the V Corps (from Magdeburg) midway between the two latter points, and had constructed there a few redoubts, the enemy would have believed that you intended to offer battle. Hence he would not have passed the Oder until he had united 60,000 to 80,000 men, which he was far from being in a condition to do." As a fact, on March 4 the Russians were still five days' march from Berlin, Yorck and Bülow even further; but there is no evidence to show that the Viceroy was aware of this, and in view of the hopeless inadequacy of his mounted forces and the nature of the country, it seems hardly possible that he could have scouted efficiently to that end. Napoleon then continues: "The day on which your Headquarters retired behind Berlin you practically advertised your determination not to hold that town, and thus lost that attitude of determined opposition which it is the real Art of War to know how to keep. An experienced General in your place would have established a camp (presumably entrenched) in front of (i.e. east of) Küstrin, and thus have gained time to draw forward the Corps on the Elbe to Berlin. He could not then have been attacked except at the cost of the time it would have taken the enemy to prepare the wide sweeping movements the capture of such a position would have entailed."

Eugène, however, seems to have had but little choice in the matter of his retreat, and appears to have considered even the Magdeburg road, to which the Emperor refers, as not safe enough for his retrograde movement, for, in fact, he retreated in two columns, the principal one on Wittenberg, the other by Lückau on Torgau, a Saxon fortress still held by Saxon troops, who declined to allow the French to pass on the grounds that Saxony was a neutral country. Refused passage here, the column bent off up stream to Meissen, where it arrived most conveniently in time to assist Reynier in overawing the people of Dresden.

These movements brought the French troops into position along the Elbe, a cordon position of the worst kind; and here for the moment the Viceroy left them, till, his report having reached the Emperor, a storm of reproaches burst upon his head.

"I do not see what obliged you to quit Berlin. Your movements are so rapid that you have not been able to take the direction I had prescribed (alluding to a previous letter received too late for compliance with its mandates). You have uncovered Magdeburg with-

out having taken steps to assure yourself whether it is sufficiently provisioned or garrisoned. Yet it contains all our Field Artillery, and many other important things. (This is hardly fair, as Eugène had, in fact, left there the whole V Corps, some 30,000 men.)

"By your march on Wittenberg you have left unprotected the whole of the 32nd 'Division Militaire' and the Kingdom of Westphalia. You thus run the risk of losing all the Cavalry which is distributed in cantonments, and have left the finest provinces of the Empire at the mercy of an advance guard of a few thousand men. I have always told you that you should retire on Magdeburg. In laying your lines of communication via Mayence, not only have you compromised the safety of the 32nd 'Division Militaire,' but also Holland and my squadrons in the Scheldt. It is really time to begin making war seriously. It is in front of Magdeburg (i.e. to the east of it) that you should have united 80,000 men, whence as a centre you would protect the whole of the Elbe. Our operations make us ridiculous in the eyes of our allies and of our enemies, because you constantly retreat a week before their infantry come within sight of you. It is really time that you should set to work and begin to operate like a soldier. I have laid down what you ought to do."

Then follows in detail the plan the Emperor wishes to see carried out:—

Napoleon on the Defence of the Elbe

"Prince Eugène takes position nine to twelve miles east of Magdeburg with the V and XI Corps, Roguet's Division, and the greater part of the Cavalry—65,000–70,000 men of the best available—and covers his camp with redoubts, leaving ample space to manœuvre between them. Marshal Victor with the 4th Division (12 Battalions) moves on the left bank of the Elbe to near Dessau, where he establishes a bridge, and till this is complete a ferry, covered by fortifications. His action will extend as far as Torgau, and the garrison of Wittenberg, raised to 2,000 men. General Reynier, with the 7th Corps (which the Emperor imagined to be 12,000 strong, but which was in reality only 6,000) will ensure the watch over the line of the Elbe from Torgau to the mountains of Bohemia (about 70 miles); he will fortify the bridge at Meissen. The Saxon General commanding in Torgau will employ two-thirds of his force (4,000 men) to watch the river above and below the town; the rest will remain always in the place. (As we have seen, the Saxon General refused to accept any orders from the French.)

"Marshal Davoût, with the 1st Division (16 Battalions) will place himself on the left of Magdeburg (i.e. north). He knows Hamburg and is known there too, and his proximity to that town will be very useful. Hamburg will have a garrison of 8,000 men, sufficient, with the aid of its municipal guards, to hold the town against the Cossacks. The King of Westphalia will organize a mixed Division of his troops, to be concentrated two or three marches west of Magdeburg, which will be ready to support either Victor or Davoût as the case may require.

"Of course all the boats on the Elbe and its affluents on the right bank must be systematically destroyed, or brought under the protection of our own guns. The line of communications will be from Magdeburg on Wesel.

"The principal Corps, placed in the camp in front of Magdeburg, will send out every day mixed reconnaissances of 1,500 horsemen and a Division of Infantry. I presume that you do not intend to let yourself be shut in by the Cossacks and a few Battalions.

"In case of an attack directed against the principal Corps, Marshals Victor and Davoût will cross the river and manœuvre against the enemy's flanks.

"Your position in the camp in front of Magdeburg will re-establish the 'moral' of your troops. If the enemy marches in force on Havelberg, he must leave at least 80,000 to mask you (and this is impossible, as the Allies have not a sufficient number of men available). If they make a serious effort towards Dresden, more than Reynier can deal with; then the latter will fall back behind the Mulde, or, further, always keeping on your right. Then an advance of the principal corps from Magdeburg or Brandenburg will frighten them and bring them back to the right bank of the Elbe again. In taking up this offensive position and showing the great number of troops you have in Magdeburg, the enemy will be held in check and will be unable to undertake anything without bringing at least 100,000 men against you; and seeing himself on the eve of a battle, he will take good care not to make any detachments which would weaken him."[1]

Although throughout this letter Napoleon had systematically overestimated Eugène's forces and underestimated those of the Allies, the form of defence is perfect; but before this letter reached its destination the Viceroy had made further dispositions which aggravated the evils of the first. He had brought Davoût from Hamburg and sent him to command all the troops about Dresden, and had written to justify his previous measures. This brought down on him renewed reproaches, for, as Napoleon very rightly points out, "for General Reynier to withdraw from Dresden means nothing, but for a Corps (however weak) under the Prince of Eckmuhl to be compelled to retreat is quite another matter; it would show that we intended to defend that place, but did not dare to act up to our intention."

Emperor's Plan Adopted

Ultimately on March 18, under renewed pressure from Napoleon and the news of the occupation of Hamburg by Tettenborn's Cossacks, orders were issued to concentrate in the form indicated in the Emperor's orders, but with the important exception that the bulk of his troops were retained on the left bank of the river.

Meanwhile, the news from Hamburg which reached the Viceroy became alarming. A rumour was in circulation that 10,000 to 15,000 British troops were expected there, to form the nucleus of a Corps of 10,000 Danes, 5,000 Russians, and some thousand Swedes, their object being an attack on the 32nd "Division Militaire" and a descent thence on the Viceroy's communications with the Rhine. Napoleon was evidently much annoyed at the facility with which such rumours gained credence, and he administered to his unfortunate son-in-law the following reproof: "You go altogether too quickly, and alarm yourself too readily. You attach too much importance to every rumour. More calm is required in the direction of military matters, and before attaching credence to reports they should be carefully discussed. Everything that spies and agents tell you (unless they have seen with their own eyes) is nothing, and even when they have seen, it is worth very little. Why do you believe that the British are going to disembark at Hamburg? Where are their means? All their efforts are directed towards Portugal. Is it because a number of ships are in view? But you can see thousands every day from the coast of France. What I tell you is all useless, because it is only experience which teaches one to reduce these astonishing reports to their true dimensions."

Actually this censure was in excess of the Viceroy's deserts, for the Cossacks had spread far into the territory of the 32nd "Division Militaire," and as the inhabitants had risen in many places, it was almost impossible for any accurate idea of the enemy's movements to be ascertained.

Combat of Möckern

On March 31, however, definite news was received to the effect that Wittgenstein had quitted Berlin on the 27th, and was marching on Rosslau to cross the Elbe at that place. The Prince now decided to bring his troops over the river to the position indicated in Napoleon's instructions in front of Magdeburg, and from this movement resulted a straggling encounter known as the "Combat of Möckern" on April 3, 4 and 5, only noticeable from the extreme fury with which the raw Prussian troops fought. Their numbers, however, were far less than Eugène had been led to expect, hence when by the evening of the 5th it had become apparent that there were not 20,000 men engaged in front of him, he concluded that the real main body of the enemy must still be on the march towards Rosslau with the intention of turning his right flank by the left bank of the river, and a report coming in stating that the bridge at Rosslau actually had been captured (a false rumour, as it afterwards turned out to be), he ordered his troops back to the left bank of the Elbe, and the Prussians were far too spent by their exertions to interfere with them.

The whole incident was unfortunate for the French, for the Allies made the most of their success, and the reports of it went far and wide all over Germany, raising confidence everywhere in the hearts of the patriotic party, which as yet was far from being synonymous with the whole Nation. Contrasting Eugène's action with Napoleon's orders, one can only ask oneself wonderingly, what possible cause there could have been strong enough to compel the Emperor to leave this most important command in such incapable hands, when all the time there was on the spot perhaps the ablest and most determined of all his Marshals: Davoût—a man of his own age—active and resolute far beyond the common standard, and devoted to Napoleon heart and soul. Every commentator in turn has asked this question, but hitherto no adequate reply has been suggested.

Viceroy moves to Lower Saale

The Prince now, recognizing the impossibility of continuing to hold the line of the Elbe, determined to defend the Lower Saale, and during the following days the Army of the Elbe moved into the position shown on Map 1. Wittgenstein having now no enemy in front of him crossed the Elbe at Rosslau on the 10th, and moved southward to gain touch with Winzingerode and Blücher, whose cavalry scouts already watched the whole line of the Saale, and whose troops were disseminated between Leipzig and Dresden, whilst the Russian Main Army still lay at Kalisch, retained there by Kutusow in spite of the protestations of the Prussians. It was only on April 7 that the Russian Guards commenced their march on Dresden, distant 200 miles; hence they could not be expected to reach Leipzig; 90 miles further on, before the 27th or 28th of the month.

Till that date therefore the Allies had not more than 70,000 men available. Hence of necessity they called a halt and busied themselves in the improvement of communications, notably of bridges across the Elbe at Meissen and Dresden, whilst Wittgenstein attempted to surprise Wittenberg, but was repulsed.

On April 19 a rumour, premature as it turned out to be, that Napoleon was in full march at the head of the Army of the Maine to effect a junction with that of Prince Eugène, startled them into activity. Wittgenstein moved to Düben, Kleist to Halle, and Bülow, left before Magdeburg, was relieved by a small Russian corps of observation, and also rejoined the main body

Napoleon takes the Field—Concentration of the Grand Army and Operations to the Battle of Lützen

Composition of Grand Army

It is time now to return to the Emperor, and to review his activity during these months of heavy strain.

By a decree issued from the Trianon, March 12,[1] the composition of the Army was laid down as follows:—

I Corps, Marshal Davoût (Prince d'Eckmühl). 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions.
II Corps, Marshal Victor (Duc de Belluno) 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions.
III Corps, Marshal Ney (Prince de la Moskova), the existing I Corps of Observation on the Rhine, together with the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th Divisions.
IV Corps, General Bertrand, the existing Corps of Observation in Italy, with the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th Divisions.
V Corps, General Lauriston, the existing Corps of Observation on the Elbe, with the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Divisions.
VI Corps, Marshal Marmont (Duc de Ragusa), the existing II Corps of Observation on the Rhine, with the 20th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Divisions.
VII Corps, General Reynier, intended to comprise the two, Saxon Divisions, the 24th and 25th, and the 32nd Divisions (Durutte.)
VIII Corps, General Prince Poniatowski. Two Polish Divisions Nos. 26 and 27 (only partly raised).
IX Corps. No General named. The 28th and 29th Bavarian Divisions (never completed).
X Corps, General Rapp, in Danzig with the 7th, 30th and 33rd Divisions (old numbers), the remains of the old 34th Division were absorbed by the 30th.
XI Corps, Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, which had hitherto formed the Advance Guard on the Elbe, consisted of the 31st, 35th and 36th Divisions.

Besides these troops, the Westphalians were to supply the 37th Division, the Würtembergers the 38th Division, the Hessians, Badeners, and Frankiurters the 40th Division, and ten Battalions organized in Erfurt were made into the 41st Division.

Subsequently on April 24, the formation of a XII Corps was decreed, and at a later date a XIII, Headquarters at Bamberg, was called into existence.

As a whole the plan was never realized, for, as already pointed out, circumstances proved even stronger than Napoleon's will, but as far as practicable each fresh

unit organized was fitted into its appointed place, so that the framework of an Army existed from the very first, and the commands remained, whatever changes in detail might supervene.

I Corps

The débris of the I Corps had rallied in Stettin, 68 officers, 1,536 non-commissioned officers and men, on February 17. An order of January 27 had originally laid down the strength of these Corps at four Divisions of 64 Battalions in all, of which the 1st Division was to be formed by 16 Battalions in Stettin itself, the 2nd Division (of another 16) in Erfurt, but on the evacuation of the Oder line this became impossible, and on February 10, the 1st Division began its formation in Leipzig. As the battalions (practically all new formations) only became ready in succession, and complete Divisions were required at the earliest possible date, all the 1st Battalions of Regiments went to the 1st Division, the 2nd Battalions to the 2nd Division, the 3rd and 4th Battalions in like manner to the 3rd and 4th Divisions, a method which was generally followed throughout the Army. The 1st and 2nd Divisions, commanded respectively by Phillipon and Dumonceau, were available for field service by the end of April.

II Corps

The II Corps.—Originally the Emperor had hoped to constitute this Corps out of the wreck of the old II and III Corps, but this proved quite impossible. No attempt, therefore, was made to build up the Battalions at the front. "But the Companies in the Oder fortresses will take the numbers of the Companies belonging to the 5th Battalions, and those of the 5th Battalions at the dépôts take the number of the Companies of the 1st Battalions, thus I shall have in France all the 1st Battalions at full strength"[1] as Napoleon wrote to his War Minister, General Clarke, on March 31, adding, "Each Regiment in the Grand Army will thus have four Battalions, with one or two Companies of the 5th Battalion in the Oder fortresses, and the balance of the 5th Battalion Companies will be at the dépôt." Ultimately the 4th and 5th Divisions were formed at Magdeburg and Osnabrück respectively, and by the end of April had attained the strength of—4th Division (Duberton), 12 Battalions, 8 guns, 7,000 men; 5th Division (Dufour), 11 Battalions, 8 guns, (5,979 men); and they were then moved up to the Elbe and Saale. The 6th Division did not reach the front till the end of June.

III Corps

The III Corps, the original Corps of Observation on the Rhine, was built up of eight Regiments formed of the "Cohorts" (see above, p. 31) of the old 22nd Regiment of the Line (4 Battalions), 10 provisional Regiments, and the 9th and 29th Light Infantry, both of two Battalions in all 60 Battalions. The Corps Headquarters were fixed at Mainz, and the Divisions were ordered to concentrate at Hanau, Frankfurt am Main, and Mainz. The 39th Division (Badeners, Hessians and Frankfurters) was also assigned to it as a 5th Division. Four Squadrons of the French 10th Hussars, and five Squadrons of the Baden Dragoons were further allotted to it, and by the end of April 44,764 men and 84 guns were available on the Saale. The Divisional Commanders were: 8th Division, Souham; 9th, Brenier; 10th, Girard; 11th Ricard; 39th, Marchand.

IV Corps

The IV Corps.—Already on January 10, Napoleon notified the Italian chancellor (Melzi), of his intention to concentrate a Corps of Observation at Verona, and on February 27 informed him that the Corps must be ready on March 10 to set out for Augsburg. General Bertrand was to start with the first Division available, the others to follow as they were completed. Eight Battalions of "Cohorts," two Line Regiments with nine Battalions, 16 Battalions, conscripts of 1813, 13 Italian, one Algerian and three Neapolitan Battalions in all, were to supply the Infantry, and two Squadrons of Neapolitans, eight Squadrons of Würtembergers, the Cavalry. The Würtemberg Division was also assigned to this Corps. Many delays arose in carrying out these orders, and only the 12th (Morand), and 15th (Peyri) Divisions, numbering 18,400 men with 37 guns, were available on the Saale by the end of April. The Würtembergers, 7,204 men, 12 guns, joined on the march, (May 4), at Freyburg (Saxony).

V Corps

The V Corps.—Eleven Regiments of "Cohorts" (44 Battalions), the 34th Regiment of the Line (four Battalions) and four foreign Battalions were assigned to this Corps, and the four Divisions, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th were at first ordered to be formed at Magdeburg, Münster, Osnabrück and Frankfurt am Main, but at the beginning of March they were all ordered up to Magdeburg, where Lauriston assumed the command. Towards the end of April they had attained a strength of 28,000 men (with 67 guns) unequally divided in the following manner—16th Division (Maison) eight Battalions, 17th (Puthod) 12 Battalions, 18th (Lagrange) 15 Battalions, 19th (Rochambeau) 12 Battalions, the 3rd Light Cavalry Brigade being assigned to them. The 17th (Puthod) was detached towards Hamburg and only rejoined on the battlefield of Bautzen, this left available at the end of April only 32 Battalions, 51 guns, in all 20,832 men.

VI Corps

The VI Corps.—The II Corps of Observation on the Rhine became the VI Corps of the Grand Army, by the decree of March 12, and was to be collected about Mainz. The material available was 20 Battalions of Marines, eight provisional Line Battalions, four Battalions of the 37th Light Infantry, 10 other Light Infantry Battalions, and 16 Line Regiments.

The formation of this Corps met with all kinds of difficulties. Only fourteen Battalions of Marines had arrived on April 15. The 23rd Division (Teste) had only received two of its Battalions on the same date, and had to be left behind in Giessen and finally was only completed in Magdeburg in June, after the Armistice.

Thus only three Divisions, the 30th (Compans), 12 Battalions, 21st (Bouet) 13 Battalions, and 22nd (Friederichs) 14 Battalions, with 62 guns, making 24,250 men, were ready on the Saale at the end of April; only two Squadrons of Hessians had joined on May 1.

VII Corps

The VII Corps had only the 32nd Division (Durutte) available, and on May 1 its strength amounted to only 102 officers, 903 men, with four guns.

XI Corps

The XI Corps was principally constituted out of the only intact reinforcements for the Grand Army of 1812, on their way to the front in December of that year, viz. the 31st Division (Lagrange) of the old XI Corps, the very strong Division (Grenier), formed in November, 1812, in Verona, was divided into two Divisions on arrival at the front, which received the number 35 and 36. Seven Battalions of the 31st Division had been left behind in Stettin, and the remaining five were grouped with five others belonging to a temporary Division under Gerard, who received the command of the whole. Lagrange being recalled to France and given another command instead. Three Polish Battalions were also added, so that by the middle of March the Division, then at Meissen, numbered 13 Battalions, 12 guns. The 35th Division consisted of 12 Battalions and 22 guns, the 36th of 11 Battalions and 14 guns, but as the 31st Division was ordered to find 2,000 men for the garrison of Wittenberg, and to make other detachments, it was only six Battalions (about 3,000 strong) on the resumption of hostilities. The total strength of the Corps on April 15 was only 661 officers, 21,700 men. On April 22 General Gerard was again transferred to the 35th Division. General Ledhu received the 31st Division, and General Charpentier the 36th.

XII Corps

The XII Corps was formed by a decree of April 24, by taking two Divisions, the 13th (Pacthod) and 14th (Lorencez), from the IV Corps and adding to it a Bavarian Division (Raglowich). The command of it was given to Oudinot (Duc de Reggio). On April 30 it was in the vicinity of Saalfeld 24,000 men and 50 guns strong.

The Guards (Mortier)

We have already seen how the Viceroy had gathered a small body of the Old Guard under Roguet around him. On March 13 this little Division numbered 133 officers, 2,896 Infantry; 62 officers, 944 men. Cavalry, 4 officers and 188 men artillery and engineers.

About 1,000 other officers and non-commissioned officers for whom no men were available had been sent back by post to France, where on a nucleus supplied by 3,000 veterans of the Guard, who had volunteered to rejoin, they proceeded to reconstruct sixty Battalions of the Young Guard. Of these only one Division (Dumoustier), 16 Battalions and 52 guns, reached the front in time for the battle of Lützen, and a second (Delaborde) joined on May 25, at Dresden.

General Bessières received the command of the Cavalry of the Guard, which numbered 2,800 men, with two Horse Artillery batteries. It consisted of two Regiments of the Lancers, one of Chasseurs, one Dragoons, one Grenadiers, the celebrated Mameluke squadron, four Squadrons of "*Elite Gendarmerie*" and four Regiments of the "*Gardes d'honneur*" formed of young men of good family who had hitherto escaped the conscription by paying for substitutes, but at length had been caught by the same trick which was applied to the "Cohorts."

The Cavalry

The Cavalry of the whole Army was, as before mentioned, by far the weakest element of the whole force. It was organized in three Corps, of which the 1st had attained a strength of 172 officers, 3,343 men, 3,705 horses, on the Elbe and Saale, at the end of April. The 2nd, on April 15 numbered 149 officers, 3,144 men, and 3,581 horses; and the 3rd, which on May 1 was at Hanau, reported 3,895 men fit for duty.

Further formations were in progress throughout the whole of Europe at the time under the Napoleonic dominion, the details of which would require more space than it is possible to afford. However, the net outcome of the whole was that on May 1, 1813, the Emperor again stood at the head of 226,177 men, with 457 guns, which were subdivided into two Armies, the Army of the Main under his own command, and the Army of the Elbe under the Viceroy of Italy (Prince Eugène). To the former belonged the III, VI and IV Corps, the Guards on arrival, and the 3rd Cavalry Corps. The latter comprised the V and XI Corps and such portions of the I, II, and VII Corps as were available, together with the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps.

Napoleon plans a Raid on Berlin

Early in March, he entertained and drafted an outline plan, which though it was never put into execution, deserves notice for the amount of criticism to which it has been subjected, and also because its guiding idea recurs repeatedly at a later stage of this campaign (1813).

Leaving a retaining force on the Saale, he proposed to cross the Elbe with his main body, march direct on Berlin and thence relieve the garrisons of the Oder fortresses and Danzig. The chief criticism directed against this has always been, that neither Berlin nor the relief of the fortresses afforded a sufficient objective for a Field Army, which should always aim primarily at the destruction of the Field Army of its adversary, essentially the guiding principle of the whole Napoleonic strategy. Further, it is condemned because it contains no single allusion to the *decisive battle* which all sound strategy should aim at. These criticisms come chiefly from Germany, and I confess that for years they had my full adherence, until I came under the influence of the modern French school, when Napoleon's reasons at once became plain. The chief difficulty of his situation lay in holding, or inducing his enemies to stand, or indeed in controlling their action in any way. The march to Berlin, thence onward, ultimately towards Königsberg, not only meant the ruin of the Prussian Monarchy for a second time, but also threatened the Russian communications with Petersburg. It was, therefore, a reasonable calculation that the threat on Berlin, as once before at Jena, would bring the Allies down in force to oppose it, and marching in his favourite *battalion carrée* it was, as already explained, immaterial to him when, where or how they chose to attack him.

His reason for abandoning the idea has never to my knowledge been made clear. The necessity often alleged for covering the Southern States of Germany to ensure their loyalty has never appealed to me as adequate, because nothing would seem better adapted to secure their wavering attachment than the sight of the beaten Russians and Prussians straggling back upon their frontiers. More probably the scheme was originally based on insufficient information, and was given up when it became clear that the total force the Allies could have concentrated to oppose him was altogether too small to offer them a reasonable prospect of success in the battlefield; therefore they would voluntarily, (abandoning Berlin and East Prussia), fall back into Russia, when he would again find himself face to face with the terrible problem of the previous year, and with

far less satisfactory material to enable him to deal with it. At the time of its inception also he had still no adequate idea of the completeness of the disintegration which his old Army had undergone, and he attached far more value to its fragments than they actually deserved. With them the process of "war seasoning" been overdone, and "war weary" would better discribe them. "I have 600 men of the Guard with me here," wrote Rapp from Danzig "but not two hundred will ever be fit for the field again"—and if this was the case with the Guard, the condition of the rest of the Army may be imagined!

Action of the Allies

Meanwhile, the action of the Allies was forcing Napoleon's hand, and the question of the neutrality of the German Southern States became a matter of time, whilst the attitude of Austria was more than threatening. From Dresden, their advance if continued towards the upper waters of the Saale and Main, covered Bavaria and Saxony, and might even jeopardize the arrival of the IV Corps from Italy via Augsburg. On the other hand, the further they continued in this direction, the more they exposed their own communications to a blow from the north-west, and the chance of catching them in a position in which they would be compelled to fight increased. He, therefore, now busied himself with a plan which was almost the exact inverse of his Jena Campaign, and issued orders to unite his whole force in the angle of the upper Saale and Elbe.

On April 11, The Army of the Elbe lay with its Headquarters at Aschersleben—about 30 miles south of Magdeburg. The III Corps along the road from Aschaffenburg to Schweinfurt; VI Corps around Hanau; Guards at Mainz; the IV and XII coming from Italy with their head at Anspach and the rearmost Division ten days' march behind, near Augsburg. The Emperor knew from a certain source that the Russian Guards had only commenced their march from Kalische on April 1, and could not, therefore, reach the troops already in the field before May 1; but it was always possible that the latter might continue their advance without waiting for the Guards, in which case they might reach the Saale by April 20. Therefore, he had to be prepared for this contingency, though it was an improbable one.

Orders for Concentration

Accordingly he prescribed the next stage of his advance in such a manner that his concentration would be assured whatever case arose. To this end the Army of the Elbe was directed to advance to the line of the Wipper—a small affluent of the Saale, with its left resting on the latter river and its right on the slopes of the Harz Mountains, thus threatening the enemy's right if they should attempt to march upon Erfurt. The VI Corps and Guards were to move along the great road from Mainz through Fulda, Gotha, to Erfurt, the III Corps from Schweinfurt to Meiningen, and the IV and XII Corps by Bamberg, Coburg, and Graf-

The Emperor had caused most careful reconnaissances to be made of all the roads through the Thuringian forest—a mountainous densely wooded district with ridges rising some 3,000 feet above the plain. He knew that from Meiningen and Coburg alternative roads existed which would enable him either to direct the further movement of these Corps on Erfurt or on the Saale, as the case might require. If now the llies determined to march either direct upon Erfurt against the Army of the Elbe, in either case the latter could hold them till the centre and right swung in—or if by the time they reached the above-mentioned places it was clear that the enemy was moving southward against the right column, or waiting for the Russian Guards to arrive—the whole of his forces could combine their forward movement, and complete their concentration in the neighbourhood of Leipzig; and this was what actually happened.

On April 24 the French Army of the Elbe still lay on the Wipper, the III Corps at Weimar, followed by the Guards, which had passed the VI Corps at Erfurt, and the VI strung out along the road from Gotha to Vacha for some 30 miles. The IV and XII Corps lay with their advance guard at Grafenthal, their main body extending from Coburg to Anspach. The Bavarians were on the extreme right at Bayreuth, the total front being about 140 miles, depth 60 miles. But the Emperor himself had delayed too long at Mainz, trusting to his Generals on the spot, and as usual they had fallen far short of his reasonable expectations. Ney, having reached Meiningen, and not having appreciated Napoleon's reason for ordering him to make a temporary halt at that place, had concluded, that as the road from Meiningen to Weimar across the hills was rather an indifferent one, he would take the easy one down the valley to Eisenach, and cut in on the main road through Erfurt to that place. He thus fouled the line of march of the Guards and VI Corps, blocking them back all along the road.

Cavalry Raids by the Allies

At the same time the Cavalry of the Allies made a succession of brilliant attacks in the district between the Wipper and Unstrutt with the result that a series of regrettable incidents, from the French point of view, took place. On April 12, Major Blücher (son of the Field-Marshal) at the head of some 200 Prussian Hussars appeared before Weimar, with this result, that the Saxon Battalion on duty immediately laid down its arms. On the 17th, Major Helwig with a Squadron of 150 men fell suddenly upon the rearguard of the Bavarian Division (Rechberg) near Langen-Salza, capturing some hundred men and a couple of guns. On the 18th the same party dispersed a Westphalian Cavalry regiment, near Wanried on the road to Cassel, thus creating wild alarm in King Jerome's mind. Finally, reports of all these events reaching Ney at Erfurt on the 19th, caused him serious apprehension of more to follow. The result was a series of orders and counter-orders which narrowly escaped throwing the whole command into disorder. As Marshal Bessières wrote to Berthier, "I must tell you frankly that if the enemy had been advancing on Naumburg and Jena as the Prince de la Moskova wrote to me that night, we should have been in no position to meet them, or the Prince either."

Napoleon's Orders

Meanwhile the Emperor's orders were already on their way for the whole Army to concentrate on the Saale on April 25.

"The Army of the Main marches on Jena and Naumburg; the Army of the Elbe will move up the Saale and occupy Halle and Merseburg. The Corps from Italy, circumstances permit, will march by Saalfeld on Jena, the left bank of the Saale."

In elucidation of this the Major General (Berthier, wrote to Prince Eugène from Mainz (April 22):—

"The Emperor is to-day still in Mainz. As the Corps of the Prince de la Moskova cannot be completely closed up until the 24th, it is necessary for you to occupy Querfurt so as to maintain direct communication with the Prince, who is going to occupy the heights above Naumburg. Destroy the bridge which the enemy has over the Saale near Wettin. Occupy Halle and Merseburg as bridge heads, and place these towns in a condition of defence against Cossacks by palisading the gates. Occupy Halle first, Merseburg afterwards. *The Emperor's intention is to guard the whole of the Saale, so that the enemy cannot penetrate to the left bank at any spot.* You must be on the alert to march at once against the enemy should he advance from Jena or Naumburg."

Supply Service

Following closely upon these orders, the Emperor himself reached Erfurt on the morning of the 25th April, and the first duty to claim his attention was the arrangements of the Supply Service. The Corps had taken the field with from 12 to 14 days' bread, biscuit or meal—four days' rations carried by the men, the remainder in carts, and they had lived as far as possible on the country they had traversed. But now they were too concentrated to do this, and were to be fed from the magazines Napoleon had ordered to be prepared in Erfurt. Evidently this service had been neglected, for on the evening of the 25th we find a letter to Marshal Duroc.

"Collect to-night the Intendant and two or three of the principal members of the administration of the country, as well as the Commissary of War, and settle what steps are to be taken to collect supplies at Erfurt. We must have in four days 200,000 rations of bread to issue at the rate of 50,000 a day. They must also procure as soon as possible, two million rations of flour—as much beef on the hoof and brandy; also two million rations of oats. To get these quicker you are to pay cash."

Communications

The main line of communication for the Main Army was to be by Mainz, Fulda, Gotha, while the IV and XII Corps after passing Saalfeld were to give up completely their previous line, viz., Coburg and Nuremburg; and any communications necessary with Augsburg were to go by Fulda-Wurzburg, an indication of the growing insecurity of the country. A comparison of the halting places actually attained with the orders issued, shows that in the Army of the Main all the prescribed marches were duly and punctually performed, but the Army of the Elbe was 24 hours late in starting and then only averaged seven miles a day. No explanation of this extraordinary passing that, with Napoleon in person on the spot, twenty-five, even thirty miles a day was by no means an unusual effort for bodies of such strength to accomplish. Singularly, also, there is no trace of any reprimand being administered to Eugéne for this dilatoriness.

French Positions 30th April

On the 30th, the several Corps attained the under-mentioned positions.

ARMY OF THE MAIN.

Headquarters of the Emperor: Weissenfels.
The Imperial Guard: Weissenfels.
III Corps: Headquarters and four Divisions: East of Weissenfels. Marchand's Division: Stossen.
VI Corps. Headquarters and two Divisions: Naumburg. Friedrich's Division: Kösen.
IV Corps: Along the Saale from Dornburg to Jena and Rudolstadt.
XII Corps: Still in rear, between Saalfeld and Coburg.

THE ARMY OF THE ELBE.

Headquarters and Division Roguet (Guards): Merseburg.
1st Cavalry Corps and XI Corps: Three miles east of Merseburg
V Corps: Three Divisions west of Merseburg; a detachment of four Battalions at Halle.
32nd Division: at Schafstedt.
4th Division (Victor): Bernburg.

The ten Battalions of this Division formed a cordon all along the Saale, which river was henceforth so closely watched that none of the enemy's Cavalry succeeded in crossing it. *This cordon defence of a river line was Napoleon's expedient to compensate for his deficiency in Cavalry, for it gave him "security" and ensured secrecy of his own movements,* but of course it could not help him to ascertain what his enemy was about. For this, however, he cared little; he had now 145,000 men in hand ready to fight in any direction at a moment's notice, and it mattered nothing to him when or where he met his opponents, if only they would fight to a finish when they did encounter him. Secrecy and promptitude were, however, the essential factors of the situation, for if once the Allies realized the overwhelming numbers against them, they would certainly concentrate to the rear, as for the moment they had no interest in the actual occupation of the ground on which they stood. Experience had shown them the efficacy of a rapid retreat as a means of evading Napoleon's sledge hammer blows.

Napoleon's Orders 1st May

His orders, therefore, for May 1, ran as follows, "The Army of the Elbe is to advance in front of Merseburg to Schladebach—placing Merseburg in a condition of defence.

"The III Corps with the Cavalry of the Guard from Weissenfels towards Lützen.

"The VI Corps to support the III with two Divisions, the third remaining at Naumburg. The Imperial Guard (two Division) to Weissenfels.

"The IV and XII to continue towards Naumburg as rapidly as possible."

As this movement took the Army out into open country very favourable for the enemy's Cavalry, to avoid any possibility of surprise, the troops now marched in masses straight across country.

The formation of the III Corps may be taken as the type generally followed. Behind an Advance Guard consisting of all the Corps Cavalry (a Brigade of 10 Squadrons), two Battalions and a half Battery of Light Artillery, the Main Body followed at a distance of about 3,000 yards in as many lines as it contained Brigades. Each Brigade was in line of columns of Regiments (four Battalions) with double company front at half distance, so as to be able to form regimental squares rapidly. The Artillery of each Division between the leading Brigades.

As Napoleon had expected, the Cavalry of the Allies attempted several charges during the day, but were easily repulsed with a trifling loss. There was no longer a Seydlitz to lead them, nor were they trained to that great Leader's standard of perfection; and the day ld have ended most satisfactorily but for the unfor-

…mate death of Marshal Bessières, killed dead by a cannon shot at the passage of the Rippach. The bearing of the young soldiers had won the approval even of Ney, who with many others seems at first to have had serious doubts as to their steadiness. At the close of the day the Emperor was at Lützen.

ARMY OF THE ELBE.
XI Corps from Quentz to Markranstädt.
V Corps in rear of Gunthendorf.
1st Cavalry Corps, between Schladebach and Oetzach.
32nd Division, at Merseburg.

ARMY OF THE MAIN.
Cavalry of the Guard at Lützen.
Imperial Guard (two Divisions) Weissenfels.
III Corps. Headquarters: Kaja.
- Souham's Division: Kaja, Rahna, Klein and Grosz Gorschen.
- Girard's Division: Starsiedel.
- Brennier's Division: near Lützen.
- Ricard's Division: near Lützen.
- Marchand's Division: near Lützen.

VI Corps. Headquarters: near Rippach.
- Bouet's Division: near Rippach.
- Compans Division: near Lösau, west of Rippach.
- Freidrichs' Division: at Naumburg.

IV Corps. Headquarters: Stössen.
- Morand's Division: Stössen; Advance Guard: Pretzsch.
- Peyri's Division: Grosz-Gestewitz.
- Würtemberg Division: Jena.

XII Corps. Head of Column at Kahla, rear near Saalfeld.

Looking at the Map we see that the *battalion carrée* or lozenge formation, has been modified to suit the circumstances. On the left the flank being protected by the Elbe and Elster, needs no particular precaution, so the whole left and centre are closed up to form the "mass of manœuvre"—the right flank being covered by the III Corps and Guards, from Weissenfels to Lützen, whilst the IV Corps from Stössen to Jena is in a position to outflank any attack upon the III coming from the southward.

From the reports of the enemy's movements received, it appeared that the latter was concentrating about Zwenkau, whilst a portion of his troops still held Leipzig. Judging from his knowledge of Wittgenstein's character, the Emperor considered an attack on his right flank during the next day as highly probable. But this threat did not deter him an instant in his determination to gain ground to the front and appear in mass in the plains to the east of the Elster on May 3.

As a measure of precaution, however, the III Corps around Lützen was ordered to stand fast till noon, whilst the Army of the Elbe advanced on Leipzig, and all other elements of the Army closed in on the III Corps.

In case of an attack from Zwenkau the III Corps is thus facing in the required direction to act as Advance Guard—to fix the enemy and allow the remainder of the Army to manœuvre against him.

Battle of Lützen

In their execution of these orders the troops had reached the position shown in the sketch, when about 11 a.m. a tremendous cannonade burst out in the direction of Kaja, and Napoleon leaving the Army of the Elbe to continue its movement, galloped across country to see what had happened.

Reaching the brow of a low undulation which hid the field of action from his sight, he suddenly discovered Souham's Division (part of it already in serious disorder), beset by overwhelming forces of the enemy. Souham's troops had allowed themselves to be surprised in broad daylight by almost the whole of their adversary's Army.

The Emperor was not disconcerted even for a moment. Taking the whole situation in at a glance, he issued the following terse and fitting orders.

"The III Corps will hold its position *at any cost. Its business is to fix the enemy, and thus form a pivot on which the rest of the Army can manœuvre.*

"The VI Corps prolongs the right of the III Corps.

"The IV Corps moves against the enemy's left.

"The XI and 1st Cavalry Corps against his right.

"The V Corps occupies Leipzig with one of its Divisions, the others to be echelonned near Markranstädt ready to move on Kaja.

"The Guard marches to the sound of the guns."

Here we will leave him and return to the doings of the Allies which had led to this surprise.

Movements of the Allies

We saw them last on April 19, just at the moment when a premature rumour of the arrival of the Emperor at the front compelled them to decide on a course of action.

At this date the Corps of Miloradowitch was moving from Dresden to join Blücher at Altenburg, where he had been since the 14th of the month, and the Russian Guards were still five marches to the west of Dresden. The news of the death of Kutusow had just been received, and Wittgenstein appointed to the Command-in-chief of the whole Army. At this date, inclusive of the troops already on the Saale, it consisted of 65,000 Infantry, 22,000 Cavalry, 8,000 Artillery with 450 guns.

A rearward movement of concentration would undoubtedly have been the best plan to adopt from a strictly military point of view, but to withdraw without even the show of a fight would have been politically disastrous, in view of the attitude of Austria and the state of public feeling all over Germany. Moreover, the Prussian troops were still too raw to stand the strain of a prolonged retreat. A defeat in battle even if accompanied by heavy losses, might, in the exalted condition of patriotism in which they found themselves, be far better for their subsequent cohesion than the depressing influences of a continuous withdrawal. Finally, in view of the reports that had reached them, as to the poor condition of the French Cavalry and conscripts, both Blücher, Yorck and Wittgenstein felt that with 22,000 horsemen behind them, in a theatre of rolling plains especially favourable to their action, the chances in favour of a victory were good enough to justify the risk. The only point unsettled was the best point of concentration to select. Wittgenstein had rightly gauged the intention of Napoleon to advance through Leipzig, and had called up Blücher from the south to Borna, whilst he himself had determined to concentrate between Leipzig and Würzen. But the Emperor Alexander, who arrived at this moment, considered that this disposition rendered it probable that, in case of disaster, the whole Army would be thrown back on the Elbe about Torgau—and he decided on a more southerly position between Leipzig and Borna.

They were in this position when, in the course of May 1, the reports of Cavalry—most accurate as to what could actually be seen—led them to conclude that the whole French Army was moving in one long column on Leipzig, hardly guarding their right flank at all. And the opportunity to take advantage of this negligence was too tempting to be allowed to escape them. This conclusion, though in fact erroneous, was an almost inevitable consequence of the failure of the Allied Generals to penetrate the real secret of the Napoleonic methods.

Accordingly, leaving Kleist in Leipzig to hold the town (a semi-mediæval fortress) to the last, orders were issued at 11.30 p.m. on May 1, to the following effect:—

"The Corps of Miloradowitch (12,000 men) on Zeitz to watch in the direction of Naumburg and Jena.

"The Corps Winzingerode (12,000 men), to Werben, to cover the passage of the main Army over the Elster and Flossgraben.

"The Corps of Blücher (27,000 men) in two columns to cross the Elster at Storkwitz and Pegau.

"The Corps of Yorck (7,500 men) passes the Elster at Pegau, after Blücher's left column., the troops of Berg at Storkwitz behind the right.

"The Guards (18,500 men) follows the troops of Yorck and Berg.

"The Army will form up beyond the Flossgraben, the right on the canal near Werben, and the left at Grünabach near Sohesten, the movement to be completed by 7 a.m."

The troops were on the march between 1 and 2 a.m. (they were, therefore, probably awaiting the arrival of the above orders), but from want of clearness in their instructions, the columns crossed one another, and the resulting delays postponed the final deployment till 11 a.m. The Army then stood in three lines, hidden by a roll of the ground, some 2,000 yards south of Gross Gorschen. Owing to the long night march, the men were much exhausted, and it was decided to allow them another hour's rest. Meanwhile Wittgenstein, with the Headquarters Staff, rode forward to a mound about 1,200 yards south of Gross Gorschen, whence they saw great clouds of dust hanging heavily over the main road to Leipzig, and in the immediate foreground were a large mass of French troops cooking their dinners and completely off their guard.

Attack by the Allies

The whole Army of the Allies being already deployed, it would have sufficed to launch a Cavalry Division on Souham to overwhelm all opposition, and then to advance over the wreck of the French Advance Guard with the whole of the Artillery and Infantry on a broad front, crushing each fresh echelon of the enemy as it came on the ground. Instead of this, the Allies grew circumspect, and advancing some 36 guns, opened the attack with a single Brigade, and the first shots fired gave the alarm to the whole of the French Army.

The first rush of the Prussians easily carried Gross Gorschen, but when they endeavoured to throw a mass of 23 Squadrons on the retreating French—a line of Batteries came rapidly into action between Rahna and Klein Gorschen, and brought the former to a stop with case shot. Then Girard's Division arrived on the spot, and immediately afterwards the whole of the VI Corps (Marmont) came up on his right about Starsiedel, so that by 10 p.m. about 40,000 French were in action against some 65,000 of the Allies. Then followed a series of disconnected and successive attacks by Brigades, where whole Army Corps would have been more to the purpose, and after desperate fighting the villages of Rahna and Klein Gorschen also fell into the hands of the Allies, who then prepared to push forward on Kaja, where Ney in person had in the meantime arrived. Placing himself at the head of Brenier's Division, on whom the remains of Girard's and Souham's commands at once rallied, Ney led them forward, and with the bayonet drove the Allies back to Rahna and Klein Gorschen. Again the Prussians threw in another Brigade, and in turn the French gave way.

Napoleon on the Battlefield

At 2.30 Napoleon rode up to Kaja with the Guards. His arrival produced an extraordinary effect on his troops, who saluted him "with cries of 'Vive l'Empereur,' in which even the wounded and dying joined" (*vide* testmony of von Odeleben, a Saxon officer on Napoleon's staff). Instantly taking in the situation, he sent his A.D.C., General Mouton, to Ricard's Division (the last closed reserve of the III Corps), with orders to execute a counter attack, and again bearing down all opposition, the French became masters of the two villages.

Meanwhile, the Cavalry and Cossacks of the Allies had been thundering down in a succession of disunited charges on Marmont's Infantry, and the Marshal, impressed by the visible masses of the enemy in front of him, sent to Napoleon for reinforcements.

The reply he received was characteristic. "Tell your Marshal he is mistaken, the decision lies at Kaja, not at Starsiedel."

A lull in the battle now set in, only the Artillery on both sides continued their fire, and meanwhile Wittgenstein, learning of the approach of the IV and XI Corps, prepared for a final effort. The moment was critical for Napoleon—it was about 4.30 p.m.—the III Corps was practically burnt out and useless, the VI could not be moved, as its presence at Starsiedel was imperative to protect the flank of the III Corps, and only the Guards were available on the spot. But he hesitated to engage them, because he saw that the "battle was not yet ripe," i.e. that the enemy had not yet expended all his reserves and reached that crisis of nervous exhaustion on which the success of the aggressor's final blow depends.

At this moment, about 4.30, some Battalions of the III Corps broke. The Emperor galloped into the middle of them, rallied them by the sheer magnetic power of his personality (none who lived through this moment could ever forget it), and sending in a Brigade of the Young Guard to give them a lead, led back the whole III Corps into the fight. On no occasion in his whole career did Napoleon expose himself more recklessly, and never had his extraordinary power of command asserted itself to a greater extent. It was not, and could not be the mere example of personal courage. In an Army numbering such men as Ney, Mouton, and Rapp in its ranks, personal courage in itself would hardly have attracted unusual attention. It was the indefinable something in the man himself that reawakened the confidence and enthusiasm of all ranks, which, to put it gently, had slumbered somewhat during the months succeeding his hurried departure from Smorgoni on December 14, 1812.

This must be borne in mind throughout the whole of this campaign, if the extraordinary heroism of the French troops immediately under his eyes is to be understood and explained.

At last towards 5 p.m. the XI Corps preceded by all

its Artillery (60 guns), began to arrive from the direction of Eisdorf and Kitzen, reaching well round the enemy's right wing, and at the same time Morand's Division of the IV Corps appeared upon their left.

Napoleon's Decisive Attack

The time had now come for the final "knock out" blow, and Drouot with sixty guns of the Guard Artillery galloped out to the front, and unlimbering at case shot range, began to tear the very heart out of the Allied Army, whilst the whole Infantry of the Guard followed in rear, sweeping along with it all that still had life in the sorely shattered III Corps. The Allies gave way at all points, but the blow had been timed a little too late, and in the absence of an efficient Cavalry, darkness intervened to prevent the victorious Infantry reaping their full reward.

To cover their retreat, the Cavalry of the Allies made several gallant charges, and finally just before midnight, a party of eleven squadrons, under a Colonel Dolfs, in the midst of complete darkness, over difficult ground, and guided only by the bivouac fires, threw themselves into the very heart of the French lines. What followed has never been quite clearly established. The French deny all panics, the Prussians affirm them; all that is certain is that the French were kept under arms all night, and morning found them too completely worn out to pursue.

No more striking contrast, illustrating the difference of the fighting value between troops raised under the old long service conditions, fighting for "the honour of their arms" and those raised under the new, inspired primarily by a feeling of nationality, can well be desired than is presented by the different conduct of the Prussians on this occasion and at Jena. In a surprisingly short time the stragglers had sorted themselves out, and were well on their way from the field, and when next morning dawned not a single gun or trophy of any kind remained as prizes for the victorious French.

This was a most fatal blow to the Imperial prestige, for it entirely obscured the remarkable strategy that had united about 140,000 men on the battlefield, but called attention to the fact that these 140,000 odd had not achieved sufficient success against the 75,000 of the allies to bring in a single gun or other trophy. All other conditions which might be brought forward to palliate this want of success, i.e. want of Cavalry, the darkness of the night, etc., were overlooked in the general rejoicing in every Foreign Ministry in Europe over this striking contrast between Napoleon's previous victories and that of Lützen.

Nor had the Emperor better reason to be pleased with the fighting quality which his men had shown. He had actually engaged three Corps, about 60,000 men, had expended one completely, and but for his arrival in person on the scene with the Guard, there could be no doubt that both the VI and III Corps, together with any other Corps in the Army except the Guard, would have been completely defeated under any of his Marshals. Yet the Allies had not engaged the whole of their forces, for (apart from Bülow, who away to the north near Halle had been left out of the combination entirely) Miloradowitch, delayed on the march by causes no longer possible of elucidation, had failed to reach the battlefield before the resolution to retreat had been taken.

It will be noticed also that throughout the day the Allies were on relative interior lines. Had Wittgenstein's original proposal to concentrate about Würzen been adhered to, they would then have been outside the horns of the attack, with the whole Corps of Bülow, (inclusive of Kleist) available, and might then have entertained the reasonable expectation of crushing the heads of the French columns as they defiled across extemporized crossings over the Elster, and out of the narrow gates of Leipzig. This is assuming that Kleist had abandoned that place of his own free will, without any adequate garrison, a course he had no reason to adopt, since poor though its fortifications undoubtedly were, 5,000 men could have held it for days against an Army unprovided with a siege train.

The losses of the day, quite sensible. While the Allies owned to 10,000 the French had to admit 18,000 killed, wounded, or prisoners, 12,000 of which were in the III Corps alone, and it thus lost 25 per cent. of its Infantry. But whereas the young French conscripts, fighting without a cause which appealed to them, reported themselves as sick or wounded on the smallest excuse, the young Prussians, fully saturated with the importance of the stakes for which they fought, stuck to the ranks as long as their legs could carry them. The Russians also have ever been good malingerers, their Company was and is their home, and their ambulances held no attraction for them.

From Lützen to the Armistice

Under cover of Miloradowitch's intact command (12,000 men) and the Cavalry, the Allies rallied their troops which had been engaged, on Frohburg and Borna, and then decided to continue their retreat, the Prussians by Colditz and Meissen, the Russians by Rochlitz, on Dresden. Parks and convoys by Freiburg and Chemnitz ultimately on Dresden also. Bülow, near Halle, charged with the special mission of covering Berlin, was informed of their intentions and invited to withdraw behind the Elbe at Rosslau.

The French Pursuit

As soon as order could be restored in the French ranks the Emperor pressed on in pursuit, but here his want of Cavalry told severely, and, over and above his deficiency in this respect, lay the hopeless corruption and inefficiency of his Supply Department. Since the men could draw no rations, they broke up to forage for themselves, and presently this evil attained the most serious dimensions. Thus in a report of the Provost Marshal dated May 15, 1813, quoted by Col. Lanrezac (p. 170) we find that flying columns sent in to collect stragglers had found no less than 5,200 between the Elsters and the Elbe, three-quarters of which, it is only fair to the French to record, were Italians of the IV and XII Corps, neither of which had been actually under fire.

The following order speaks for itself:—

Ordre du Jour,

May 6, 1813.

"Many soldiers have wandered into the country to right and left of the road, others follow the columns as stragglers. It is the fault of the officers who allow the men to leave the ranks. It is the fault of the Generals who march without rear guards to pick up the stragglers. The soldiers unload their arms by firing them off, instead of using the cleaning stick to draw the charge. Others roam about the fields firing at the cattle. This is a crime; because in War a gun shot is frequently the signal of alarm. It is also a crime, because the bullet might kill or wound persons by accident; finally it is a crime because it is an act of maraud. His Majesty orders that any soldier who fires off his musket either as a marauder or to save himself the trouble of unloading properly, shall be punished by imprisonment and degradation. If the shot wounds or kills any one, he shall be punished by death.

"Alexandre,"

"Prince de Neuchatel, Major-General."

The Army of the Elbe not having been engaged in the battle, and being also nearest to Dresden and the Elbe, was sent on in pursuit of the enemy, but again the Viceroy's incurable slowness called down upon him the Emperor's reprimands. It seems that the custom had crept in of allowing an indefinite number of private wagons and carriages to accompany the troops, and for second line transport to be inserted in the columns between the combatant Divisions. To put a stop to this abuse, orders were issued that any private vehicles found in the columns would be burnt, and their horses handed over to the Artillery. Only the Artillery wagons were to march with their Divisions, and the rest of the baggage was relegated to the tail of the columns. Fortunately for the French, the Allies were in no hurry to evacuate the ground they held, and soon the pursuers were in touch with rear guards of all arms on the roads towards Dresden and the Elbe, but it was not at first clear by which road the bulk of their forces had moved. Napoleon, therefore, pressed for prisoners, but the admirable order in which the retreat was conducted made it difficult for his subordinates to comply with the demand. At Colditz, on May 4, the XI Corps came upon a Prussian rear guard, and after a sharp tussle, the latter retired, leaving only some twenty or thirty prisoners behind it. The Emperor's reply to the Viceroy's report of this action is characteristic:—

"My Son,—Yesterday's would have been a very pretty affair had you sent me 3,000 prisoners. How is it that in a hilly and wooded country where the enemy's Cavalry are useless, you cannot catch any for me? The Duke of Ragusa marches for Waldheim at 4 a.m. to-morrow. Take good care to move off not later than 5 a.m., and close up your columns so as not to occupy more than three leagues (nine miles) of road. Place all your baggage at the end of your 3rd Division, so as to march in a soldier-like manner, and be able to bring the whole of your three Divisions into action simultaneously. Put a little order into your Corps; it wants it badly. The Italians in particular commit atrocities, robbing and pillaging wherever they go. Shoot a few of them.

"Your affectionate father."

The reports received on the night of May 4 made it clear that the Russians and Prussians were retreating on Dresden and Meissen, but the strength and whereabouts of Bülow's troops to the northward were still in doubt. In any case it was not and could not be clear whether the Allies would endeavour to hold the line of the Elbe, whether they would cross the Elbe, then separate, the Prussians retiring on Berlin, the Russians to Silesia, or whether the two combined would continue their retreat in the latter direction. Moreover, Napoleon appears to have been obsessed with the idea that the King of Prussia attached particular importance to the possession of Berlin, and he also seems to have been unable to rid his mind of the thought of relieving the Oder fortresses; a proceeding which would only have set free the investing forces by which their garrisons were held in check. According to rule these could not well be less than three times the strength of the troops they neutralized.

A new Army under Ney

With a double object before him, he therefore decided to form a new Army, under Marshal Ney, out of Ney's own Corps the III, the II provisional Corps under Victor, the VII under Reynier, and another provisional command under Sebastiani which consisted of Puthod's Division of the V Corps, and the 2nd Cavalry Corps, both of which were still on the Lower Elbe. With this command Ney was to cross the Elbe at Torgau, and hold himself ready to move either up the right bank of the Elbe to Dresden or direct on Berlin as circumstances might dictate.

The Emperor seems to have counted on Saxon co-operation from the first, for Reynier's Corps on paper comprised the two Saxon Divisions, at that time forming under General Thielman the garrison of Torgau, and he was disagreeably surprised when on May 7 news reached him that Torgau refused to open its gates, alleging specific orders from the King of Saxony, and simultaneously that the King himself had abandoned Dresden and withdrawn to Prague, taking with him all his heavy bodyguard Cavalry. Prague being in Austrian territory made the matter doubly awkward.

A messenger of the Diplomatic Staff was at once sent post haste after the fugitive, with an ultimatum giving the King six hours to decide whether he would adhere to the alliance still existing between himself and the Emperor, order Torgau to surrender, at once and return to his capital, or see Dresden and his country treated as conquered territory forthwith.

Meanwhile the Allies were resolutely contesting every mile of the French advance, and the operations of Miloradowitch's column are a model for rear guard Commanders to study. Only a resolute push from the southward by the IV Corps could have hastened matters, but this was one of the Italian Corps, and its men were poor marchers, from want of sufficient discipline. On August 8 the advance guard of the French Army with the Emperor's Headquarters entered Dresden; only to see the last of the Russian troops filing over the bridge to the Neustadt, the suburb on the right bank of the Elbe, and immediately afterwards two spans of the bridge were blown into the air, leaving gaps of 140 feet to repair. Unfortunately for the Allies, the demolition charges were put in too high up, thus the lower tiers of the bridge piles were left untouched, and the work of reconstruction was markedly facilitated.

The French had taken six days to cover 80 miles, an average which fell far short of Napoleon's usual

idea of a day's march in pursuit, viz. seven to eight leagues, i.e. 21 to 24 miles.

Passage of the Elbe

All the boats on the river had been systematically destroyed or removed, and though the pontonniers were at hand, the pontoons were still fifteen marches in the rear. Hence recourse had to be taken to rafts of timber and other improvised material, which led to many delays. Even anchors had to be improvised out of rough timber cases filled with stones. The Emperor, finding it impossible to reconstruct the main bridge in face of the Russian guns and musketry from the Neustadt, decided to force a passage lower down the river at a convenient re-entering bend near Briesnitz; and this gave rise to one of the classic examples of the passage of a river under fire. The Russians held the opposite bank with Infantry and some sixty guns, but the French brought up eighty, and taking the whole salient bend of the stream, and the plain beyond it, under a convergent fire, soon obtained a fire superiority, under cover of which a few parties of Infantry were first put across. Then the pontonniers, sheltered by the actual bank of the river from direct vision, managed to float their rafts into position and complete the roadway.

At the same time another attempt to secure a footing on the right bank at Neustadt was made. Twenty guns unlimbered on the well-known terrace of Brühl, and protected by their fire, 300 Voltigeurs of the Guard managed to cross on the few boats which had escaped the general destruction, and seized a strongly built stone building covering the exit from the permanent bridge. Upon this the Russians began to evacuate the suburb, seemingly without sufficient justification. The repair of the bridge was at once put in hand, and on the afternoon of the 10th, a few men of Charpentier's Division passed the principal breach in the bridge by means of long fire-escape ladders.

As soon as it became clear that the passage at Briesnitz had been won, orders were issued to the XI, IV and VI Corps to prepare to cross on the morrow (May 10). But in the night a flood came down the river, carrying with it great quantities of drift wood, the bridge was swept away, and a further delay of some thirty-six hours was thus occasioned.

For the moment, therefore, the outlook for the French was gloomy, for not a single standing bridge over the river was in their hands. Besides which the same flood that had swept away the bridge at Briesnitz had increased their difficulties everywhere else. Fortunately, the messenger despatched to the King of Saxony at Prague returned very opportunely with orders to Thielman to hand over the fortress of Torgau.

Accordingly, during the course of May 11, troops entered the town and Reynier was at last in a position to take over his two Saxon Divisions.

Occupation of Torgau

This move, however, did not pass off without friction. Thielman, who was most bitterly opposed to the French had left for Dresden before they arrived, and throughout the period of his command he had done his best to promote a German spirit amongst his men and officers, therefore a good deal of re-organization was necessary before the Saxons could be induced to march under their new masters. Reynier's report to Ney (given in *Foucart*, p. 137) is amusing in its querulousness, and his troubles did not end there, because an epidemic, "nervous fever" (probably "influenza") had broken out, so that it was inadvisable to quarter troops in the town. Neither Victor's nor Sebastiani's Corps had arrived, they were indeed still some seven days' march away, their advance being constantly harassed by partisan raids based on Bülow's Corps, and it was fortunate that the Allies had already set out on their further retreat, as Ney had only Durutte's Division of the VII Corps and his own III Corps, of reliable troops, at his disposal.

Retreat of the Allies

Much ill feeling had developed between the Prussians and Russians during the retreat to Dresden, of which Napoleon was kept duly informed by rumours collected by his advance patrols. It seems that this ill feeling had penetrated even to the Supreme Command, for the Prussians actually began their march on May 9, from Meissen on Groszenhayn, i.e. towards Berlin, whilst the Russians from Neustadt took the road to Radeberg and Breslau. But on the 10th wiser counsels prevailed, and leaving the protection of Berlin to Bülow and his partisans, King Frederick William directed his troops, by the road through Kamenz towards Bautzen, where the Russians had preceded him. Here the two Sovereigns decided to make a further stand, and proceeded to fortify their position.

Napoleon's Headquarters remained in Dresden from May 8 to 17, the time being utilized to re-organize his troops and incorporate into the several Corps the reinforcements completed since the opening of hostilities, and now on their way to join him.

On May 12, Prince Eugène received the following order, which those who have followed his progress so far must admit to have been fully deserved:

"My Son,—Start to-night for Munich, and from thence proceed to Italy, where you will take over the command of all my troops in that country, and the Illyrian Provinces. It is my intention to form an Army of observation of between eighty and ninety Battalions, half French, half Italian."

The Army of the Elbe was now broken up, its Corps being absorbed by the Grand Army under the personal command of the Emperor. The following table gives its composition on May 15.

	Divisions.	Batts.	Squdrns.	Batteries.	Men.
IV Corps Bertrand	Morand (French) . . . Peyri (Italian) . . . Franquemont (Würtemberg)	34	4	7	25,000
VI Corps Marmont	Bouet (French) . . . Compans ,, . . . Frederich ,, . . .	39	4	20	22,000

	Divisions.	Batts.	Squdrns.	Batteries.	Men.
XI Corps	Gérard, Fressinet, Charpentier (French and Italian mixed)	31	2	8	17,000
XII Corps	Lorencez (French) . . Pachtod ,, . . . Raglovich (Bavarian) .	33	0	7	24,000
Guards	Old Guard . . . . 2 Divisions Young Guards Dumoustier and Barrois	6 25–30	— —	— 14	4,000 15,000
Guard Cavalry		—	20	3	4,000
1st Cav. Corps Latour Maubourg	Bruyère— 8 French Regiments = 12,000 men 1 Regiment Italian Chasseurs 2,400 2 Regts. Saxons Division Chatel— 1,800 French detached to V Corps . . . Division Heavy Cavalry . Division Bourdesoulles— 6 French Regts., 1,200 2 Saxon Regts., 1,200 Division Doumerc— 6 French Regts. 1,200 1 Neapolitan Regt. 1,000	—	45–50	4	9,800
			Total . . .		115,000

Army under Marshal Ney.

	Divisions	Batts.	Squdrns.	Batteries.	Men.
III Corps Ney	Souham . . . . . Delmas . . . . . Albert . . . . . . Ricard	66	8	12	30,000
V Corps Lauriston	Maisons, Lagrange, Rochambeau (French) . Puthod (mixed . . .	30 14	— —	10 2	19,000 8,000
VII Corps Reynier	Durutte (French) . . .	16	1	2	9,500
II Corps Victor	Sohr (Saxon) . . . . 1st and 4th French Divisions	22	—	2	13,000
Châtel's Division of Light Cavalry detached from 1st Cavalry Corps to march with V Corps, 1,800 men .		—	9	—	1,800
II Cavalry Corps. Sebastiani . .		—	15	—	3,000
			Total . . .		84,000

The two Armies together totalled 200,000 men, but were evidently a very heterogeneous collection, particularly weak in Cavalry, and guns for all the Batteries were not complete, so that the proportion was barely 2 instead of the normal 3 per thousand bayonets, but the Allies had received far fewer reinforcements, and on the morning of the battle of Bautzen could not dispose of more than 110,000 over the whole theatre of operations, of which only 90,000 could by any possibility take part in the fighting.

Dresden as a Base

Simultaneously, whilst re-organizing the Army, the Emperor's attention was directed to the preparation of Dresden as a base of operations.

Three bridges were completed with their approaches and defences, and hospitals, magazines, etc., were all prepared; that is to say, orders were given to that effect, but subsequent events make it doubtful whether they were all obeyed.

The following *routes de l'Armée* were decreed.

1st. Main road from Mainz to Dresden, by Frankfurt, Fulda, Erfurt, Weimar; with two branches, one by Jena to Altenburg; the other by Naumburg and Leipzig.

2nd. A branch from Leipzig to Wittenberg.

3rd. A branch from Augsburg to Altenburg by Nuremberg, Bamberg Schleiz and Gera.

The Augsburg–Würzburg road was suppressed. Halting-places were arranged every six leagues (18 miles) and troops moving along the roads were given one day's rest for six to seven day's marching.

As Col. Lanrezac, whose account I am here following almost textually, points out, the suppression of the links from Erfurt to Dresden *via* Altenburg and of the Würzburg road was not altogether wise, for partisans continually interfered with the Leipzig line, and orders had to be issued that detachments should march in bodies not less than 500 strong, with all due military precautions.

The main road from Dresden to Bautzen runs across the many forest-clad spurs which descend from the crest of the Riesengebirge. The country was sparsely cultivated and always inhospitable, whilst every day's delay gained by the resistance of their rear guards was employed by the Allies to drive off cattle and forage. The fact that the two Armies, after passing the Elbe, had utilized every available road, and covered their retreat with Cossacks, made it very difficult for Napoleon to decide on the true direction they had adopted. The troops that had gone north to Groszenhayn might very well have been sent to join Bülow before Berlin; hence the Emperor hesitated before making a final decision, and on May 13, he wrote a letter to Ney, which shows clearly what was in his mind.

Pursuit of the Allies

"I cannot yet see clearly what the Prussians are doing; it is certain that the Russians are retreating on Breslau; but the Prussians—are they also retiring to that town, or have they thrown themselves on Berlin, *as seems natural, to defend their capital*? The reports I expect to-night will clear the matter up. You will understand that with the considerable forces at your disposal there can be no question of sitting down with folded hands. To relieve Glogau, to occupy Berlin, so that the Prince d' Eckmühl (Davoût) can re-occupy Hamburg, and advance with his five Divisions (he had only three) through Pomerania to seize Berlin, these are the three objects I propose to attain during the month. By the position I have assigned to you, we shall always be able to concentrate and move either to the right or left according to circumstances."

According to the orders already sent to him, Ney would occupy on May 16, with the III Corps and his own Headquarters, Luckau, with the V Corps Dobrilugh, VII Corps Dahme and the II Corps with 2nd Cavalry Corps, Schönwald. The centre of this group is about seventy miles from Dresden. Bautzen is thirty-five miles from Dresden, and about sixty from Luckau; and in view of the fact that the Allies in their own country were always well informed of the French movements, the temptation to move behind the screen of forest land to deliver a stroke on Ney with the whole united Army, must have been great for the Prussians, for they at least could change their base from Silesia to Berlin. But Napoleon gauged the consequences of the Alliance correctly, and though he certainly expected that the latter would try to cover their capital (in which case Ney could easily hold them till he arrived in person) he was convinced that the conflicting interests of the two parties could never be reconciled sufficiently to admit of concerted action.

Meanwhile, as we have already seen, the IV, VI, and XI Corps had crossed the Elbe on the 11th, and on the same day Macdonald's Corps (XI) overtook the Russian rear guard under Miloradowitch at Weissig, on the road to Stolpen, and a sharp action resulted. The Russians withdrew as night came on, and took post at Bischofswerda, where they were again attacked by Macdonald. The fighting on this day was very serious; the village itself was burnt to the ground, and though the Russians again retreated, morning found them only a few miles east of the position they had abandoned, and quite ready to renew the action. For the next two days the French remained watching them whilst the IV Corps (Bertrand) moved by the main road towards Bautzen as far as Königsbrück, encountering only Cossacks, the VI Corps (Marmont), following in second line to Reichenburg.

French Difficulties of Supply

Supplies, however, immediately began to create difficulties, and the complaints of the Marshals against the barbarous methods of the enemy in clearing the country read quaintly from the very men who had first set the example of making "war support war" under other conditions.

The Cossacks, backed by Prussian Light Cavalry, also began to make themselves troublesome, and on the 12th, detachments reached the Elbe near Meissen from Groszenhayn necessitating the dispatch of Latour Maubourg's Cavalry and a supporting force of Infantry to keep communication open with Ney.

The degree of insecurity produced by these raids is indicated by the fact that all important dispatches were now sent off in triplicate, and were frequently entrusted to friendly Saxons in disguise, whilst all provisions had to be sent up to the front in convoy under escort. In six days *nearly one-third of the Cavalry horses* were broken down from want of forage.

By midnight on the 13th, all doubts as to the direction of the Prussian retreat were set at rest by the comparison of the reconnaissance reports sent in during the previous forty-eight hours, but whether the two armies now reunited at Bautzen would stand their ground or retreat further to Breslau required to be cleared up.

Orders for 14th May

With this object, the following orders were issued at 4 a.m. on the 14th.

The XI Corps remains in position at Bischofswerda.

The IV Corps by Kamenz, advance guard to Kloster Marienstern on the way to Bautzen.

The VI Corps closes up to Frankenthal (three miles west of Bischofswerda).

The XII Corps by Weissig to Fischbach.

Imperial Guard to remain in and around Dresden.

On the 15th, Macdonald (XI) resuming his advance beyond Bischofswerda encountered the Russian rear guard at Göda, and after hard fighting drove it back till he came within sight of Bautzen, and the camps of the Allies about that place.

To the north the IV Corps also came within touch of the enemy about Bautzen and established communication with Macdonald on its right. The VI and XII also closed up in support.

It now seemed clear that the enemy intended to receive battle, for numerous entrenchments were observed on the heights above Bautzen, and the inhabitants reported the arrival of reinforcements to join the Allied Forces.

Instructions to Ney

In order to complete the defeat of the Allies at Bautzen, it was Napoleon's intention to send Ney with his III Corps to join the troops already assembled there. Berthier was directed to inform Ney in due course, but by some misunderstanding he failed to make it clear to Ney that the order issued by the Emperor's command was merely a "Corps," and not an "Army" order. Berthier had forgotten that Ney was in command of the whole force, as well as his own special Corps (III). Very naturally, when Ney received his order to advance, knowing the importance of the coming engagement, he took with him on the 17th 85,000 men, including Victor with the II and VII Corps. The Emperor had intended on the 14th to send definite orders to Victor to advance from Lückau towards Berlin, but the matter was somehow overlooked, and only on the 18th was the omission rectified; an illuminating instance of Staff management in the Grand Army as it was. Such an oversight would be inconceivable in a continental Staff nowadays.

Meanwhile, twenty-four hours later, the Emperor changed his mind again, and Ney received an order to take Victor and the VII Corps with him (II Corps understood, as that was Victor's special command). Now Victor had already marched with Ney, but Ney having started in a single column his 85,000 men were strung out over thirty miles of highway. Had Napoleon been marching to fight, in order to get his men up as quickly as possible, and as nearly as might be close together, he would have marched them in masses of Divisions, with only the guns on the roads. Under these conditions he would have had his troops up to the point whence they could deploy into the fighting lines in far less time, and with less confusion, than men marching in column could have been handled. Victor with his 35,000 being in rear of Ney's troops could not get past to obey the Emperor's order as sent to him, and failed in consequence to reach the battlefield until after the Allies had made good their retreat from the field of Bautzen.

On the morning of the 18th, Ney's troops occupied the following positions:—

V Corps (3 Divisions) at Leutenberg

III Corps and Headquarters at Kahlau.

VII Corps and Headquarters at Lückau.

II Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Corps at Dahme.

Napoleon's Orders 18th May

On the same day the Emperor left Dresden with the Guards for Harthau, half way to Bautzen, and before starting wrote the accompanying letter for Berthier (the "Major-General," as he was always called).

"Dresden, 4 a.m., 18th May.

"Send orders to the Duc de Treviso (Mortier) and to General Latour Maubourg, to move to-morrow to Bischofswerda.

"As soon as the head of his column arrives, the Duc de Reggio (Oudinot) will deploy into line of battle. Reiterate the order to him to occupy Neukirch, and the positions on the right, so as to make sure that no enemy remains in those forests.

"Send orders also to General Latour Maubourg to search out all the country to the right and actively pursue any Cossacks he may find on the roads from Neustadt to Neukirch.

"Order the Old Guard with the reserves of Artillery to start from 4 to 8 a.m., and make a day's march on the Bautzen road.

"Give orders to Barrois' Division (Young Guard) to hold itself ready to move off at 11 a.m. I think it will be necessary to distribute a pound of rice to each soldier of the Old Guard and of Barrois' Division; that will make a reserve for four days in case of a block amongst the transport.

"Reiterate the order to General Bertrand (IV Corps) to place himself in communication with General Lauriston (V Corps) and the Prince de la Moskova, who are due to-day at Königswerda.

"I suppose the Field Headquarters have started; send on everything necessary for a day of battle."

Comment

I have cited this order as typical; for the total absence of any form, its want of precision, and the way in which points to be attended to are jotted down almost at random, gives one the insight necessary to appreciate the peculiar functions of the "Major-General" in the machinery of the whole Army. It was his duty to comb out and disentangle these ideas, and transmit them with the necessary additions, to their several addresses, and the slightest want of form or courtesy in the final order seems often to have been bitterly resented by the recipients.[1] When in addition to these sources of friction, the uncertainty and irregularity in the arrival of the orders themselves at their destination is taken into consideration, one can only marvel at the high average of success which this almost casual staff service attained. The chief explanation, of course, is *that the whole Army, Emperor and Marshals, were so accustomed to War and its chances that the latter "played the game" on a mere indication from their chief*—but as events will presently show, *that indication was the essential factor in the whole matter.*

We have seen above that mistakes and delay in the receipt of orders had thrown Ney's command twenty-four hours behindhand in the whole combination. On the morning of the 19th his troops resumed their march in accordance with the orders written on the 17th, but received on the evening of May 18, but these were so laconic, and conveyed so little information as to the position of the enemy, that Ney misunderstood their purport altogether, and his columns were actually heading for a position in the left rear of the Grand Army, instead, as intended, to the right rear of the enemy.

Counter Attack by the Allies

Fortunately the unexpected action of the Allies interfered to prevent this *contretemps*. They had determined to strike a blow at the converging columns outside the zone of their position, and to this end a force of 18,000 men of all arms under Barclay de Tolly and York set out very early in the morning, and news of their approach being given to General Lauriston (V Corps) he closed up his troops for action and brought up their right shoulders to meet them.

This movement left the flank of the IV Corps exposed, and its outermost Division (Peyri's Italians), marching in to Königswartha without proper precaution, was suddenly overwhelmed and severely handled.

The further advance of the V Corps, however, disengaged them, and York and Barclay fell back in the night on their main position. But the unexpected attack completely upset Ney, who now drew up his troops for the night facing east, instead of south, as he had originally intended doing; and in notifying the fight to Napoleon he stated his intention to fall back on Buchwald if the attack were renewed in the morning. In that event, he begged that support should be sent him from the IV Corps on his right. Nothing could serve better to show how completely Ney misunderstood his own rôle, and the whole conception underlying the Napoleonic system; but fortunately further orders to continue his march via Klix reached him in sufficient time to avert misfortune.

Napoleon Reconnoitres Bautzen.

The Emperor in the meanwhile had reached the Grand Army in front of Bautzen and had reconnoitred the enemy's position as far as it was visible. During the afternoon of the 19th the positions of the several Corps of the Grand Army were corrected for the battle expected on the following day.

The enemy held the line of the Spree with strong outposts, and as before said many entrenchments were visible on the heights to the westward. Bautzen itself, with its mediæval ramparts, was strongly held, and north of the village or townlet a succession of inundations and ponds rendered access to the position beyond somewhat difficult. South of the town the stream rapidly decreased in depth as it neared its sources in the main-chain of the Bohemian frontier; on the other hand its banks became steep and in some places precipitous, whilst numerous patches of forest rendered concealment easy on either side.

Recognizing that such ground suited to perfection the tactics which all Europe had come to consider the especial characteristic of the French Infantry, the Allies from the first regarded this wing, i.e. their left, as the most exposed to attack, and feeling its weakness, had prepared a second position about three miles in rear of the Spree, indicated by the line of the Blossauer Wasser, a small affluent of the Spree, where more open ground on their own side gave greater facility of manœuvre, particularly for their Cavalry, which formed their main strength. The right wing of the Allies rested on a group of small kopjes about two miles north-east of Bautzen, and throughout the position villages had been fortified, and redoubts and batteries erected.

Wittgenstein, who still officiated as Commander-in-Chief, had determined to fight a defensive-offensive battle within his prepared position—and his voluminous orders provided for every possible contingency, *except the one that arose.* The extreme front of the position was about 15,000 yards, altogether too great for the 85,000 men, which seems an outside estimate of the numbers actually available for its defence.

Owing to the various *contretemps* which had arisen in Ney's command, the Emperor had a difficult problem to adjust. Barclay's reconnaissance in force of the previous day must have completely enlightened the Allies as to their danger if they continued to hold their ground. On the other hand, a direct assault on their carefully prepared position could only be attended with very heavy sacrifice, and the Emperor was in no position to throw away men for anything but the prospect of an adequate return.

Remembering his previous experience of Russian methods, he could not overlook the very great possibility of their retreat during the night if he neglected to hold them during the day. His only chance, therefore, of holding them lay in involving them in such a severe fight that it would be difficult for them to break it off and retire under cover of darkness. With this object the morning of the 20th was spent in ostentatious movements of the centre of the Army—which in itself was not numerically imposing enough to frighten the enemy off his ground, whilst they on the extreme left and Oudinot on the right moved into their positions under cover.

About 4 p.m. he put his troops in motion, and whilst sending Oudinot (XII Corps) against his enemy's left, he advanced the remainder of his Army down to the river, and under cover of a tremendous cannonade threw trestle bridges across the stream and drove in all the enemy's outposts.

So far this was exactly what the Allies wanted. Their hope had been throughout to induce the French to cross over to their side of the Spree, and then to attack out of their prepared and concealed position on the Blossauer Wasser. They had also succeeded in rather more than holding their own against Oudinot's attack on their left, and no sign of danger from Ney's troops on the north had as yet become apparent. They, therefore, reinforced their left and determined to continue the battle next day.

Napoleon's Orders for the Battle of Bautzen

This was what Napoleon had anticipated and as the arrival of Ney on their right was now certain, he fully expected a victory on the grandest scale. Making every allowance for possible delays *en route*, he ordered Ney to continue his movement via Klix on Preititz, a position well in rear of the enemy's right, and to be there at 11 a.m. Then between 11 a.m. and noon, the general attack would be delivered along the whole line. Meanwhile, Oudinot, reinforced by part of the XI Corps, was to advance against the enemy's left at daybreak, and push the attack home. The centre of the Army was to stand fast until the Emperor gave the word.

Thus the battle began with renewed fury on the Allied left, and the Royal Headquarters rode out to a little knoll near Baschütz, from whence they overlooked the whole of Napoleon's centre, and could watch the progress of the struggle on their left. Their view to the right (north-west) appears to have been interrupted by the ground, in any case their attention was completely absorbed by the scene in front of them. For very soon the French attack began to be held, and presently it was clear that the Russians were making headway. In the excitement of the moment, reports from Barclay on their right appear to have been neglected, at any rate no sufficient attention was paid to them. Here Ney was driving everything before him with overwhelming numbers, and away beyond his left, heavy masses of troops, the V Corps, were showing.

By 10 a.m. Ney had reached Preititz, but his orders told him to be there at 11 a.m. Unfortunately a roll of the ground hid him from Napoleon, who had ridden forward to a low kopje near, and being left without guidance Ney concluded to wait until the appointed time for his appearance. This delay saved the Allies, for now their danger became apparent to them and orders were issued to retreat, but the troops actually in contact with the enemy were to resist as long as was practicable.

The consequent slackening of resistance along the centre did not escape Napoleon, who in the interval had brought up the Guards for the decisive blow, and about 3 p.m. he gave the signal for the final advance. Meanwhile Ney had become absorbed in the fight raging to his right front, and entirely forgetting his instructions to continue his march from Preititz on Weissenburg, a point well on the line of retreat of the Allies, he made his troops bring up their left shoulders and advanced almost south-west across the field. The French converged on the plateau —— just as the Prussians who had hitherto held it had received orders to retreat. As the several French columns rose above the slopes they found themselves face to face with one another. The jaws of the trap had closed, but they held nothing between them, for the Prussians had vanished unseen. These incidents are not infrequent on manœuvre grounds, and take some time even then to straighten out. In the confusion incident to the close range fighting of a century ago. the scene which ensued can be imagined, not described.

This was the opportunity of the Allies, and they seized it. Covered by their excellent Cavalry they withdrew in order, and with all possible rapidity, and by nightfall were far on their way towards Görlitz, leaving for the second time not a single trophy to grace the conqueror's victory.

Napoleon's Second Failure

Situated politically as Napoleon was, this second failure to reap the rewards of a crushing success was almost as disastrous as an actual defeat. With 200,000 men at his disposal—170,000 of whom had actually appeared upon the field, he had failed to capture a single gun or stand of colours. The Allies with less than half his force had resisted all his efforts to beat them for two whole days, and though the reason of this resistance was clear enough to him, he could hardly explain the fact away without seriously damaging the prestige of his Army and its Commanders. His one chance of retrieving the situation lay in a rapid and relentless pursuit, which he immediately initiated. But the heart was out of his Army. His men had not seen their enemy beaten. The failure of the last great blow which should have shattered the "*moral*" of the Allies beyond retrieval, and turned them from a fighting Army into a frightened flock of sheep, exalting the courage of the victors in proportion as the panic reaction spread through the flying masses, had robbed the French troops of the chief stimulus for further exertion, and they stumbled on blindly, too weary to guard themselves efficiently against possible attack. Each day of the pursuit brought fresh and bitter experience. On May 22, finding the enemy in position just beyond Reichenberg, instead of *dashing* at them with the old confidence and *élan*, they halted to manœuvre them out of position, and Napoleon galloping up at the moment, impatient at the way his men were checking, sent forward Latour Maubourg's Cavalry who were suddenly ambushed by a couple of Russian Horse Artillery batteries, and before they could recover from the surprise, they were charged and very roughly handled [1] by the Allied cavalry. The sudden engagement had to take its course, and after a stubborn fight the Russian rear guard, having gained all possible time, began its retirement. Reynier, whose Corps (VII) had been making forced marches four days running, now begged for authority to halt and rest his men. But Napoleon only ordered him forward, though he had yielded to a similar appeal less well founded, after the battle of Eckmühl in 1809. A few moments later a spent cannon ball struck down Marshal Duroc, his most faithful and devoted friend. The shock upset even the Emperor's iron nerve; he was profoundly affected, and ordered the firing to cease. That night the Allies bivouacked about Görlitz.

The French Pursuit

On the 23rd, the pursuit was continued, and on the following days also. Each time the Emperor demanded another 20 miles, which the troops were too worn out to accomplish.

Dissensions Amongst the Allies

On the side of the Allies the outlook was also far from promising. They had lost on the battlefield about 20,000 men, and what was worse, all confidence in each other and in their leader had departed. Wittgenstein's position had become impossible. He offered his resignation, which was accepted, and Barclay de Tolly was appointed to the chief command in his place. But this scarcely mended matters. Barclay, of Scots extraction, as his name sufficiently indicates, took a very cool and level-headed view of the situation, and refused altogether to satisfy the patriotic but impracticable longings of the Prussians for another battle. The troops were far too spent for there to be any prospect of success were they allowed to fight, and a thorough reorganization was essential, but when the opportunity for that might arrive remained very doubtful.

The Surprise of Haynau

On May 26, the Prussian Cavalry, under Blücher, prepared an ambush for the V Corps, which formed the advance guard of the French Left Column. It had been observed marching without adequate precaution, and Maison's Division, which led the march, was ridden into and dispersed. Then the French grew more cautious, but Napoleon had already reopened negotiations begun after Lützen for an armistice on the basis of *uti possidetis*. He, therefore, felt it necessary to press on and occupy Breslau. After leaving the line of the Katzbach at Leignitz and Goldberg, the Allies had bent away to the south-east, by Jauer on Schweidnitz, leaving the road to Breslau open, and in the course of June 1, the French entered that town, whilst the Allies concentrated on Schweidnitz. The indomitable energy of the Emperor had again triumphed over all obstacles, and if the Allies stood their ground, as in fact they had resolved to do, it would seem, from the map, that their doom was certain. The French stood on a front of 30 miles from Jauer to Breslau, and in thirty-six hours must have penned them against the Austrian frontier.

The Armistice

It was probably this fact which induced the Emperor finally to agree to the Armistice, a step in his career which has received more unfavourable criticism than any other.

Want of Cavalry was the principal military reason which Napoleon put forward in explanation of his consent to an Armistice, and his German critics, notably Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, have always maintained that this reason was insufficient to justify his conduct. This, however, I submit, is because they have systematically viewed this Cavalry question from the standpoint of its reconnoitring value, and not from that of its "victory completing" power.

Comments

Situated as he now was, it must have been quite clear to the Emperor, after the experiences of Lützen and Bautzen, that he could no longer hope to win a really decisive battle, such as would of itself bring the War to a close. His Artillery might tear out gaps in the enemy's line with case fire, but in face of the enemy's superior Cavalry, his Infantry could only avail themselves of the lanes of death thus formed by marching in dense columns, ready to form square at a moment's notice. This, he knew, meant delay, which the enemy utilized to break off the fighting. If he could afford to wait for six weeks he could make good this deficiency in the proportion of the Cavalry arm. It would also enable him, not only to fill up the gaps in the existing Corps, due to battle and sickness (principally to the latter—there were 90,000 sick on the morning states of the first week in June), but he could place new Corps now in process of formation in his fighting line, and thus bring up his available field forces to a figure that the Allies, even with Austria included, could hardly hope to exceed. If then, Napoleon could once involve the whole Army of the Allies in a single decisive battle, he had every reason for expecting to end the War by a single blow, for his superiority as a Leader rose relatively to the command on the side of his enemies, almost in proportion to the numbers to be controlled. In other words, he, with his Marshals under his own eye, on one battlefield with 200,000 might safely be trusted to make fewer mistakes than would his opponents at the head of an equal number, and the greater the numbers to be handled, the better his chances of necessity became.

Actually the conduct of operations by his adversaries, as we shall presently see, never gave him his hoped-for opportunity, but at the time it was impossible for him to forecast this.

To make the picture of the Emperor's situation complete, it must be remembered that he had left Dresden with only ammunition enough for "*un jour de bataille*," and his march had been so rapid that his trains could not overtake the troops; and further that Oudinot (the Duke of Reggio), who had been detached after Bautzen to cover the French rear from the direction of Berlin, was facing Bülow near Luckau, and was in fact, badly beaten by him on June 9, before the news of the Armistice could reach either side. Further Tschernitschew's Cossacks had dispersed a regiment of provisional Cavalry on May 25, near Halle, and had captured on the 30th a convoy of Artillery and its escort of 1,600 men near Halberstadt. In addition to this Woronzow, who had been left behind to observe Magdeburg, had made a descent on Leipzig, and was actually driving the French garrison out of its gates when news of the Armistice, arriving very opportunely, put a stop to the fighting. The two most important of these incidents happened after the Armistice, it is true, but they suffice to show how very real were the dangers to which the French lines of communication were exposed.

The Armistice—French Preparations for the Autumn Campaign

The French Army in August

The foundations of the new Grand Army were laid, as we have already seen, by Napoleon's Decree of the 12th March. All the Corps therein provided for could not be made ready for the field in time to take part in the operations beyond Dresden in May, but an enormous

number of conscripts were already on the march before the Armistice, principally belonging to the levy of 1813, but embodying also many recalcitrants (*réfractaires*)[1] of previous years, and these sufficed to fill the ranks of all the existing Corps, at the front, as well as to complete the I, II, XIII, and XIV Corps, whose formation had scarcely been begun when their Headquarters were hurried up to the front. The Cavalry Corps were also brought up to full strength or nearly so; hence at the close of the Armistice the French Army stood in the following order[1]:—

		Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Men.
The Guards		62	59	218 =	58,191
I Corps.	Vandamme	42	4	76 =	33,298
II „	Victor	43	6	76 =	25,158
III „	Ney	62	11	122 =	40,006
IV „	Bertrand	36	8	72 =	23,663
V „	Lauriston	37	7	74 =	27,907
VI „	Marmont	42	8	84 =	27,754
VII „	Reynier	33¼	13	68 =	21,283
VIII „	Poniatowski[2] (Poles)	10	6	44 =	7,573
XI „	Macdonald	38	7	90 =	24,418
XII „	Oudinot	30	14	58 =	19,324
XIII „	Davoût	47	15	76 =	37,514
XIV „	St. Cyr (Gouvion)	51	12	92 =	26,411
					372,236
Cavalry Corps					
1st Cavalry Corps.	Latour Maubourg	78		36 =	16,537
2nd „ „	Sebastiani	52		18 =	10,304
3rd „ „	Arighi	27		24 =	6,000
4th „ „	Kellermann	24		12 =	3,923
5th „ „	L'Héritier	20		6 =	4,000
					40,764

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Men.
Girard's Corps	10	16	28 =	15,000
Artillery and Engineers, Reserve Park	—	—	— =	8,010
Corps of Observation at Leipzig. General Margaron	10	8	10 =	7,800

Grand total of Field Troops—558¼ battalions, 395 squadrons, 1,284 guns = 442,810 men.

In the above list the numbers IX and X are omitted; the former was reserved for the Bavarian Corps (Wrede) and was subsequently transferred to the Corps of Augereau, still in process of formation, and the latter under Rapp formed the garrison of Danzig.

Garrison of Fortresses on the Elbe, exclusive of field troops in the command.

Hamburg	12,000
Bremen	1,500
Magdeburg	3,250
Wittenberg	2,318
Torgau	2,000
Dresden	5,000
Total on the Elbe	26,068

Second Line Troops.

Lemoine's Division at Minden	5,460
Augereau's Corps, about	10,000
Cavalry Corps Milhaud, in formation	2,500
Bavarian Corps, Wrede	25,000
	42,960

Garrisons of Fortresses in Poland and Germany.

Danzig	25,000
Zamoscz	4,000
Modlin	3,000
Stettin	8,500
Küstrin	4,000
Glogau	5,500
Erfurt	1,874
Würzburg	2,500
	55,374

Add to all these reinforcements on their way to the frontier, sick and wounded in hospital, troops of the Bavarian and Westphalian contingents, not included in the above, and the grand total of all cannot well fall short of 700,000, available more or less within the German theatre of operations.

On the whole the average quality of the troops must be considered as somewhat better than those that fought at Lützen, even though the age of the conscripts who had filled up the gaps in the field Army was fractionally lower. The troops had fully recovered their confidence in the Emperor; the weakest elements in *moral* and physique alike had been eliminated and the remaining cadres of old war-seasoned non-commissioned officer's and men readily absorbed their contingent of recruits, and imbued them with their own rigorously trained spirit. It must be remembered that no man reached the ranks with less than ninety days' training, sixty of which at least had been spent on the line of march, and the physically weak had been removed by the process of the survival of the fittest.

The Cavalry, however, were still the weakest point in Napoleon's organization. They were, as a whole, miserably mounted on horses not broken but broken down, though they possessed some leaders of the highest quality, who knew their men and their work (de Brac; for instance) and their exploits at Dresden and Leipzig prove that under competent commanders they were still capable of efficient service.

The Artillery was always excellent, and in spite of deficient horse supply showed a uniform superiority over that of the Allies.

The greatest advantage that the French possessed over the Allies lay not alone in the incontestable superiority of the Emperor himself, whether as strategist or tactician, but in the uniform war experience of the Marshals, their Divisional Commanders, Staff and subaltern officers.

The Armies of the Allies

The condition of the Allied troops when for the time hostilities ceased was little if at all better than that of their opponents. Battalions had shrunk, in some cases to 200 men and even less, and the survivors were spent with the constant strain of marching and fighting. But the Prussians at least were in the heart of their own country, and knew that they were fighting for very existence. The Russians on the whole were older men, of longer service, and far more accustomed to hardship and privation. The men had forgotten, if indeed they had ever known, any other tie but that of the Regiment, and as long as that held together they were at home in the only "home" they were capable of realizing. Moreover, they recovered from the depression due to their heavy, almost daily, losses with the fatalism peculiar to their race.

The Prussian Army

The losses of the Prussian field troops were made good by recruits with an average of about three months under arms; and since all were filled with the same spirit of goodwill for the service and a fierce desire to close with the enemy, these new drafts were soon assimilated by the war-seasoned ranks of the older men.

By the end of July, the Landwehr also were sufficiently ready for the field. Under normal circumstances they would certainly not have passed the easiest of reviewing officers, for in many cases the front rank was armed only with pikes, their clothing was anything but regulation, and their foot gear beneath contempt. But events proved, as they so often have done before and since, that a regulation equipment is not absolutely essential for men who really wish to conquer their enemies, therefore once these rough troops had become accustomed to their new surroundings, they did excellent service. In all they made up 37 Regiments in 149 Battalions (*Friedrich*, ii, 43), averaging about 680 men; so that we may count them in round numbers as 100,000.

The Cavalry of the Landwehr seems to have been on the whole markedly better than its Infantry, but according to the Cavalry officers of the old Army, they were quite deplorable. They were always willing to charge, but the difficulty was to rally them, and Marwitz, in his diary has many anecdotes about them.[1] But the spirit was in them, and they were about as good as the bulk of their opponents. Altogether they supplied 116 squadrons of a total strength of about 10,000 men. Adding Artillery and Engineers, the grand total of armed men available amounted to about 275,000, to which some 25,000 reinforcements joined during the campaign, must be added.[2]

These numbers were organized in the following manner (*Friedrich*, ii, 47):—

Field Army.

		Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Men.
(*a*) In Silesia—					
	The Guards	6½	8	16 =	7,091
	I Corps. Yorck	45	44	104 =	38,484
	II „ Kleist	41	44	112 =	37,816
(*b*) In Brandenburg—					
	III Corps. Bülow	40½	42	80 =	41,135
	IV „ Tauentzien	48½	29	42 =	33,170
	The Partisans of Lützow, Reiche and Schill	4	7	8 =	4,068
		185½	174	362 =	161,764

Siege Troops.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Men.
For Blockade of Küstrin	9	5	8 =	7,122
„ „ Stettin	15	7	8 =	10,548
„ „ Danzig	10	6	8 =	8,000
„ „ Glogau	9	4	16 =	5,000
	43	22	40 =	30,670

Grand total of troops actually organized: 228½ battalions, 196 squadrons, 402 guns = 192,434 men.

Russian Army

The total number of Russian troops on German territory at the conclusion of the Armistice amounted to 296,000 men, grouped as follows:—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Cossack Regts.	Guns.	Men.
(*a*) In Silesia—					
Langeron's Corps	47	15	10	139 =	34,551
Sacken's „	18	30	12	60 =	18,553
Wittgenstein's Corps	45	38	5	92 =	34,926
St. Priest's Corps	20	22	3	36 =	13,586
Guards and Reserves, under the Grand Duke Constantine	47	71	10	182 =	44,347
	177	176	40	509 =	145,763
(*b*) In Brandenburg—					
Winzengerode, Woronzow, Tschernitschew	29	44	20	92 =	29,357
Attached to Bülow's Corps	—	—	3	22 =	1,160
Attached to Tauentzien's Corps	—	—	1	— =	318
	29	44	24	114 =	30,835
(*c*) In Mecklenburg, attached to Walmoden's Corps—					
Detachment Tettenborn	—	—	4	— =	1,495
Russo-German Legion	6	—	—	—	4,475
With Dornberg's Cavalry Division	—	8	—	— =	1,192
Russo-German Artillery Brigade	—	—	—	16 =	363
					6,525

Giving a total for the Field Army of 212 battalions, 228 squadrons, 61 Cossack regiments, 639 guns = 184,123 men.

In Second Line.

About Warsaw—	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Cossack Regts.	Guns.	Men.
Polish Army of Observation under Bennigsen	70	67	10	198 =	59,000
Blockading Zamosez	21	5	3	36 =	15,000
Blockading Modlin	?	?	?	? =	9,000
Siege of Danzig	58	12	11	59 =	29,100
					112,100

The Austrian Army

The successive campaigns of Austerlitz and Wagram had reduced Austrian finance to a condition of almost hopeless destitution. As a measure of economy, the effectives of the troops had been reduced to the lowest possible point, and, worst of all, the greater part of the workpeople in all the arsenals and Government factories had been discharged. Hence the efforts to raise new forces in 1813 were most severely hampered. Men existed in abundance, but it was difficult to arm and equip them, and the motive of self-preservation not being so overwhelming as in the case of Prussia, the Generals were by no means so ready to take the field without adequate equipment.

In the middle of the month of August the field states gave the following totals:—

In Bohemia: 107 battalions, 117 squadrons, 280 guns, under F.M. Prince Schwarzenberg	127,345
Between the Ems and Traun, under F.M. Prince Reuss	30,070
In the interior of Austria, under F.Z.M. Hiller	35,557
	192,992
Garrison troops	27,544
Grand total	221,525

Two-thirds of this force consisted of recruits of three months' service, with little enthusiasm for their work, as until a few days before the expiration of the Armistice they did not know against whom they were to fight. As soon as they found out that the French were to play the rôle of their enemy, the whole Army gained courage and enthusiasm. The Cavalry seems to have been considered the most efficient of all the Allied troops, and the Artillery was fairly good. The Infantry, on the other hand, were below the standard of the other Armies; they had neither the dogged pertinacity of the Russians nor the intense patriotism of the Prussians.[1]

There remain to be considered—

(*a*) the Swedish Contingent, amounting in all to 27,263 men. These were excellent material, well found, but the policy of their Commander-in-Chief never gave them a chance of distinguishing themselves;

(*b*) the Anglo-German Contingent—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Men.
British German Legion	7	—	6 =	4,506
Dornberg's Cavalry Division	—	9	— =	1,322
Reserve Artillery of Walmoden's Corps	—	—	12 =	412
The Hanseatic Legions	2	8	8 =	3,043
	9	17	26	9,283

Note the composition of an "English" battalion—111 Dutchmen, 92 Prussians, 80 Italians, 66 Flemish, 63 Hanoverians and Brunswickers, 46 Frenchmen, 35 Saxons, 27 Austrians, 18 Hamburgers, 14 Bavarians, 14 Hessians, 12 Spaniards, 12 Mecklenburgers, 11 Poles 10 Holsteiners, 10 Swiss, 9 Hungarians, 7 Danes, 5 Oldenburgers, 3 Russians, 2 Swabians, and 1 Englishman, 1 Portuguese, 1 Swede.

Of these one Hussar regiment of five squadrons, two horse and one rocket battery were nominally British, and six Battalions in British pay formed the garrison

of Stralsund.

(c) The Mecklenburg Contingent—

4 battalions, 4 squadrons, 2 guns = 6,149 men.

The sum total of all available Field troops, therefore, amounted to 556½ battalions, 572 squadron 1,380 guns and 68 Cossack regiments = 512,113 men; with, in round figures, 350,000 reserve troops behind them. (*Friedrich*, vol. i, p. 56 *et seq.*)

The Command of the Armies

The great difficulty that confronted the Allies at this juncture was to ensure the harmonious co-operation of these very heterogeneous forces, and after much friction the commands were arranged in the following manner.

As the three Sovereigns were to accompany the Army of Bohemia, and as it was assumed that Napoleon would turn first with his full force against Austria, this Army was made very materially the strongest, and the command entrusted to Field-Marshal Prince Carl von Schwarzenberg. This appointment was severely criticized at the time, for popular feeling was strongly in favour of the Archduke Charles, the victor of Amberg. Würzburg, Stockach, Zürich and Aspern; but political complications with his brother, the Emperor, had rendered him impossible; also he would have been most unpopular with the Russians.

Field Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg

Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, though of no great talent, was peculiarly well fitted to act as conciliator of the many and various interests involved. He was still in the very prime of life, only forty-two; his reputation for personal courage stood very high, and his unselfishness and modesty made it possible to him to adjust the petty jealousies of the war-seasoned veterans around him, as perhaps no other man in Europe at the time could have done. It was no small feather in his cap that in the previous year Napoleon had personally requested his appointment to the command of his Austrian contingent. But he was too humane for War as it had developed during the last few years, and the very strong hint he received before leaving for the front, to the effect that this was the one and only Army that Austria could furnish, was perhaps hardly needed to deter him from adventurous resolves.

Chief of Staff Radetzsky

His Chief of the Staff, Radetzsky, had seen, if anything, more of War than had even the French Marshals, and seems by universal consent to have been the most able and courageous soldier in the Austrian Army. Unfortunately, however, for the Allies, he was too wanting in personal ambition to assert himself sufficiently; thus it happened that the Quartermaster-General, von Langenau, formerly of the Saxon Army, a brilliant but somewhat unscrupulous man, immeasurably behind Radetzsky in the solid judgment and knowledge of War which characterized the latter, usurped more than his share of the Sovereigns' confidence, with disastrous consequences to the conduct of operations. He was only thirty-two years of age, and owed his reputation chiefly to the fact that he had served for several campaigns under Napoleon, but as events were to prove, he was like Prince Eugène's mule, which, "though it had served in seventeen campaigns under that great General—remained still a mule."

It would probably have been far better for the Allies if they could have agreed to elect any one of the three Sovereigns as Commander-in-Chief; for all of them possessed considerable military talent, and all had acquired the habit of command. But political interests rendered this out of the question, and hence, having no real responsibility, but feeling the necessity of action, they frequently interfered, sometimes indeed most opportunely, but generally with the reverse result, and they always required to be consulted when any question arose as to the employment of their own Guards.

Two renegades attached to the Royal Headquarters deserve a word of mention, viz. Moreau and Jomini. The former had been banished from France in 1804, and had always been considered by his friends as a rival of Napoleon's. However this might be, a cannon shot at Dresden terminated his career before he had an opportunity of establishing this claim. Jomini, a Swiss by birth, had attracted Napoleon's attention in 1805–6 and 1808-9 in Spain. His military writings had given him a European reputation, and as Staff officer to Ney he had certainly rendered valuable service. But he had quarreled with Berthier, and when, after Bautzen, the latter held him responsible for Ney's many shortcomings, and not without reason one would think, he deserted to the Allies, and was received by the Emperor Alexander. His conduct, however, was so universally deprecated by the officers of all three Armies that (though the Emperor's friend) he was practically boycotted. Disgusted with his reception, he withdrew, after Leipzig, to his native country, and his subsequent writings were markedly tinged with the strong personal bias one would expect from such a character.

Blücher

For the Silesian Army the choice of the Sovereigns fell on General von Blücher, then in his seventy-first year, and though events have long since justified this selection, at the time it was received by the higher Prussian and Russian officers with almost unqualified disapproval. It was felt that he was far too old, that he was a born gambler, that he drank freely, and was destitute of all knowledge of any other arm but his own—the Cavalry. Of the higher art of War he was considered to know nothing at all; he could not write a decent report, or even spell correctly; he never looked at a map, and the Staff appointed to keep him straight, Gneisenau, Müffling, Rühle von Lilienstern, and Scharnhorst, were all held to be interlopers, or reformers, by the classic old survivors of the Frederickian period, of whom Yorck was the most typical. But Blücher possessed the one great quality of supremest importance in a great emergency of this nature, when men have to be induced to die for their country somehow, *the power of exciting enthusiasm in the Nation, and not merely in the rank and file of the Army.* Yorck, who undoubtedly had higher claims in the Army itself, and who was intellectually and morally immensely Blücher's superior, was his exact antithesis in this latter respect. His conduct at Tauroggen ought to have made him the idol of the Nation, but somehow it failed to do so, and though the men immediately under his command loved him for his care of them and devotion to their interests, it was precisely this attitude of fatherly solicitude for their welfare which would have rendered him useless in supreme Command; he lacked the stern resolution requisite for great emergencies.

Langeron, one of the Russian Corps commanders placed under his orders, resented his supersession even more bitterly than did Yorck himself. He was a French *emigré* who had joined the Russian Army at the beginning of the Revolution, and since then had made a very brilliant career, having held an independent command against the Turks. He would have hated serving under any foreign officer, but might have submitted with better grace to a man of acknowledged military education, and more courtier-like manners than those of rough old Blücher. This feeling of dissatisfaction, which Langeron took no pains to repress, soon spread to the remaining thirty-five generals with which his Corps was overloaded,[1] and throughout the campaign a veiled hostility to Headquarters prevailed, against which the latter were all the more helpless as they did not understand each other's language. Only Sacken seems to have been an exception to this general feeling. He was many years younger than Langeron, of German extraction, and possessed many of the same characteristics as Blücher; in consequence the two understood one another, and Sacken was never called upon in vain.

Bernadotte

The Army of the North was given by acclamation to Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden, whose reputation as a Marshal of France stood higher then, before military histories had been written, than it has done since; for as an independent Army Commander he proved an unspeakable failure, as we shall presently see.

The Agreement of Trachtenberg

The commands having been regulated, it remained to lay down the principles which were to guide the co-operation of these three Armies operating on widely separated lines, and between which inter-communication was, under existing conditions, impossible.

To this end a series of conferences were held, at which endless strategic memoirs were read and discussed. The principal ones are to be found in Friedrich's invaluable work, and deserve attentive study to enable us to get at the spirit of the time. All one can say of them here, is that like the Bourbons, the Staff officers of the period had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing.

Since agreement on any one plan was out of the question, a common bond of union was at length found in the universal consensus of opinion that Napoleon himself was the dangerous foe. From this the rest easily followed, and was embodied in a long memorandum known, from the place of its signature, as the agreement of Trachtenberg.

The cardinal principle of this document was that, under no circumstances should any one of the three Armies incur the risk of a decisive action against Napoleon in person. Whichever Army he advanced against was to fall back, whilst the others made the best use of their time and opportunities; and probably no other method could have led to a successful termination of the war.

But it made tremendous demands on the young and untrained troops, burning, in the case of the Prussians at any rate, with patriotic fire, and not yet broken in to understand that the soldier's *highest duty is to die where he is told, not when and where he would like to do so.* Blücher alone proved equal to the situations thus erected, not that he rivalled Napoleon in this greatest gift of a Commander, the psychological power of leading and influencing men, but at least he did more than any other who could have been chosen to fill his position.

Napoleon's Plans

Meanwhile, we must return to Napoleon, who was now busily studying his opening moves for the coming campaign.

His first plan was to arrange for the defence of the whole line of the Elbe, from Königstein in the Bohemian mountains, a little mediæval fortress perched on a kopje overlooking the river, to Hamburg, a line some 400 miles in extent. Across this river he held all the passages, by works, either permanent or provisional, which in the end proved sufficient for his purposes. Throughout the whole district he organized supply dépôts, and also did something towards the improvement of his lateral communications, though that was singularly little in comparison with what might have been done in the time and with the means at his disposal, considering the importance of such work for the execution of his strategic methods. Road making was as exact a science in those days as it is now, and better roads might have saved him the disaster of Leipzig.

His first idea was a resuscitation of his plan of March 18, viz. to mass the bulk of his troops between Magdeburg and Hamburg, and advance on Berlin, seizing the town and thus relieving the garrisons on the Oder. As before calculated, if the Allies came to meet him, he was certain of a decisive battle under most favourable conditions, whilst if they broke forward to the south of Dresden over the Bohemian mountains, he could fall on them in flank and cut them off from all communications. Against this plan was the possibility that they might elect not to stand at all, in which case he would have to follow them into Bohemia, and again exhaust himself by his ever lengthening line of communication. There was always before him *this absolute necessity for the delivery of a decisive battle, as near to the head of his communications as it could be fought.* Ultimately he decided that his best chance of securing such an opportunity would be by taking up a central position with the bulk of his forces between the two principal Armies, those of Silesia and Bohemia, and taking advantage of the first opening which either should offer him. Meanwhile, separate columns, aggregating nearly 130,000 men, should converge on Berlin from Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wittenberg and Bautzen. This latter feature of his plan was so entirely at variance with all his own previous practice, that we can only suppose he adopted it out of complete contempt for the Prussian Landwehr in front of him; and more particularly for the military ability of Bernadotte, whose probable conduct of operations he predicted in one of his letters in the following words: "Il ne fait que piaffer."

It must be clearly understood that it is the *form* of this movement on Berlin, and not the idea itself, that is here criticized. The threat against his communications contained in the presence of upwards of 100,000 men within about four days' march of the single organized line which connected him with his ultimate base in

France, could by no means be overlooked, and no merely passive defence of the 400 miles from Dresden Hamburg could conceivably be undertaken by those of his forces available for such a purpose. But to place Ney and Davoût under Oudinot, of all men, and to expect the three to execute a combined march of concentration from points several marches apart, seems to have been a voluntary invitation to disaster. As Marmont wrote in reply to a letter written on August 13, 1813, in which Napoleon, after announcing his final decision, asked for his Marshal's free and unfettered opinion of the project—"It is to be feared that on the same day your Majesty wins a great victory, you will learn that your subordinates have lost two"—a prediction which proved true to the letter.

The decision, however, having been taken, the troops moved rapidly to their appointed position and on August 17 the date on which the Armistice expired, they stood as shown on sketch.

French Positions on Conclusion of Armistice

A strong advance guard of four Corps under Ney in the square Liegnitz, Goldberg, Lowenberg, Bunzlau. The Main Army under Napoleon, at Görlitz, Zittau, Stolpen and Bautzen. A flanking detachment at Lückau of 60,000 men under Oudinot; whilst the XIV Corp (Gouvion St. Cyr) held the Elbe from Königstein to Dresden, which town Napoleon believed to be sufficiently strong to hold out for at least eight days with the strong garrison assigned to it. *This must be remembered, as it was the keystone of all his arrangements*, which were based on the supposition that the whole Silesian Army was still near Breslau, and the Bohemian Army about Theresienstadt. Viewed from the ordinary standpoint of strategical criticism, the situation appears to the last degree strained and unreal, for the Bohemian Army on the South and Bernadotte on the North already overlap the flanks of the forces immediately opposed to them, both are in a friendly country and therefore presumably well informed as to their enemies' whereabouts, and both are far superior in Cavalry to their immediate opponent. A raid against, or across, Napoleon's communications would therefore seem the obvious plan to adopt, and if strategy really were the "science of communications" as it has sometimes been defined, the extinction of the French Army would seem to be merely a matter of days.

Napoleon was, in fact, quite prepared for the Bohemian Army to make the attempt; indeed the intention to do so had been announced beforehand. When St. Cyr notified the Emperor of the current rumour to this effect, he replied, "If the enemy should march into South Germany, as he proposes, then I shall wish him '*bon voyage*' and let him go, quite certain that he will return quicker than he went. It is only of importance that he should not cut us off from Dresden and the Elbe; I care very little if he severs our communications with France," and he concludes with these remarkable words: "What is certain is that you cannot turn 400,000 men, based on a line of strong places and a river like the Elbe, from which they can break out as they please, either at Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg or Magdeburg. All the enemy's far-reaching detachments (against French communications understood) will be missing on the day of battle."

The reply to this is of course obvious; *if you cannot 400,000 men, etc., you can starve them*; and this is ed what ultimately happened. But it took two months to do this and had the Emperor's orders been carried out to the letter it would have taken even longer, so ample were the stores and provisions accumulated, on paper. But in two months many battles might be fought, and *a single decisive victory* would have completely transformed the situation.

The truth is *that the value of communications is relative and not absolute, and the Art really consists in knowing when and where it is safe to break the letter of the rules and to provide alternative lines and bases in time to permit change of plans.*

The above distribution was arrived at on the basis of the best information available at the time; but almost on the day the orders were issued, the Allies had made a decision of such magnitude that the Emperor had never taken even its possibility into account On the night of August 11, over 100,000 Russians and Prussian troops broke up from their encampments and set out over the Bohemian mountains to join the Austrians, and some days elapsed before the secret of this sudden movement leaked out.

We have given above the total forces of the several contingents, and such notes as to the personal factors of their commands as are indispensable to the student of military history. It remains now to indicate the final grouping of the forces before the Armistice ran out.

Order of Battle of the Allied Armies

When the above mentioned transfer of Russian and Prussian troops from Silesia to Bohemia was finally effected the order of the Bohemian Army was as follows:—

Commander-in-Chief: F.M. Prince Schwarzenberg.
Chief of Staff: F.M. Lt. Graf. Radetsky.
Quarter Master-General: Major-General Baron Langenau.

1. Austrian Field Army.

1st Light Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Prince Moritz Liechtenstein. 4 battalions, 12 squadrons, 14 guns = 4,399 men.
2nd Light Division: Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf. Bubna. 3 battalions, 18 squadrons, 12 guns = 4,400 men.

Right Wing.

Prince von Hessen Homburg.

1st Infantry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf. Civalart. 11 battalions, 18 guns = 9,478 men.
2nd Infantry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf. Colloredo. 14 battalions, 18 guns = 14,252 men.
1. Infantry Reserve Division (Grenadiers). Field-Marshal-Lieut. Marquis Chasteler. 2 Brigades = 8 battalions, 12 guns, 5,807 men.
2. Infantry Reserve Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Bianchi. 3 Brigades = 12 battalions, 13 guns = 10,643 men.
3. Infantry Reserve Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf. Crenneville. 2 Brigades = 5 battalions, 12 squadrons, 6 guns = 7,004 men.
Cavalry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf. Nostitz. (Cuirassiers). 16 squadrons in 2 Brigades, no guns = 2,472 men.
Cavalry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. von Schneller. (Light, 21 squadrons in 2 Brigades) = 2,336 men.
Pioneers: 8 companies.
Pontonniers: 1 company.

Total: 50 battalions.
49 squadrons.
72 guns.
8 Pioneer companies.
1 Pontonnier company.

52,736 men.

Left Wing.

Feldzengmeister[1] Graf. Gyulai.

Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Prince Aloys Liechtenstein. 3 Brigades = 12 battalions, 18 guns = 12,514 men.
Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Wiszenwolf. 3 Brigades = 13 battalions, 18 guns = 12,300 men.
Cavalry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Freiherr-Lederer. 2 Brigades = 18 squadrons = 2,608 men.
Pioneer companies.

Total: 25 battalions.
18 squadrons.
36 guns.
8 Pioneer companies.

27,983 men.

Avance Abtheilung.

3rd Light Division. Field-Marshal Lieut. von Meszho. 2 Brigades = 5 battalions, 12 squadrons, 12 guns (strength not given).
Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Freiherr von Mayer. 3 Brigades = 12 battalions, 18 guns (no strength given).
Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Prince Hohenlohe-Bartenstein. 2 Brigades = 8 battalions, 12 guns (no strength given).
Cavalry Brigade. Major-General Kuttalek von Ehrengreif. 2 Cuirassier regiments, 1 H. A. battery (6 guns).
1 Pioneer company.

Total: 20 battalions.
8 squadrons.
36 guns.
1 Pioneer company.

Artillery Reserve Park = 18 battalions = 108 guns.
Grand total Austrians = 127,000 men.

Russo-Prussian Troops.

Commander-in-Chief: General Graf. Barclay de Tolly.
Chief of Staff: Lt.-General Sabanjen.
Quarter-Master-General: Lt.-General von Diebitsch II.

Right Wing.

General Graf. Wittgenstein.

I Infantry Corps. Lt.-General Prince Gortschakow.
14th Infantry Division. Major-General von Helfreich.
2 Brigades, 8 battalions = 5,211 men.
5th Infantry Division. Major-General Messenzow.
2 Brigades, 13 battalions = 8,792 men.
Artillery: 3 batteries, 36 guns = 638 men.
II Infantry Corps. Lieut.-General Duke Eugène von Wurtemberg.
4th Infantry Division. Major-General Püschnitzki.
3 Brigades, 10 battalions = 5,370 men.
3rd Infantry Division. Major-General Prince Schachowski.
3 Brigades, 12 battalions = 6,598 men.
3 Batteries, 36 guns = 636 men.
Cavalry Corps. Lieut.-General Graf. Peter Pahlen III.
Irregular Cavalry—Don Cossacks.
4 regiments = 1,600 men.
1st Hussar Division. Major-General Milesimow.
2 Brigades, 19 squadrons = 2,630 men.
Lancer Brigade. Major-General Lisanewitch.
3 regiments, 16 squadrons = 1,940 men.
Artillery: 2 batteries, 20 guns (6th Battery: 8 guns; 7th Battery, 12 guns).
Pioneers: 1 company.
Headquarter Guard.
1 Dragoon regiment, 2nd Brigade Cossacks, 1 Landwehr battalion (Olonetz and Wologda) = 1,000 men.
Total: 45 battalions, 38 squadrons, 5 Cossack regiments, 92 guns, 1 Pioneer company = 34,926 men.

Left Wing.

II Prussian Army Corps. Lieut.-General von Kleist.
Chief of Staff: Col. von Tippelskirch.
Quarter-Master-General: Lieut.-Col. von Grolmann.
10th Brigade. Von. Pirch I.
16 battalions, 4 squadrons, 8 guns = 8,026 men.
9th Brigade. Von. Klüx.
10½ battalions, 4 squadrons, 8 guns = 8,021 men.
12th Brigade. Prince August von Preuszen.
10 battalions, 2 squadrons, 8 guns = 7,172 men.
11th Brigade. Von. Ziethen.
10½ battalions, 6 squadrons, 8 guns = 8,743 men.
Reserve Cavalry. Von Röder.
Brigade. Von Mutius. Landwehr, 2 regiments.
Brigade. Laroche von Starkenfels. Light, 3 regiments.
Brigade. Von Wrangel. Cuirassiers, 3 regiments.
Artillery. 2 H.A. batteries, 16 guns.

Reserve Artillery, 64 guns.
2 companies Pioneers.
Total: 41 battalions, 44 squadrons, 112 guns = 37,800 men (about).

Russo-Prussian Guards and Reserves.

Grand Duke Constantine.
Infantry. General Graf. Miloradowitch.
III Infantry (Grenadier) Corps. Lieut.-General Rajeovski.
2nd Grenadier Division. Major-General Sulima.
3 Brigades, 12 battalions = 6,756 men.
1st Grenadier Division. Major-General Tschaglokow.
3 Brigades, 12 battalions = 7,206 men.
Artillery. 2 batteries, 24 guns = 382 men.

V I ry (Guard) Corps. Lieut.-General Yermolow.
2nd rd Division. Major-General Udom I.
2 brigades, 10 battalions = 5,941 men.
1st Guards Division. Major-General Baron Rosen.
2 brigades, 13 battalions = 7,725 men.
Artillery. 3 batteries, 36 guns = 632 men.

1st Cuirassiers Division. Major-General Depreradowitch.
2 Brigades, 19 squadrons = 2,428 men.
Light Cavalry Division. Major-General Schewitch.
22 squadrons = 2,345 men.
3rd Cuirassiers Division. Major-General Duka.
2 Brigades, 16 squadrons = 2,165 men.
Artillery. 2 batteries = 16 guns.
Irregular Cavalry. 3 regiments Don Cossacks.
Royal Prussian Guard Cavalry Brigade. Col. von Werder.
8 squadrons, 1 battery (8 guns) = 1,606 men.
Reserve Artillery. Major-General Baron Huene. 94 guns.
Russo-Prussian Guards = 51,438 men.
Grand Total:

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Cossack Regts.	Men.
Austrian	107	117	290	—	= 127,345
Russians	92	109	274	15	= 82,062
Prussian	47½	52	128	—	= 44,907
	246½	278	692	15	254,404

Royal Prussian Guard Infantry Brigade. Lieut.-Colonel von Alvensleben.
6 battalions, 2 rifle companies, 8 guns = 5,485 men.
Cavalry Corps. Lieut.-General Prince Galitzin.
4th Cuirassier Division. Kritow.
2 brigades, 14 squadrons = 1,860 men.

Katzbach—Dresden—Kulm

By the terms of the Armistice a neutral zone some twenty miles in width had been established between the contending forces in Silesia. As the period for the resumption of hostilities (August 17) drew near, it became important to Blücher to be in close touch with the enemy to his front so as to have timely warning of his possible manœuvres. To obtain this the neutral zone must be traversed, consequently a pretext for infringing the letter of the Armistice had, to be found.

Prussia Breaks the Truce

It was fortunate for the Prussians that this was not far to seek. The French at the front had been suffering much from want of food and forage, and had from time to time entered the neutral zone in small parties in search of supplies. On August 13, a number of these foraging parties being reported, Blücher, affecting to regard them as a prelude to the more formal fighting to be expected after the 17th, ordered the whole Silesian Army forward, in a line of four Corps, one marching on each available road. The advance Cavalry soon came in contact with the French, who were completely off their guard. When on the following day they learnt that strong Infantry columns were moving against them on a front of thirty miles (being in entire ignorance of the great detachment Blücher had made to the Bohemian Army) they naturally concluded that the troops in front of them were the advance of the whole Silesian army in force, and concentrated backwards, not without some confusion. Thanks to this, the Prussians gained several minor advantages in the fighting which ensued, facts which served materially to raise the *moral* of the new German levies.

But from the first the want of experience in the Prus- Staff began to create friction. Thus on the very st day, Blücher and Gneisenau separated from each other the better to superintend their observations over the enemy's front, with the result that they did not meet again until late in the afternoon, hence the issue of

orders was delayed to such a degree that the troops did not begin to move until the following noon, and then had to march late into the night to reach their destinations.

Each day, fresh causes of delay arose, and the resistance of the French became more obstinate. Thus every march ended as a night march, and the weather being abominable, the whole Army suffered so severely that when on the morning of August 20, Blücher found himself in presence of the whole massed forces of his adversary across the Bober river, it only needed the sound of the cheers which announced Napoleon's arrival to assume command of the French Army, to decide him to retreat forthwith.

Blücher's Retreat

Then followed a series of most obstinately contested rearguard actions in which every day many lives were lost, and by the 25th the whole Silesian Army was in a condition bordering on dissolution. The Landwehr men had deserted in masses to their homes, Langeron, St. Priest, and even Sacken, were complaining bitterly of the way their troops were being wasted, and Yorck found the position so intolerable that he actually wrote to the King, begging the latter to relieve him of his command, as he could not look on and see his troops ruined by the incompetence of the Staff.

Blücher's own position was almost impossible; he hated retiring even more than did his subordinates, with whom and with the men he thoroughly sympathized. But he was compelled to submit, by the terms of his appointment, to the dictation of Gneisenau. For a moment, it is said that he contemplated the extreme step of displacing Gneisenau and appointing von Kaetzler in his place, but learning that Napoleon was no longer in personal control of the French pursuit, on the night of the 24th he decided to turn upon his enemy. Accordingly he issued orders for an advance towards the Katzbach, which resulted on the 26th in the general action which has since borne that name.

Now it was that good luck favoured him in a most unusual degree. The Katzbach springing from high ground in the mountains to the southward, rose during the battle in a sudden flood. Carrying away many of the bridges, and destroying all the fords, it cut the French Army in half as it was moving to the attack of the Prussian position. At the critical moment Blücher ordered an advance of his right wing, and the muskets being too wet for effective use, the battle was practically decided by cold steel, the French, overwhelmed by the fanatical impetuosity of the Prussian assault, being driven into the river, where many hundreds were carried away and drowned. This brilliant victory was the making of Blücher and the Prussian Army. Indeed it was the salvation of the whole Allied cause, for news of it was brought to the Royal Headquarters at a moment when the general situation seemed hopeless, and more than a possibility existed that Austria might enter into a separate treaty with Napoleon and abandon the coalition altogether.

Napoleon on Interior Lines

We must now return to Napoleon, and the measures he was taking to utilize to their full the advantages of the "interior lines" on which he stood as regards his adversaries.

The position pronounced a model for all time; for notwithstanding its great extent he could concentrate on its centre or on either wing a greater force than his enemies could possibly bring against him, and provided Dresden could be relied on to hold out for six or seven days, he felt completely master of the situation. *It had however the disadvantage inherent in all defensive arrangements, viz. that the initiative lay in the hands of his adversary.* Napoleon's first view had been that the Allies might attempt a direct attack on the line of the Riesengebirge, and to that end, he had occupied, and caused to be fortified, all the passes leading over them into the plains. Being for the time quite independent of his communications with France, and relying solely on Dresden, he desired nothing better than an advance of the Bohemian Army against Leipzig, and he seems hardly to have hoped for so much good fortune as actually befell him.

His first act on learning of Blücher's advance was to reconnoitre personally the line of the passes he had taken up, in order to assure himself that he would have ample time to deal with the Silesian Army before the Austrians could arrive. Being satisfied on that point by a reconnaissance made on the 18th, by which he learnt that troops had actually marched from Blücher's command to Bohemia, he issued orders to Macdonald (now in chief command of the "Army of the Bober," as the troops facing Blücher were called) to have the troops ready for his personal command on the morning of the 20th. He then spent the 19th in reviewing troops and dealing with the endless details of administration, with which, in the absence of a properly trained Staff, he was compelled to burden himself.

His arrival on the morning of the 20th caused, as we have seen, Blücher's immediate retreat; and as information came in which made clear the weakness of the Silesian Army, and hence the exceeding improbability that he could compel it to stand for a decisive battle, he handed over command again to Macdonald on the 22nd, and returned to Görlitz, taking his Guards with him, there to await further developments.

Plans of the Allies

Meanwhile the Allied Headquarters in Bohemia had fallen completely into the trap he had laid for them. Believing Napoleon to be vitally concerned in the retention of his communications with France, they had, after many conferences, decided on a concentric advance over the mountains across Saxony to Leipzig, their right watching Dresden, about the defences, or perhaps the spirit which animated its defenders, they appear to have been better informed than was the Emperor. The detachments of the Prussian and Russian forces made by the Silesian Army having arrived within supporting distance, the march was started by every available road from the Elbe to Leipzig, only two of which, however, were made and metalled roads. The others were little more than mountain tracks, scarped roughly out of the side of the hills with gradients up to 1 in 4 (15°) and no attempt to improve them appears to have been made throughout the campaign.

The natural consequence was that the heads of the several Corps could not keep their alignment, and those unfortunate enough to be on the bad roads (and these were the majority) were worn out in their efforts to keep up with their luckier comrades. During the 20th the news of Napoleon's personal appearance at the pass of Zittau (on the 18th) created something approaching consternation, for many supposed it preluded an advance on Prague, which to the strategists of that day must have loomed up as the prelude to an appalling calamity. Every one in any way entitled to give advice (Moreau and Jomini amongst them) at once assembled, and a discussion ensued in which the only man who appears to have maintained an attitude of decorous modesty was Prince Schwarzenberg, the Commander-in-Chief. Ultimately (though it is impossible to trace with whom the idea originated), the meeting decided that the whole Army should bring up its left shoulders, and swing in upon Dresden, which was to be attacked and stormed before Napoleon could return.

Bohemian Army changes Direction

Orders to this effect were prepared and issued. This wheel to the left, however, threw the bulk of the columns from the main roads and tracks upon cross-tracks, which, running transverse to the drainage lines of the district, presented a succession of up and down gradients of the worst description, thus throwing an increased strain upon the already over-taxed marching powers of the Allied troops, and though during the course of August 25 the heads of the columns, driving the French outposts before them, closed in on the city, the tails were left straggling far behind.

In the afternoon of that day Schwarzenberg, with the three Monarchs and their retinues, rode up to the heights above Räcknitz overlooking the town, and here again a long discussion took place. Eventually it was decided that the forenoon of the following day should be devoted to concentrating the several columns for battle, and that the attack itself should begin about 4 p.m.; the actual signal for movement was to be given by three gun shots.

The crowd now separated to prepare the necessary orders. How long Schwarzenberg's Staff required to draft out the prolix and exhaustive memorandum that was to guide every detail of execution, it is impossible to specify. I should imagine that it would take a man well acquainted with the ground at least three hours, and after that it had to be dictated, and sent out to about 200,000 men. When, if ever, its pith reached the company officers must remain undecided; but it must have been late in the following day, if at all.

Next morning, the Monarchs were out early to watch the preparations, when about 9 a.m., through the veil of mist which still lay over the valley, a great cheer of *Vive l'Empereur* surged out of the town, and in a moment the words "too late" were on every one's

ally the King of Prussia stood out, emphasizing the point that for an Army of 200,000 men to back down before the mere threat of a shout, was unprecedented; it could hardly be called War at all. Again a long discussion, prolonged into the afternoon. Finally counsels of prudence prevailed. It was decided to retreat, and Schwarzenberg rode off to prepare the necessary orders for this step. The precise time of this decision cannot be fixed, but the fact remains that at 4 p.m. no orders had reached the troops, who had all arrived at their appointed places, and were waiting for the word to advance. Suddenly, some one, who it never can now be ascertained, fired the signal guns, and the attack on Dresden began.

Napoleon at Gorlitz

We must now return to Napoleon, whom we left on the 23rd at Görlitz.

Contact with the Bohemian advance had been established by the French troops watching the passes, early on the 22nd, and their reports reached Headquarters during the 23rd. For the moment the Emperor's thoughts turned towards Prague, as the Allies had anticipated that they would, but presently the letters from St. Cyr became alarming and his attention was directed into another channel. The situation appeared to him as follows. Distance precluded any immediate danger from the Silesian Army, but to make assurance doubly sure, he ordered Macdonald to advance, and attack anything that attempted to stand against him. It was this order in fact which brought on the battle of the Katzbach. Presuming his most explicit instructions to have been obeyed, Dresden was amply secured against any attempt to carry it by storm. At the worst its defenders could retire into the fortified "bridge head" of the Neustadt and so prolong their defence by days. To St. Cyr, together with his own Corps, he had given authority to call upon the II Corps (Victor) and I Corps (Vandamme) for assistance, both of which could reach him in twenty-four hours.

But St. Cyr did not mention whether he had as yet made any use of this authority, or indeed whether he intended to use it at all.

For the moment he appears to have made no definite plan. Calling up the Guards to Görlitz, where his own Headquarters lay, he wrote an encouraging letter to St. Cyr, pointing out the strength of his position, and the time during which it could be held, also intimating that he would march himself to his assistance, and could if necessary arrive on the 25th. But at the same time a doubt seems to have crossed his mind as to whether the fortifications which he had ordered were in fact as far advanced as they ought to have been.

Napoleon's Resolution Fails

Then at last Napoleon's resolution failed. Cancelling all previous orders, he directed all available troops (except Vandamme's) by the nearest roads to Dresden, and riding on himself in advance, he galloped over the bridge, where his unexpected arrival gave rise to the cheers which so terrified the Allies. Close behind him came the leading files of the Guard. These had marched from Stolpen at 4 a.m. and moving in dense rendezvous formations (mass of columns on a company front at half distance generally, only the guns being upon the road), they went straight across country, and by noon 26 battalions were already in Dresden. At nightfall this number had risen to 68 battalions, 117 squadrons, 534 guns. In what order the mounted arms actually arrived is uncertain, most of them probably between noon and 5 p.m., the distance (17½ miles) being of course for them inconsiderable. But the march as a whole remains one of the most remarkable on record, and one can only imagine how such a feat must have upset the calculations of his opponents, who judging the situation by the ordinary rules of the game, could never have believed it possible to transfer a whole Army of this magnitude by a single road in little more than twelve hours.

The Corps of Victor and Marmont (II and VI) reached Stolpen during the night, and pushing on at daybreak next morning arrived in time to take part in the renewed fighting of the 27th. Considering the material of which these troops were composed—young and inexperienced conscripts—and considering also the fact that the Guards were always better fed and cared for than were any other of the units, their performance is even more remarkable, for they had traversed a distance of 120 miles in four days; by a single road and through a country practically destitute of supplies. They had had no proper night quarters, they had simply lain down and slept wherever the column halted. Yet as a body they marched in full of swing and life, and remained in touch with the enemy for the next forty-eight hours.

How many of them fell out and were left along the road it is impossible nowadays to ascertain. *The essence of the whole matter is that enough of these raw immature boys actually reached the field in sufficiently good order to be controlled and directed in action.*

Battle of Dresden

The details of the battle which now ensued possess but little interest at the present day. About 4 p.m. of the 26th the columns of the Allies attacked with considerable vigour, driving in the principal advance posts of the French, but before they could recover from the confusion inseparable from such success, the French Reserves issued forth from the wide openings intentionally arranged to facilitate such counterstrokes, and attacking in their turn with the bayonet, promptly recaptured their lost positions. Generally, when darkness put a stop to the fighting, the troops on both sides occupied much the same aligment as they had held at starting. But during the night Napoleon made his arrangements for a great counterstroke against the left of the Allies.

Murat was given the command of the Cavalry Corps Latour Maubourg, and of Pajol's Cavalry Division, 68 squadrons in all, with 30 guns, and of Victor's Corps and Teste's Division, 44 battalions, totalling some 25,000 men with 76 guns. These were ordered to work round the enemy's outer, i.e. left, flank, whilst the fight was continued along the front, and fortune favoured this plan in a singular manner. Shortly after midnight the rain came down in sheets, turning all the country off the roads in the low grounds into a morass; on the plateaus between the water courses, the drainage being better, the going was at any rate fair. Whilst Victor and Teste attacked the Austrians in front, Murat took his Cavalry by road right round the prolongation of the enemy's front, and emerging suddenly out of the cover on which their left rested, literally swept away the whole wing, for owing to the continuous rain the flint-locks of the Infantry proved useless, and squares without fire power were entirely inadequate against the momentum of his charges.

The effect of this success, however, was only local, for owing to the configuration of the ground, the centre of the Allied Army still remained intact, as it was separated from the beaten wing by a broad and deep ravine. But the Allies' Commander-in-Chief had already determined that want of both food and ammunition rendered retreat imperative, and during the afternoon the fighting was only continued to gain time for the necessary dispositions. In fact, the battle came to an end by the mutual exhaustion of both sides. Men and horses were alike so worn out that anything approaching an effective charge across the rain-sodden fields was out of the question. Napoleon knew that Vandamme had already reached Pirna, thus closing the shortest and best line of retreat available for the Allies, and he felt confident that after a night's rest his troops would soon overtake any start the enemy might have obtained.

About 5 p.m. the Emperor rode back into Dresden, drenched to the skin, and worn out, but still in good spirits and hopeful for the morrow, as his letter written the same evening to Cambacères sufficiently proves: "I am so tired and so busy that I cannot write at length . . . the Duke of Bassano will do so for me. Affairs here are very satisfactory." At dinner in the palace of the King of Saxony, he was most cheerful, and after commiserating his unfortunate father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, he said: "To-day the rain saved the enemy from complete destruction. I had intended to storm the whole line of heights. However, we shall be in Bohemia before my colleagues (the three monarchs) after all." Then a little later he added: "I am well satisfied with the results of the day; but when I am not present, things go wrong. All the troops sent towards Berlin have been beaten, and I fear for Macdonald. He is brave and good, but unfortunate." A true prediction, as it happened.

Napoleon's Pursuit

Early next morning the French were in motion; the Emperor riding out towards their left flank to reconnoitre in person. Everywhere the advancing troops came upon signs of a hasty retreat, and of terrible suffering in the ranks of the Allies. Whole Austrian battalions had moved off leaving their muskets still piled in ranks, and men too exhausted to drag themselves further lay in the fields, while some were found suffocated [illegible]e downwards in the deep mud. It seemed impossible that the Army could have gone far. Indeed, the Cavalry reports indicated that the retreat had been made along all the roads over the mountains, far to the south. Therefore, it was a reasonable conclusion that Vandamme with his 40,000 men at Pirna (in command of the only first-class road in the district) could reach the exits from the mountain passes about Teplitz in time to intercept the bulk of the enemy's forces. St. Cyr and the Young Guard marching by the same good road would be within supporting distance if anything untoward happened, and Marmont following on directly was to hang upon the enemy's rear, whilst Murat with Victor and the Cavalry tried to work round their southern flank.

As at the same time satisfactory news arrived from Vandamme, who had attacked and driven back the flanking detachment under the Duke Eugène of Wurtemberg (left to hold the passages of the Elbe at Pirna on the previous day), the Emperor concluded he could give the Young Guard a much needed rest. He accordingly ordered them to bivouac where they stood, and getting into his coach drove back to Dresden, where at 8.30 p.m. the news of Macdonald's defeat on the Katzbach was handed to him.

Escape of the Allies

The escape of the right wing of the Allies from the trap thus laid for them is one of the most curious episodes in military history and deserves to be treated with more detail than is usually accorded to it.

Duke Eugène of Würtemberg, in reply to his repeated requests for reinforcements, found himself suddenly superseded in his command by the arrival of General Ostermann with a whole Division of the Russian Guards. Ostermann, however, was practically out of his mind, and in charge of two attendants. But in his lucid intervals he agreed not to interfere with the Duke's command. Unfortunately he insisted on riding with him, and when any question concerning his Guards arose, his senses appear to have deserted him entirely.

The Duke saw quite clearly that Vandamme was endeavouring to reach the defile of Peterswalde, where the road on which he and Kleist's Corps of Prussians were marching opens into the great Pirna-Teplitz *chaussée*. He therefore implored Ostermann to give him the assistance of the Guards to attack, and hold Vandamme in check throughout the day, pointing out the vital importance to the whole Army of keeping him at bay.

But Ostermann was not at all touched by these arguments, nor were his subordinates either. The Guards were the Tsar's own personal property, and their officers felt that they would never be forgiven if the bright paint on their Ruler's expensive toy should be tarnished or chipped in the rough game of war. Deaf to all remonstrances from Duke Eugène, Ostermann marched off leaving the Duke to do the best he could with his very inadequate means to carry out his plan of obstructing Vandamme's movements.

In the meantime a number of coincidences arose. The King of Prussia had ridden on alone from the night quarters of the Monarchs, and had chosen a path along a spur of the mountains from whence he had a full view over the plains below. The sound of heavy firing arising from the action between the Duke's little column and Vandamme's advance guard, reached his ears, and he saw in a moment the inevitable consequences if the French General should succeed in driving his opponents beyond the defile of Priesten, through which at that moment Ostermann's column was retiring.

The King at once galloped after the madman, and by a happy inspiration pointed out to the Russian Staff the danger in which their Sovereign, still within the mountains, would be placed if Priesten was not defended by the Guard; this appeal proved efficient. Ostermann or his representative counter-marched the column, and took up a retaining position, ready to receive the Duke of Wurtemberg as he fell back.

Simultaneously, almost, the Tsar himself had left Headquarters by another path running along a spur parallel to that on which the King of Prussia was riding. The sound of firing caught his attention also, and in his turn he took in the situation at a glance. From his spur of the mountains he could not see Ostermann, however. What he did see was another large body of Allied troops away in the plains, and he rode after them to bring them back to the Priesten position.

They turned out to be Colloredo's Austrian Corps of 14 Battalions and 18 guns moving in direct compliance with Schwarzenberg's orders, issued the night before, and Colloredo did not see his way to acceding at once to the Imperial request that he should reinforce Oslermann at Priesten. Fortunately at this moment Metternich, the Austrian Prime Minister, arrived, in a very dejected frame of mind. Learning from the Emperor Alexander's own lips the yet greater danger that threatened if the French under Vandamme were not promptly opposed, he took the responsibility of ordering Colloredo back to Priesten, at which place the latter arrived so opportunely that Vandamme found himself compelled to delay his final attack until the following morning, as in the long and confused day's fighting his command had straggled a good deal.

The Battle of Kulm

When the battle was renewed the next morning the two opponents were fairly well matched, about 46,000 victory inspired French against some 50,000 Austrians and Russians. Vandamme had taken up his position in the little village of Kulm in face of the Priesten defile. About 1 p.m. he had sent forward practically all his troops for a decisive effort. They seemed to be carrying everything before them, when suddenly there was an outburst of heavy firing and cheers to his rear. The next moment a mass of Prussians burst into the village, taking the French force completely in reverse, Vandamme was captured with his Staff, and his command was completely destroyed or dispersed.

We must now retrace our steps to follow the vicissitudes of this Prussian Corps which had appeared so exactly at the right moment.

The Corps of Kleist, some 10,000 strong, had been left in touch with the main French Army in the vicinity of Dohna, and in its retreat had found itself gradually shouldered off successive lines of escape by Vandamme's advance.

On the night of August 29, Kleist found himself in desperate straits. The one roadway still open to him was so completely blocked by broken-down transport that twenty-four hours would hardly have sufficed to clear it for the passage of troops, so he decided to cut himself adrift from the map and trust to luck to find a way across country. Calling his officers together, he told them that he intended to fight his way through the French, sword in hand, and his plucky resolution was greeted with cheers. At daybreak next morning his columns climbed the spur which lay between them and the Pirna-Teplitz road. They then moved northwards along it, till they struck a country track leading down a ravine which ultimately debouched upon the above-named road. Scrambling down through the forests, for some 2,000 feet, they at length reached it. Finding it entirely unoccupied they promptly proceeded to reform their columns, and then marched along it towards the sound of the firing which came from the village of Kulm.

Rounding a turn in the road, they saw the battle raging in front of them. Being as yet entirely unobserved, they formed up for attack and rushed the village, almost before the French were aware of their presence.

There can be little doubt that this fortunate intervention changed the whole fate of the campaign, and the credit for it belongs in fairly equal proportions to the Duke of Wurtemberg for his courage, to the King of Prussia and the Tsar for their timely interference,

and to Kleist for his daring acceptance of responsibility which meant much more in those days of rigid adherence to prescription, than it would do at present.

Comments

The proximate cause which led to this complete disappointment of all Napoleon's hopes, lay undoubtedly in St. Cyr's failure to avail himself of the authority delegated to him by Napoleon to call Vandamme to his assistance. How a man of St. Cyr's distinction, who had himself exercised independent command on several occasions, and whose writings prove him to have been one of the first strategists of his day, could have blundered in this extraordinary manner is one of those insoluble problems in human psychology which from time to time arise and upset all calculations and all designs. If Vandamme, in obedience to St. Cyr's summons, had been already on the march to Dresden when Napoleon sat down to write the letter quoted above, no question as to the safety of that town could possibly have arisen; while the Emperor would have been free to carry out his design of placing 100,000 men in rear of the Allies on August 27, as he wrote to Maret, then in Paris.

But the question then arises whether but for his uncertainty as to Vandamme's movements, the plan would have occurred to him at all? Evidently it was not in his mind when he began his letter. It flashed across him as he wrote, and so blinded him for the moment that he failed to notice that by ordering Vandamme back to Stolpen he created the very situation which ultimately caused its abandonment. The letter strikes me as conclusive evidence of an absolutely tired mind. It is so carelessly worded that it is almost incredible that he can have read it over a second time, and the following letter confirms the impression; for Napoleon, when under the full control of his genius, would never have contemplated a dual objective, and still less would he have talked about the occupation of Prague as long as his enemy's undefeated Field Army was in existence.

The next questions are—How did this fatigue originate? Was its cause preventable? and is not the fact of its appearance in itself the best proof of the failure of the Commander to have realized in this instance the whole scope of all that his career had previously taught the world of War. It has been said by many critics that in this campaign the Emperor no longer gave proof of that all compelling energy in execution, of that ceaseless attention to detail, and that absolute disregard of his personal comfort which had distinguished him in his earlier days? But Major Friedrichs, with all the documentary evidence now in existence before him, has no difficulty in rebutting these accusations. It is absolutely clear that Napoleon was ceaselessly on the move; the marvel is how he ever found time to either sleep or write. But all this only confirms the point I propose to bring forward, viz., *that he had never intellectually realized the secrets of his own success.*

Hitherto, when in command of Armies approximating in magnitude to those he was now directing, *he had always acted on the offensive*, with a clear and definite purpose before him, a purpose which no possible threat or movement of his enemies could possibly disturb. Where they moved in darkness, distracted by every passing rumour and threat, he marched confidently forward, convinced of his power of beating down all opposition on the battlefield itself, when and wherever he might encounter them. *Now, however, events had thrown him upon the defensive, and at once the increased difficulty of the situation forced itself upon his attention.*

It was not only that his Cavalry failed him, for that had happened to him before, notably in 1806 and 1809. No, *the essential difficulty now lay in the fact that the initiative had passed from his hands to those of his adversary, and therefore he was compelled to wait until the latter gave him an opening, of which to take advantage.* That opening he certainly saw when he penned his letter to Vandamme, *but it is clear from the measures he suggested that his inspiration did not suffice to show him the best way in which to avail himself of the chance given to him*; and this simply because his mind was at the time too weary to work out intellectually the full possibilities of the situation.

Presumably since he had actually prepared three bridges at or near Pirna, and held two others in hand to throw across the river as occasion might require—the new road, or roads (I can only find mention of one) which he had ordered to be constructed, must have been good enough for 100,000 men to pass along them, during the twenty-four hours he allowed himself. But there was only one road available in continuation to Hellendorf (the objective he mentions in his letters to Maret) and in the defiles of that district, his Army could hardly move on a broad front, as it had done from Bautzen and Stolpen on Dresden. His 100,000 men, therefore, would have taken about as long to concentrate to the front as the Austrians would have taken to countermarch to their rear. Moreover, the latter would have held the best graded road in the district in their possession, viz., from Freiburg via Dux to Teplitz, by which to manœuvre against the French flank.

I therefore submit *that had Napoleon's conduct of war been the result of intellectual study, and not the intuition of genius*, a far simpler, and more effective plan would have followed from the intellectual application of the forms which he had himself invented, which depended for their efficacy on the superior marching powers of the French troops under certain conditions, all of which presented themselves in the case now before us.

In the campaigns of 1807 and 1812 in Poland and Russia, the formation "in battalion square of 200,000 men," had broken down because, owing essentially to difficulties of supply, he had not been able to outmarch his enemy and compel him to stand and give battle.

If he had struck towards Prague whilst the Austrians and Allies were still in the vicinity, it is possible that he might have caught them up. The harvest was just being gathered on the southern slopes of the Bohemian mountains, and as the whole district had escaped the ravages of war for the last fifty years, supplies therefore would have been abundant. On the other hand, however, there was no particular reason why the Allies should stand to be beaten, when they had the whole of Austria and Hungary in which to manœuvre and escape.

When once, however, the columns of the Bohemian Army had entangled themselves in the defiles leading to Saxony, they were at Napoleon's mercy had he, as before said, only realized intellectually the secret of his own successes, viz., *superior mobility*. Leaving only a weak rear guard under Ney to cover his withdrawal the IV and XI Corps, preceded by Poniatowski (VIII Corps) as an advance guard, should have been set in motion via Zittau, Graben, Leitmeritz, Lobositz, on Teplitz, which they would have reached during the course of August 28, having started on the 24th, the distance being less than what the II and VI Corps actually accomplished in their march to Dresden, and the gradients better than those they had surmounted.

The II and VI Corps, with the Guards, would have reached Hellendorf in the same time; while Dresden, with St. Cyr and Vandamme would have been perfectly safe for forty-eight hours, even assuming that the town was ever in danger. Further, whilst the centre and right attacked and held the enemy, the left would have taken the Teplitz-Dux-Freiburg road, and would have swung in on the enemy's rear, wherever and however he might have placed himself.

Gross Beeren—Dennewitz—Wartenburg

We left Napoleon on the afternoon of August 28 driving back from Pirna, well satisfied with the promise of the day, and pleased with the number of trophies and prisoners which were hourly arriving from the front. A second report from Oudinot relating to his defeat at Gross Beeren, received about noon, was insufficient to disturb his serenity, which remained proof even against the far more serious news of Macdonald's defeat on the Katzbach, and of Girard's reverse at Hagelesberg, which reached him during the evening of the same day. For once, however, no immediate step was taken to remedy either misfortune, and we are amazed to find the great Emperor, hitherto the very incarnation of rapid decision, faltering for thirty-six hours before

Napoleon's Notes on the Situation

deciding on his next move in the great game. During these hours he dictated two memoranda on his strategical situation. These are so absolutely opposed in their contents and arrangement to anything one could previously have conceived as coming from the mind of this great Master of men and War, that many doubts have been cast on their authenticity. But as the German General Staff have accepted them, we may bow to their authority.

They are too long for reproduction, but briefly they discuss at considerable length two alternatives, viz., a march with the main Army on Prague, or a march, with Oudinot's command largely reinforced, on Berlin, and the marvel is that the Emperor's decision could have wavered for a moment. For Prague, it was already too late, from the moment when he had said, "I see nothing more to do" at Pirna; and, as already pointed out, the direction of Prague held out no hope of decision. The Bohemian Army could always run away faster than he could follow them. Berlin, on the other hand, held out all the fascination of his original northern plan, heightened by the satisfaction to be derived from administering prompt chastisement to Bernadotte, to say nothing of the more real advantage of a fresh country in which to operate, and finally the relief of the fortresses of Danzig, Küstrin and Frankfurt.

In the early hours of August 30 Napoleon's resolution was taken to march on Berlin, and Berthier was instructed to order the Guards and the Cavalry back from the Bohemian frontier, across the Elbe at Dresden, and towards Groszenhain. In consequence of these orders, during the afternoon the troops began filing ceaselessly over the bridges.

But already the foundations on which this plan had been based, flimsy enough at the best, had crumbled to pieces under the stubborn logic of events.

Napoleon hears of the Disaster at Kulm

Late in the evening the Emperor received a despairing appeal from Macdonald, imploring his presence to re-establish order and discipline in his defeated command, and at 2 a.m. on the 31st came the news of Vandamme's catastrophe at Kulm. A few hours later, General Corbineau, who, with a few cavalry men, had cut his way through the enemy, appeared, and was at once admitted to the Emperor's presence. What followed is thus described by Baron Fain in his *Manuscript de* 1813 (ii. p. 319) which I translate from Major Freidrichs' work (Vol. ii, p. 8):—

"Napoleon received the detailed account of the disaster without betraying any sign of his feelings. What he could not understand was how Vandamme could have allowed himself to be tempted so far in pursuit. "For an Army in retreat one must either build a golden bridge or oppose its progress with a dam of steel and iron." Walking up and down the room in deepest thought, he asked Berthier: 'Can we have written anything which could have thus misled him? Fetch me your order book. Fain, show me my notes. Let us see what we said.'

"The Major-General brought his order book, the Cabinet Secretary the notes, and together they went through the papers. They found nothing which could have justified the unfortunate General in leaving his position at Peterswalde."

This was perhaps the most magnificent exhibition of his histrionic talent that Napoleon ever gave, and of such exhibitions not a few have been recorded. But the facts were too hard to be explained away, and the Headquarters Staff failed to be impressed with it. General von Gersdorf, (Saxon) writing in his diary the same evening summed up the situation as follows:—

"The impression made by the successes at Dresden and by Moreau's death have been wiped out; all consequences these events might have entailed are simply destroyed. Confidence grows in the camp of the Allies in proportion as it sinks with us. The Emperor is very quiet; I hardly like to write 'depressed,' but very pensive, curiously he is not irritable; the spirit of Headquarters generally bears the stamp of the time."

As an immediate consequence of these disasters the movement on Berlin was suspended. Nothing whatever was done on August 31. On September 1 the Emperor replied to Macdonald's appeal (received on the night of the 30th) ordering him to hold on to Görlitz at all costs, meanwhile holding out the hope of his own arrival with reinforcements. He also sent Ney to Wittenberg to relieve Oudinot of his command and to restore order in the disorganized débris which after the defeat of Gross Beeren had rallied about that place. But his chief attention appears to have been devoted to preparing the troops about Dresden to meet a renewed offensive on the part of the Allies.

With this object St. Cyr (XIV) was ordered to remain at Pirna. Victor (II) was sent to Freiberg, and Marmont (VI), Mortier (Guards) and Latour-Maubourg's Cavalry were united around Dresden as a central reserve. Lobau received the command of the wreck of Vandamme's Corps, (I) which by using Teste's Division as a nucleus was raised to about 14,000 men and 66 guns (obtained by drafts from other commands) and 300 sabres.

It was now too late to carry out his march on Berlin in the manner he had originally designed. On the other hand, it was quite impossible for him to remain where he was, and since the outpost reports gave no hope that the "Grand Army"—as it had come to be called—would obligingly step down into the plains to be beaten, he now resolved to move the Guards, the VI Corps and his Headquarters to a central position equally convenient to reinforce Macdonald, Ney or Murat, whom he determined to leave in chief command at Dresden.

This central position Napoleon found in the little village of Hoyerswerda, where the road from Dresden to Berlin viâ Cottbus intersects a second-class road coming from Wittenberg viâ Leutenberg to Bautzen. During September 2nd Berthier wrote to Ney the following sketch of the situation, also an outline of Ney's special mission, to supplement such verbal instructions as the latter had taken with him from his personal interview with the Emperor, which seem to have been of the vaguest description:—

Orders to Ney

"We have just received news from the Duke of Reggio (Oudinot) who has seen fit to fall back to within two marches of Wittenberg. The consequences of this untimely movement are that General Tauentzien and a strong body of Cossacks have turned towards Lückau and Bautzen, where they threaten Macdonald's communications. It is really difficult to show less head than Oudinot.

"Everything is being set in motion for Hoyerswerda, where the Emperor and Headquarters will arrive on the 4th. You must march on the 4th, and be in Baruth on September 6. On that day the Emperor will place a Corps at Lückau which can join you. From Baruth it is only three marches to Berlin. Communication with the Emperor will thus be established, and the attack on Berlin can take place on the 9th or 10th. The whole division of Cossacks, and all this mass of inferior Landwehr Infantry will everywhere be thrown back on Berlin if your march is made in a determined manner. *You will understand the necessity for rapid action in order to draw advantage from the confusion of the Bohemian Army*, which is sure to set itself in motion as soon as it learns of the Emperor's move. Oudinot never attacked the enemy, and was clever enough to engage only one of his Corps. If he had gone at him resolutely would have overrun him everywhere."

The above deserves attentive study, as it was the immediate cause of the catastrophe of Dennewitz, which in its consequences proved the most serious reverse which the French had as yet sustained. Ney, who, in fact (in his usual impulsive manner), had started for Wittenberg with no definite instructions, had found Oudinot's troops in extreme disorder, penned in with their back against the Elbe by the whole of the Army of the North, which Bernadotte had very skilfully disposed so as to hide its weak effectives.

The Emperor in his instructions never alludes to the position of this enemy at all, and they were clearly written under the impression that no serious opposition cou'd be opposed to the prescribed march on Baruth by the Army of the North. But Ney saw only his orders, and with the fate of Oudinot before his eyes, determined not to fall into the error of weak execution, which the context of Berthier's memoranda so strongly condemns.

Having re-established some measure of order among the troops (during September 3 and 4), on the morning of the 5th Ney broke out of his position with his whole three Corps. He moved straight across country in masses towards Zahna to gain the Lückau-Bautzen road. The weather being clear and dry, the dense dust clouds stirred up by this formidable array gave Bernadotte ample warning of its coming, and though Tauentzien's weak Corps of Landwehr, on whom the blow of Ney's advance directly fell, were easily thrown back in dire confusion, all the remainder of his Army, Bülow, Wintzengerode and the Swedes, were immediately set in motion to move parallel to the French and head them off if possible from Jüterbogk. A cloud of Cossacks, and a low roll of the ground concealed this movement from Ney, whose troops bivouacked for the night around Zahna, quite unaware that a formidable enemy was gathering within five miles of their left flank.

Early the next morning the march was renewed, the IV Corps (Bertrand) leading, followed by the VII (Reynier) and XII (Oudinot), each marching in mass of Divisions, the Artillery only on the road.

Battle of Dennewitz

Tauentzien had bivouacked near Dennewitz and had spent the night in restoring order amongst his Landwehr, and with such success that, confident of prompt support, he was able to take up a position effectively barring the further progress of the French, though he had barely 10,000 men under arms. *This is worth noting, for it shows how readily raw troops can be rallied, even from serious panic, if they only know what they are fighting for.* Still, an encounter against such odds could only end one way, and after about two hours' fighting the Landwehr were faltering in every direction, when Bülow's men appeared on the flank of the French IV Corps. Their attack at once stopped the progress of the latter, and now it was Bertrand who was thrown on the defensive. The arrival of the VII Corps again turned the scale, but fresh Prussian battalions turning up, the left flank of the French gave way, and their position was only saved by the appearance of the leading troops of the XII Corps.

But just as the whole mass of this new command were preparing for a final counterstroke against the allies in order to finish the day, Ney, who all this time had been watching the battle with Bertrand's men, and knowing nothing of what was happening on his extreme left, sent orders to Oudinot to continue his march to the front. The latter, who since his supersession by Ney in the command of the Army, had been in that worst of tempers in which a man confines himself to the literal obedience of his orders—however much circumstances may have altered and his own common sense may apprehend this fact—called off all his troops, and in spite of Reynier's most urgent remonstrances he resumed his march to join Ney, passing close along the rear of the hardly pressed VII Corps.

Punishment was not long delayed, for ever since morning the Russians and Swedes had been pressing their march to the utmost, and warned of the urgency of the case, their Horse Artillery and Cavalry had hurried on far in advance. Almost as the last of the XII Corps quitted the line, the storm burst upon the exhausted VII Corps. An advance of every available gun to case shot range preluded the approach of a perfect hurricane of horsemen, before whom the French broke, and pursuers and pursued poured down the slopes upon the flanks of Oudinot's masses.

The defeat was absolutely catastrophic! A wild panic seized the French, and for the next few days Ney's command ceased to exist.

We must now return to the Emperor, whom we left completing his arrangements for the defence of Dresden. His orders on this subject to Rogniat (his Chief Engineer) dated September 3 remain as masterpieces for all time, and equally so are his instructions to St. Cyr of the same date. Thus, having provided for every contingency as far as human foresight could well go, he started on the afternoon of the 3rd to overtake the Guards and Reserves already on their way to Hoyerswerda (about forty miles north-east of Dresden). But at the last moment a report from Macdonald, dispatched the previous evening, was handed in to him, which again shattered the basis of his whole design.

Briefly, Macdonald again represented his command as absolutely out of hand; he could find no one to support him in his efforts to maintain discipline, and only the Emperor's presence could avert utter disaster.

Napoleon Joins Macdonald

This time there was no hesitation. Orders went to all the marching columns to change direction towards Bautzen. Ney was warned of the Emperor's alteration of his destination, which might postpone his march on Berlin until Blücher's Army had been disposed of; but Ney was to continue the execution of his own march on Baruth to be able to back up the Emperor the moment he returned, and Macdonald was warned to have all his troops in readiness for inspection early next morning, so that the Emperor could ride down the front in half an hour. Then the moment the Guards and Latour Maubourg arrived, which would be between 2 and 3 p.m., the Emperor proposed to attack the enemy wherever he found him.

Napoleon slept that night at Gross Harthau, and rode on in the early morning of September 4 towards Bautzen. That he had expected to find things in a bad way is clear from the steps he had already taken to meet the most urgent necessities, and to replenish both arms and equipment. But what he really encountered was worse than any one had dreamt of imagining. Swarms of bare-footed, unarmed and starving stragglers met him as he rode; and there was no food to give them, for a big convoy of provisions and ammunition had been intercepted by a raiding command from Blücher's Army, and only its smoking remains lay by the roadside. And here, at length, the Emperor lost his usual self-control. A miserable dog ran out and yapped at his horse as he rode by; he drew his pistol on the poor wretch, but the pistol missed fire, and in a rage he flung it at the animal. Then he rode on in gloomy silence, until he met Macdonald and his staff outside Bautzen. Then his temper completely overmastered him. Turning on Sebastiani (Commander of the 2nd Cavalry Corps), he upbraided him in such unmeasured terms that Caulaincourt and the Staff had to close round him to shut off the undignified scene. Thence he rode on to Hochkirch, where the heads of columns of the Silesian Army were seen approaching. At these he hurled the nearest of his troops at hand, who now, suddenly ashamed of themselves and anxious to retrieve their reputation under their Emperor's eyes, attacked with such vigour that Blücher and his Generals immediately detected the presence of the Master, and at once ordered a retreat behind the Lobau river. This was carried out successfully, thanks to the desperate fighting of their respective rear guards.

He then spent the night at Hochkirch, and rode off early in the morning to the Wohlauer hill to reconnoitre the enemy's position in person. But the morning reports made it clear that Blücher was in full retreat, and despairing of bringing him to action, suspecting also a plot to draw him further from Dresden, he returned to Bautzen with the Guards, and learning from Ney that he would leave Wittenberg for Jütebogh on the 5th, orders were issued for the Guards and VI Corps to march on the 6th to Hoyerswerda.

Napoleon Returns to Dresden

But two hours after this decision had been taken again he felt compelled to alter their destination, for further alarmist reports from St. Cyr at Dresden reached him. Seemingly forgetting all the orders which he had issued to meet the contingency of a fresh advance on the part of the Bohemian Army, he hesitated, changed his mind, and forthwith couriers were sent after the Guards and the 1st Cavalry Corps to change their direction from Hoyerswerda to Dresden. Only Marmont (VI Corps) was to continue his march on Kamenz.

Comment

Of the many strange situations in this Campaign, this is perhaps the most difficult to unravel. St. Cyr's reports contain nothing to show that anything had occurred in excess of what Napoleon's precautions had been intended to provide for. Hence, if his calculations before leaving Dresden had been correct, there was no particular reason for this extraordinary alarm. Further, even if St. Cyr's story had been many times darker, and the Bohemian Army had, in fact, been in full march over the mountains, this would have been only a repetition of the situation he had already faced and provided for on the 23rd of the previous month. Then he had written, in reply to similar dismal forebodings on the part of St. Cyr, "If the Bohemian Army crosses the mountains and advances into Saxony, in that case I will wish them *bon voyage*; they will come back quicker than they went."

His troops at this moment occupied almost identically the same position as on the night of August 25, and if Dresden really was in jeopardy, surely the shortest way to its relief would have been by one side of the triangle from Bautzen to Teplitz, rather than by the two sides from Bautzen to Dresden, Dresden–

Teplitz.

Before leaving Bautzen the following order was published to the Army :—

"Every soldier who leaves his colours betrays the first of his duties.

"His Majesty therefore orders—

"Soldiers who leave the colours without sufficient reason will be decimated. The Corps Commanders, therefore, every time they have collected ten stragglers will cause them to draw lots, and one of them is to be shot."

On the evening of the 6th Napoleon reached Dresden, where he found renewed reports from St. Cyr to the effect that "The Austrians were advancing by Altenberg, the Prussians and Russians by Borna and Berggieszhübel, where they had already arrived." There was no indication at all of the forces they had deployed, still less as to whether they were moving on Chemnitz and Freiberg, both points of very great importance. The Emperor expressed his dissatisfaction at the incompetence of the whole Intelligence Service. To clear up the situation he sent Victor's Corps in support of St. Cyr to Dohna, on the 7th, and rode out next morning at the head of the Guards to conduct a reconnaissance in person.

The Bohemian Army

It is now time to return to the Bohemian Army, which we left at the moment when the tide of its misfortune had been suddenly arrested by its victory over Vandamme at Kulm (August 30), and when the news of Gross Beeren and the Katzbach, both of which had been received during the previous twenty-four hours, had stiffened its drooping spirits.

But though all idea of further retreat was abandoned, a halt to re-establish order in the several commands, and to issue fresh ammunition and equipments, especially boots (for nearly half the Army was by this time barefooted) was urgently necessary.

The abortive expedition had entailed a loss in killed, wounded, prisoners and sick of some 45,000 men, of which 9,000 men with 600 horses fell upon the Prussians, nearly 30 per cent. of their original effective. But in spite of this heavy punishment, endured day by day under the depressing conditions of continuous retreat, the Commanding Officers were all able to report that in their conduct the men had shewn both goodwill and devotion beyond all expectation or praise.

The breakdown of the commissariat had been complete, and the Russians, particularly the Cossacks, had sought to make good the deficiencies in their supply by living on the inhabitants, and robbing them right and left. So serious, indeed, were the disturbances and sufferings created by these half-civilized horsemen that flying columns had to be organized, which the inhabitants of the country gladly joined, to hunt down these marauders and hang them out of hand. It may be mentioned here that these same troops proved equally troublesome in the rear of all three Armies, and that behind the Silesian Army they formed themselves into organised bands of brigands, who waylaid, stripped and murdered every civilian and even officer who fell into their hands.

The chief result of these victories, viz., Kulm, Gross Beeren and Katzbach, on the future of the campaign was, however, to confirm for good and all the allegiance of Austria to the Triple Alliance. Up to the very day of the battle of Kulm, Metternich had been carrying on diplomatic relations with Napoleon, and both the Prussians and Russians felt that he might desert the common cause at a moment's notice. Now decisively he flung diplomacy to the winds, and in a final communication to the French Emperor formulated such preposterous demands for the conclusion of peace that nothing but hopeless defeat could have enabled the latter even to consider them.

The Monarchs call upon Blücher

Under the depressing influences of defeat a letter had been despatched to Blücher on August 29, calling upon him to march with 50,000 men (i.e., more than half his command as it stood) to the assistance of the Bohemian Army, and notwithstanding the victory of Kulm, the demand was not withdrawn. Thence a long correspondence arose, which reveals very completely the entire want of anything approaching organized co-operation in determining the ultimate issue of the campaign.

The letter to Blücher did not convey an absolute order, merely a royal wish, leaving, as far as these things can be left, the final decision to depend on the circumstances prevailing at the Silesian Headquarters on delivery of the document.

Now at that moment, unknown, of course, to Blücher, Napoleon had actually gathered together his forces for his often proposed march on Berlin, and Ney had received his orders to fall upon Bernadotte and overwhelm him, and it was only Blücher's resolute pursuit, or, better, pressure upon Macdonald's command which caused the Emperor to abandon his design and turn upon Blücher.

Bernadotte

Meanwhile, Bernadotte, able to gauge the Emperor's mind far better than did any other of his colleagues, was painfully aware of the imminent danger which threatened his command in its isolated position right in the path of the Emperor's march on Berlin, which he had divined, from the first, as Napoleon's immediate reply to the defeat of Oudinot at Gross Beeren. Judging by the light of the fuller knowledge now available, there can be no doubt that this counterstroke, had it been carried out, must have been decisive of the whole campaign. Having marched right over the North Army, relieved Danzig and the Oder fortresses, and then with Davoût having reopened communications with Magdeburg, the Emperor again would have been in touch with all the resources of France, and the 32nd Military Division. Indeed, he might have renewed the campaign with an assured numerical superiority and with a wholly re-established military prestige. But not an inkling of this possibility seems to have dawned on the Allied Headquarters, who called on Blücher for reinforcements, which would only have added to the existing congestion of the district in which they stood. These were refused by Blücher, not on the grounds of Bernadotte's danger and consequent claim on the loyalty of his nearest comrade, but because neither he nor Gneisenau desired to have their freedom hampered by the loss of half their troops.

Blücher's private autograph letter to Knesebeck is so characteristic that I reproduce it with its original spelling ; it was sent under cover with the formal dispatch :—

"Um des allgemeinen wohl und Besten, bewahren, si mich vor einer vereinigung mit der groszen armeh ; was soll eine solche ungeheure masse auf einen gleichsam ausgezerten terrain, hir will ich wirksahn sein und kann ich nützlich werden, weiche ich von einen den Kronprinzen von Schweden mitgetheilten operations Plan ab, so kriegt er sicher, staht dasz er nu mit starken chritt vorwerts geht ; solte Napoleon nach Boehmen hineingehn wollen, so musz man ihn in Boehmen vernichten, ich glaube aber, dasz er die Elbe verläst wenn man gut manouvrirt.

"BLÜCHER."

HERNHUT, den 13 *Sept.*, 1813.

It will be noticed that in this letter Blücher does speak of a combined operation with the Crown Prince of Sweden. But Major Rühle von Lilienstein, who carried this dispatch, had verbal instructions to point out to the Allied Sovereigns, not the imminence of the danger which threatened the Crown Prince and his troops as long as Napoleon held the passages over the Elbe, but that no reliance could be placed on the loyalty of the Crown Prince himself unless Blücher and Gneisenau were at hand to drive him ; and, in anticipation, it may be added, that a secret intrigue was already on foot by which on the approach of the Silesian Army Bülow and Tauentzien were to refuse obedience to the Prince and transfer their forces to Blücher's command, in case the latter hesitated to press operations with the energy they desired.

Bernadotte's conduct in every campaign has always remained an insoluble problem to all students. His absence from the battlefield of Jena at the critical moment, and his amazing indiscreetness at Wagram (for which the Emperor had actually ordered him to be tried by court martial) had cast suspicion on him in many quarters. Now the fact that neither at Gross Beeren nor Dennewitz had he nor his Swedes taken part in either battle had completely shaken the confidence of the Prussians in his courage and his loyalty. Yet in the present instance those suspicions prove to have been unfounded, and Major Friedrichs (who is the first to discuss the situation with adequate documentary evidence at his disposal) is able to establish Bernadotte's *bona fides* at this period of the campaign beyond all reasonable doubt. In so far as he appeared to be lacking in enterprise, the explanation is that he knew his wily adversary and the nature of his own danger far better than could any of his critics.

Fortunately for the Allies, events moved far more rapidly than the correspondence, but it was necessary to emphasize the point at this period of the narrative in order to throw light upon the undercurrents of intrigue which hampered the movements of the three Armies.

Bohemian Army Advances

Returning now to the Bohemian Headquarters, we find the troops sufficiently re-established to resume operations on September 5. Accordingly, the columns again penetrated into the mountains by the same roads which they had used previously, and it was the fighting which ensued as the advance guards came in contact with the French outposts that led St. Cyr to send off his alarmist reports to the Emperor at Bautzen.

But on the 6th, and whilst the first line of their Army was still in close touch with St. Cyr's troops, news reached the Allies from an unimpeachable source that Napoleon had again turned against Blücher, taking with him the bulk of his troops. Now it was that while still uncertain as to the reply Blücher would give to the demand for 50,000 men, the Headquarters decided to march 60,000, by Aussig, Leitmeritz and Rumburg, to his support, and the movement was actually initiated.

We must pause a moment to contemplate the amazing spectacle which would have been presented had Blücher already complied with the Allied Sovereigns' request ; 60,000 men marching north on one road, whilst parallel to them and only a few miles distant 50,000 marched south on another highway ; 110,000 men neutralized, and Napoleon in the middle of them to take advantage of this incredible opportunity.

Napoleon rejoins St. Cyr

But hardly had the troops started their march than the situation once more underwent an entire change, for Napoleon was again reported as in full march for Dresden, and, as we have seen, the report was confirmed by his appearance in person during the course of September 8 at the head of his Guards in that city.

A retreat and concentration was immediately decided upon, and the whole Bohemian Army was ordered to be drawn up for battle on a plateau covering Teplitz and the exits from the mountains.

The retreat of the advance detachments involved severe fighting, but by the evening of September 9 the whole of the Russian and Prussian contingents had taken up their positions, and on the morning of the 10th Napoleon, from the heights of the Geiersberg, was able to look down upon, and almost count, the individual men opposed to him.

Reconnaissances were at once pushed out to find roads suitable for the passage of artillery across the ravine lying at his feet, but when in the evening Drouot, his most trusted Artillery Commander, returned with the report that the plateau was utterly inaccessible to that arm, he made up his mind to abandon the attempt to force on a battle. Leaving St. Cyr to make every show of concentration, to send out working parties to ostentatiously repair the roads, etc., he returned to Dresden to attend more closely to the situation which had arisen out of Ney's defeat at Dennewitz, the full magnitude of which had at length struck home to him.

Comment

St. Cyr in his *Memoirs* has criticized this decision most adversely, drawing unfavourable comparisons between the man who crossed the St. Bernard without field artillery in 1800 when entering Italy, and the Emperor who now hesitated because his guns could not follow the Infantry. But this criticism only serves to show how little his contemporaries had fathomed the secret of their Leader, or grasped the profound change in the spirit of their own troops and the character of their opponents. In 1800 the French Infantry still fought with Republican fanaticism, the Long Service Armies of Austria by routine. Now the situation was entirely

reversed, and the French could only hope to beat their enemies when artillery fire had done its work. To bring up adequate masses of guns for this purpose on to the plateau being impossible, no decisive action could be hoped for, and only a decisive victory could be of use to the Emperor in his present situation.

Arrived in Dresden, Napoleon immediately issued orders transferring the Administrative Bureaus of the Army from Dresden to Torgau, which seems to indicate that for the moment a policy of concentration against the Northern Army, whilst still unsupported, flashed through his mind. But if this was the case, the idea was only temporary, for next morning (September 12) he ordered Marmont from Kamenz to Grossenhain, and sent Murat with the 1st and 5th Cavalry Corps to join him.

Immediately this movement served to cover the transit of a convoy of 15,000 cwt. of flour up the river into Dresden, but it might also have served as a preliminary for a renewed offensive against the Army of the North, and was appreciated in that spirit by Bernadotte.

Bernadotte. The latter, after his victory over Ney at Dennewitz, had detailed Tauentzien to observe the French who had fallen back on Torgau, and Bülow was told off to besiege Wittenberg, whilst the Swedes moved down stream on Rosslau. Wintzingerode and Woronzow were at Zerbst, and Bernadotte was being strongly urged by his Prussian subordinates to pass at any rate one Corps of his Army over the Elbe to operate on the French communications, a step he had refused to take until Wittenberg was in his possession. His resolution had all but led to open mutiny on the part of the Prussians, as already noticed above, but Napoleon's threat from Dresden towards Grossenhain so completely vindicated his judgment, that it was impossible to cross the river as long as the Emperor was free to debouch from Dresden, Meissen or Torgau, that this opposition was for the time at least withdrawn, and more harmonious relations were established in his command.

Renewed Advance of Bohemian Army But a fresh offensive by the Bohemian Army on September 14 against St. Cyr caused the Emperor to change his plans again, and on the 15th he marched with two Divisions of the young Guard to Pirna in the hope of surprising the Allies in an unfavourable position. This desire, however, was disappointed. The Allies immediately began their retreat, contesting every position desperately, and concentrating ultimately near Kulm, where they appeared as ready to accept battle once more.

On the 17th Napoleon rode out to reconnoitre from the mountains near Nollendorf, but fog and rain hindered all observations until midday. The attack was then begun, but a Prussian Corps defended the advance posts so resolutely that hardly any ground had been gained when a tremendous downpour of rain put a stop to the fighting about 5 p.m.

On the 18th the Emperor again rode out to reconnoitre in person. The air being clear he could see every detail of the enemy's position, and he noted particularly the stream of their reinforcements arriving. Reluctantly he ordered the Guards back to Pirna, and leaving Lobau and St. Cyr to reoccupy their former positions he returned to Pirna, where for the next few days (during which ceaseless rain made operations impossible) he remained secluded in his chambers, striving to grapple intellectually with the tide of misfortunes that now began to pour in upon him.

From the south came the news that the Austrians had surprised and captured (during the night of September 17–18) the garrison of Freiberg; from the west he heard that Merseburg, with a garrison of 1,800 men, had surrendered to a partisan commando under Thielmann and Mensdorf, and finally from Ney came the report, premature though it happened to be, that Bernadotte with 80,000 men had crossed the Elbe at Rosslau.

To add to all this, the condition of the French troops was deplorable; their rations had been cut down from 28 oz. of bread to 8 oz (raised again, it is true, by the successful introduction of the 15,000 cwt. of flour into Dresden to 24 oz.); but this supply was already beginning to give out, and the district offered absolutely nothing but potatoes. Meat had scarcely been seen for weeks, and the half starved men, exposed to the inclement weather night after night in rain-sodden bivouacs, were melting away by battalions.

Since the resumption of hostilities, he had lost not less than 150,000 men, 300 guns and a huge amount of war material. Upwards of 50,000 sick and wounded still crowded the hospitals, whence it was said only one man in ten came out alive; but yet, notwithstanding this accumulation of catastrophes, the iron will of this extraordinary man would not bow to the inevitable and sacrifice Dresden, although this city not only was of no further military advantage to him, but on the contrary was a source of gravest danger. And for this reason. His foes had now approached so close on both sides that he had no longer room to manœuvre, and all the time Bernadotte lay in his direct path to ultimate victory, simply waiting to be destroyed. Here the Ruler undoubtedly sacrificed strategy to the apparent interests of his dynasty.

On September 21 Napoleon returned again to Dresden, and on the 22nd, taking with him his Guards, as usual, he joined Macdonald, who still faced Blücher, and drove the latter back on the 23rd to the strong position he had already prepared about Bautzen, where this time it was apparent the old fellow had determined to make a stand. But at this moment Ney sent word that the Northern Army had thrown a bridge over the Elbe at Wartenburg, close above Wittenberg, and that he feared to be cut off both from Torgau and Dresden. On receipt of this news (again a premature report) the Emperor at length gave orders for a general withdrawal of the whole of Macdonald's command to the left bank of the Elbe, giving out that it was his intention to afford them the few days' rest which they so urgently needed. In accordance with this intention, by September 27 the French Army occupied the following positions:—

I. At Dresden (*a*) on the right bank of the Elbe—
   XI Corps (Macdonald) at Weissig.
   2nd Cavalry Corps (Sebastiani) at Pillnitz.
   III Corps (Souham), Dresden and on the road to Grossenhain.
   (*b*) On the left bank of the Elbe—
   V Corps (Lauriston) around Dresden.
   The Guards, Dresden and Pirna.

II. Facing the Bohemian Army—
   I Corps (Lobau) at Berggiesshübel.
   XIV Corps (St. Cyr). 43rd Division, Pirna and Pillnitz. 42nd Division, Königstein. 44th and 45th Division, Borna and Dippoldiswalde.
   II Corps (Victor) at Freiberg.
   VIII Corps (Poniatowski) and 4th Cavalry Corps (Kellermann) at Waldheim.

III. Facing the North Army—
   IV Corps (Bertrand), Kemberg and Schleesen.
   VII Corps (Reynier) and 3rd Cavalry Corps (Arighi) (exclusive Lorge's Division) in Dessau, Wörlitz and Oranienbaum.

IV. Covering the Elbe north of Dresden—
   VI Corps (Marmont) between Meissen and Wurzen.
   1st Cavalry Corps (Latour) between Grossenhain, Meissen and Schildau.
   5th Cavalry Corps (L'Héritier) at Meissen.

V. To guard the rearward connections—
   2nd Guard Cavalry Division and Leipzig Corps of Observation (Margaron) under the command of Lefebvre-Desnouëttes, at Altenberg.
   Dombrowski's Division and Cavalry Division (Lorge) on the march across the Mulde.

VI. On march to reinforce the Army—
   IX Corps (Augereau) from Würzburg towards the Saar.
   March Division (Lefol) from Erfurt to the Saale.

For the next few days the Emperor was fully occupied in reorganizing the Army and issuing instructions for placing the towns along his main line of retreat in a state of defence. Bridge heads were ordered to be constructed at all important river passages, and all sick and wounded were sent back towards France.

On September 27 a decree was published calling up 120,000 men of the contingents of 1812–11–10 who had hitherto not been drawn as conscripts, and 160,000 men of the contingent of 1815 were ordered to be enrolled in advance.

In order to obtain more unity in the command of the troops destined to confront the Bohemian Army, the King of Naples (Murat) was ordered to take over the II, V and VIII Corps with the 5th Cavalry Corps, and one Division of the 1st Cavalry Corps, and to establish his Headquarters at Freiberg.

If this disposition is carefully studied it will be seen that it is in itself a masterpiece of defensive strategy, for each wing is strong enough to resist, for a couple of days, any force which could reasonably be brought against it, and in that time the strong central reserve could support it with overwhelming numbers.

Unfortunately, however, it suffered from one grave defect, which nullified all its many advantages, viz., *the whole army was starving, and the men no longer possessed the physical strength with which to meet their Emperor's demands.* Yet there is no sign that the idea of retreat had received serious consideration, for such precautionary orders as had been issued are quite insufficient to justify this interpretation.

Blücher's Movements In the meantime, the Silesian Army, released from the pressure hitherto exercised upon it by Macdonald's command, had been quick to take advantage of its freedom for action. Posting Sacken to watch Dresden in the vicinity of Grossenhain, Blücher had directed the whole of the remainder of his forces by Kamenz-Liebenswerda towards Wittenberg, hoping by his presence to drag the Crown Prince of Sweden into activity.

As already pointed out above, the relations between the two commands had been none of the best, and neither Gneisenau nor Blücher had recognized the extreme danger of Bernadotte's position, hence they seem to have been quite unprepared for the cordial reception their proposals evoked from him. In the Silesian Army itself the idea of undertaking this dangerous flank march across Napoleon's front, and abandoning all their communications, evoked the liveliest anxiety. The Russian Commissary-General, Count Thuyl, protested solemnly, and demanded that the proposed plan should be submitted to a council of all the Generals in the command, but Blücher here showed the firmness of his character, and dismissed the suggestion with an absolute refusal to hold any council of war. The risk was extreme, and he knew it; but since the Bohemian Army could not make up its collective mind, and Bernadotte alone was powerless to move, he determined to assert his initiative, and to drag the whole three Armies into motion by the force of accomplished facts.

The march was so far beyond anything that Napoleon had ever anticipated from any one of his enemies, that he was completely deceived as to its object when the news reached him, which it did very promptly.

He at once interpreted it as a preliminary to an attack on Dresden from the north-west, between Meissen and Grossenhain, in order to avoid all the difficulties of manœuvring presented by the forest land towards Bautzen, and whilst making dispositions to deal with this threat, he allowed Blücher to continue his march undisturbed, with the result that on October 2 the Silesian Army had concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Wartenburg, and had begun preparations to force the passage of the Elbe at that point.

The attention of the French had already been directed to this spot by an attempt at a crossing made by detachments of the North Army on September 20, and Bertrand had provided abundantly, as he thought, for its defence. But though an engineer, he had forgotten to consult the levels of the river, and had not realized that a fall of a couple of feet might render his position untenable.

The Prussians, though in their own country, seem to have been equally, or indeed more, ignorant of the nature of the ground. They had selected the point of passage from the best map available (a very bad one), and on paper it appeared to present all the most desirable conditions for a river crossing, viz., a great re-entrant bend towards their side (the north), bushes and trees to mask operations, and a convenient tributary (the Elster) in which to collect their material. But the surface within the re-entrant was completely hidden from view by dense undergrowth, and the existence of an old branch of the river, only fordable with difficulty at a couple of points, seems to have been quite unknown to them. It was on the existence of this old river-

bed that Bertrand relied; he had personally reconnoitred the ground in the spring, and believed it to be quite impassable. But he had not noticed that the river itself was at the moment considerably lower than usual.

The Prussians, after several hours of desperate fighting across it at close quarters, ultimately did find unsuspected passages, and pouring through them with both Cavalry and Artillery, by almost unequalled efforts (the result of a fighting spirit which would not be denied) they turned the French right, defeated all counter-attacks by case fire and Cavalry charges, and before nightfall were complete masters of the enemy's position.

The troops, line and Landwehr, side by side, had been marching and fighting incessantly for six weeks, alternately in advance and in retreat, and their privations had been most serious. Yorck's Corps, to whom the credit of the whole day belongs, had shrunk, notwithstanding frequent reinforcements, from 38,484 to 12,000 in the morning of the battle, and of these 12,000, 1,600 were left on the field. But this loss does not fairly indicate the strain actually endured by those personally engaged at the decisive points of the fighting line, for in the densely wooded ground only the heads of the columns could be hotly engaged; but these seem to have been shot away again and again, and it was their absolute refusal to admit defeat that in the end turned the scale in their favour.

STRENGTH OF FRENCH ARMY—END OF SEPTEMBER, 1813

	Men.	Guns.
(*a*) In and around Dresden—		
Imperial Guard	44,000	202
XI Corps. Macdonald	25,000	68
I Corps. Lobau	12,500	47
XIV Corps. St. Cyr	28,000	60
2nd Cavalry Corps. Sebastiani	6,800	12
	116,300	389
(*b*) Along the Elbe, Strehla to Meissen—		
III Corps. Souham	15,000	61
(*c*) On the Mulde, Eilenburg to Bitterfeld—		
IV Corps. Bertrand	15,500	32
VII Corps. Reynier	22,000	48
Dombrowski's Cavalry Division	3,500	8
Detachment. 3rd Cavalry Corps.	2,500	6
VI Corps. Marmont	22,500	82
1st Cavalry Corps. Latour Maubourg (less Berckheim's Division)	6,000	27
	71,700	203
(*d*) Between Altenberg and Freiberg—		
II Corps. Victor	16,000	55
V Corps. Lauriston	14,200	53
VIII Corps. Poniatowski	6,900	30
4th Cavalry Corps	3,000	12
Berckheim's Division from 1st Cavalry Corps	1,000	6
	43,550	156
(*e*) In and around Leipzig—	Men.	Guns.
Corps of Observation under General Margaron	5,700	16
Cavalry Division. Lorge	1,500	6
	7,200	22
(*f*) Between Weissenfels and Naumburg—		
A mixed Cavalry Corps under Lefèbvre-Desnouëttes	5,000	6
(*g*) On the march to Leipzig—		
IX Corps. Augereau	9,200	64
Cavalry Division. Milhaud	3,500	—
	12,700	14
Grand total . . 256,000 men., 784 guns.		

LEIPZIG

WHILST the Silesian Army completed the passage of the Elbe at Wartenburg, Bernadotte with the North Army crossed some twenty miles lower down at Rosslau. The two Armies were thus within easy supporting distance of each other, and together constituted a fairly formidable fighting force of about 150,000 men. The Bohemian Army could still put 180,000 in the field, and Napoleon at Dresden lay midway between them with—including reinforcements—about 260,000. From a purely military standpoint, therefore, his situation had not been altered for the worse, since he no longer had three separate forces to contend against; and by continuing to play the game of "interior lines" he could still mass a numerical superiority against either of the Allied enemies, sufficient at least to ensure a victory under normal conditions; but absolutely overwhelming when multiplied in fighting power by the magnetism of his personal presence and command.

The catastrophe of Leipzig, however, was so complete and dramatic, and its final causes were so obvious, that posterity has invariably treated the subject as if the end must have been as clearly evident to the actors in it then as it is to us now; and instead of seeing in the Emperor a great General playing his part, still with absolute confidence in his final triumph, it has insisted on regarding him as a hunted animal trying to evade the toils of its trappers, and it has magnified every little incident which has seemed to intensify the animal's sufferings.

Viewed from this standpoint, it is indeed easy to pick holes in Napoleon's strategy; for his blindness and his hesitation to seize the many chances of escape which the blunders of the Allies provided for him, become quite unaccountable. But when we picture the Emperor to ourselves as still supremely conscious of his own superiority over his opponents, one can only marvel at the fertility of resource, and the unswerving confidence in his Army and in its marching and fighting powers which he maintained under the most depressing surroundings.

Defects of Dresden Position

From his point of view his position at Dresden had become intolerable only because he could not get at his enemies to smash them utterly.

The Bohemian Mountains formed no suitable setting for a great tactical decision, but once he could tempt the Bohemian Army out into the plains he knew them to be far too slow to evade the consequences of his determined onslaught. On receiving the news of the passage of the Elbe, on the night of October 4, he at once issued orders for the troops about Dresden to march next day towards Meissen, placing the XI, VI and III Corps, together with the 3rd Cavalry Corps, provisionally under Ney's command. He then prepared to follow himself at the head of the Guards, the XI Corps, and 2nd Cavalry Corps next morning (October 7).

His general idea is best expressed in the following letter to Marmont:—

Napoleon's Attack

"I shall be this evening with 80,000 men in Meissen; my advance guard at the cross roads from Leipzig and Torgau, and I shall decide upon which to choose according to the reports I receive. . . . I intend to move to Torgau and from thence down the right bank of the Elbe in order to cut the enemy off and seize all his bridges without the necessity of attacking his bridge heads. An advance down the left bank would have the inconvenience that the enemy might retreat across the river and thus avoid the battle. In that case one certainly might debouch by Wittenberg. But as the enemy still holds the initiative I shall only decide when I learn the situation to-night."

As regards the fate of Dresden, the Emperor hesitated for some time. On the afternoon of October 6, he sent for St. Cyr and instructed him to take command of the I and XIV Corps in order to defend it. About midnight, however, he sent for him again and told him he had changed his mind. "I shall fight a battle, without doubt," he said. "If I win I shall regret not having all my troops at hand. If I lose, then if I leave you here, you will have been of no use to me, and you will be hopelessly lost. After all, of what advantage is Dresden to me now? The place can no longer form the pivot of our operations, the district is too completely cleaned out to feed an Army. . . . Once the Elbe is frozen over it ceases to form an obstacle. I will choose another position; my right on Erfurt, centre along the Saale, the left on Magdeburg. It is a big, strong fortress which one can leave to itself as often as one chooses without fear that the enemy can carry it by a surprise assault." Then, after dwelling in detail on the difficulties of fortifying Dresden, he continued: "Dresden is too near the mountains; as soon as I make the smallest movement from this town against the enemy's Army, it steps back again under their cover, as it has only a short way to go, and I have no means of cutting it off, as I cannot get behind it."

The result of this conversation was drafted into the form of an order, and next morning St. Cyr set about evacuating his advanced positions, not without severe fighting. Later in the day he received a counter-order from the Emperor, dated 10 a.m. (October 7), instructing him to remain in his position, as he had decided not to give up Dresden after all.

Probably no orders during the whole course of the campaign have evoked more criticism than the above. St. Cyr, in his *Memoirs*, has dealt with them at length, describing in detail the Emperor's manner on the several occasions, and it is indeed difficult to explain away the obvious vacillation they betray. But if one endeavours to focus the position from the Emperor's standpoint of certain victory, and remember the many plans seething in his mind as to his future conduct in that event, such as the occupation of Berlin, and the relief of the Oder garrisons; or a descent on the rear of the Bohemian Army should it venture forth into the Saxon plains, his motive becomes clearer. It is certain that the concentration of every available man, horse, and gun on the decisive point is a sound fundamental principle, but just as no engineer thinks of putting more metal into a bridge than is necessary to meet the maximum strain which experience shows can be brought to bear upon it, so a General, when obviously he has made sufficient provision for every emergency, is justified in employing the excess of his forces elsewhere. This is more especially the case since the actual striking power of an Army does not increase in direct proportion with its numbers, but may on the contrary lose by them, particularly where, as in this instance, the troops had to live on the district they traversed, and the roads were few and very indifferent.

As the Emperor only estimated the combined forces of the Silesian and Northern Armies at 100,000 men (a 20 per cent. under-estimate, as a matter of fact), he was surely justified in believing that with himself and 160,000 men he had made sufficient provision for all possible contingencies. Bernadotte, as we shall presently see, considered them more than ample.

Blücher and Bernadotte

Meanwhile, Blücher and Bernadotte after their passage across the Elbe, determined to march upon Leipzig, with a view to facilitating the exit of the Bohemian Army into the plains by diverting to themselves Napoleon's attention. In pursuance of this plan the Silesian Army was to reach the vicinity of Düben on October 8, and both Headquarters together were to enter Leipzig on the 9th. Following out these orders, Sacken reached Eilenburg, Langeron Düben, and Yorck Mühlbach. But the main body of the North Army, for some unexplained reason, remained halted at Jessnitz; and alarmed by a rumour of the approach of a French Corps from the direction of Magdeburg, Bernadotte sent back a strong force to guard his bridges at Rosslau. The whole Army was thus distributed over a depth of some forty miles, needing two whole days to close on its front for action. Notwithstanding the fact that they were operating in a friendly country, and possessed a great superiority in Cavalry, their knowledge of the French position was most vague. It was not until late in the afternoon, when the news reached them that the Emperor had left Dresden taking the road to Leipzig, whither a very large force had preceded him, that the full danger of the situation dawned upon the Allies. October 8, 22 Infantry Divisions and 12 Cavalry Divisions, in all 150,000 men closely concentrated under the Emperor himself, who was actually drafting the orders for the battle which he confidently expected to fight near Düben next morning.

During the previous days the Headquarters of the two Armies had discussed, on paper and verbally, the measures to be adopted in every emergency; and in the particular one that had now arisen, Blücher was to fall back on Wartenburg, whilst Bernadotte attacked the advancing French in flank. A proceeding which would, in fact, have resulted in the complete destruction of both Generals, for the Emperor in his *battalion carrée* formation was safe from anything which the North Army might attempt against him. But Blücher's obstinacy saved him from this pitfall. He was absolutely determined not to retreat, and his Staff knew it was impossible to move him; so using this knowledge as a fulcrum, they managed to open a door for escape.

In any event, the closest co-operation with Bernadotte was indispensable. Fortunately, it was common knowledge that Bernadotte had been most averse to the movement on Leipzig, and had strongly advocated the occupation of a defensive position behind the Saale.

Accordingly, an officer of the General Staff, Major Rühle von Lilienstein, was sent to Bernadotte by the Silesian Headquarters to give him the latest intelligence, and to suggest a recurrence to his previous plan of a position on the Saale. The Staff officer arrived late at night, and found the Crown Prince of Sweden in bed, but he was nevertheless immediately received, and duly made his report. Bernadotte having heard it, expressed his opinion that under the circumstances all the rules of War indicated an immediate retreat across the Elbe of both Armies, in order to cover Berlin. Von Rühle replied that the Silesian Headquarters attached no particular importance to Berlin. "The Russians had burnt Moscow, and they could sacrifice their capital also," further, that he knew for certain that Blücher would never consent to retreat, but would prefer to withdraw behind the Saale and thence extend a hand to the Bohemian Army. Asked by the Prince what authority he could show in support of his position, he replied that he had none, except his intimate personal knowledge of the character of his Chief.

Bernadotte appeared much struck with this assertion, and he then proposed himself that both Armies should revert to the original plan of the Saale position. It is suggested that in fact he believed Blücher would not dare to accept this responsibility. With this message then von Rühle returned to his Headquarters.

Needless to say Bernadotte, if he really entertained any such idea, was disappointed in the result. Blücher jumped at the offer, and forthwith the orders were drafted which enabled the Silesian Army to escape the blow which Napoleon had intended should fall upon it, by sacrificing all its communications and moving to its right, though not without some fighting and a series of most fortunate accidents.

Had the French Cavalry been at all equal to its duties, the direction of Blücher's march could hardly have escaped detection. But in fact the French Army lost touch of its adversary altogether, and Napoleon therefore had recourse to his favourite principle of marching against the most vital point in the enemy's possession, in order to compel him to turn round and fight in its defence.

In 1806 this had been the roads to Berlin, in 1813 it was again the roads to Berlin, but more particularly the bridges which the Allies had thrown over the Elbe; and throughout the 9th and 10th the French pursued this general direction; the Silesian Army continuing its movement to the Saale, and Bernadotte's marching to join them in a very half-hearted manner.

For October 11, the Emperor ordered Reynier (VII), Macdonald (XI), Bertrand (IV) and Sebastiani's Cavalry Corps to cross the river at Wittenberg, disperse the Prussian Corps of observation before that place, and move down the right bank of the river to capture and destroy all the bridges. This movement was to be supported by Souham's Corps (III) directed towards Dessau, and the Guards at Kemberg; all the Cavalry well to the front, and Marmont to remain behind in support at Düben, scouting towards Halle.

These orders, however, received very partial execution. The weather had again set in very wet, and the exhausted half-starved troops were quite incapable of reaching their assigned destinations, while the information they collected proved insufficient to establish with any certainty the whereabouts of their enemy's main body.

Napoleon therefore directed the movement to be continued on the following day, and for himself remained in Düben, impatiently awaiting further intelligence.

If we revert to the usual standpoint of criticism and imagine the Emperor as endeavouring to find a loophole of escape, his apparent hesitation at this point can easily be construed into anxiety and vacillation. The road for escape to Magdeburg down the right bank of the Elbe was absolutely open, and the enemy's parks, miles of which were seen by the advanced parties moving along the roads, guaranteed his subsistence, whilst Murat was free to retire at any moment either by Torgau or Wittenberg. Why then should he hesitate, or show any anxiety? But if we conceive him as bent on securing a really decisive success, it is quite clear that the strain upon his patience must have been immense, and sufficient to justify a certain shortness of temper. For now the idea was growing within him that a far bigger game than the mere destruction of the Northern and Silesian Armies was opening out for him.

A glance at the map is sufficient to show that these two Armies lay absolutely at his mercy. Tauentzien's force at Dessau had been driven over the Elbe in such disorder, that, in fact, it never rallied until it reached Berlin, ninety miles away, and a concentric advance of all his available forces must have placed Blücher and Bernadotte, wherever they stood, in an impossible position. But meanwhile to the southward, the Bohemian Army had at length left the shelter of the mountains for the plains and with every hour were laying themselves more and more open to his attack.

Instead of following boldly in the footsteps of the Emperor's forces, and taking Torgau and Wurzen as their points of direction—in which case Napoleon might have found himself between two fires—they had moved to their left viâ Chemnitz and Altenberg, in order to avoid any risk of an offensive return on the part of the Emperor, and were nearing Naumburg on the Saale. Their right, on the night of the 12th, actually rested on Chemnitz, so that there was a great gap open to Napoleon's attack between that place and the mountains, and their direct communications with Bohemia were completely uncovered.

Murat had hitherto easily held his opponents in check, and if Napoleon now joined him with his whole Army, he could count upon bringing 200,000 men on to the battlefield, a force which, under the Emperor's command, were more than sufficient to ensure success.

Defeat of the Bohemian Army would almost certainly entail the break-up of the whole Alliance and a peace on terms of his own dictation. Under such conditions, the idea of safety for his own line of retreat must almost have seemed superfluous to Napoleon, yet since he still held Dresden, Meissen, Torgau and Wittenberg, with the resources of the Oder fortresses and Berlin behind him, his situation even in the event of defeat, could hardly have appeared desperate in his eyes, and one can easily understand both his impatience at the delay until all necessary information for the carrying out of his resolution was in his hands. At the same time the vein of optimism that runs through all his correspondence of the day is equally easy to understand.

The one doubt in his mind had been whether the Bohemian Army would give him battle, and when at length at 9.30 a.m. on October 12, a report from Murat arrived, stating that the Austrians were actually advancing towards Leipzig, and not towards Naumburg, as he had feared, his decision was instantly taken, and Berthier was instructed to prepare at once the necessary orders for a general counter-march of the whole French Army.

Napoleon's Concentration on Leipzig

At 3.30 in the afternoon he wrote to Marmont a note which reveals his whole line of thought. "We have captured the enemy's bridges over the Elbe and it appears that Bernadotte's Army has retreated to the right bank. On the other side, the King of Naples is at Crobern in a position which I have ordered him to hold all the 13th. My intention is that whilst the King holds this position, you should march off at 3 a.m. to-morrow and take up a position on the Düben road with your left on Taucha. I am coming from Düben with the Old Guard to join you, and Curial's and Lefèbvre's Divisions are coming from Eilenburg, so that to-morrow about noon, we can unite 70,000 men about Leipzig. My whole Army will be concentrated on the 14th, and I shall give battle to the enemy with 200,000 men."

Later in the day again, a doubt appears to have crossed his mind whether Murat could hold his position throughout the 13th? But the only difference this makes in his disposition is to induce him to select a point of concentration on the Mulde nearer to his hand, at which to halt his troops if the necessity should arise, but a battle at all costs he is determined upon.

The Silesian Army

In the meantime the Silesian Army had taken up its position about Halle on the Saale, and the Northern Army lay some fifteen miles further down the stream between Wettin and Connern. The patrols of the Silesian Army had joined hands with those of the Bohemian Army and communication between the Headquarters was regularly established.

Deserters from the French Army, generally Saxons or Würtembergers, kept Blücher well informed of the French movements between Düben and Leipzig, but Bernadotte appears only to have received alarmist rumours from his bridges on the Elbe.

All through October 12, he had shown signs in his correspondence with Blücher of growing anxiety, and when at length the news of Ney's attack on Dessau reached him, he completely lost his head and ordered his own troops to concentrate forward on Cöthen; that is to say, if the reports on which he acted were well founded, he meant to commit the act of happy despatch, and at the same moment he wrote to Blücher to implore him to accompany him in this voluntary suicide.

Blücher, however, looked at the situation with far greater coolness. If Bernadotte's information was correct, it was clear that it was *too late* to retreat, and the greater the number of troops which Napoleon had massed on the north, the fewer there must necessarily be about Leipzig with Murat. The obvious plan, therefore, was to join the Bohemian Army in crushing the latter's forces. His (Blücher's) communications could look after themselves, for after all he had eaten up everything the country could contribute in the north whilst the south had almost escaped the ravages of recent War; and his guns and muskets took the same ammunition as the Austrians, Bavarians and French. Leipzig must fall into the hands of the Allies and was well known to be well stocked with war material.

He therefore decided to continue his movement on Leipzig, and meanwhile set in motion every conceivable means of diplomatic pressure to induce the Crown Prince to renounce the idea of retreat and join him in his manœuvre towards the Bohemian Army.

Whether the diplomatic pressure succeeded, or whether the greater fear of being left to face Napoleon single-handed prevailed, cannot now be decided, but in the night Bernadotte changed his mind and ordered his Army to follow and support Blücher. But the delay had left them so far behind that his troops arrived far too late to render assistance in the desperate combat of Möckern on the 16th.

The Bohemian Army

As we have seen, on the night of October 12, the Bohemian Army lay with its right in Chemnitz and its left on Altenberg, but its advance, in spite of its extreme slowness (about six miles a day), had been so badly regulated, that portions of the troops were still far to the rear and a couple of days at least were needed to concentrate it for action.

For October 13, Schwarzenberg had instructed the leading units of his right wing to report to Wittgenstein in order to carry out a "forced" reconnaissance towards Leipzig. Owing to the usual delays in the circulation of orders, the troops did not reach their allotted positions of readiness till 4 p.m., when it was too late to carry out the proposed advance—a typical instance of the hopeless want of organization of the Staff service throughout the whole campaign, and the direct cause of the extraordinary slowness of all its operations. What prompted Schwarzenberg to this reconnaissance is not quite clear, for long before it could by any possibility have borne fruit, he issued orders for the whole Army to continue its movement to the left, towards Naumburg.

This order, however, evoked a storm of opposition, especially from the Prussians and Russians, and such pressure was brought to bear upon him that it was cancelled, and in its place fresh instructions were drawn up which pointed to an advance on Leipzig. And these rendered a battle inevitable.

As a preliminary Wittgenstein was directed to execute the postponed reconnaissance on the following morning (14th), and out of this developed the sharp action of Lisbertwolkwitz, notable for Murat's great Cavalry charges in masses; squadrons following one another at six horses' length distance; with which the more mobile Cavalry of the Allies, in spite of want of unity in the command, found no difficulty in dealing.

Though the French Cavalry achieved nothing, their Infantry held their ground without difficulty, and thus Napoleon was led into taking up the position for the battle of the 16th, which, it has always seemed to me, was the primary cause of his failure, as the sequel will show.

Schwarzenberg's Orders for Battle.

The general result of the engagement was so far in favour of the Allies, that it became practically impossible for their Commander-in-Chief to avoid the battle, and the whole of the 15th was spent in reconnoitring the ground and preparing detailed orders for the attack. Relying on Langenau's local knowledge (as a Saxon officer he was reputed to be intimately acquainted with the ground) a first disposition was issued about noon, which had the extraordinary effect of breaking up the whole Allied Army into three commands; separated from one another by the unfordable streams of the Pleisse and Elster, which converge in the suburbs of Leipzig itself.

On the right a body of 72,000 men were to attack the position held by Murat resting its left on the Pleisse; in the centre 52,000 were to operate in the marshy and densely overgrown district between the Pleisse and the Elster, with the intention of turning Murat's left which lay in the village of Connewitz; and 19,000 under Gyulai were to attack the defile of Lindenau through which ran the main road from Leipzig to the west.

The defects of this disposition were so glaringly apparent that nearly the whole Russian Staff, including Barclay de Tolly, Diebitsch, Toll, and Jomini, approached Schwarzenberg to induce him to modify it. All their efforts, however, were in vain, and at length in despair they sought the Emperor Alexander and laid the matter before him; in no measured language it would seem, for Jomini went so far as to say that "one would imagine Napoleon must have dictated it in order to procure for himself the most decisive victory possible" (*Friedrichs*, vol. iii, 11).

The Emperor Alexander, "surprised beyond measure at this unanimity between his Generals" (*ibid*) requested Schwarzenberg's attendance, and endeavoured to induce him to modify his plan. Even this was in vain, until at length the Emperor ended the interview by announcing his determination to dispose of all the Russian troops as he chose, which of course rendered an alteration of the plan inevitable. The Russo-Prussian Guards were withdrawn from the central command to Rotha, nearly ten miles from the probable battlefield, so that the possibility at least existed of bringing up the right wing during the course of the battle to 96,000 men, were ignored. Russian Divisions and Prussian Brigades, even Regiments, were distributed about on no system at all; and though it was impossible for his command to be concentrated within itself before noon, he ordered the leading detachments to commence the attack at 7 a.m., which meant a break up of their bivouacs long before daylight. Yet it seems quite possible that this typical piece of bad Staff management was really the most important factor in the day's success, for it took the French by surprise at a time when the Emperor had not yet completed his arrangements for the battle; and though nowadays it is impossible to trace in full detail the exact sequence of cause and effect, the best relations of the battle seem to reveal from the outset a want of co-ordination in its direction, unusual where Napoleon was present in person.

From the Emperor's instructions to Berthier, given out in the early morning of the 16th, it is clear that he meant to hold the direct attack of the Bohemian Army with Murat's command, viz., the V, II, and VIII Corps, together with the 4th Cavalry Corps, on the line Connewitz-Liebertwolkwitz, whilst the IX and XI Corps with the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Cavalry Corps, pivoting on Liebertwolkwitz, swung in on the right of the Allies; and the Guards, VI and III Corps, and 3rd Cavalry Corps were to give the decision out of the centre, when "the battle was ripe." Altogether he had about 160,000 men, with 600 guns, against the 96,000 troops of the Allies, which as we have seen could only be engaged in succession, and not handled as a united whole.

But at the moment the attack began the XI Corps had not reached its position, and both the III and VI Corps found themselves held by the advance of the Prussians from the direction of Schlandlitz, a possibility for which the Emperor had not made sufficient allowance.

However, the first rush of the Allies was easily repulsed; but, quite at variance with their usual custom, the repulsed troops refused to run away, and holding on to such cover as the ground afforded, they formed rallying points on which their reinforcements actually hastening to the roar of the guns formed in succession as they arrived. The accounts of this read exactly like those of the early battles of 1870; each detachment independently forcing its way to the front, with the superior Commanders in rear exerting no further influence on the troops engaged, except through such fresh troops as they could find to throw into the combat.

At length, about 11 a.m., Macdonald's Corps (XI) reached its preliminary position, initiated its turning movement, and about 2 p.m., its attack having sufficiently developed, the Emperor ordered the whole line of Corps to advance; and Drouot with 84 guns galloped out to clear the way for Mortier and the Guards with case shot. But at this moment the unforeseen arrived. General Bordesoulle, with his Division of about 2,000 Cuirassiers in 18 Squadrons, suddenly decided to launch his whole force against a great Russian battery from whose fire the leading columns of the French Infantry were suffering severely. The attack was most gallantly ridden, and 26 guns had been put out of action, when from all sides the Cavalry of the Allies, by Brigades, Regiments, or even Squadrons, just as they came to hand, bore down upon the blown and disordered Squadrons of Bordesoulle's command. Then in turn, to rescue their comrades, all the remaining available Squadrons on the French side rode down into the *mêlee* which speedily formed. The confusion which ensued has baffled all attempts at analysis; but, briefly, for about an hour and a half wild hordes of horsemen were hurled at one another, rallying and charging again and again and completely masking the fire of the guns on either side, and thus preventing their further advance. But when at last the turmoil ceased, the French opportunity was lost, the Russian and Prussian Guards had arrived on the scene, had occupied villages, woods and coppices, and against these fresh troops under cover, the French case fire could achieve nothing. Step by step the French fell back, and as darkness put an end to the fighting, they had been driven back to the limits of the position they had held in the morning.

The attack of the Austrians on the bridge at Connewitz had effected absolutely nothing, and thus it came to pass that at length Napoleon on a field of his own choice, with odds of nearly two to one in his favour, had been beaten by the sheer obstinate devotion to their cause of his individual enemies, and not at all by the skill of their leaders.

Thus failed one of the greatest, if not the greatest strategical conception in history; for had it succeeded Napoleon's success must have been final and irrevocable. Nothing the Silesian Army could have achieved on the other extremity of the battlefield could have altered the final result, and the Austrian centre columns between the Pleisse and Elster could not conceivably have extricated themselves from their hopeless predicament.

Still, the French Army, though it had failed, was not beaten, as the events of the next forty-eight hours were to prove.

The night which followed the battle of Leipzig was one of terrible suffering for both sides. The opposing forces lay so close to one another that the utmost vigilance was necessary, and the actual fighting lines practically stood watch and watch all through the hours of darkness. There was no shelter for the wounded, who had to be left where they fell, and, though it rained all night, water except from the puddles in which men and horses had bled to death was hardly obtainable. Fire-wood, too, was so scarce that the men had to break up and burn saddle-trees, broken muskets and gun wheels, and the night was most bitterly cold. Exact statistics of the losses on this day are unattainable, but probably about 35,000 killed and wounded cumbered the ground on which the fighting had taken place, i.e., a strip about four miles long by one wide, and arouud the villages (scenes of the fiercest fighting) the dead lay in swathes. Fortunately for those who had been wounded at first, no quarter was either asked or given, thus several thousands escaped the most awful suffering, prolonged, in some cases, for more than a week before they could be moved or help be brought to them.

Napoleon had his tent pitched in the midst of his Guards' bivouac, and here he spent a wakeful night, while messenger after messenger brought him tidings containing nothing but evil.

Battle of Möckern

Worst of all these was the news of Marmont's defeat at Möckern—about four miles north east of Leipzig. Marmont, on the 14th, had been sent from Taucha by Napoleon with a general mission, to keep the Silesian Army at bay, whilst Ney's command filed into the town behind him. Ney to support him, if necessary, as it was of vital importance to ensure the arrival of all the ammunition trains. On the morning of the 16th, the V Corps had safely passed, the III Corps was in the act of passing, and the VII was due during the early hours of the afternoon. Napoleon had summoned both the VI and III Corps to the main battlefield, believing that distance alone would prevent the Silesian Army from reaching the scene of action in time to take effective part in it. Both Corps were actually moving in accordance with this order, when such heavy masses of the enemy appeared in sight that Marmont decided to halt and face them, while Ney promised him the assistance of the III Corps. Marmont deployed his men across a low elevation of the ground, his left resting on Möckern and his right on Klein Widderitzsch. Here he was assailed by Yorck's Corps and part of Sacken's, whilst Langeron's followed in echelon on their left rear.

The combat which ensued was most obstinate and sanguinary. Möckern was taken and retaken over and over again, and time after time the Prussians threw themselves upon the French lines. At length came the psychological moment. Marmont was moving his last reserves into the line, when out of a cloud of powder smoke a great mass of Prussian Cavalry suddenly charged down upon their flank. Panic ensued and spread along the position, which, attacked again by the Prussian Infantry, was carried all along the line.

Marmont left some 6,000 to 7,000 men on the ground, and Yorck's Infantry was reduced from 16,120 according to the morning states of the 16th. to 9,000 at nightfall. Langeron lost 1,500 men; Sacken's troops only reached the field at the last moment, and suffered less than did the others. It was in this combat in particular that the Prussian Landwehr won its enduring fame. Hitherto they had given the old officers, accustomed to the faultless march discipline which the regular troops had inherited from the old Frederickian Army, reason to complain bitterly of their conduct, and this unsteadiness seems to have inspired mistrust of their fighting spirit. Hence they had rarely been given a chance of showing what they could do when occasion demanded a supreme effort. On this day, however, they exceeded all possible expectations; and the example they afforded is at present being freely cited by German Socialists as an argument for still further reduction in the time of service in the existing Army, and is being so bitterly resented by the Regular Army, that even Major Friedrichs is hardly fair to them in consequence.

Marmont's defeat certainly aggravated the dangers of Napoleon's situation, and possibly had he been aware that a fresh Corps of Russians under Benningsen, 30,000 strong, was in full march upon the Dresden-Leipzig road to close the gap between the Parthe and the right wing of the Allies, he might even then have reconsidered his position and determined to break back to the northward on Wittenberg and Dessau, by the same roads by which he and Ney had just arrived.

If Blücher and Bernadotte endeavoured to interpose, his combined force could practically march out over their bodies, for with nearly two to one odds in his favour, victory must still have seemed almost a foregone conclusion. Moreover, there was always the very strong probability that Blücher and Bernadotte would never venture on such a bold stroke, but would manœuvre to their right to join Gyulai in front of Lindenau. Napoleon naturally believed this General to be still in the position he had occupied during the day, he could not know that Gyulai had been ordered to move across to his right to join the Main Army, leaving the great road to the Rhine practically open for the French

retreat. As far as the Emperor's knowledge extended, there was still ample time to crush the Bohemian Army first of all, and his line of retreat could not be seriously compromised for another forty-eight hours at least. It was probably this line of reasoning which led Napoleon to decide to renew the battle on the 18th. Meanwhile, probably to create divided counsel at the Allied Headquarters, he endeavoured to reopen diplomatic relations by a proposal to treat for peace, with the view of putting a stop to further useless effusion of blood, for nobody could be more humane than Napoleon when it suited his purpose.

The Allies, however, were in no humour to treat, and with full knowledge of the near approach of Benningsen, they closed their whole Army in on its right (thereby uncovering the road to the Rhine, as already mentioned), and arranged with the Commanders of the North and Silesian Armies that these two forces should march off by their left, cross the Parthe, some five miles above Leipzig, and join hands with Benningsen, when the semicircle around the French would be completed, its outer flanks resting on the Elster and Parthe respectively, both being susceptible of easy defence.

During the day, Blücher also attacked the north-west suburb of Leipzig (through which run the roads to Halle and Düben) in order to conceal still further his ultimate intentions.

Napoleon, on his part, formed up his Army in a semicircle, his left still on the Pleisse about Connewitz, his centre at Probst Heyda, and his left thrown back towards the Parthe, whose marshy banks appeared impracticable for troops attacking from the north. Very strong outposts still held the ridge on which the fighting of the previous day had taken place, thus the dispositions of the French Army were entirely concealed, and the main position had this further advantage, that the Allies in advancing to the attack had, of necessity, to disclose their masses to sight, and found no sheltering woods or copses to conceal them as on the 16th.

The 18th October

Ney held the command of the whole of the right wing, Murat of the left; Napoleon himself with his Guards and Cavalry covered the junction at the centre, and could move unimpededly to either flank as occasion required. Only Bertrand (IV Corps) and the garrison of Leipzig were absent from the battlefield, the former remaining to cover the exit of the defile of Lindenau.

The exact strength of the French Army cannot now be ascertained. Probably 160,000 men with about 650 guns stood in the ranks on the morning of the 18th, and against this force the Allied Sovereigns disposed of no fewer than 295,000 men with 1,500 guns, of which some 100,000 never came into action at all.

It is impossible nowadays to trace in detail the vicissitudes of the struggle which followed. The French left and centre held their ground until the evening, and the decision was given by the junction of the Silesian and Northern Armies with Benningsen's column, which took place about 2 p.m.

But Napoleon had already realized that further resistance was useless; his first orders initiating a retreat by Lindenau had gone out at 11 a.m., and now fighting was only continued to gain space for withdrawal.

He himself spent the night on the battlefield, snatching a few minutes' sleep sitting upright on a peasant's chair by the bivouac fire, surrounded by his Staff. About 5 a.m. a chance round shot struck the embers of the fire, scattering the crowd. The Emperor woke up, and continued at once dictating the necessary orders.

About 10 a.m. he rode through the town, and took the road to the Rhine, moving through all the turmoil with the same stern set face which his men had learnt to know in the Russian retreat just a year before.

Eventually the Allies carried Leipzig by storm, and owing to the premature destruction of the bridges a large number of French prisoners fell into their hands; but of a pursuit in the real sense of the word there was no indication, and in a few days the Emperor again had in his hands a total force exceeding 80,000 combatants, with which he completely routed the attempt made by a combined force of Austrians and Bavarians (about 50,000 strong, under Wrede) to intercept his retreat at Hanau.

Here we must leave him, whilst we try briefly to formulate the lesson of this most extraordinary, and *strategically most successful* of his campaigns, for strategically his concentration at Leipzig will ever remain his masterpiece. In his early campaigns he was handling little more than an Army Corps; in 1814 again his actual effectives mustered little more, and in both he was leading troops animated almost with fanaticism. But in this great struggle in the heart of an enemy's country, miles away from his ultimate base, he controlled Armies, he imparted to them his own spirit, and managed even to make good the mistakes of his Generals. But the fighting which centred around Dresden marked the limit of his powers, and it is interesting to note the essential reason why it was so. If we compare the conditions with which he had to contend from the Armistice to the end of September, we find the same enemies, the same masses of men, and the same subordinate Commanders, only whereas the enemy had become bolder, Napoleon's men and officers had grown more and more war weary, the latter indeed were often despondent, yet whereas in the earlier part of the campaign his conduct is marked by painful indecision (never due, by the way, to ignorance of his enemies' positions, but to inability to control their intentions) in the latter, once he had definitely decided to hold on to Dresden, we find him acting always with the fixed determination to inflict upon his opponents the maximum amount of punishment possible. As I have pointed out above, critics hitherto, judging him by the final result, have insisted on regarding him as a hunted animal seeking a loophole of escape, whereas in fact his anxiety for the future, in so far as any genuine feeling of the kind can be proved to exist (see Friedrichs' comments on Yorck von Wartenberg's account of events at Düben) *was always as to the magnitude of the result to be achieved, and not its achievement, that, he believed to be beyond question secured to his side.* The only one essential difference between these two phases of the war lies in the fact that about Dresden, force of circumstances compelled him to adopt the defensive, whereas in the end he was free to act as assailant, and the measure of the advantage which the latter form enjoys over the former can be measured by the startling resuscitation of all his powers, once Blücher's march to join Bernadotte enabled him to change his rôle from defender to that of aggressor.

It is clear that throughout the Dresden episode, from the moment indeed that his memory failed him in the middle of his letter to Vandamme on August 23, he was no longer able to control events, and the evidence available for every day shows the gradual breakdown of his powers. The most elastic mind in the world, however, can scarcely throw off the effects of such severe overstrain in forty-eight hours; and his men and officers could hardly thus easily shake off the depressing influences of hunger, useless exertion, and impending retreat. Yet once he was at liberty to act as he chose, and to dictate situations, he mastered the whole situation easily, and if, as alleged, he appeared worried and impatient for news when at Düben, well! any man who has ever been compelled to face great odds and to play for really high stakes can understand his frame of mind.

A further point brought out by this campaign is the purely *relative* value attaching to communications. Theoretically Napoleon's line was severed again and again by organized raids made in considerable force, but he never for one moment allowed these interruptions to hinder his designs. Both Blucher's and Bernadotte's communications lay open for nearly a month, and those of the Bohemian Army for about a fortnight, yet the Emperor simply disdained to strike at either, preferring to direct his blows at the Field Armies themselves. The curious thing to note is, *that no decision became possible until practically all parties had renounced the usual rules of the game*, and then at last it fell to the side which, according to all precedent, had placed itself in the most unfavourable position conceivable.

This appendix is a reprint of the original edition of 1908, published under the title "The Leipzig Campaign," by F.N. Maude (here slightly abridged). Even though the text occasionally departs from history to fuel the war hysteria which ultimately lead to the First World War, it is the most concise treatment of the campaign in English. Any problems with legibility are the result of the state of the badly decomposed seventy-three year-old edition reproduced; which was never re-issued and is nowhere else available.

	Berlin	Breslau	Bunzlau	Chemnitz	Dresden	Dux	Freiburg	Glogau	Goerlitz	Halle	Haynau	Hof	Hoyerswerda	Jauer	Koethen	Landshut	Leipzig	Luckau	Magdeburg	Meissen	Torgau	Weimar	Wittenberg
Altenberg	—	—	30½	12	4½	6½	7½	—	22	30½	—	27	26½	—	—	—	24	25	—	9	20	—	—
Altenburg	—	—	—	9½	19	24½	14	—	—	13	—	16½	31	—	17	—	6½	26	31	27	26	14	19½
Aschersleben	—	—	—	29½	—	—	—	—	—	11	—	—	—	—	11½	—	17½	—	7	32½	25½	27½	22
Berlin	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	28½	—	—	26½	—	27½	—	30½	15	25	—	20½	—	17½
Bitterfeld	23½	—	—	19	26½	—	23½	—	—	5	—	30	32	—	5	—	7	22½	19	22	16½	22	6
Boehmisch Leipa	—	—	22½	28	18	15	23½	—	14½	—	27½	—	23	34½	—	32½	—	—	—	22	—	—	—
Borna	—	—	—	7½	17	20½	12	—	—	11	—	18½	28½	—	15	—	4½	23	29	14½	13	16	17½
Breslau	—	—	20½	—	—	—	—	23½	28½	—	15½	—	—	16	—	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bunzlau	—	20½	—	—	25½	—	33½	16	8	—	5	—	20	13	—	15	—	36½	—	29½	—	—	—
Chemnitz	—	—	—	—	11½	13	4½	—	29	18½	—	15	28½	—	27½	—	12	36½	—	11	26½	28½	25
Dresden	—	—	25½	11½	—	9½	7	—	17½	26	30½	26½	11½	—	30	—	19½	19½	—	4½	15½	—	32
Dux	—	—	—	13	9½	—	8½	—	28	31½	—	30	24	—	—	23½	25	—	—	13½	27½	—	—
Elsterwerda	24	—	28	22	10½	22½	17½	—	20	23½	—	—	8	—	27½	—	17	9	—	11	7½	—	24
Freiburg	—	—	33½	4½	7	8½	—	—	24½	23	—	19½	18½	—	32	—	16½	26½	—	6½	22½	33	29½
Freihrit	—	21	19	—	—	—	—	29½	22	—	21½	—	—	15½	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Glogau	—	23½	13	—	—	—	—	—	21	—	8	—	28½	15½	—	25½	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Goerlitz	—	28½	8	29	17½	28	24½	21	—	—	13	—	12	18½	—	18	—	23½	—	11	22½	—	—
Goldberg	—	15½	8	—	—	—	—	16½	15½	—	3½	—	28	5	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Halle	28½	—	—	18½	26	31½	23	—	—	—	—	29½	31½	—	7	—	6½	25½	18	21½	16	17	11
Haynau	—	15½	5	—	30½	—	—	8	13	—	—	—	25	8	—	17½	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hellendorf	—	—	29	21½	11½	—	16½	—	21	—	—	—	19	—	—	—	25½	31	—	16	27	—	—
Hof	—	—	—	15	26½	30	19½	—	—	29½	—	—	—	—	33½	—	23	—	—	26	32½	17	36
Hoyerswerda	26½	—	20	28½	11½	24	18½	28½	12	31½	25	—	—	32½	—	30	25	11½	—	16½	15½	—	28
Jauer	—	16	13	—	—	—	—	15½	18½	—	8	—	32½	—	—	11½	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Juterbog	11	—	—	—	25	—	32	—	32½	19	—	—	20	—	20	—	19	8½	29½	29	9½	34	8
Kalau	19	—	27½	31	19½	29	26½	32	19½	29½	32½	—	7½	—	30½	—	23½	4	—	24	14	—	20½
Koethen	27½	—	—	27½	30	—	32	—	—	7	—	33½	—	—	—	—	10½	30	14	25½	20	24	12
Komotau	—	—	—	10½	13½	4½	10	—	—	29	—	25½	25½	—	33	—	23	—	—	15	29	—	—
Landsberg	25½	—	—	18	25½	31	22½	—	—	3	—	29	31	—	4½	—	6	24½	18	21	14½	20	8
Landshut	—	17	15	—	—	23½	—	25½	18	—	17½	—	30	11½	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Leipzig	30½	—	—	12	19½	25	16½	—	—	6½	—	23	25	—	10½	—	—	18½	24½	15	9½	14½	13
Lubben	14	—	33	—	22	—	29	—	25	28	—	—	13	—	32½	—	21	2½	—	23	12½	—	19
Luckau	15	—	31½	36½	19½	—	26½	—	23½	25½	—	—	11½	—	30	—	18½	—	—	20½	10	—	16½
Magdeburg	25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	—	—	—	—	14	—	24½	—	—	—	33	35	21½
Meissen	—	—	30	11	4½	13½	6½	—	11	21½	—	26	16½	—	25½	—	15	20½	—	—	16	30½	31½
Muenchengraetz	—	—	20	—	26½	27	—	—	16	—	25	—	28	28½	—	26½	—	—	—	31	—	—	—
Muskau	31	—	16	31½	21	30½	28	19	8	—	21	—	9½	26½	—	26	—	16	—	25½	25	—	—
Naumburg	—	—	—	20	31½	33	24½	—	—	10	—	23½	—	—	17	—	8½	27	28	24½	18	6½	21
Pirna	—	—	25½	19½	8	11½	15	—	17½	—	30½	—	15½	—	—	—	27½	27	—	12½	23½	—	—
Saalfeld	—	—	—	27½	—	—	32	—	—	25	—	14	—	—	32½	—	22	—	—	34½	31½	8	—
Sagan	—	32½	17½	—	27	—	—	14	14	—	17	—	15½	25	—	32	—	22	—	31½	31	—	—
Schweidnitz	—	11	18½	—	—	—	—	21	17½	—	13½	—	—	5½	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Spremberg	24½	—	22½	31½	14½	27	21½	25½	14½	—	27½	—	3	33	—	32½	28	9½	—	19½	18½	—	26
Thieresienstadt	—	—	29	26	20½	13	21½	—	21	—	—	—	29½	—	—	—	—	—	—	25½	—	—	—
Torgau	20½	—	—	26½	15½	27½	22½	—	22½	16	—	32½	15½	—	20	—	9½	10	33	16	—	24½	15½
Weimar	—	—	—	28½	—	—	33	—	—	17	—	17	—	—	24	—	15	—	35	30½	24½	—	27½
Wittenberg	17½	—	—	25	32½	—	29½	—	—	11	—	36	28	—	12	—	13	16½	21½	31½	15½	27½	—
Zittau	—	—	14½	27	15½	21½	22½	27½	6½	—	19½	—	15	25	—	24½	35	26½	—	20	30	—	—

Berlin Breslau Bunzlau Chemnitz Dresden Dux Freiburg Glogau Goerlitz Halle Haynau Hof Hoyerswerda Jauer Koethen Landshut Leipzig Luckau Magdeburg Meissen Torgau Weimar Wittenberg

Notes: Distances are shown in Movement Points, almost always via 1° road (if not, via 2°).
Distances above 30-or-so MPs are not shown. Accuracy is ±5%. When two routes are possible, the shortest in MPs is listed.